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ABSTRACT 
The provision of public services and infrastructure has evolved over the years and currently, the 
ever-increasing demand for public services and the greater levels of required renewal and repair 
of infrastructure have created unsustainable strains on limited public sector resources, leading 
to a resurgence of private sector involvement in such proj ects, to a much larger degree than ever 
before. The key to the success of such privately financed projects is the structure of the 
fmancing package. 
This thesis traces the evolution of project fmancing, exploring the fmancial engineering of 
funding packages using debt and equity instruments by way of fmancial modelling. This 
research derives a generic health sector project for which a fmancial model is subsequently 
developed, based on actual project finance modelling practice and incorporating various 
financial instruments for funding and credit enhancement. Using this financial model, different 
permutations of financial structure are simulated and investigated; the use of bank loans versus 
fixed and index-linked bond issues, debt repayment profiles and blended equity structures, are 
some of the areas examined, as are gearing, credit enhancement, and the sensitivity of different 
fmancial structures to inflation. 
This thesis offers insightful knowledge on the process of fmancial engineering for project 
finance, and on the various instruments and mechanisms that can be employed for project 
profitability and fmancial robustness. The development and manipulation of a detailed fmancial 
model highlight the role and importance of optimisation of the financial package during 
modelling and overall, afford the reader a better understanding of the dynamic that exists 
between the components of a project's financial structure. 
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CHAPTER ONE 
INTRODUCTION 
1.0 INTRODUCTION 
This thesis reports on research conducted over a three-year period in financial engineering for 
project finance. Within this account are the detailed results of an extensive literature review an , 
outline of the practical research conducted with details of the results, and subsequent analysis of 
the results of the research. 
The first section of this chapter gives a brief and initial overview of the general subject area for 
the research. This is followed by the author's justification of the purpose of the study and the 
anticipated use that industry might have for the results of the study. Next, the primary aim of 
the research is stated and the objectives that have been set for achieving this aim are 
highlighted, and for balance, an examination of the limitations and scope seen to apply to this 
study, is made. The chapter concludes with a detailed outline of the structure of the report. 
1.1 OVERVIEW 
Project Finance is a term used to refer to the fmancing of projects by the private sector, through 
limited or no recourse financing. In general it is the securing of finance primarily against cash 
flows generated by a single facility or system (the project), with limited or no recourse to the 
other entities involved in its realisation. Several projects round the world have been and 
continue to be realised through project fmancing. Most of these projects have been 
infrastructure projects but more recently there has been a great diversification as the concept of 
project finance is applied to various other sectors. Where the public sector has turned to the 
private 'sector to provide infrastructure normally provided by the state, Concessions contracts 
are normally the means by which the private sector's involvement is implemented. 
The use of private fmance to provide services and facilities or assets has been around for 
hundreds of years. In fact, prior to the recent acceptance that provision of infrastructure was in 
the domain of the public sector, private finance was the only means by which infrastructure 
could be provided to improve transportation and communication links to generally stimulate 
economic growth; an early example would be the early Turnpike roads in England. Currently, 
the strain on the public purse has meant that such provision has in effect gone full circle; with 
governments increasingly looking to the private sector to fmance much needed projects. Such 
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has been the turnaround that in the early part of the last decade all major projects in the UK had 
to be considered for the viability of private fmance. However more recently, with growing 
expertise and understanding of the risks in project finance, there has been the realisation that 
private fmancing is not a panacea. Hence only certain projects are now considered for 
procurement through the private finance market. 
As with most projects, privately fmanced projects are inherently risky. Due to the differing 
nature of the contractual and fmancial arrangements there are risks that are particular to projects 
financed by the private sector. One, if not the most, fundamental aspect of privately financed 
projects is the financial engineering that accompanies the project proposal and it is with this 
aspect of project finance that this study is concerned. Financial engineering in project fmance is 
the structuring of the fmance terms of the projects in the most efficient and profitable way 
whilst maintaining the robustness of the venture. It addresses the source of funds, repayment 
and debt service structures, the payment mechanisms or the revenue stream, and of course the 
profitability of the project. Essentially financial engineering could make or break a project and 
it is on this aspect of project fmance that this study focuses its attention. 
1.2 PURPOSE 
The purpose of this thesis is to aid the formulation of financial packages for privately fmanced 
projects, based on the merits and suitability of the financial instruments available, and 
independent of bias that may arise from familiarity with certain package formats or from lack of 
understanding and experience. 
The. author anticipates that the study will be most beneficial to the project companies in the 
private sector who have limited expertise and knowledge of the instruments involved in 
financial engineering, depending mostly on specialists in the field. With the growing practice 
and increasing complexity of partnership arrangements, the public sector could also benefit 
from this research, as it provides valuable information on options for structuring fmance that 
may be far removed from the sector's usual approaches. It also provides an insight into the field 
of fmancial engineering and should hence prove to be a valuable resource to public sector 
officials involved in the evaluation of project finance tenders. Understanding the processes 
involved in the structuring of the financial packages will be relevant to countries where 
concessions are awarded to government owned companies. The study is also useful to the 
lending sector, which has a need to remain abreast of profitable alternatives in the project 
financing market as it reviews the practices adopted by the private sector during the preparation 
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of bids. Such insight is particularly useful when performing due diligence on the financial 
aspects of the bids. 
1.3 AIM AND OBJECTIVES 
The aim of this research is to improve the understanding of fmancial instrumen~s used in project 
fmancing, and the process of financial engineering, and to provide decision aiding notes and 
observations on the optimal engineering offmancial structures in project fmance. 
This study seeks to achieve this by ultimately simulating some of the decision-making processes 
involved in assembling the fmancial structures for concession type projects. The following 
measurable objectives have been set as a guide to the study. 
1. To review the project fmance market, tracing its ongms and development, and 
determining its current form 
2. To explore the instruments used m financing projects and their development and 
application in today's market 
3. To collect, analyse and interpret data from the project fmance market, and explore 
permutations of fmancial structures, using fmancial tools that may be applied directly to 
this data. 
4. To verify and validate the results and outputs of the thesis. 
5. To provide discernible notes and observations on processes necessary for the 
formulation of an optimal fmancial structure for a privately fmanced project. 
1.4 LIMITATIONS AND SCOPE 
As the project fmance market continues in its development there is constant generation of ever 
more complex and sophisticated mechanisms for mobilising private funds and maximising 
returns on investment. This in tum gives rise to a vast range of variables and possibilities for 
research considerations. As with all studies this investigation will have practica1limitations; 
some of these are highlighted here. 
There exists a great variation in the available mechanisms for the financing of projects ranging 
from traditional contracting where the client pays for the works done, through design and build, 
and on to funding of projects by the private sector. With mechanisms varying further within the 
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private sector, and by industry (energy versus transportation or water for example), this study 
focuses mainly on projects fmanced by the private sector on a concession basis. Whilst other 
sectors are reviewed, simulations and analysis are conducted on a theoretical concession project 
in the health sector, the analysis of which contributes to the conclusions of this study. 
Energy projects have carved themselves a seemingly separate sector within the project finance 
envelope. Due to the nature of energy development and the limited number of sponsors for 
energy projects, an almost natural monopoly may have developed within this area of project 
fmance resulting in different rules being applied and different levels of risks being considered 
in the fmancial engineering of such projects. It is for this reason that the focus of this research 
does not rest on energy projects and where reference is made to these projects it must be borne 
in mind that the existence of certain financial situations may be the exception rather than the 
rule vis-a-vis project fmance as a whole. 
In the past few decades the integration of Europe has been a relentless and inevitable 
phenomenon and for the foreseeable future this growing union is almost inescapable. As a 
result there has been an incredible amount of development both in infrastructure and in other 
sectors. Project finance has featured in a great majority of the developments and will continue 
to do so and for this reason, this study retains events and practice in Europe as a main source of 
its information. There is however, no geographical limitation on the study focus as the 
developments in fmancial issues as addressed here are global in nature and effect, and 
innovations and practices elsewhere will be looked to when drawing comparisons, and when 
investigating recent advances and their applicability. 
During simulations conducted within this study, capital allowances and taxation requirements 
have not been applied rigorously as these are outside the scope of this study. Conclusions drawn 
from the results of analysis regarding repayment of senior debt do not make the distinction 
between senior debt as loans or bond issues. 
Within the analysis of results as performed in Chapter Ten of this thesis, some areas for possible 
further work is identified. These areas are not pursued in this study as they are considered 
outside the direct scope of this research. These areas include determination of the level of 
blended equity gearing at which a change in debt repayment profiles should be considered (see 
section 10.3), and also the impact of the cost of sponsor or third party provided subordinated 
debt, on the determination of optimal gearing (see section 10.4). 
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Due to time limitations, the use of equity bridge loans was not investigated although the 
financial model developed for this study included this capability. 
Finally it must be noted that the pace of evolution of the project ftnance market has been 
somewhat overwhelming. As there may have been some changes between the commencement 
of this study and the conclusion of this thesis, efforts have been made to keep abreast of any 
such developments but for application of the results of this study, the changes between time of 
development and time of implementation must be considered. 
1.5 OUTLINE 
Structurally, this report is in two distinct sections. The first section comprising Chapters One to 
Five, addresses the ftrst two objectives, whilst the second section consisting of Chapters Six to 
Ten detail the practical side of this research which serves to realise the other objectives and 
further develop the first two objectives. Chapter One introduces the study, describing the aims 
and objectives and revealing the structure of the rest of the study whilst Chapter Eleven 
concludes the thesis bringing together the salient points of the review of project ftnance and the 
results of the analysis conducted in the in the latter stages of this research. 
Chapter Two introduces some of the mechanisms and approaches that are available for the 
fmancing of projects. Issues for consideration are highlighted and comparisons are drawn 
between the alternatives with the financial nature of the arrangements as the focus. This chapter 
serves to focus the study on the fmancing of projects in the private sector, deftning and 
developing the concept of concession contracts or concession type projects. The evolution of 
concession projects is traced, and the key parties to the contracts are introduced and their roles 
defmed. The latter sections of Chapter Two highlight the key features of private ftnance and 
outline some of the advantages and disadvantages of project ftnance to the private sector. 
Chapter Three is in itself structured in two parts. The first introduces the organisations that are 
involved in the provision of ftnance for projects. These include the public sector, commercial 
banks, pension funds and development banks. Islamic banks are also discussed and the 
attributes and mechanisms that are particular to each of the introduced organisations are 
highlighted. These organisations form part of the key participants introduced in Chapter Two. 
Some of the operations and mechanisms employed by these parties in providing ftnance are 
discussed highlighting differences in operations, approach and intrinsic worth. The second part 
of Chapter Three focuses on the sources of ftnance that are available to a project promoter and 
examines the primary categories of funds (equity and debt) provided by the organisations 
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previously discussed, and the roles that these categories playas components of a project's 
financial structure. Within this section some of the more innovative and novel sources through 
which funds may be raised for the finance of a project are identified and discussed. 
Chapter Four addresses, in great detail, the issue of structuring available financial options for 
the profitable fmancing of a project in the private sector. The concept of fmancial engineering is 
introduced and defined as involving two processes. These processes, Credit Enhancement and 
the use of Financial Instruments, are fully explored in this chapter and their application 
examined. The various tools and mechanisms that are available and that come into play with 
each of the processes are defmed and discussed. Under the heading of Credit Enhancement, the 
mechanisms of guarantees and wraps are explained and other tools that help to improve the 
credibility of the project identified. The use of financial instruments to engineer an appropriate 
finance package is then explored in depth. 
The chapter is structured to include a logical and sequential examination of engineered equity 
and then debt as previously introduced in Chapter Three, with emphasis on opportunities for 
redesigning their roles and structure within the project. The variation of equity terms is 
discussed and mention is made of the sale and transfer of equity stakes and the difficult issues 
of value capture. Debt fmancing is explored next, examining approaches taken when 
considering straight bank debt, and discussing the dynamics of bonding issue as well as the pros 
and cons of engineering a bond element in the debt package. This section contains illustrations 
given by way of examples of real projects with significant bond issues. A discussion is 
conducted on other fmancial engineering tools and approaches such as the use of mezzanine 
finance, interest rate swaps and project leasing. Their impact on the project structure is 
examined as well. 
Chapter Four also makes extensive use of case studies in revisiting Capital Markets, Financial 
Institutions and Commercial Exploitation, and the integration of these into the engineered 
package of finance for a project. The case studies allow an international perspective on the 
implementation of project finance. Finally in light of the overviews and discussions of earlier 
sections, an excerpt of the details for a real project is given and is critiqued in the context of 
financial engineering. This serves to show some of the ways in which an actual project on the 
ground has engineered its financial elements to improve its creditability and profitability for all 
concerned. 
Chapter Five discusses bid development and issues and considerations of relevance when 
structuring a bid for a privately financed concession contract. The stages of procurement are 
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introduced and the processes that bidders have to go through within each stage are outlined. The 
role and development of the fmancial model is also introduced. The latter sections of the 
chapter explore some of the strategies that may be adopted by bidders in developing their bids 
and outline areas that are significant to the development of the financial model such as the 
constraints in effect and some approaches to dealing with these. 
In Chapter Six the process of data capture as adopted for this research is presented. The types of 
data required are first identified and then classified. The collection of the data is then discussed 
and some of the difficulties encountered are highlighted. The chapter goes on to outline the 
initial manipulation and interpretation of the data, and its use to derive a theoretical generic 
project, which is used for the rest of the study. Chapter Six concludes by outlining the cost and 
fmancial profiling of the generic project, and identifying some of the key perfonnance 
indicators used for assessing the perfonnance of the fmancial structure of the generic project. 
The development of a financial model to represent the fmancial structure of the generic model 
as derived in Chapter Six is outlined in Chapter Seven. This chapter initially presents the logic 
and structure of this generic model and then discusses its individual components and their 
function. The approaches adopted in developing these elements are also outlined. Optimisation 
in the context of fmancial engineering is explored and the different elements that are involved 
are identified and defmed. Chapter Seven concludes by outlining the method of optimising the 
generic model, designed integrally with the model's development. 
Chapter Eight reports on the verification and validation of the financial model to establish 
confidence in the model's outputs. The role of verification and validation in research is initially 
introduced and the approach adopted to verify and validate the generic model is outlined. The 
chapter goes on to discuss the results of the verification and validation techniques as applied to 
the model. This chapter concludes with an outline of the simulations designed to facilitate 
exploration of various pennutations of fmancial structure using the generic model designed in 
Chapter Seven and verified and validated in Chapter Eight. 
The results of the simulations are presented in Chapter Nine and any arising issues during the 
simulation process are highlighted. The chapter is structured to list the simulation results 
sequentially as outlined in Chapter Eight. The results consist primarily of the measurements of 
the performance indicators identified in Chapter Six and other observed trends are presented as 
tables and charts in the chapter, and also within the Appendices of this thesis. 
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Chapter Ten explores the results reported in the previous chapter conducting an in-depth 
analysis of the recorded outcomes of the simulations. As part of the analysis further tests are 
performed using the model, to establish trends and to support inferences made from the initial 
results. The analysis is conducted and reported in the same order as the simulations. Chapter 
Ten concludes with a precis of the salient deductions made from the analyses within the 
Summary section. 
This thesis is concluded in Chapter Eleven. Here the elements of the thesis resulting from 
realisation of the objectives set out earlier in this chapter are highlighted. A summary of the 
outcomes is made for each objective and the implications outlined. The chapter demonstrates 
how by realising the objectives, the aim of this research is achieved. Chapter Eleven concludes 
with details of areas identified during this research that may provide potential avenues for 
further research. 
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CHAPTER TWO 
FINANCING OF PROJECTS 
2.0 INTRODUCTION 
This chapter introduces some of the mechanisms that are available for fmancing projects with an 
initial discussion of some of the approaches that can be adopted when financing a project. Some 
issues that must be considered when choosing an appropriate fmance mechanism are 
highlighted and comparisons are drawn between the mechanisms. The main focus of the 
alternatives is on the financial nature of the arrangements. 
Attention is then turned to the financing of projects by the private sector by way of forming 
Public Private Partnerships (PPP's). Initially a definition for such projects is provided in simple 
terms. This definition is developed and some key aspects are highlighted and discussed for a 
better understanding of PPP type projects. The origins of the concept are mapped on the basis 
of the defmition, tracing its evolution and outlining its development, from very early sourcing 
of finance by private individuals, through to the shift of responsibility for the provision of 
facilities and infrastructure to the public sector, and on to the recent trends in project finance. 
Within this chapter there is also an introduction to the key parties of concession projects and the 
roles they play. The emphasis placed here on the financial aspects of concession projects is 
essential in providing a base for further study in later chapters. Where possible comparisons are 
drawn between the alternatives. Mention is made of issues such as the lifecyde of concession 
projects, associated risks, and the different types of concession projects. 
The latter sections of this chapter are tailored to drawing together the key features of private 
fmance and outlining some of the advantages and disadvantages of project fmance to the private 
sector. 
2.1 ALTERNATIVE FINANCING APPROACHES 
Morris (1994) reports that there has been a change in forms of financing in the last few decades; 
from the adoption of limited-recourse financing in the 1970' s through the early 1980' s where 
there was a shift from public to private sector financing, to the late 80's where innovations in 
limited recourse fmancing, debt, equity, swaps and barter arrangements, as well as some 
sophisticated co-financing arrangements using bilateral and multilateral aid, and/or exports 
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credits caused fmancial engineering to become a necessary ingredient for many, if not most 
major projects. 
Funding a project by either the private or public sector requires a financial evaluation and there 
are various approaches used when engineering the financing of a project, some of these are 
discussed below. Gerardin (1994) identifies the public sector's financial evaluation methods as 
being based on a cost benefit or cost effectiveness philosophy; taking externalities into account 
such as the wider impact of the project on the community and environment. The private sector 
on the other hand evaluates projects on the basis of the ability of the cash flow to cover debt 
service, operating costs and capital repayments, and of course the all important internal rate of 
return (IRR). Although the borrowing costs of government are lower than private borrowing: 
there could be a 20-40% difference (Muranyi 1998: 4-5), follow-up costs must be considered 
when deciding to make the investment. Schmidt (1986) reports that a study conducted in The 
Federal Republic of Germany showed that follow-up costs of public investments, such as 
maintenance costs, could amount to more than 30% of the investment cost every year. These 
are some of the issues that must be considered when the choice of fmance for a project is to be 
made. 
Various studies to date categorise different mechanisms either under public or private sector 
financing or even public private partnerships. The author feels that the increasing complexity of 
financing structures and arrangements now invented for projects causes a blurring of the 
boundaries between these categories. In this section no attempt is made to categorise the 
mechanisms. The reader may wish to refer to Nakagawa and Matsunaka (1997) who dedicate a 
whole Chapter to classifying funding resources. The following sections outline the alternative 
fmancing methods. 
2.1.1 Traditional Financing 
\ 
Although not strictly a definitive term, the term traditional is used here to define financing 
arrangements that involve the client/principal (public sector) paying contractors for works 
carried out under contract. Sinding states, "Traditionally, private sector involvement in road 
networks was limited to implementation tasks (detailed studies, civil engineering, material and 
equipment supply) and went through short term or medium term contracts" (Sinding 1997: 55). 
Road financing was entirely public, and roads were seen and managed as taxpayer supported 
facilities i.e. free. This method of financing projects resulted from shifting responsibility for 
infrastructure provision to the public sector over the years. 
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The funds for these projects come from the tax receipts of the government, which are then 
allocated in the government's budget. The government can also borrow from the private sector 
at rates lower than the market rates to fmance projects. Although these borrowings are from the 
private sector they still appear on the government's balance sheets and are taken into 
consideration by lenders assessing a government's creditworthiness. The public sector provides 
facilities by awarding contracts for the various works that are involved in the- realisation of a 
project. In the case of a project implemented with the objective of performing public services, 
all costs are fully paid from the public budget and raised by the public organisation at better 
than standard money market terms. All risks other than political risks are covered by 
government guarantees with the private sector's liability i.e. warranty and liquidated damages, 
being restricted to construction and/or operation and maintenance activities. Although the 
author does not necessarily agree with Muranyi, who goes as far as stating that there is actually 
no need for the public organisation to identify, assess and estimate the costs of each risk, as it 
accepts all project risks, there is an element of truth in his view that must be acknowledged 
(Muranyi 1998: 3). This reflects the lack of a requirement to ensure a return on all costs 
incurred in realising a project, and the fact that the public sector often considers the revenue 
generating potential of publicly funded projects as a secondary issue. 
Although the share of projects financed from the public budget is decreasing, it is still one of the 
main sources of financing in Europe. Bousquet and Fayard (1995) identify Germany, Finland 
and Denmark as countries that have always financed their roadways from the state budget. 
However these countries have to consider other possibilities for financing due to the increasing 
traffic volumes and escalating construction costs, and reliance on ever decreasing budgets. In 
Denmark where there is no link between public road expenditure and road traffic taxes, the 
budget of Directorate of Roads fell from DKK3.7 billion in 1972 to DKK2.6 billion in 1995 
with a overall traffic increase of75% in the same period. 
The experience of the Highways Agency in the UK with traditional financing for roads may 
reflect the general public sector's views of the application of traditional financing to certain 
projects. The previous method used by the Agency for procuring construction and maintenance 
of a road was to let contracts for separate tasks. For example, there would be a design agent, a 
contractor and a maintenance agent. Although each party may have been performing its 
specified task efficiently, there was insufficient incentive for the parties to collaborate to 
maximise overall value for money for the Agency, especially in terms of whole-life costs and 
quality. 
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The Agency would let a construction contract, which required the contractor to build to the 
Agency's design. (More recently however, the Agency has let Design and Build contracts that 
link these two functions: see section 2.1.3) Payment would be made by the Agency on the basis 
of measured progress in construction. Fixed rates were agreed on the basis of a detailed 
specification. However, the assumptions on which the contractors gave fixed rates often led to 
-
numerous claims. Once a contract was let and the contractor was on site, claims could be made 
against the Agency for additional costs. For example, claims would be made for unforeseen 
ground conditions, necessary variations to the works for carriageway and structures or 
measurement variations. A National Audit Office report stated that there was an average 
increase of 28% between tender and out-tum price, based on a sample of 42 road construction 
contracts each worth over £0.5 million (although a proportion of the cost increase quoted 
resulted from the Agency's required changes). Increase of this magnitude has a significant effect 
on Agency budgeting (Highways Agency 1998). 
2.1.2 Road Funds 
Road funds are a body of funds set aside by the government for the provision of roads and 
highways and may also be set up with different objectives; construction or maintenance for 
example. Road funds are used extensively in Europe but the sources of revenue for these funds 
often differ greatly. For example the Luxembourg road fund looks to the State budget for its 
source and the national road funds in the Netherlands are fed from two road taxes (including 
fuel tax) and from the economic structural fund (Bousquet and Fayard 1995: 122). 
Excerpt l. "No guidelines and accounting instructions were issued to enable effective management 
of the funds raised ... " 
Excerpt 2. "Records of quantities of fuel sold ... suggest that a substantial sum of money was 
collected from road users but was not paid into the road fund." 
Excerpt 3. 
agency." 
Excerpt 4. 
expenses." 
"About $200,000 was used to purchase vehicles which were never delivered to the road 
"Funds were used to pay hotel bills, including substantial amounts billed as extraneous 
Excerpt 5. "Substantial sums were spent on refurbishing offices, purchasing 1,800 yards of carpet, 
carrying out repairs at State House and the Parliament building, etc." 
Excerpt 6. "We were unable to certify the account due to a general lack of financial information 
and lack of specific information on the revenue side." 
Table 2.1: Excerpts from Audit Reports on selected First Generation Road Funds 
13 
Generally the funds have fuel tax receipts allocated to them and also other earmarked public 
revenues. The road funds have evolved over time from those termed as First Generation Road 
Funds to the current Second Generation Road Funds as identified by Heggie and Vickers 
(1998). There have been several problems with road funds and the second generation seeks to 
rectify these. Some of these are described by Heggie (2000a) who illustrates the extent of these 
problems by the excerpts in Table 2.1, which he takes from audit reports carried out on road 
funds set up in various countries. Heggie (2000b) describes the second generation of road funds 
and the requirements for their effective implementation. 
2.1.3 Design and Build 
In the report titled Survey of problems before the construction industries, Sir Harold Emmerson 
stated, "in no other important industry is the responsibility so far removed from the 
responsibility for production" (Emmerson 1962). Very gradually, the building industry has 
evolved and introduced the concept of Design and Build to combat some of the problems that 
are symptomatic of traditional fmancing. Although each party may have been performing its 
specified task efficiently, there was insufficient incentive for the parties to collaborate to 
maximise overall value for money for the client, especially in terms of whole-life costs and 
quality (Highways Agency 1998: 7). 
The Design and Build concept is the procurement position that exists where one organisation is 
responsible to the client for both design and construction. The client requires in-house skills to 
prepare the requirements for the project. Turner (1990) considers the Design and Build concept 
to have been around for quite some time although under different names and variations, some of 
which are Package deals and Turnkey projects. His text may be referred to for details on these 
variations. 
Some of the characteristics of Design and Build projects are that the client is provided with an 
early financial commitment and that the combined responsibility for design and construction 
produces economies for both the contractor and the client. The contractor is also allowed a 
degree of innovation that creates savings for both parties. 
Walker (1989) however highlights some of the concerns of clients that may wish to utilise the 
Design and Build approach. Whilst assenting that the effective integration of the design and 
construction processes is theoretically higher with the Design and Build contract, Walker points 
out that the large majority of firms offering this service originated as building contractors, and 
many also offer competitive contracting as well as a Design and Build service. 
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As a result of these origins, there may be a tendency for these fInns to be orientated towards 
construction activity. This may have detrimental consequences for the integration of the design 
and a subsequent effect on its quality. 
Nevertheless the Design and Build approach has been used for numerous projects; by carefully 
structuring the bidding requirements and including stringent perfonnance criteria some of the 
problems can be overcome. 
2.1.4 Shadow Tolling 
Shadow tolls are payments based on traffIc levels that are made by a government to a contractor 
or operator to fInance the construction, operation, or both, of a highway facility. The payments 
are tenned "shadow" tolls because although they are directly based on traffic levels, they are 
not paid directly by users, and users see no tollbooths or other visible evidence of the payments. 
Shadow tolls are like conventional tolls, because the owner of the road collects revenue based 
on how many vehicles choose to travel the road. Unlike conventional tolls, however the 
motorists do not pay the tolls. Under a shadow toll agreement, a public entity such as a city or 
county fonns a partnership with a construction company or consortium to build a road with 
privately raised capital. In North America for instance, the agreement stipulates that the public 
entity reimburses the private partner based on levels of traffIc on the road, so that if traffIc 
levels are below expected then the public sector would pay less for the road and the private 
partner would pay more. One benefIt of shadow toll agreements, therefore, may be that the 
private partner shares in the risk associated with new road construction, whereas with 
conventional toll roads financed by the public sector, it is typically the public entity (and/or 
bondholders) that bears traffic risk, although these are not widespread in Europe. While actual 
experience with shadow tolls has yet to develop in the US, the report, The Selective Use of 
Shadow Tolls In The United States, explores the concept in greater detail (FeN 1998). 
As mentioned earlier there are differing schools of thought on classifIcation of resources and 
shadow tolls are not excepted. The Design-Build-Finance-Operate (DBFO) method of road 
construction has been used extensively in the UK and it would appear from the Highways 
Agency's approach, that shadow tolls are considered under the umbrella of private finance. 
Also because the payments are termed "tolls," many assume that shadow tolls are an alternative 
revenue source. Other sources consider it more accurate, from the perspective of a public 
sponsor, to consider shadow tolls as a type of payment structure where governments may use 
any kind of tax or fee revenue as revenue sources for the shadow toll payments. 
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As with conventional tolling, shadow tolls can amortize capital costs over the useful life of the 
investment and can create early completion and other incentives by sharing traffic and other 
risks with the private partners. A typical shadow toll agreement would be made between a 
government and a private contractor/operator for a specific construction or reconstruction 
project. Under a Design-Build-Finance-Operate arrangement payments to the contractor are 
based on traffic volume, so the contractor benefits by completing the project -early, avoiding 
construction delays, and ensuring a long-lived road. 
As highlighted by Manoj (2000), for any mechanism applicability needs to be assured before 
implementation. Manoj cites the case where, in its desperation to complete the construction of 
the much-publicised highways along the Golden Quadrilateral (GQ) by December 2003, as 
mandated by the Prime Minister, the National Highways Authority of India (NHAI) is opting 
for an annuity payment method with private sector participation on BOT (build-operate-
transfer) basis. 
Experts advised the NHAI, perhaps rightly, that direct tolling would not be possible on many 
stretches of the National Highways because of lack of viability and effective access control. As 
with direct tolling, the response of the investors to shadow tolling too, it is felt, will be 
lukewarm as the private operators opting for it will be paid a certain amount calculated on the 
basis of the number of vehicles actually using the highway i.e. the investors would remain 
exposed to traffic risk. Though the shadow tolling method removes the additional revenue 
collecting costs and the foreseen problems of the direct tolling method, its implementation may 
be slightly challenging because of the difficulty in ensuring an acceptable level of monitoring of 
traffic flows. The other problem with shadow tolling is that the payouts involve use of traffic 
flow forecasts, which are quite often unreliable, thereby impacting the effectiveness of the 
bidding process. 
For these reasons the annuity method mentioned above was chosen with the payment of a fixed 
semi-annual sum by the NHAI to the project operator during the concession period to 
compensate for the capital cost, and operational and maintenance expenses of the project, plus a 
certain percentage of returns thereon. The private operator will be paid the annuity amount if 
operation and maintenance of the highway are as per standards specified by the NHAI in the 
concession document. This however, would seem slightly removed from the concept of private 
finance, as the risks taken on by the private sector appear limited. Manoj points to the success 
of the annuity approach in the Panagarah-Palsit pilot project on NH-2 in West Bengal, which, 
as he also notes, is in the financial bidding stage. This may be a success in terms of financial 
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closures or attraction of private interest but there is still a long way to go before the Panagarah-
Palsit project can be hailed a success for both the private and public sectors. 
Perhaps the NHAI's apparent rush to sign up private developers for other projects on an annuity 
basis rather than using shadow tolling is understandable as the Tuni-Ankapalli section on NH-5 
in Andhra Pradesh which was supposed to be a pilot for shadow tolling, made little headway. 
This too has been offered to prospective operators on an annuity basis. 
Nevertheless it may be difficult to evaluate the effect of a shadow toll payment structure on net 
public sector financing costs, particularly if tax-exempt debt is available through a government 
agency or non-profit conduit. In general, the security of shadow toll debt is directly related to 
the perceived security of the underlying revenue source that a government pledges for 
repayment. However, contractor incentives and limits on financial risk provided by the shadow 
toll structure may lower the financing costs for shadow toll debt, in comparison to an issue that 
does not involve a shadow toll structure (Roskin et al 1998: 6). Roskin et al identifies project 
access to non-taxable debt and stable and creditworthy underlying repayment sources as 
prerequisites for the best implementation of shadow tolls. 
2.1.5 Public Private Partnerships 
Due to the lack of budgetary sources and substantial public sector indebtedness, governments 
have to decide whether to implement or postpone required public service developments. This 
decision must be taken with the understanding that in case of deferred implementation the 
public and social benefits will be deferred as long as the required project finance is not raised. 
In the case that the development cannot be delayed any longer public resources may have to be 
reallocated, or increased by raising private finance (Muranyi 1998: 1-2). The resource 
reallocation mentioned here includes borrowings that may be made by the public sector, as 
these are included in the governments' balance sheet. 
Due to their inability to match the demand for public utility spending, governments are 
increasingly looking to the private sector to fmance projects. Such ventures are termed Public 
Private Partnerships (PPP' s). The financing of projects within the private sector is a complex 
task and involves established financial institutions and experts. In the U.K it has resulted in the 
establishment of the Private Finance Initiative (PFD and more recently, Private Enterprise 
Partnerships (PEP) and Partnerships UK (PUK) , all classed as Public Private Partnerships. 
Round the world other mechanisms have been set up to smooth, encourage and regulate private 
financing not just for the construction industry but in all major service and facility providing 
sectors (Carlile (1994: 53). 
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Figure 2.1 illustrates the combination of public and private sector financial involvement that can 
be used to fmance a project. In the true sense of the term, with private fmancing, 100% of the 
funds are from the private sector. These funds are raised through equity paid by shareholders 
and from the loans raised by the project company. The availability of these funds depends 
mostly on the revenue generating potential of the project. However, as a majority of the more 
commercially attractive projects are completed there is now a leaning towar~ greater financial 
partnership between the private and public sector. With the public sector taking more risk than 
previously in concession contracts, projects that may have been deemed too risky by the private 
sector are able to go ahead, providing even more required infrastructure and services 
(Richmond-Coggan 1995: 300-302). 
100% 
Private Sector 
Finance 
0% 
Projects 0% 
Public Sector 
Finance 
100% 
Figure 2.1: Possible percentage contributions by the public and private sectors to the finances of a project 
Projects can be fmanced by the private sector by various methods and examples are out and out 
privati sat ion, and joint ventures between the private and public sector (PPP). One of the PPP 
techniques is the use of concession contracts. This involves the granting of a concession by the 
public sector for a private company to design, construct and operate a facility for a concession 
period of say 30 years. During this period the company 'owns' the revenue stream of the 
facility and from it any debt incurred is serviced and eventually paid off, operating costs are 
paid and returns are made to investors in the project, i.e. shareholders. 
At present there is increasing complexity in the mechanisms that are applied to finance projects 
and some of these, although classed as private fmance, involve the public sector to a degree. In 
PPP's involving concessions the public sector needless to say is at pains to limit its fmancial 
commitment to the project whilst still ensuring that it obtains value for money with regard to 
successful risk transfer. Throughout this study concession contracts and PPP's are considered 
interchangeable and as such the terms are used to that effect (Cornwell 2000). The rest of this 
chapter will focus on PPP's involving concessions. 
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2.2 DEFINITION OF CONCESSION PROJECTS 
A concession contract can be defined as a project based on the granting of a concession by a 
principal, usually a government, to a promoter, sometimes known as the concessionaire, who is 
responsible for the construction, financing, operation and maintenance of a facility over the 
period of the concession before transferring the facility, at no cost, to the p~cipa1 as a fully 
operational facility. During the concession period the promoter owns and operates the facility 
and collects revenues in order to repay the fmancing and investment costs, maintain and operate 
the facility and make a margin of profit (Merna 1994: 1). 
Concession projects are also known as BOOT projects (Build, Own, Operate, Transfer) and 
have several documented defmitions of which the above is one (Carlile 1994; Richmond-
Coggan 1995). Concession or BOOT projects, in effect, allow governments, governmental 
agencies or regulated monopolies to obtain the provision of a service or facility to the public 
sector whilst incurring little or no cost. Contracts are awarded to organisations that commit to 
providing the service or facility in exchange for a concession to run the facility and generate 
revenue. For the promoters to 'own' the revenue stream or 'cash flow line' for the period of 
concession, they must ensure that the facility or service provided meets the required 
specifications and standards required by the principal. 
2.3 THE EVOLUTION OF CONCESSION PROJECTS 
The development of the involvement of private sector fmance in providing infrastructure can be 
traced to Europe, during the second half of the seventeenth century, when suddenly there was a 
demand for mass travel and long distance commerce. The details of these developments have 
been well documented and reference may be made to other texts (Perkin 1971 & Williams 
1883). The modem concept of concession projects is based on the turnkey contracts where the 
promoter is responsible for the project from conception to completion and effectively hands the 
"key" of a facility ready for immediate operation to the client. Usually, after handing over the 
facility, the turnkey contractor is on hand to ensure satisfactory training of operators so that the 
facility meets the required performance standards. Concession contracts are, in effect, an 
extension of this period such that the promoter is in control of the facility for a concession 
period, after which the whole facility returns to the principal. The fundamental difference 
between turnkey projects and concession contracts is in the finance; turnkey contractors bid for 
the project on a unit rate or lump sum basis and are paid accordingly whilst for the concession 
contract, the promoter is responsible for arranging the fmance to fund the project from 
conception through to design, construction and operation. 
19 
Even though the concession type projects are described as an evolution of the turnkey projects, 
private involvement in providing public infrastructure through concession contracts can be 
traced back further still; to the eighteenth century. A notable example was the concession 
obtained by the Perrier Brothers to build an aqua-duct providing water to the city of Paris and to 
realise revenue by charging for the water supplied. Other examples include the Suez Canal and 
the Trans-Siberian Railway; both raised private fmance through bond and sh~e issues and then 
charged users a fee to generate revenue to cover risks, construction and operation as well as 
fmancing costs, and to provide a margin of profit (Pudney 1968). 
In 1982 the volume of major construction work activity declined drastically, with international 
work declining by as much as two-thirds. Contractors retrenched severely letting go of huge 
numbers of staff, as the world economy appeared to offer no prospect of steady construction 
growth. Contractors, now unable to survive merely by responding to Requests For Proposals, 
looked inwards to their development and marketing activities. They realised that to stay 
involved in major projects they would have to put money and effort into initiating them. 
Financial engineering led by contractors hence became established in the initiation of projects 
(Morris 1994: 170-171) 
Effectively, the construction industry had to take on the responsibility of creating a demand for 
it's products and also make the provision of such products possible. Governments' frequent 
decisions not to go ahead with projects, regardless of the demand for them, stemmed more from 
their entwined political and economic positions, with the impact on governments' balance 
sheets and their accountability to the country, crucial factors in deciding whether or not to 
proceed with projects (Rendbaek 1982). 
Concession projects have benefits for both the industry and principals. By fronting the cost of 
carrying out these projects the private sector ensures that there is continued growth in the 
construction industry. Also, if effectively managed, the fmancial gains can be far greater from a 
concession project than from projects procured through the traditional approach. The principals 
are able to place major projects, mostly for infrastructure, in the private sector rather than 
providing these facilities themselves. By granting a concession the principal is assured the 
provision of a facility to meet required performance standards whilst risks associated with the 
project are transferred to the promoter. The tool for this risk transfer is the Concession 
Agreement, i.e. the contract between the principal and promoter (Scriven 1995: 98-101). The 
Concession Agreement is discussed in section 2.6. 
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As with all projects the concession contract has a beginning and an end. There are different 
parties and 'players' involved at different stages of the projects lifecycIe from conception to 
completion. The promoter is able to involve these other entities from different sectors and to 
transfer risk to them by entering into Secondary Contracts. These contracts or agreements are 
tailored to suit the parts played by the parties in line with achieving the project's objectives. 
The roles of these sectors are expanded on later in this chapter. 
The financing of concession contracts is a complex task and involves established fmancial 
institutions and experts. In the U.K it has resulted in the establishment of the Private Finance 
Initiative (PFn and more recently, the Private Public Partnerships (PPP), and round the world 
other mechanisms have been set up to smooth, encourage and regulate private fmancing not just 
for the construction industry but in all major service and facility providing sectors (Carlile 
1994: p53). In the 'true' definition of concession contracts, 100% of the funding is from the 
private sector, however as a majority of the more commercially attractive projects are 
completed there is now a leaning towards a financial partnership between the private and public 
sector. With the public sector taking more risk than normal in concession contracts, projects 
that may have been deemed too risky by the private sector are able to go ahead, providing even 
more required infrastructure and services (Richmond-Coggan 1995: p300). 
Both sectors are aware that raising finance has its associated costs. The government has to bear 
the cost of revenue collection itself and government borrowing also has its charges. However, 
private borrowing incurs much higher costs than government borrowing and the financial plan 
for a project often has a greater impact on its success than the construction or design costs. 
Hence the use of private fmance instead of public fmance has to be justifiable as a more cost-
effective option. The fact remains that government fmanced structures continue to prevail in the 
developed and less developed world, as well as in those markets where the project provides a 
service in a monopolistic environment, which for political reasons it is not felt appropriate to 
leave solely to the private sector (Blaiklock 1992: p212). Indeed in many Central Eastern 
European countries, the governments cannot avoid the commitment of sufficient public funds to 
the development of infrastructure even if there exist inventive combinations of tools for private 
financing. This is primarily due to the low demand volume, poor paying capability, low 
willingness to pay tolls and the resistance to privatisation of traditionally public services 
(Muranyi 1998: p7). 
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2.4 BOOT PROJECTS 
Contractor-led fmancial engineering in the initiation of projects provided the conditions for the 
development of build-own-operate-transfer (BOOT) type of projects. These concepts had 
already been applied in various forms and early examples are given in section 2.3, but the 
emergence of the BOOT concept was at a time that privatisation was beginning to be looked at 
as a crucial policy for the improvement of infrastructure and industrial efficiency. Suddenly 
there was the possibility to allow contractors to build and operate roads, power stations and 
other forms of infrastructure at no cost to the public sector. BOT projects (build-operate-
transfer) are a slight variation of the BOOT concept, the main difference being in the 
ownership, which does not lie with the promoter but is retained by the principal. The initiation 
of a BOT project in a developing nation context was in 1984 by the Turkish Prime Minister, 
Turgut Ozal, for the Akkuyu nuclear power project. He introduced the term BOT; a formula 
often referred to as the Ozal Formula. The Turkish Government published a list of several 
proposed BOT projects but progress was slow and some of the pitfalls of BOT to contractors 
became apparent, as by 1989 even the Akkuyu project had not yet finalised it's financing. 
The engineered fmance for a BOOT project is crucial to the award of a concession and its 
success. This is again illustrated by the Hong Kong Second Harbour Crossing contract, awarded 
in 1986 to a consortium led by a Japanese contractor, Kumagai Gumi, whose tender was not the 
best either from an engineering or cost view but won on its concession terms and financing 
plans (Morris 1994: pI71). 
ill awarding BOOT contracts the use of private finance instead of public finance has to be 
justifiable as a more cost-effective option. Raising finance has its associated costs; the 
government has to bear the cost of revenue collection itself and government borrowing also has 
its charges. However, private borrowing incurs much higher costs than government borrowing 
and the fmancial plan for a project often has a greater impact on its success than the 
construction or design costs. All these factors need to be taken in consideration when deciding 
whether or not to fund projects partially or fully in the private sector (Smith A.J 1999: p65). 
Concession contracts are described by many other acronyms, some of which include: 
FBOOT Finance-Build-Own-Operate-Transfer 
BOO Build-Own-Operate 
BOL Build-Operate-Lease 
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DBOM Design-Build-Operate-Maintain 
DBOT Design-Build-Operate-Transfer 
BOD Build-Operate-Deliver 
BOOST Build-Own-Operate-Subsidise-Transfer 
BRT Build-Rent-Transfer 
BTO Build-Transfer-Operate 
BOT Build-Operate-Transfer 
Many of these are alternative names for BOOT projects and are used to defme projects that 
differ in some aspects to BOOT but have adopted the main function of the BOOT strategy. For 
instance, the transfer term of BOOT projects implies the transfer of the facility to the principal 
after a concession period; this cannot be termed as real privatisation. However in BOO projects 
the promoter owns the facility for as long as desired and this is more in the vein of privati sat ion 
(Smith N.] 1995: p250). 
2.5 THE LIFECYCLE OF CONCESSION PROJECTS 
Like all civil engineering projects, each concession project is unique, has a defmable beginning 
and end and is undertaken to achieve certain objectives. There are different stages all through 
the lifecyc1e involving different organisations. Figure 2.2 is a schematic of the lifecyc1e of a 
typical concession project and shows the different stages of the lifecyc1e. 
The diagram also shows the trend of cash flow as the project progresses; obviously for the 
project to be a fmanciaI success the cash flow line must end on the positive side. The duration 
of concession contracts vary depending on the nature of the project and the predicted revenue 
stream, and can last from 15 to 60 years. A critical factor in the success of the project is the 
early appointment of a project manager who must be involved with and have control of the 
project from conception to completion. 
During the conception stage of concession projects principals determine the need for a facility 
or service and then ask for conceptual designs. Promoters can also come up with a conceptual 
idea and then try and sell it to the principal. Whether or not the acceptance of a conceptual 
design means that the same promoter is awarded the concession depends very much on the 
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tendering practices and legislation of the region. Once the concession is awarded the fmal 
detailed design of the project starts in earnest. Construction can only start after a design is 
sanctioned. The design of different elements may be sanctioned at different times. It is during 
construction that most of the cost is incurred as can be seen from Figure 2.2. Careful planning 
and management by the promoter must permeate all levels of construction, as well as all other 
stages, to ensure that tight control is kept on the progress of the project. Maximinn use must be 
made of the concession period to generate revenue and hence the payback period must be 
protected. 
Conception 
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Cash i 
Flow 
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Figure 2.2: The lifecycle of a typical concession project showing cash flow 
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Smith identifies two phases within the lifecycle where risks associated with fmancing 
concession projects occur (Smith 1999: pI48). These are: 
• The pre-completion phase, i.e. relating to construction risks; 
• The post-completion phase, i.e. relating to operational risks with the first few years of 
operation involving the greatest risk. 
These phases are noted here, as a typical concession would most probably include refinancing 
or restructuring of the borrowing arrangements at the end of construction. This is due to the fact 
that the risks are greatly reduced post construction and the promoter is able to secure better 
financial terms against a tangible facility that is able to generate revenue. The terms may be 
more favourable for the promoter if a satisfactory revenue stream can be demonstrated. 
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2.6 THE CONCESSION AGREEMENT 
The concession agreement (CA) is the contract between the principal and the promoter 
organisation that sets out the tenns and the conditions of the concession, and is also used as the 
tool for transferring risk from the principal to the promoter. It also outlines any guarantees by 
the principal, the risks taken on by the promoter, the revenues packages, the payback 
mechanism, and the tenns of the concession relating to the facility. The submitted bids for the 
project are evaluated based on the tenns and conditions of the Concession Agreement. Figure 
2.3 illustrates the contractual relationship between the principal and promoter. 
Figure 2.3 : The Concession Agreement (CA) 
The structuring of the contract is a key ingredient in attracting private finance; very rigid and 
inflexible contracts are regarded with suspicion by the private sector. For instance, a principal 
that reserves the right to ternlinate the concession at will, may frighten off promoters and may 
find the project impossible to finance. The roles of the principal and promoter are examined 
below. 
2.6.1 The Principal 
Nonnally referred to in traditional contracts as the client, the principal is the body responsible 
for awarding the concession for the provision of the facility and who, on expiry of the 
concession period, takes on full ownership of the facility. Principals are nonnally governments, 
government agencies or regulated monopolies. This is nonnally the extent of the involvement 
of the principal in the provision of the facility but sometimes the principal may offer guarantees 
or provide assistance in a legislative capacity. Guarantees may be in the fonn of guaranteed 
minimum demand or guaranteed supply. Occasionally principals may guarantee a percentage of 
the required loans . 
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Principals are keen to transfer all the manageable risk to the promoter organisation and their 
interests are normally limited to ensuring the continuous provision of a service or facility to the 
public. The terms and flexibility built into the concession agreement enable them to regulate the 
project and take necessary measures to achieve this. 
2.6.2 The Promoter 
In concession contracts the promoter takes on the functions normally attributed to the client in 
traditional contracts. Also referred to as a Single Project Vehicle or Special Purpose Vehicle 
(SPV), the promoter organisation is often a result of several organisations coming together and 
creating a single independent company for the purpose of realising a particular project. An SPV 
often has minimal or no asset value and often consists of construction companies or operators in 
a Joint Venture that incorporates constructors, contractors, operators, suppliers, vendors, 
bankers, business ventures, lenders and shareholders. The promoter, having no capital assets 
and yet bound by contract to the principal under the terms of the concession agreement, will 
therefore use secondary contracts to transfer the risks of the project to other parties. The 
promoter is responsible for attracting fmance for the project and is responsible for ensuring the 
success of the project, and that the following objectives, typical of concession contracts, are 
met: 
a) Minimum capital cost and minimum risk of overrun; 
b) Minimum operating cost; 
c) Maximum revenue stream. 
Some of the main challenges faced by promoters become apparent here - there is often conflict 
in achieving (a) and (b) together as proj ects that generally require minimum initial capital 
expenditure (CAPEX) often need large operating expenditure (OPEX). Conversely, minimum 
OPEX normally implies large CAPEX. Also the user revenue might be subject to fixed caps, 
which dictate the maximum levels of revenue. Another question to consider is: How do you 
attract the vast sums of money necessary to finance a project that is being undertaken by a 
company with no capital assets and hence minimal value upon liquidation? This can be difficult 
and complex due to the risks that are inherent in construction projects. More so for international 
construction projects where some of these inherent risks are not obvious from the start, even to 
experienced contractors. Contracting on the international stage brings with it more risks and 
variables such as politics, different economies, market fluctuations, inflation and devaluation. 
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The continual change that occurs in these areas could have a significant impact on a project's 
outcome where the project operations are balanced between two or more countries. 
2.7 SECONDARY CONTRACTS 
The promoting organisation in accepting the risks transferred to it from the principal by the 
concession agreement is not in a position to retain much risk, as it has very little asset value; 
The promoter for the Dartford Crossing concession for example, had an asset value of around 
£100. These risks need to be transferred or allocated to other parties; parties capable and in a 
position to deal with the risks effectively. This allocation is done by secondary contracts that set 
out the risks accepted by each party and the terms and conditions of their involvement in the 
project. The terms of the secondary agreements must be in line with the concession agreement. 
It is not uncommon for divisions of one or more members of the promoter organisation to be 
contracted on this basis. Although contracted on a separate basis, the presence of part of the 
promoter organisation, particularly in the construction phase, introduces an element of self-
policing; having vested interests in the project as part of the parent promoter, the contractor is 
encouraged to keep costs down and discouraged from making excessive charges that might 
adversely influence the success of the project as a whole. The other members of the promoting 
organisation can always bring pressure to bear on fellow partners whose operations might be 
'rocking the boat' . 
It is essential that accepted and well-understood dispute resolution procedures are in place to 
deal with any grievances. The promoter has to co-ordinate the activities of all these third parties 
at the different stages of the project. The following section highlights the roles played by 
organisations under the various secondary contracts. 
2.8 PARTIES To SECONDARY CONTRACTS 
l 
There are several other sectors that are involved in the realisation of the project as shown in 
Figure 2.4. Organisations in these areas enter into a contractual relationship with the promoter 
and play different roles in delivering the fmal end product of the project. There are six main 
areas in which the promoter is able to transfer risk and these are illustrated in Figure 2.4. Again 
this risk transferral is by form of contract documents i.e. secondary contracts/agreements. 
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Equity: Parties wishing to invest in the project may purchase equity or provide goods in kind. 
Equity finance is usually an injection of risk capital into the venture and such equity/share 
holders may include suppliers, vendors, constructors, major fmancial institutions, operators and 
private individual shareholders. These equity providers are compensated with dividends from 
profits if the venture is successful, but no return should it become loss making. The amount of 
equity raised depends on the terms of the concession agreement or the Loan/Equity ratio 
required by the lender, typically 2 to 20%. The fmance provided by equity is usually an 
indication of the promoter organisation's commitment to the project. It also forms the initial 
cash inflow to the project and is normally recouped last, after all debts have been serviced. 
(Adapted from Merna; 1994, p2) 
CONCESSION 
AGREEMENT 
[ .... '.'~~]. . = Secondary contract/agreement r'ff{ sc }~ 
Figure 2.4: The secondary sectors involved in a concession project 
Debt: Normally, the larger percentage of the finance for the project is obtained in the form of 
loans. The lenders are often a syndicate of commercial banks, niche banks and pension or 
export credit agencies. In most cases one lender takes the lead role for the lending consortia and 
enters into a loan agreement with the promoter. The lenders have no contractual ties with the 
actual construction. Typically the lending is in the form of "limited recourse" financing where 
the recourse of the banks for the repayment of the loans is limited to the project company and 
the assets and contracts of the particular project. 
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Debt and Equity are the primary categories of funds for projects and are examined in greater 
depth in the following chapter. The following areas are mentioned here for completeness and do 
not form part of this study, which takes fmancial arrangements as its main focus. 
Supply: Suppliers are often private companies, state agencies or regulated monopolies who 
enter into a supply contract to supply raw materials for the duration of the operational period. 
This contract transfers the risk of lack of raw materials to the supplier. 
Off take: An off take contract is that entered by the promoter with the users of the facility. 
These contracts are normally present with contract-led projects such as power generation plants 
when the promoter organisation secures guaranteed sales of the output of the facility. A well 
structured off take contract, when complemented by a supply contract, more or less assures the 
financial viability of the project. Contracts are less possible in market-led projects such as toll 
roads and estuary crossings, where the revenue is collected directly from the users. 
Operation and Maintenance: The risks associated with the operation of concession contract 
facilities are transferred by the promoter organisation to a specialist operator company or a 
company drawn up particularly to run the facility. Their activities and efficiency are crucial to 
the success of the project as they are responsible for the payback period of the cash flow curve 
(see Figure 2.2). The methods employed during this period are normally geared towards 
maximising the opportunity for revenue collection in line with the terms and conditions set out 
in the concession contract. For projects where decommissioning of the facility is a requirement 
care must be taken to control the fmal declining gradient of the cash flow line. 
Design and Construction.: The contractors responsible for the design and construction of the 
facility are more often than not, members of the promoting consortia or equity providers. Hence 
they have vested interests in the success of the proj ect outside the design and construction. They 
assume risks associated with designing and putting up the facility by entering into a contract 
with the promoter. Most of the project cash outflow occurs at this stage of the project and strict 
monitoring and management is required to ensure that the depth of the cash flow curve is not in 
excess of the planned expenditure. A self-policing relationship is created when the contractors 
are part of the promoting organisation and any deepening of the cash flow curve by exorbitant 
contractor charges is checked by other members of the consortia. In any case, the extension of 
the payback period would not be in the interests of the contractors' investments into the project. 
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The engineered financial plan and attributes of the project as a whole, depends on all elements 
of the organisational structure in Figure 2.4; each with a different perception of the risks 
involved. 
2.9 FEATURES OF PROJECT FINANCING 
This section summarises the relevant features of project finance as are related to this study and 
is compiled from the topics discussed earlier in this chapter. 
Simply put, project fmancing is the raising of funds based purely on the merits of the relevant 
project (Macquarie 1996). Hoffman elaborates rather lengthily on this definition by stating that 
project fmancing is generally used to refer to a non-recourse or limited recourse fmancing 
structure in which debt, equity, and credit enhancement are combined for the construction and 
operation, or the refmancing, of a particular facility in a capital-intensive industry, in which 
lenders base credit appraisals on the projected revenues from the operation of the facility rather 
than the general assets or the credit of the sponsors of the facility, and rely on the assets of the 
facility, including any revenue-producing contracts and other cash flow generated by the 
facility, as collateral for the debt, Hoffman (1989). 
There are general features that exist in project fmancing although there may be variations from 
project to project, and those highlighted below can be considered typical. 
• A unit is normally set up specifically for the project and normally referred to as a special-
purpose vehicle (SPV) or project company. This unit is of minimal asset value and 
compnses a Joint Venture that incorporates members of construction companies or 
operators, suppliers, vendors, bankers, business ventures, lenders and shareholders 
(normally all are project participants); The SPV is a single independent company for the 
purpose of realising a particular project. 
• Bank debt is usually the primary source of funding and equity from the project company 
or other shareholders is always committed and sometimes subscribed prior to the 
provision of any debt fmance. The debt and equity providers thoroughly assess the 
project's cash flow, projected or otherwise, subsequent to investment. 
• Equity distributions are subordinated to operating costs and debt service obligations and 
once the project is operational, the lenders have no or very limited recourse to the credit of 
the project's sponsors. 
• 
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Due to the nature of project financing there is a heavy dependence on contractual 
commitments between the project participants. As these projects are traditionally capital 
intensive, the project sponsors try as much as possible to ensure that the liabilities of the 
projects are kept off their corporate balance sheet. By implementing non-recourse 
fmancing they are able to utilise higher leverage, minimise the gearing impact on their 
corporate balance sheet and are able to fmance larger proj ects than thek corporate credit 
standing might otherwise permit. 
2.10 Anv ANTAGES OF PROJECT FINANCE TO THE PRIVATE SECTOR 
Project financing is becoming ever more the option for major projects and particularly for 
infrastructure. The choice of project financing arises for many reasons; from corporations 
utilising project fmance to assist in undertaking large debt commitments with minimum risk, to 
entrepreneurial developers wishing to develop several projects in different geographical areas, 
each independent of the fmancial obligations of the other projects, and with minimal equity 
requirements. Some of the observed and documented advantages of project financing with 
respect to financial management include the following: 
• Non-recourse fmancing protects the project sponsor from any obligations in the event of 
failure or default. Unless otherwise agreed, recourse to the project sponsor is only to the 
limited extent of liability for fraudulent representations made in connection with the 
financing, Williston (1970). Note that a project's financing structure may be such there is 
recourse to the project sponsor during a limited period. For example if new technology is 
involved the lender may take the view that there are additional risks for which the sponsor 
must provide full recourse or guarantee. After the successful implementation the lender 
releases the sponsor from recourse liability and shifts the risk to the project assets and 
revenue stream (Hoffman 1998: p408). 
• Off-Sheet Debt fmancing is an attraction of project fmance from the perspective of the 
project sponsor. (In the U.K see Companies Act 1995, ch. 6,258 et seq (ENG.): Standard 
No.5 Reporting the Substance of Transactions, Accounting Standards Board's Financial 
Reporting Standards, April 1994). In the UK however, this advantage is diminishing in 
value although it is still a weighty factor in other countries. In certain countries, non-
recourse financing coupled with an appropriate ownership structure can lead to the project 
debt commitments being kept off the balance sheets. In these cases, the equity method of 
accounting is used where the investment in the sponsors Spy subsidiary is shown as a 
• 
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one-line entry in the balance sheet. This could maintain or even improve the company's 
fmancial ratios. 
Highly leveraged debt is often available to developers to fmance projects although lenders 
may often require a high level of equity investment. This is related primarily to the level 
and nature of the initial risks involved and also to the view that there is a direct 
relationship between the level of equity invested and the project sponsors commitment to 
the project; the higher the equity level, the higher the sponsors commitment (Barret, 
Matthew 1987). 
• In the event of default or project failure lenders are more likely to participate in a work-
out rather than foreclose. This is as a result of the non-recourse nature of project 
fmancing. As the assets of the project have value only together with the project contracts, 
and the project contracts have value only if the facility operates, the lender is probably 
only able to recoup losses or have its debt repaid, by the continued operation of the 
project, i.e. not opting to foreclose and sell the assets. 
2.11 DISADVANTAGES OF PROJECT FINANCE TO THE PRIVATE SECTOR 
As is to be expected there are disadvantages with project fmance and some of these are 
mentioned here. 
• Documentation associated with project finance is almost always lengthy and complex. 
The requirement of a project company to provide information to the lender is also 
significantly increased in project financing. 
• The process of due diligence conducted by the lenders, legal counsel and experts results in 
higher transaction costs than would be from typical asset based lending. As the practical 
remedies that are available to the lenders are limited, there is a high level of due diligence 
coupled with strong, restrictive borrowing covenants. 
• 
• 
Due to lenders' reliance on the revenue stream for debt repayment, their supervision of the 
project is understandably greater than would be required for a corporate loan facility. 
As the financing is non-recourse in nature, insurance plays an important role for lenders 
and equity investors. To the extent that risks can be covered insurance is employed in the 
project finance structure. This may be very expensive in comparison to other fmancing 
structures. 
• 
• 
• 
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Risk allocation is often complex and this affects the speedy fmancial closure of projects, 
particularly in developing countries where credible assets or payment promises cannot 
always cover risks. 
Interest rates higher than would apply to direct loans made to the project sponsor may be 
incurred. 
As the promoter/project company has no recourse liability, it might be argued that the 
SPY may be more likely to aggressively accept risks, which may lead to a deviation from 
optimal risk transfer. 
All in all, project finance provides another means for the realisation of projects; it may be an 
appropriate approach for certain situations and for certain governments who are unable to 
provide urgently required infrastructure, but project fmance is not a panacea. Its implementation 
must be only after consideration of the long-term implications, and extensive costlbenefit 
analysis by both the public and private sectors. These will reflect the differing overall Time, 
Cost and Quality objectives of both sectors. 
2.12 SUMMARY 
This chapter has discussed the different approaches to financing and realising projects that may 
be used for major projects. These all have differing degrees of financial involvement of the 
public and private sectors. There has also been an introduction to approaches such as traditional 
financing, the use of road funds and shadow tolling. 
It has also been highlighted in this chapter that although most projects are traditionally 
procured, the increasing inability of governments to provide sufficient projects to match the 
demand of infrastructure, has resulted in the evolution of mechanisms that allow more projects 
to be realised. The evolution of these mechanisms has also been traced in this chapter outlining 
that private sector finance can be used for realising public projects by the use of concession 
contracts as defmed in this chapter. It has been mentioned though that these may place 
obligation on future principals. The concept of private financing has indeed been termed "the 
government's credit card"; an apt phrase perhaps particularly in concessions whose terms place 
fmancial obligations on future governments and perhaps future generations. 
There are different phases throughout the lifecycle of concession type projects with different 
parties involved at each stage, the key participants being the principal, the promoter and the 
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lenders. The lifecyc1e of these projects and the participants have been introduced and discussed 
here. 
This chapter has also outlined the features that are associated with project financing and 
highlighted some of the advantages and disadvantages in the utilisation of private finance that 
exist. The reader has been exposed to the fmancing approaches and the next -chapter develops 
this further by examining in some detail, the particular financing instruments that are used 
within project fmance. 
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CHAPTER THREE 
FINANCE FOR PROJECTS: THE OPTIONS 
3.0 INTRODUCTION 
Hoffman outlines the three 'macro' varieties that project finance structures are based on as non-
recourse fmancing; limited recourse financing; and project output interest fmancing (Hoffman 
1998: 118-120). The first two look to the cash flows for debt repayment whilst the third is 
centred on the purchase of an interest in the project output. Within this chapter, there is an 
introduction to some of the numerous 'microstructures' or fmancial instruments that exist 
within these three varieties as are implemented in Europe and elsewhere, and also an 
examination of their merits. Where possible, instances of use of these instruments are used as 
illustrations. 
The need to remain competitive often necessitates exploration of various avenues for funds to 
fmance a project and this chapter examines some of the routes available, and the mechanisms 
that can be implemented when fmancing projects. The focus of the chapter is on the fmancial 
options available to a promoter who would typically seek out a fmancial consultant when 
dealing with these matters due to lack of knowledge. This chapter is ordered in such a manner 
as to afford an understanding of the components of fmancial structureS available to a project. 
Structurally, this chapter is in two parts: The first introduces the organisations that are involved 
in the provision of finance for projects. These include the public sector, commercial banks, 
pension funds and development banks. Islamic banks are also discussed and the attributes and 
mechanisms that are particular to each of the introduced organisations are highlighted. The 
second part examines the primary categories of funds, i.e. equity and debt, that these 
organisations provide, and the roles that these categories playas components of a project's 
fmancial structure. Within this latter segment also is an exploration of bonds and a look at the 
exploitation of commercial opportunities as another source of funds that project companies can 
access and build into the fmancial structure of their projects. 
As mentioned earlier, there are several parties that are involved in the provision of finance for 
projects, some of whom have been introduced in the preceding chapter. The initial sections of 
this chapter further introduce these parties and discuss some of the operations and mechanisms 
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that they employ in providing finance, highlighting differences in operations, approach and 
intrinsic worth. 
Succeeding sections present and explore the components of fmancing with an initial 
introduction to the principles behind equity financing and the role of equity in project fmance. 
Parties that provide equity fmance are identified and the markets through which equity 
provision is made for projects are also mentioned with some of the issues that arise in the 
issuing of equity discussed. 
The debt component of fmancing of projects is then examined providing an insight into some of 
the issues and approaches that a promoter must consider in attracting lenders. Some of the 
concerns that exist for those involved in mobilising debt are also highlighted. 
This chapter introduces the concept of bond issue with particular emphasis on project fmance 
and the merits are highlighted. The various types of bonds and their different attributes are also 
explored here. Creditworthiness is a very important issue especially when it comes to raising 
finance and the impact on fmance, of bond rating, which is a measure of the creditworthiness of 
bonds, is examined. 
The discussion in this chapter reflects the fact that traditionally, bank debt has been the most 
favoured and popular option for the finance of projects, and that as a result of these fore 
mentioned concerns, and the increasing number of projects that are being sought, there is a 
greater need to mobilise fmance from various other sources, and to explore novel financing 
instruments that enable the realisation of otherwise unrealisable projects. 
Some of these innovations in fmancing include various combinations of debt with: equity, the 
various types of bonds, and/or structuring financial packages that allow for exploitation of 
commercial opportunities that exist, or that might arise, as a result of the project's subsistence. 
\ 
Some of the above are explored in this chapter 
The structures are influenced by the perceptions, and appetite for risk, of the investors and 
lenders and by the economic condition of the host country. There are situations where one 
source of funding may prove more beneficial than others and the decision is down to the 
promoter/ project company. This chapter however limits its exploration to the fmancial merits 
of the components and not to the externalities and perceptions although these are mentioned for 
clearer understanding. 
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3.1 FINANCE PROVIDERS 
Participants in project financing are expanding their level of expertise and involvement, and 
with new entrants to the field, the mechanisms are getting more complex, yet more efficient. 
With increasing demand for more privately fmanced projects and the application of project 
fmancing across sectors, there is increasing specialising by providers enabling_the development 
of more efficient tools for private fmance. The following sections explore the merits and 
demerits of the existing providers of finance for project financing. 
3.1.1 The Public Sector 
The public sector's financial involvement in privately financed projects may meet with 
scepticism based on the view that this defeats the objective of transferring risk to the private 
sector. Although there may be several schools of thought on the responsibilities and roles of 
government vis-a.-vis privately fmanced projects, project finance is not a static field and the 
public sector must be prepared to meet the challenges that may be presented by projects on a 
case by case basis, but within a framework and in line with long term socio-economic policies. 
There are situations where financial commitments on the part of the public sector may be 
required such as with projects with questionable commercial viability. This may be in the form 
of guaranteed offtake contracts, subordinated loans, equity participation, and as a last resort, 
direct funding. The public sector however, prefers to limit its involvement to provision of 
guarantees and as a regulator: basically as a facilitator. 
For projects such as prisons and shadow-tolled roads the revenue stream is not generated from a 
third party, i.e. end users, but is still effectively paid for by the taxpayer (Heald & Geaughan 
1997). This mortgage arrangement seems to be based on the presumption that it is better for 
governments to pay more over a longer period than less upfront; seemingly justifiable 
depending of course, on exactly how much more is ultimately paid. This also would seem to 
push risks into the distant future; a future not as distant as it may initially appear. In the UK's 
'rush' to sign up private finance deals to provide infrastructure that would otherwise not be 
provided by public procurement, there is now a sudden realisation that the government has 
committed itself to annual payments of over £200 million for twenty five or so years into the 
'distant future' (Mackie 2000). 
With the expansion of the European union and its convergence criteria the ED has become a 
major fund provider for infrastructure projects within the union. The main mechanisms through 
which the funds are channelled into such projects are: the European Commission Budget, 
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Structural Funds, the Cohesion Fund, the European Investment Fund and the European 
Investment Bank. 
The Commission's budget is restricted in amount and in permitted uses; it can only be used for 
feasibility studies, interest rate subsidies (usually for periods of no more than five years), 
contribution to loan guarantee fees, and direct investment grants (which cannot exceed 10% of 
the total cost or the minimum amount required to launch the project). 
Structural Funds have been used by the EU as the main fmancial instrument for reducing 
regional disparities since 1975. The available funds are classed into six categories for 
disbursement, four of which may be used for infrastructure finance: 
Objective 1: for regions whose capita GDP is less than 75% of the EU average 
Objective 2: for regions seriously affected by industrial decline 
Objective 5b: for rural regions requiring support additional to that received through the 
Common Agriculture Policy 
Objective 6: for sparsely populated arctic regions (under 8 persons/km2). 
Structural Funds are slightly biased towards road projects as these are easier to agree and 
implement and partly because the bulk of structural road funds go to countries with a poorly 
developed rail network, Farrell (1999). 
The Cohesion Fund is restricted to transport and environmental projects in the four countries 
whose per capita income is less that 90% of the EU average, i.e. Spain, Portugal, Greece and 
Ireland, and is linked to the Maastricht convergence criteria. Eligible projects receive grants of 
up to 80 - 85% of costs, depending on the project's ability to be self-financing. Projects are 
normally co-financed with national governments but, as in the case of the Tagus Bridge in 
Portugal, funding can be given to private sector partners. 
The European Investment Fund (EIF) was set up in 1992 and provides loan guarantees and 
interest rate subsidies to private investors and public-private partnerships and can take equity 
shares in selected projects. Unlike the Cohesion Funds and the Structural Funds, the European 
Investment Fund is a public private partnership and operates commercially looking to raise 
appropriate return for its shareholders: the European Investment Bank (Eill), the European 
Union represented by the European Commission, and a number of European banks and 
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financial institutions. The ElF is the main guarantor agency for Trans-European Network 
(TEN) proj ects. 
The EIB does not provide concessionary loans and its interest rates are its borrowing costs plus 
0.15% to cover administrative expenses. With regional development as a primary objective, 
two-thirds of EIB lending goes to the less favoured regions. The loans are evenly split between 
public and private sector borrowers with transport, energy and telecommunications accounting 
for more than 30% of all lending (Farrell 1999). 
3.1.2 Commercial Banks 
Commercial banks to date provide the bulk of funds that are used to fmance privately fmanced 
projects. The main feature of banks is that they place themselves between the lender and the 
borrower by obtaining funds from their investors and lending them to the borrower at higher 
rates of interest. This is in contrast to the capital markets (discussed in later sections), where the 
markets enable funds to be moved from regions of surplus, to deficit regions without the 
involvement of banks as intermediaries, Marsh and Wild (1988). 
According to Lewis and Davis (1987) the activity of banks can be categorised into three classes, 
in the relation to the currency used and the location: 
• Domestic Banking. This generally includes the transactions between banks based in the 
same country and in that country's currency. Transactions of non-residents may also be 
classed as domestic when the transactions are in the currency of the country of residence. 
I 
• International Banking refers to the cross currency and cross border activities of banking 
where deposits are taken from non residents (foreigners) or the banks lend to foreigners in 
the banks' domestic currency. Eurocurrency banking falls under international banking and 
is the borrowing or lending in currencies other than the domestic currency of the country 
in which the bank is located. These transactions normally involve large sums of money 
and the main currency involved is the US Dollar, hence the term 'Eurodollar'. 
• 
• 
Multinational banking involves banking transactions across a large number of countries 
and geographic regions (Robinson 1972). 
Commercial banks, whilst prohibited from taking equity positions, act as project fmance 
lenders in order to acquire assets for their own portfolios. Through the use of warrants, or 
conversion features attached to debt, banks can sometimes obtain 'equity-like' positions, 
which yield higher returns than straight debt. Commercial banks may also act as 
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intermediaries in project finance, generating fees by providing financial advisory services 
or underwriting debt issues. 
For developing countries, commercial banks remain the largest source of private fmance for 
infrastructure development. Data from World Bank shows that in 1995, of the $22.3 billion 
raised in developing countries for infrastructure financing, syndicated loans accounted for $13.5 
billion, bonds for $5.3 billion, and equity for $3.5 billion, World Bank (1997). 
There are limitations to project financing through commercial banks such as bank exposure 
limits, and the mismatch between the short-tenn maturities sought by banks and the longer-tenn 
loans required by infrastructure projects. The exposure limits can be overcome by syndication 
(see section 3.3) however this may involve cumbersome procedures. Bank financing may 
therefore have to form part of a mix with other long tenn lending or may have to be 
accompanied by suitable refmancing arrangements (Ahluwalia 1997: p96). Getting the mix of 
lending right is significant as it affects the relationship between the promoter and the creditors. 
This view is supported by Williamson (1984), who states " ... as the exposure to risk 
increases ... debt holders become more concerned with the details of the finns operating 
decisions and strategic plans. With high debt-equity ratios the creditors become more like 
shareholders and greater consultation between the management and its major creditors results". 
It is therefore essential to acknowledge that in tenns of capital at risk, the lender who lends on a 
non-recourse or limited recourse basis is the major stakeholder in the project and may resemble 
controlling shareholders (Hass 1987). There is then an apparent breakdown in distinction 
between debt providers and equity holders. This blurring of the debt and equity is symptomatic 
of current financial developments, and the creation of hybrid fmancial instruments, which 
incorporate elements of both (Allen 1989). 
3.1.3 Development Banks 
In developing countries development needs are often unable to be met by the government 
budget and therefore external sources are looked to for fmance. Development banks or agencies 
are examples of such sources and provide extensive funding for development projects. Baum 
and Tolbert (1985) defme development projects as a discrete package of investments, policies, 
and institutional and other actions, designed to achieve specific objectives (or set of objectives) 
within a designated period. 
The European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD) based in London was 
established in 1991 and has 60 members (58 countries, the European Community and the 
European Investment Bank). The EBRD operates in Central and Eastern Europe and by the end 
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of 1999 had signed 624 projects, with a total net value of €10.8 billion, making the Bank the 
largest single foreign direct investor in the region, EBRD (2000). The Bank was created to 
support the development of market economies in the region following the widespread collapse 
of communist regimes. 
Other examples of international development agencies are listed below in Table 3.1. These are 
taken from A.D.F Price's 'Financing international projects'. (See same text or agencies' 
respective web pages for further information on the agencies operations). 
Global 
International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (mRD), World Bank, Washington, DC 
International Development Association (IDA), World Bank, Washington, DC 
International Finance Corporation (lFC), World Bank, Washington, DC 
Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency (MIGA), World Bank, Washington, DC 
International Fund for Agricultural Development (IFAD), Rome 
Regional 
Abu Dhabi Fund for Arab Economic Development (ADF AED), Abu Dhabi 
African Development Bank (AIDB), Abidjan 
Arab Bank for Economic and Social Development (AFESD), Kuwait 
Asian Development Bank (AsDB), Manila 
Caribbean Development Fund (CDB), Barbados 
European Investment Bank (Em), Luxembourg 
Inter-American Development Bank (lADB), Washington, DC 
Table 3.1: Development Agencies 
3.1.4 Islamic Banks 
Islamic banking is different from commercial banking with the operations and rules of lending 
very much dependent on Islamic principles, i.e. Shariah law, and primarily the prohibition of 
usury or interest (Riba). Islamic banks around the world have devised many creative fmancial 
products based on the risk and profit sharing principles of Islamic banking. For day to day 
banking activities, a number of financial instruments have been developed that satisfy the 
Islamic doctrine and provide acceptable fmancial returns for investors. Almost every Islamic 
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bank has a committee of religious advisers whose opinion is sought on the acceptability of new 
instruments, and who have to provide a religious audit of the bank's end of year accounts. IYM 
(1995) identifies the basic fmancial techniques of Islamic banking and those applicable to the 
area of project financing as the following: 
Musharaka: This is a partnership, nonnally of limited duration, fonned to carry out a specific 
project. It is therefore similar to a western-style joint venture, and is also regarded by some as 
the purest fonn of an Islamic fmancial instrument, since it confonns to the underlying 
partnership principles of sharing in, and benefiting from, risk. Participation in a musharaka can 
either be in a new project, or by providing additional funds for an existing one. Profits are 
divided on a pre-determined basis, and any losses shared in proportion to the capital 
contribution. 
In this case, the bank enters into a partnership with a client where both share the equity capital, 
and perhaps even the management, of a project or deal, and both share in the profits or losses 
according to their equity shareholding, IsDB (2000). 
Murabaha: This is the sale of a commodity at a price that includes a stated profit known to 
both the vendor and the purchaser. This can be called a cost plus profit contract. The price is 
usually paid back by the buyer in deferred payments. Under Murabaha, the Islamic bank 
purchases, in its own name, goods that an importer or a buyer wants, and then sells them to him 
at an agreed mark-up. This technique is usually used for fmancing trade, but because the bank 
takes title to the goods, and is therefore engaged in buying and selling, its profit derives from a 
real service that entails a certain risk, and is thus seen as legitimate. Simply advancing the 
money to the client at a fixed interest rate would not be legitimate. It is important to note that 
only a legitimate profit in addition to the actual price is considered lawful under Islamic law. 
Any excessive addition on account of deferred payments will be disallowed as it would amount 
to a payment based on the value of money over time i.e. interest. 
Mudaraba: This implies a contract between two parties whereby one party, the rabb ai-mal 
(beneficial owner or the sleeping partner), entrusts money to the other party called the mudarib 
(managing trustee or the labour partner). The mudarib is to utilise it in an agreed manner and 
then returns to the rabb aI-mal the principal and the pre-agreed share of the profit. He keeps for 
himself what remains of such profits. The following characteristics of mudaraba are of 
significance: 
• 
• 
• 
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The division of profits between the two parties must be on a proportional basis and cannot 
be a lump sum or guaranteed return. 
The investor is not liable for losses beyond the capital he has contributed. 
The mudarib does not share in the losses except for the loss of his time and efforts. 
Briefly, an Islamic bank lends money to a client - to finance a factory, for example - in return 
for which the bank will get a specified percentage of the factory's net profits every year for a 
designated period. This share of the profits provides for repayment of'the principal and a profit 
for the bank to pass on to its depositors. Should the factory lose money, the bank, its depositors 
and the borrower all jointly absorb the losses, thereby putting into practice the pivotal Islamic 
principle that the providers and users of capital should share risks and rewards. 
Muqarada: This technique allows a bank to float what are effectively Islamic bonds to fmance 
a specific project. Investors who buy muqaradah bonds take a share of the profits of the project 
being fmanced, but also share the risk of unexpectedly low profits, or even losses. They have no 
say in the management of the project, but act as non-voting shareholders. 
Islamic banks worldwide, besides their range of equity, trade fmancing and lending operations, 
also offer a full spectrum of fee-paid retail services that do not involve interest payments. These 
may include consulting and advisory roles on projects as with other non-Islamic financial 
institutions, Monzer and Tariqullah (1989). 
From the techniques described above, it may be said that Islamic financing arrangements are 
seemingly akin to equity (discussed later in this chapter). This comparison is drawn based on 
the emphasis on profit sharing in Islamic banking, which implies that the finance provided for 
projects is indeed risk capital. The Islamic lenders also may wish for a degree of control in the 
project to enable the monitoring of financial situation and to minimise their exposure to 
manifested risks. 
It is worthy of note that there is a great debate as to whether the operations of Islamic bank 
lending are actually in accordance with the principles of Shariah and not just based on several 
contracts that effectively ensure returns on lending whilst still satisfying the requirements of 
Sharia in a roundabout way. The web page http://islamic-finance.net/elief.html hosts several 
reports on Islamic banking and some of interest on this matter are The fallacy of the 'Islamic 
Bank', Vadillo (2000) and Islamic banking isn '{ Islamic, El Diwany (2000). 
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3.1.5 Pension Funds 
One source of funds for privately funded projects that has a constantly growing role is the 
pension fund. The long-term assets of pension funds are seemingly perfectly matched for 
investment in infrastructure projects, which are notably long term in nature. This is largely due 
to the move from a 'pay-as-you-go' system where current pensions are paid from taxes to the 
more widely implemented accumulative system of provision where the contribution over a long 
period are invested and used to pay pensions of individuals. 
With past and more recent reforms in Europe, the supply of capital for pension funds seems in 
no short supply as CEE countries and the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) 
introduce the voluntary or, in some cases, compulsory contribution of 10% of salary to private 
pension funds. These funds invest in government bonds and domestic equities (Clyne and 
Brimblecombe 1998: p54). However with government and corporate bonds having very short 
maturity dates in some of these countries, there is a need for the pension funds to look to 
longer-term investments (such as infrastructure projects) for better-suited returns. Clyne and 
Brimblecombe quite rightly advocate the increased involvement of pension funds in 
infrastructure projects. However, they call for this involvement not to be limited to fund 
provision but as part owners of the project (by forming part of the concession company). The 
author feels that although there will be benefits to be reaped from direct involvement by 
pension funds, externalities such as regulatory constraints on these funds, and their great risk 
aversion of which even the referenced text cannot belie, may call for careful consideration of 
the project's ownership structure and risk allocation, particularly vis-a.-vis the pre-completion 
stage. This view is supported by Scheinkestel who accedes that until recently, capital market 
investors have not accepted construction or completion risk (Scheinkestel 1997: 122-123). The 
M2 project in Sydney for instance, required commercial banks to take on the completion risk 
and provide a letter of credit in favour of institutional debt investors prior to completion 
(Kerslake 1995). 
Pension fund fmancing of infrastructure projects allow for efficient diversification of 
investments and also contribute to the growth of the local market economy especially where 
funds avoid international projects on account of exchange risk. Realisation that the 
characteristics of pension funds make them ideal for infrastructure fmance prompted 
governments to encourage the involvement of pensio~ funds in infrastructure development. In 
1993, the US Secretary of Labour, Robert Reich issued a qualified endorsement of 
infrastructure investing by pension funds; Pension funds could consider such investments as 
long as they did not sacrifice returns or take greater risks than they normally would (Pensions 
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and Investments 1993a). At the time, some analysts called for caution and others said, " ... any 
attempt to mandate pension fund involvement in infrastructure repair or similar ventures, will 
simply mandate that capital is used less efficiently than it might otherwise be" (Pensions and 
Investments 1993b). Schanes reviews the comments submitted by International Foundation of 
Employee Benefit Plans' National Opinion Panel members, on investment in infrastructure 
development by pension funds. In this review it is pointed out that some notably bad results in 
infrastructure investments might explain the reason why pension fund investment in 
infrastructure is relatively recent and why there may still be reluctance on the part of some 
funds to invest in infrastructure projects (Schanes 1993). 
Brazil can be looked to for indication of the successful involvement of pension funds in 
infrastructure development. Since enactment of the Brazil's 1995 Law of Public Service 
Concessions, pensions funds have participated directly as partners in consortia bidding in the 
privati sat ion of railroads and power companies. For instance, in 1995, the electricity 
distribution company of Espirito Santo State, Escelsa, which accounts for 2% of all Brazil's 
electricity consumption, had 50% plus one share of its stock sold for $370 million. Brazilian 
pension funds were key partners in the two holding companies that formed the winning 
consortia. Seventeen pension funds, grouped into the holding company GTD, ended up with 
25% of Escelsa's shares; while the central bank employees' pension fund Centrus joined with 
Citibank, Nacional Energetico, and other investors to form the holding company WEN, which 
now owns a 48% stake in Escelsa. In the case of Light, the electricity distributor for the City 
and State of Rio de Janeiro, Brazilian pension funds chose to take just 1 % of the $2.23 billion 
controlling stake that was sold by the state government in 1996. As Part of a consortium that 
included Electricite de France, Houston Power and AES Corp., the profitability of their 
investment seems a certainty (Infrastructure Finance 1997). 
3.1.6 Project Participants 
Chapter Two outlines the parties that typically participate in a privately fmanced project. The 
parties to the secondary contracts (see Figure 2.4) are able to provide funds to the project by 
way of providing equity. In this way, suppliers, buyers and other participants can invest in the 
project beyond their contractual interests and this also ensures their commitment to the success 
of the project. These parties may subscribe to equity by way of joining the project company or 
as individual or institutional investors. 
The organisations and parties that have been presented in the preceding sections form the source 
of funds that are available to a project. The funds provided could either be by way of loans, 
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equity subscriptions, or a combination of both. These institutions are able to offer financial 
assistance in other ways such as by underwriting debt or providing guarantees and these are 
discussed in depth in later chapters. The following sections examine the nature of the 
investments and loans that are provided to project companies and the principles behind their 
employment. 
3.2 EQUITY 
Equity is effectively risk capital that is provided by investors who in return receive payments 
(dividends) in proportion to the amount of equity provided. The returns to shareholders/equity 
providers are made from the profits of the business venture. Dividends paid to the shareholders 
are subordinate to all debt and fmancial obligations of the project. This means that dividends 
are paid only after debt service and other payments are made, and in the event of loss or 
bankruptcy, equity is the first to be forfeit. 
The providers of equity include the project sponsors, institutional lenders, insurance companies 
and all participants in the project. Often it is a requirement of the lenders and principals that the 
sponsors provide a level of equity as a measure of confidence in the project's success and to 
ensure that initial debt service is assured. Lenders usually require that all equity provided be 
utilised prior to any debt being drawn. Thus the equity holders protect the risk-averse lenders by 
retaining the high risks of the pre-completion stages, i.e. during construction. The project 
sponsors equity contribution covers, in most cases, pre-construction, or developmental cost, and 
is only part of the total equity although it can still run into millions of dollars. Although the 
risks are also higher at the pre-construction stages, the sponsors expect to reap very high returns 
on this portion of the investment and this is realised by the sale of part of the sponsors equity at 
a substantial premium to new investors, and also by charging a premium for fresh equity that is 
brought in by new investors post construction (Ahluwalia 1997: p95). 
Equity is often raised in the stock markets and from specialised funds, and the price associated 
with securing equity reflects, and fluctuates with, the risks that are assumed by the investor. 
Equity is mainly raised through the following sources: 
• Domestic capital markets and equity placements 
• International equity markets 
Domestic capital markets - Domestic capital markets provide access to significant funds for 
infrastructure projects through the issuance and sale of equity interests on the stock market, 
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both to institutional and individual investors. Domestic investors inc1~deJ~~~~i~p: funds and 
other institutional investors. 
According to the International Finance Corporation, about 70% of the financing for its 
Greenfield projects undertaken between 1966 and 1994 was derived from foreign sources. This 
heavy reliance on foreign funding could have drawbacks and strong effects -on infrastructure 
investments; most projects that raise their revenue in local currency but have obligations to 
providers of debt and equity in foreign denominations leave themselves exposed to 
convertibility and exchange rate risks. This, alongside the liquidity problems that could arise 
due to negative exchange rate movements and assumed political incorrectness of a project being 
owned or fmanced by foreigners, call for domestic markets to be developed and utilised as an 
alternative or complement to other sources of fmancing. Indeed, certain countries have taken 
measures that contribute to the development of the local stock markets. In Canada for example, 
pension funds have a restriction on the percentage of their offshore or foreign assets, which 
encourages them to tum to domestic investments (Kumar et al 1997). 
Although the capital markets in developing countries are only beginning to emerge, their noted 
growth and success to date will make them important sources of funds for projects. The 
importance of the domestic market is demonstrated by the situation in East Asia where the bulk 
of [mance for private infrastructure has come from foreign sources. This is despite the fact that 
some of the highest savings rates have been recorded (see figure 3.1) in East Asian economies. 
The low domestic fmancing of projects stems therefore, not from a lack of domestic resources 
but from the relatively immature domestic markets (Kohli et a11997: p99). 
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Indonesia 
Korea, Rep. of 
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average 
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Source: Worid Bank data. 
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Figure 3.1: Gross Domestic savings as a percentage ofGDP. 1993 - 1995 (taken from Kohli et al; 1997, 
p13) 
International Equity Markets - Although international equity markets provide access to 
significant funds for infrastructure, they are mostly limited to large, rimltinational companies. 
[Companies in developing countries are restricted in their access to international equity markets 
as a result of the legal restrictions on investment, lack of financial information and a general 
lack of internationally recognised credit historieg However, Rule 144A in the United States 
(see section 3.5.4) allows qualified institutional investors to purchase American Depository 
Receipts (ADR's) issued by companies in developing countries. This way these issues, although 
not registered with the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), allow equity to be raised in 
the U.S. markets (Ritter and Silber 1986). Through private placements in the U.S. companies in 
developing countries are hence able to access the international equity markets. 
Banks can be equity providers although this raises several legal issues. Bank equity participation 
has resulted in attempts to restructure the nature of banks remuneration better to reflect the risk 
profile being assumed in project financings (Scheinkestel 1997). 'Equity kickers', as these 
equity provisions have come to be known, came into vogue in the 1980's and have taken man) 
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forms - increased margins, royalties, shared options - triggered by either surplus profits over an 
agreed threshold or by a commodity price relevant to the project (Weight 1992: p30). 
However, Vinter (1993) raises the possibility that under English tax laws, the 'equity kicker' 
may not be tax deductible. English legislation (Partnership Act 1890) appears also to have the 
effect of removing all of a lender's priority to claims in liquidation if its returns are found to 
vary with the borrowers profits (Scheinkestel 1997: 118-120). In the context of international 
banking such structures as mentioned here, that facilitate the involvement of banks at equity 
level may pose difficulties under the laws of the banks' home jurisdiction. It is clear then that in 
the event of either party seeking the involvement of the bank at an equity level, the lender and 
the borrower must address legal considerations primarily concerning tax deductibility and 
seniority of advanced capital. 
Access to capital markets greatly widens the range of potential investors that a project can 
attract. However, as with most instruments, there are pitfalls associated with the capital 
markets. This is perhaps best illustrated by the Eurotunnel project where the excessive and wide 
distribution of shares served to diffuse power within the ranks of the equity subscribers leaving 
the project at the mercy of contractors. Ultimately the project overran the cost budget by more 
than 100%. Access to the capital markets should therefore be prudent with optimal debt-equity 
ratio in terms of financing costs, profitability, risk allocation and overall project robustness, as 
the key consideration. 
3.3 DEBT 
By far the most common and major source of funding for project financing is debt. There are 
various forms of debt available to promoters, from senior loans, subordinated loans through to 
bonds and soft loans. The major types of debt are discussed in this section. Traditionally debt 
has been considered a lower risk, lower return form of investment capital. This is because in 
theory, debt financing has a finite term; the principal must be repaid by the final maturity date 
with the providers receiving interest and principal payments prior to equity distributions 
(Scheinkestel 1997). 
There are many debt instruments that can be applied for funding projects. Broadly speaking, 
debt may be divided into senior debt and subordinated debt. Senior debt is ranked first by its 
security over all project assets and agreements. Senior debt can take the form of either secured 
or unsecured loans but most borrowings from commercial lenders for project financing will be 
in the form of senior debt. Occasionally the term Quasi-equity is used to describe loans or 
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advances made to a project, that are senior to equity capital but junior to senior debt and 
secured debt. 
As implied by the term, subordinated debt can also be secured but by a lesser ranking over all 
assets and agreements. Subordinated debt is often more akin to equity than debt as it can rank: 
after unsecured creditors in the event of liquidation. 
Unsecured loans are available when the debt is backed by the general credit of the borrower, 
and is not secured by a security interest in any asset or pool of assets (Price 1995: p46). 
Unsecured loans are generally available to projects whose sponsors and owners have 
established good reputations with the fmancial community, and when sufficient capital or 
subordinated loans have been provided to meet the equity risk capital requirements of the 
project. 
Secured debt is available to most projects where the assets securing the debt have value as 
collateral; such assets must be marketable and easily convertible to cash. In most of the cases of 
privately fmanced projects mentioned in this study the value of the projects' assets are not 
significant relative to amount of debt incurred to realise the projects. 
Syndicated loans enable loans to be made for single projects whose funding requirements make 
them too large for single banks. Several banks pool resources and provide the loan facility with 
one of the banks acting as lead arranger. By spreading the risks associated with large individual 
projects the banks avoid overexposure and this in tum reduces the overall cost of finance. 
However the complexity of the arrangements could be greatly increased when several banks are 
involved. The commitment of syndicated loans are normally limited to six to ten years with 
floating interest rates based on the London Inter Bank Offered Rate (LmOR) or the US Prime 
Rate however longer terms are sometimes available with fixed interest rates. 
Types of syndicated bank loans (Howcroft 1985): 
• Traditional syndicated bank loans (floating rate). These are based on variable rates but 
with a fixed maturity, drawn once and with repayments made to an agreed schedule. A 
period of grace is often included and the loan is normally negotiated and administered by 
a single lead bank, which will form a syndicate with other banks 
• Syndicated bank loan (fIXed rate). These are very similar to the floating rate bank loans 
but the interest rate remains fixed throughout the term of the loan. 
• 
• 
50 
Revolving credit. Similar to the syndicated bank loans, these allow the borrower to draw 
all or part of the loan and make repayments at its discretion or to an agreed schedule 
throughout the term of the loan. 
Multi-Option Facilities (MOFA Facilities can be tailored to suit individual circumstances 
or borrowers' requirements. These may be a combination of the above options and may be 
complex and expensive to implement. 
3.4 COMMERCIAL BANK LOANS 
Over the last few decades, commercial banks have been amassing experience with project 
finance. Traditionally bank debt consists of commercial banks providing a facility to initially 
fund the construction of a project with the banks repaid over the operations phase of the project. 
~ructioI!faci1it~. i~ "lls~<:l to. meet all construction and project deVelopment cos1~ and 
bank fees during the construction period. The construction facility converts into a term facility 
- ---~-----~-----
upon the completion of the construction that amortises over say, the first 15 years of operation 
(Macquarie 1996: p38). Although banks are in the short term, still the most popular funding 
source for infrastructure proj ects in most developed countries, there is ever growing 
competition from other sources. This suggests that banks may have to address their operations 
in the market if they are to keep a competitive edge. These other sources are also discussed in 
this chapter. 
l A commercial loan structure considers two project phases: the construction phase and the 
operation phase. For some projects the loan is separated into two agreements, one for each of 
the phases, with one institution providing the construction facility and another the loan for the 
operational phas~For other projects one agreement is devised but with different terms for the 
construction and operational phases. Occasionally the non-recourse nature of the loan is not 
applied throughout the project. During the construction phase the project (and the lender) is 
subject to greater risks. As a mitigation measure the sponsors may agree to accept all or part of 
the potential risks during this period, with full recourse liability reverting to the cash flows after 
this predetermined period (Hoffman 1998). During the construction phase, the funds for 
-
construction are made available as required under the construction agreement. This is normally 
predicated on the submission of appropriate requests for funds accompanied by supporting 
reports. 
Frequently, the loan structure for a project will include a Standby Facility, which is put in place 
to cover the eventuality that more funds are required as a result of cash flow problems or 
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increased costs',In effect, although the s~aIldby fun4sc:tr~,!l:~ initially ~!~~~~~ to the project, the 
~ders are assuring ~e project_.~.ompany that should the need arise, the projec~-~a~'~~c~~s to-the 
- ---~--.- •• ~,-----~"-~ .--.------.-~_"___ _._., - , ___ ._ •• _ - 0- _ 
?redetermined sum of the standby facili!y; and for this assurance the project company incurs 
----- . -.. -. -----.-.- -_>_~_r~_~ ___ ._~..............,_u._. __ ~ __ ~ __ 
costs. 
With most new projects revenue is not generated during the initial stages and therefore interest 
is rolled up into the balance outstanding; the interest payments are allowed for and included in 
the construction loan proceeds. However occasionally there may be a transfer of existing and 
operational assets to a promoter and these could generate revenue right from the onset. Lenders 
look upon this favourably, as initial debt service is more likely. 
Typically, on the ftrst day of commercial operation, with revenues now imminent, the 
amortisation of the loans can begin, with the timing and amounts dependent on the project's 
cash flows. The lender may also make a line of credit available which would give the project 
working capital during periods of low cash flow. 
Debt financing provides the bulk of funds for most projects to date, and with unsecured, secured 
and syndicated loan facilities, debt financing can be adopted at suitable terms tailored to each 
individual project. The services that are available through debt fmancing are constantly being 
improved due to the growth of the project fmance market, the entry of other fmance providers 
and the development of innovative ftnancing instruments. The fixed return nature of the banks' 
investment understandably makes the lenders averse to risky or novel structures and impose 
stipulations to protect the returns. Indeed the level of involvement of the lenders may be seen to 
support the saying: "Borrow £1,000 and you have a lender. Borrow £10,000,000 and you have a 
partner." 
3.5 DIFFICUL TIES IN MOBILISING COMMERCIAL BANK LOANS 
Although banks are still favoured as the major source of funds their participation in providing 
ftnance for infrastructure is becoming limited. This is compounded in Central and Eastern 
European (eEE) countries and other developing countries as a result of many factors, some of 
which, in line with the fmdings of IFC (1996) and Macquarie (1996), are highlighted here, 
• Generally lenders are cautious, as although they face the same risks as equity providers 
there is no upside potential. Their return is normally fixed to the interest payments on the 
principal. There is a great effort on the part of the lenders to reduce project risks by 
negotiating the conditions under which they will participate. 
• 
• 
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Often commercial banks set limitations on their risk exposure in developing countries and 
are reluctant to provide long-term funds that can match the growing needs of 
infrastructure projects. There may exist also a high level of implementation risks, foreign 
exchange risks and high inflation risks. 
Foreign banks are constrained in their volume of lending by their country exposure limits, 
requirements imposed by their respective Central Banks and the need to adhere to Bank 
for International Settlement standards (BIS). [The BIS is an international organisation 
fostering the cooperation of central banks and international financial institutions and 
serves as a bank for central banks - see http://www.bis.org!aboutlindex.htm]. After the 
debt crisis of the 1980's, most OECD countries (Organisation for Economic Co-operation 
and Development) now require commercial banks to make specific country provisions for 
loans to certain countries (IFC 1996). 
• The existence of a large public sector external debt level compounded by under developed 
domestic bond markets in certain countries could also be a deterrent to lenders to 
participate in projects in such countries. 
• The measure of a country's central bank's ability to make foreign currency available to 
service debt is one of the factors that determine the credit rating given to a country by 
credit rating agencies such as Standard and Poor (S&P) or Moody. These greatly affect the 
debt raising capacity of projects in these countries. Large external debt or political 
instability are factors that could contribute to a low sovereign state credit risk rating which 
makes it difficult for projects to access cross-border capital markets and international 
funds. 
• Normally, as developing domestic markets cannot mobilise the large volumes of long-
term debt required for most projects, funds are sourced from foreign lenders. This 
however requires a consideration of risks that are outside the domain of the private sector 
such as interest rate risk and availability of foreign exchange mentioned previously. 
• 
• 
Although there are more recent entrants to the market, globally there are less than fifty 
banks with a strong tradition of project fmancing in developing countries, and each has its 
exposure limits to clients, sectors, and countries (IFC 1996: p58). 
The time profile of deposits that commercial banks have does not allow them easy lending 
of large volumes of long-term debt. Typically international commercial bank loans are for 
seven to twelve years. Many infrastructure projects however require much longer tenn 
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financing to enable a more robust fmancial project with less prohibitive debt service. 
Other sources of funding such as pension funds and life assurance companies are better 
equipped to provide the required long term fmancing, mostly due to their long-term 
depositors. 
• Although pension funds and insurance companies in countries such as Central and Eastern 
European countries (CEE) and other developing countries are a potential source of 
financing for projects, their poor management and public ownership causes under 
performance when it comes to meeting the potential. Many countries also require these 
institutional sources of fmance to invest mainly in government securities. 
Through bank debt and equity subscriptions the necessary fmancing can be, and has been, raised 
for many projects. There are difficulties and costs associated with raising such finance. These 
and the need to remain competitive, drive participants in the market to seek alternative cost 
effective routes for financing. With the private sector's growing experience and confidence in 
the project financing market project companies may consider tapping into innovative provision 
of fmance in an attempt to reduce financing costs, whilst possibly reaping returns, which may be 
re-injected into the project. One such approach is by the issue of bonds against the project and 
this is covered in depth in the following section. 
3.6 BOND ISSUES 
Bonds are a means of raising fmance. This section initially introduces the concept of bond issue, 
highlighting the merits. The various types of bonds and their different attributes are also 
explored here. Creditworthiness is a very important issue especially when it comes to raising 
finance and the creditworthiness of bonds (bond rating) and the impact on financing IS 
examined. Finally bond issuance in the context of project fmance today is discussed. 
Bonds ~e pieces of paper that state that the issuer/the borrower promises to pay whoever owns 
the bond, i.e. the lenderlbondholder, certain interest payments at specified dates in the future. 
The principal/loan is also paid off at a specified date, i.e. at maturity. Normally bonds are issued 
with coupons attached that bondholders can clip and send in every six months or every year and 
for this reason bonds are often referred to as coupon securities (Ritter and Silber 1986: p55). 
Repayments may also be by way of amortisation of the bond on an agreed instalment basis. 
Price (1995) classifies bonds into Domestic, International and Foreign bonds, and Eurobonds. 
Bonds issued by borrowers in their country of residence are domestic bonds. International 
bonds are issued by borrowers in countries other that of their residence and can take the fonn of 
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foreign bonds or Eurobonds. Foreign Bonds are issued by non-resident borrowers, on the 
market of a single country and in that country's currency; Eurobonds on the other hand are sold 
in several countries simultaneously. 
Bonds issued without coupons are referred to as zero coupon bonds. These are sold at a value 
far less than their stated face value with the difference representing the interest that will be 
earned by the holder over the life of the security. Perpetual bonds are those that are issued 
without a finite maturity date and promise to pay interest indefmitely without any contractual 
obligation to repay the principal (Moyer et al 1984). 
Bonds are typically issued by governments, authorities or companies but can also be issued by 
SPY's. Depending on the issuing government, sovereign bonds are regarded as highly tradable 
and risk free as they are backed by the usually significant resources and taxing ability of the 
relevant government. The yield on sovereign bonds are normally the benchmark from which 
financial institutions determine the interest rates at which to lend funds. 
Bonds differ on grounds of their taxability, call provisions and conversion features. Certain 
bonds issued by state governments have their interest payments exempted from taxation. This is 
obviously important to investors when considering investments. Some bonds are callable after a 
certain specified period. The issuer then has the right to payoff part or the entire principal 
before the maturity date. This right is only exercised when it is in the interest of the issuer as 
there are normally penalties applicable to the calling of bonds. For example if the interest rates 
fall then the issuer may re-borrow more cheaply. In this case the advantages of calling must 
outweigh the penalty. 
Some corporate bonds (issued by companies) allow the holders to convert their bonds into 
company shares at a predetermined price. This convertibility often attracts lenders and allows 
the issuer to sell such bonds at a lower price than it would otherwise have to. 
In many ways bond fmancing is the ideal source of finance for infrastructure. Although the costs 
are higher than with syndicated loans, bonds have much longer maturities (ten to thirty years 
with even longer maturities available to creditworthy issuers). Bond finance is one of the most 
rapidly developing financing instruments for infrastructure fmance and in developing countries 
alone total flows have increased from $2.3 billion in 1993, to $45.8 billion in 1996 (World 
Bank 1997). However, even with Rule 144a in the Unites States (see section 3.3.4) newly 
established infrastructure companies might find it difficult to access the bond markets, as there 
is a perceived limitation to corporate bodies with relatively high credit ratings. 
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Merna and Owen are of the opinion that bonds provide a lower degree of flexibility relating to 
possible cost overruns, cost savings during the construction phase and repayment delays during 
the operations phase (Merna and Owen 1998: p84). Nevertheless with the development of the 
project finance market and growing expertise, promoters are now looking to access the bond 
markets directly as a means of improving project returns and! or reducing the costs of financing. 
Bonds, if issued by promoters, may be best issued post construction, when- risk perceptions 
have diminished and the project has a proven and steady revenue stream. In this way bond 
financing may be used to refmance shorter-term loans taken initially to finance the construction 
stage. 
3.6.1 Municipal Bonds 
Municipal bonds are those issued by public agencies that own infrastructure assets and these are 
commonly used in the United States of America for the finance of infrastructure projects. The 
total U.S. municipal bond market has expanded from $743.0 billion in 1985 to $1055.6 billion 
in 1990, and $1250 billion in 1993 (Eddy 1995: p101). This is representative of the need for, 
and the growth of infrastructure. 
Federal authorities do not issue municipal bonds whilst State and Local authorities issue two 
types of municipal bonds: 
• Revenue bonds which are backed only by the revenue stream generated by the asset 
against which they are issued and as such have no corporate guarantees, and 
• General obligation bonds that are secured by the general tax revenues of a state or 
government. 
Of the two, obligation revenue bonds have historically been more highly rated due to their tax-
backed nature. Generally, revenue bonds are riskier as the particular project that they are tied to 
might falter financially. lliustrating this possibility is the example of the 1983 default of the 
State of Washington on $2.25 billion of Washington Public Power Supply System (WPPSS) 
bonds, one of the largest municipal bonds failures in U.S. history (Ritter and Silber 1986). 
Washington State sold these bonds to fmance several nuclear power plants in the state with the 
payments depending on the success of those specific projects. However two of the projects 
were plagued by troubles for years and their financial difficulties eventually resulted in defaults 
and consequent losses to those who had invested in the bonds. Eddy (1995) fmds that recent 
trends indicate that revenue bonds may be potentially more stable during economic cycles. This 
has been attributed to the nature of the services that these assets provide. For example, the 
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consumption of electricity and water tends to be relatively unaffected by economic downturns 
whereas income and sales taxes could be adversely affected. 
Despite some of the success that Eddy has reported on revenue bonds and although revenue 
bond financing has been utilised in countries like the U.S. and Australia to develop the 
investment market, Garwood (1995) reports that the UK government defines -this approach as 
just another form of government borrowing, and as such, not appropriate to the objectives of the 
UK's Private Finance Initiative (PFI). At the time of writing, the UK's Treasury Taskforce on 
PFI (now succeeded by Partnerships UK- PUK) was unable to confirm that this was still the 
government's view on financing with revenue bonds, Treasury Taskforce (2001). 
It is clear that the use of revenue bonds raises issues with regards to the treatment of bonds as 
government borrowing. The limitations that are imposed on the borrowing of governments or 
agencies have an impact on the success of the use of revenue bonds for project financing. This 
is reflected in Australia's Economic Planning Advisory Commission's (EPAC) report on 
private infrastructure where it is stated that if a government issued revenue bonds, it is likely 
that they would by included in that jurisdiction'S borrowing allocation (EPAC 1995: p64). In 
the same report, New South Wales government in Australia noted that projects financed 
through revenue bonds would fail a 'commerciality' test since it would be difficult to remove 
the presumption that the government is accountable for the project failure even if this wasn't 
contractually so. 
Investors in appraising a bond issue will look to ensure that the revenue ,produced by the asset is 
adequate enough to ensure a satisfactory return. The rating that revenue bonds receive are 
important as revenue bonds that do not receive investment grade rating (BBB and higher) are 
unlikely to be attractive to investors at a reasonable margin (see section 3.6.5). The ratings 
depend on the credit rating agency's assessment of the revenue stream with respect to the 
ability of the operator to change the level of toll or tariff, the security of the revenue, and 
whether insurers are willing to insure the revenue stream wholly or in part. A proven record of 
government commitment and the possibility of securing revenues with low risk, perhaps as a 
result of limited competition or granted exclusivity, will help to attract better credit ratings. 
Bond ratings are discussed in section 3.6.5. 
Some of the benefits of using revenue bonds are outlined below. 
• The state's credit rating is not affected subject to whether or not it affects the states 
borrowing allocation 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
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Ownership of the project remains in the public sector, avoiding philosophical objections 
to private ownership of facilities 
Revenue bonds can be resorted to if the private sector is unwilling to bear all the risks 
unless they are allowed an excessive rate of return 
Capital markets provide the funds rather than banks 
Revenue bonds represent a partnership between the public and private sector with the 
public sector owning the facility while the private bondholders pay for it 
There is high transparency and accountability as each project has separate bonds and the 
accounts are available for public scrutiny 
3.6.2 Zero Coupon Bonds 
These are bonds that are sold or issued at a discount to the face value and the return is reflected 
in this discount. The return to the bondholder is only realised at maturity where the difference 
between the face value of the bond that the holder receives, and the price paid for the bonds, is 
the return on the investment. The bondholder has no coupons to claim interest payments and 
hence these bonds are known as zero coupon bonds. Zero coupon bonds can also be sold in 
secondary markets if they exist (Ritter and Silber 1986: 55, 74-75) 
Zero coupons can be used for project financing as infrastructure projects often have minimal 
revenue at the early years and it is therefore advantageous for such a project to have borrowings 
where payments are not made until later years when healthier cash flows have been generated. 
Zero coupon bonds also reduce the greater risks associated with widely fluctuating interest rates. 
This is because they enable the investor to lock in a specific yield for a stated period of time, 
often as long as twenty or thirty years, regardless of what happens to market interest rates 
during that interval. With ordinary coupon bonds the investor may have to reinvest coupon 
payments in order to achieve a target yield. 
The attractiveness of zero coupon bonds is dependent on whether the income they yield is taxed 
or not. In some countries like Australia and France, the notional interest accrued is taxable as 
the bondholder is deemed to have received these payments throughout the life of the bond even 
though no cash is actually received until maturity (Macquaire 1996: p42). Having to make tax 
payments without the receipt of the tax liable cash can make the use of zero coupon bonds 
relatively costly. 
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3.6.3 Index-Linked Bonds 
The variation of interest rates over time is of major concern to investors and as such, fixed 
interest bonds are not considered an attractive investment in a high inflation environment. 
fudex-linked bonds are structured so that interest rates or inflation risk can be effectively 
managed or hedged so that the investor can be offered a specified real rate of r~turn. This means 
that while a fixed rate bond would have repayments that remain constant until it is paid off, the 
repayments for an inflation-linked bond would vary with the rate of inflation. fuflation indexed 
bonds provide for better cash flows in projects where the revenues are linked to a Consumer 
Price fudex (Cpr). 
fu the past investors invested mostly in bonds of the highest credit rating. However with 
protection against inflation investors are more willing to purchase bonds with maturity dates in 
excess of 20 years. Some of the benefits to the borrower/issuer include: 
• Better margins after meeting fmancial obligations in the early years, which are normally 
difficult. This is because the coupon payments on the bonds are initially low and rise over 
time. Furthermore the escalation of the project revenue over time also means that a 
balance is struck with the cash flows throughout the project's life. 
• Whereas loans have typical terms of 7 to 15 years, index linked infrastructure bonds can 
have tenors of up to 25 to 30 years. 
• Larger sums of debt are available through bond fmancing as the profile for amortisation of 
the borrowings can be extended over much longer periods. 
Category 
Term 
Margin over Commonwealth Rate 
Risk of Revenue mismatch with 
Inflation rate 
Interest Cost 
(Source: Macquarie 1996: p42) 
Bank Debt 
15-20 years 
125-175bp* 
Mismatch 
11% 
Table 3.2: Bank debt versus index-linked bonds 
Index-Linked 
Bonds 
20-35 years 
175-200bp * 
Matched 
Floating, 
indexed to 
CPI rates 
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*A basis point is one-hundredth of a percent. For example, a 150 basis point rise in interest rate is the 
same as a 1.5% rise. A 10 basis point fee is the same as a 0.1 % fee. 
Table 3.1 compares the generally available terms for bank debt to index-linked bonds. It clearly 
shows the difference in tenor and more importantly that there is room for further downward 
adjustment in the pricing of the bonds even after allowing for a lower starting interest rate. 
However the competitive advantage of index-linked bonds may only exist where the concession 
is for 30 years or more. 
3.6.4 144A Bonds 
144A Bonds are particular to the U.S. as a result of the Securities and Exchange Commission 
adopting the 144A Rule in 1990 (Hoffman 1998). The SEC traditional private placement allows 
an issuer to sell its securities to an investment banking firm and the SEC historically restricted 
secondary placement of private placements, such that securities placed privately could not be 
re-offered on the market. 
With the adoption of Rule 144A, the investment banking firms are allowed to resell the 
securities to a Qualified Investment Buyer or QIB's as they are termed. Hoffman defines QIB's 
as entities that own and invest, on a discretionary basis, at least $100million in securities of 
unaffiliated companies, including securities issued or guaranteed by the U.S, examples of which 
are insurance companies and pension funds. The resale must be to QIB's only and the securities 
must not be of the same type as those listed or quoted on a U.S. exchange. 
Pros: Although the Rule 144A market is not as large as the public debt market it is another large 
and liquid alternative source of funding. Debt maturity for 144A debt is longer than for the 
private debt market where commercial banks and some institutional investors have regulatory 
or internal restrictions on term of debt. Unlike most public market deals 144A deals don't 
require lengthy SEC registration processes. 
Cons: Due to the passive nature of the investment, changes to a project are extremely difficult 
to negotiate. Like other bonds, in most circumstances the proceeds of the debt offering must be 
raised at one time. This results in interest charges being incurred as opposed to traditional loans 
where drawdowns are on an as-needed basis even though a commitment fee is sometimes 
required for undrawn funds. 
60 
3.6.5 Bond Rating 
Regardless of which of the above bonds are to be issued for any transaction, the investor or 
buyer will obviously be interested in the creditworthiness of the issue or the project against 
which the issue has been made; The investor will be interested in the rating of the bond. 
Generally speaking, in project finance, bond rating evaluates the creditworthip.ess of a project 
company financially with respect to fmancial certificates issued, and it is based on a forecast of 
the ability of a project company to redeem (from the project cash flows) any bonds issued. 
Bond rating is a method for quantifying solvency risk. As such a borrower/issuer who wishes to 
attract a wide spectrum of investors will seek to obtain ratings for the issue. The different 
ratings are discussed further in the section but as a rule, the betterlhigher the rating, the less 
risky the project is deemed (with respect to rating parameters set out by the rating agencies), 
and hence the lower the investors' return. In other words, the riskier a bond issue is rated, Le. 
the lower the rating, the higher the returns to the investors, as they assume more risk. The use of 
ratings creates a standardised market where investors can compare opportunities and make 
informed decisions depending on the level of risk they are willing to expose their investments 
to. 
Several firms or agencies are in the business of rating bonds with the most prominent being 
Duff and Phelbs Credit Rating Co., Fitch Investors Service inc., Moody's Investor Service Inc., 
and Standard and Poor's Corporation (S&P). These agencies, for a fee, which varies with the 
complexity and size of the rating, evaluate bond issues and classify them into different 
categories of creditworthiness. The client's interests determine whether the ratings are made 
public or not. Table 3.3 shows the ratings used by Moody's and S&P. Issues with ratings from 
Aaa to Baa (Moody's) andAAA to BBB (S&P) are classed as Investment Grade and those from 
Ca to C (Moody's) and BB to C (S&P) are classed as Speculative Grade. S&P also have a 
rating of D for issues already in default. 
Timeliness of debt service is an important aspect considered by the rating agencies, as the 
private investor has neither the willingness nor the ability to intervene in the· management of a 
project that may have encountered difficulties. This is in contrast to lenders who are better 
equipped to actively participate in the management of a facility. In the context of project 
finance ratings, the focus is more on the timeliness of the payment than on ultimate payment 
after and in the event of default although there is a close link with ultimate payment (Connell 
1995: p60). 
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The main risks in bond investments are interest rate changes on the one hand and default risk on 
the part of the issuer on the other. Fluctuating interest rates have different consequences on the 
bonds depending on whether the rates agreed are fixed or variable. Also, the magnitude of 
losses depends on the length of time that the capital is tied up. For instance, the losses due to 
interest rate change on a bond issued on a zero coupon basis will differ greatly from those 
issued with coupons. With coupon bonds the investor is able to reinvest his dividends at higher 
rates of interest whilst the zero coup bonds allow reinvestment only at maturity. 
Moody's S&P 
Investment Grades 
Aaa AAA 
Aa AA 
A A 
Baa BBB 
Speculative Grades 
Ba BB 
B B 
Caa to C CCC to C 
D 
(Source: Ritter and Silber 1986, p57) 
Table 3.3: A Guide to Bond Ratings 
Description 
Highest quality with least risk; strong 
ability to pay principal and interest 
High quality but with slightly less 
financial strength than above 
Strong capacity to pay interest and 
principal but a bit vulnerable to 
changes in economic conditions 
Adequate current financial strength 
but could be threatened by changes in 
the economy 
Currently paying interest but with 
uncertain future 
Little assurance that interest and 
principal will continue to be paid 
Highly speculative bond that may be 
in or near default 
Used only by S&P for bonds in 
default 
Default risk is the likelihood that an issuer cannot repay a bond. In the context of project 
financing, this means that the cash flows generated by the project are insufficient to service the 
debt. This revenue related risk is of course dependent on the other project risks that are inherent 
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in the structuring of the project as a venture. For the investor the levels of these risks are 
reflected in the bond ratings that the investments receive. 
The rating of a host country is of great influence on the overall rating of project bonds. It 
reflects the level of creditworthiness of the host country in respect of political and economic 
stability. At the time of writing, Zimbabwe is currently under international pressure due to its 
controversial land reforms. The reforms essentially involve the reclaim of farms owned by the 
Zimbabwean white population, for redistribution to the poorer black population. This has 
resulted in many deaths, with ensuing internal political turmoil and international condemnation. 
A concern being voiced by the international community and by other countries in the region in 
particular, is the impact on the flow of foreign investment to the country and region. The 
outlook might be negative, as was the case with Turkey in February 2001 when its B+/B long 
and short-term issuer credit ratings were reduced by S&P and placed on CreditWatch with 
negative implications. This followed the instability of the government coalition and the 
heightened risks to the IMF supported economic programme after a public row between the 
Turkish President and the Prime Minister (Al-Yousuf2001). 
Whereas commercial lending involves the banks carrying out comprehensive risk analysis on 
the project details prior to agreeing fmancing, institutional investors with little or no expertise 
in project financing can only rely on bond rating as their 'risk analysis' instrument. Credit 
ratings are credible, independent assessments based on consistent criteria, which provide 
investors with some ability for screening and selecting among project lending opportunities, 
and also facilitate communication between project sponsors and the investors (Connell 1995). 
With the increasing use of bonds in the project finance market, and project companies looking 
to issue bonds themselves, bond rating will continue to be of great importance both to the 
investor as a classification tool, and to the issuer as a means of enhancing access to potential 
investors. However such investors must be aware that the different rating bodies place 
analytical emphasis on different factors, as do banks' credit assessments. 
3.6.6 Bonds and Project Finance 
The bond financing structure is similar to the commercial loan structure except that the lenders 
in this case are investors purchasing the borrowers' bonds in a private placement, or through the 
public debt market, with a trustee acting as the agent and representative of the bondholders. 
The different features of bonds such as convertibility, principal amount, maturity date, yield to 
maturity (rate of return earned on a bond purchased at a given price and held until maturity) and 
face value, can all be varied. This leads to numerous permutations in financial structure that can 
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be achieved with the bonds and makes them ideal for infrastructure projects. Conventional 
bonds have been used to fmance projects but with the constant evolution of project finance 
market, more innovative types of bonds are being developed and used to fmance projects. 
As has been pointed out already, as project fmance instruments develop and participants gain 
experience, promoters may be able to tap into the bond market directly. There may be benefits 
in the project company directly issuing bonds against the project cash flows. By issuing bonds 
at the outset of the construction the promoter is able to raise capital right at the beginning of the 
project. This capital even if simply deposited in an account would raise interest that could form 
part of the returns for the project company. Availability of this initial capital would also reduce 
transaction and fmancing costs, improve returns to the promoter group and enable greater 
control over the financing structure of the project as a whole. 
Infrastructure bonds issued at the outset of the construction period would provide the investors 
with an immediate return. The interest or coupon payments can be funded by additional debt 
raised and earmarked for this purpose. Investors ought to be aware that although the additional 
debt should be adequate to pay a fixed return on the bonds during construction, there is the 
possibility that these funds may be required in the case of project cost overrun. However, as is 
the case with most of these projects, the construction risk is primarily assumed by a reputable 
construction contractor under a fixed-time and fixed-price contract. Therefore investors are 
more comfortable with the security of the return and more inclined to invest in such promoter 
issued bonds at the project outset without a letter of credit backing (Byers 1995). This should 
however be considered against Merna and Owens opinion that bonds are best issued post 
constrUction (Merna and Owen 1998: p84). 
There is still a long way to go in the growth of the market worldwide in terms of access. The 
IFC has underwritten very few bond deals (a US$207 million revenue bond in 1992 for a 
Mexican Toll road that was already in operation for example) but most of the companies that it 
has helped to fmance have tapped international bond markets. Although a few projects in 
developing countries have accessed international bond markets, bond financing has mostly been 
available only for large projects with strong sponsor and government support arrangements 
(often past the construction stage), in countries with an adequate sovereign rating (IFC 1996). 
Recent examples of UK projects that have accessed the bond market include: 
• June 1998 - Morgan Stanley Dean Witter launched a bond to fmance construction of a 
UK hospital under the private finance initiative (PFI). The £136 million, 30-year deal, 
guaranteed by AMBAC Insurance UK, will pay for a new building for Law Hospital in 
• 
• 
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Wishaw near Glasgow. The bond, issued by Spy Summit Finance (Law) pIc, with a 
coupon of 6.484% has scheduled amortisation beginning in September 2001, giving an 
average life of20.l years. Bond proceeds will cover most of the £146m construction cost 
of a new 684-bed hospital. Law Hospital NHS Trust has granted a 30.5year concession to 
Summit Healthcare (Law) Ltd. to design, build, finance and operate the hospital 
(EuroWeek 1998a: pI8). 
August 1999 - £137.4 million bond by Barclays Capital was launched under the UK's 
Private Finance Initiative (PFI). The Spy for the project is Endeavour SCH pic, and the 
bond provided the senior portion of a £165 million package to finance the redevelopment 
of the South Tees Acute Hospital in Middlesborough, UK (Euro Week 1999b: p 17) 
April 1000 - The Highways Agency and Road Management Services Consortium - which 
comprises Amec Investments, Alfred ,McAlpine, Brown & Root and Dragados - raised 
£200 million for the A13 DBFO road through a bond issue in the UK (Watkins 2000: 
p38). 
• May 1000 - Greenwich NatWest launched a £65.95 million index linked securitisation to 
finance the construction of a new hospital in Neatly South Wales. The borrower, Baglan 
Moor Healthcare Ltd, has a contract from Brow Morgannwg NHS Trust to build a new 
270 bed hospital, the Neath / Port Talbot Local General Hospital. Baglan Moor will then 
provide all non-clinical services to the hospital until the expiry of the contract in 2029 
(Euro Week 2000a: p 14). 
3.7 COMMERCIAL OPPORTUNITIES 
In the engineering of the fmancial package for projects there is scope for commercial innovation 
to create an inflow of cash. To fully exploit the commercial opportunities that might exist, a 
project company must shirk from the dogma that project fmancing is just another source of 
funds for realising projects. Instead, the philosophy that project finance is a source of revenue 
must be adopted. A lateral approach to the project may reveal innovations that can be woven 
into the fabric of the concession agreement to provide different sources of revenue. These 
innovations may involve entering into other contracts that are seemingly extraneous to the 
project or concession at the time but if carefully included in the financial engineering, could go 
a long way to achieving and maintaining the financial robustness of the project. 
The number of commercial opportunities that are able to provide initial and direct cash injection 
into the project seem limited but an example might be the inclusion of terms in the project 
65 
contract, that allow the promoter to operate the commercial ventures within say, an airport. The 
promoter is able to include the design of outlets within the facility for which businesses may 
offer initial payments to secure. 
More often than not the commercial opportunities that afford a source of funds during the 
course of the project stem from value added by the project's subsistence. An i-llustration of this 
would be the value added to undeveloped or slightly developed property as a result of the 
provision of improved access roads. 
For projects with payment mechanisms that involve payments for services or facilities made 
available such as with shadow toll roads, there might be benefits in allowing the private sector 
to capture the value added to the wider community by the project, as this may help to bridge a 
gap between commercial and social returns. These mechanisms would also allow a more 
efficient allocation of costs than a simple payment out of the government's consolidated 
revenue. 
Needless to say value capture is very difficult on the part of the promoter group and this makes 
for difficulties and contention in realising revenue from third parties that have benefited from 
the project. The Australian Private Infrastructure Task Force reports that, as value capture 
mechanisms are linked to usage of services, they form a second or third best approach to 
infrastructure fmancing (EPAC 1995: p65). Effective and foolproof means of capturing funds 
this way are yet to be devised. 
It should be noted that the funds that can be obtained from commercial opportunities are seldom 
accessible until the post-completion stage or until the venture is effectively online. However 
there are several ways of exploiting commercial opportunities if innovation is applied in 
engineering the contract terms and the financial package. Some of these innovations are 
discussed in the next chapter. By viewing concession projects as the means to an end; the end 
being access to those commercial opportunities that the promoter would be otherwise unable to 
exploit, and those that arise as result of the project's existence, project financing can be 
incorporated as part of a long-term business strategy. 
3.8 SUMMARY 
This chapter has identified the providers of fmance in the context of project fmancing as the 
public sector (or public sector agencies), commercial banks, development banks, Islamic banks, 
institutional investors and project stakeholders. Each of these potential providers has been 
examined and the mechanisms, such as the EC's specialised funds, the EIB and syndicated 
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lending by the banks, that come into play in the provision of funds explored. The extent of 
involvement, the objectives, and the criteria varies for each of the mechanisms and are 
generally applied on a project-to-project basis. Islamic lending has been highlighted as being 
different from conventional lending. This is due to the principles of Islam, which also govern 
Islamic banking operations, and which forbid the receipt of interest on funds loaned. Instead 
there is a tendency towards lending on a fee basis and acting as partners -with the project 
company, with a view ofthe project as a profit or loss (risk) sharing venture. 
The second part of this chapter has outlined debt and equity as the primary categories of funds 
supplied by the fore-mentioned finance providers and described the roles that these categories 
play in project financing. Some of the issues that arise in equity subscription and the markets 
through which equity can be provided have been noted. 
Debt fmancing has been explored and the effects of the non-recourse nature of project financing 
on the lenders' requirements have been discussed. Creditability has been identified as a concern 
in attracting lenders and a general definition of credit enhancement has been given. Due to the 
current mismatch between the relatively short-term nature of the bank loans and the long-term 
requirements of infrastructure projects, institutional investors such as pension funds are 
identified as having fund profiles that are more matched to the long-term nature of 
infrastructure developments. 
Bond issues have also been discussed as an alternative route to financing projects. The concept 
of bond issue has been described in this chapter and the different types of bonds briefly 
explained. Section 3.5.6 discusses the application of bond fmancing to reduce fmancing costs 
and increase returns for a project and gives examples of such application. Again 
creditworthiness has been identified as important with respect to the issuing of bonds. Within 
this chapter bond rating is discussed as a measure of the creditworthiness of bonds and some of 
the parameters for rating are given. Mention is also made of the continued and growing 
importance of bond rating in an era of bond issuing by project companies. 
Finally the chapter examined commercial opportunities that promoters may seek to explore in a 
bid to improve the returns on the project. This has been likened to a changed ideology from 
viewing project fmance as a source of funds to fmance projects, to viewing project financing as 
a means for creating sources of revenue. Mention is made of some opportunities that may exist 
in particular types of projects that may provide cash inflow pre- or post completion. This fmal 
section has also touched on the contentious and difficult issue of Value Capture or mechanisms 
of obtaining funds from third parties that benefit from the project's subsistence. 
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Overall, this chapter has provided a background of the components that exist in project 
fmancing structures and affords an understanding of some of the instruments involved. These 
have been explored as instruments that the promoter, with enough knowledge and expertise in 
the area, may use to maximise project returns, or at least ensure implementation of more 
fmancially efficient structures (from the promoter's viewpoint). A complete financial package 
for a project would include some if not all of the elements introduced in this chapter: various 
combinations of debt with equity, the various types of bonds, and/or structuring financial 
packages that allow for exploitation of commercial opportunities. The combination in which 
they exist in a project's structure is as a result of an engineered financial package that aims to 
maximise revenue. Awareness and knowledge of the mechanisms mentioned in this chapter, is 
fundamental to understanding the permutations that can be achieved. The 'financial 
engineering' of these permutations is the focus of the next chapter. 
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CHAPTER FOUR 
FINANCIAL ENGINEERING 
4.0 INTRODUCTION 
The preceding chapter introduced the various sources of finance for a project under the umbrella 
of debt and equity, and discussed the roles of the providers of fmance in the project finance 
market. This chapter will explore the engineering and structuring of these sources, accessed by 
the proj ect company to provide the most profitable and robust fmancing arrangement for the 
project. 
Beidleman et al (1991) describe financial engineering as involving the altering of the size, 
timing, quality and direction, or currency of cash flows to meet investors' needs. Within this 
chapter the processes and means of doing just that, along with the merits and demerits are 
examined. To achieve this engineering, novel approaches and instruments are sometimes 
required. Some of these innovations may include various combinations of debt with equity, 
various types of bonds, and/or structuring financial packages that allow for exploitation of 
commercial opportunities that exist, or that might arise; as a result of the project's subsistence. 
Most of these have been mentioned in the preceding chapter but within this chapter, these 
mechanisms and approaches are explored in greater depth and detail. 
Initially the concept of fmancial engineering is introduced and the two main processes for such 
engineering identified. These processes (Credit Enhancement and the use of Financial 
Instruments) though somewhat inextricably linked in their application, are explored separately. 
Within the context of credit enhancement, guarantees and mono line wrapping are introduced 
and discussed. This section also defines other contractual variations that are used to help 
improve the creditability and hence the bankability of a project. 
Next, the use of financial instruments in engineering the financial package for a project is 
examined. The categories of debt and equity previously introduced in Chapter Three are 
explored, and the opportunities for redesigning their structure and roles within the project 
structure examined. The variation of equity terms is discussed and mention is made of the sale 
and transfer of equity stakes and the difficult issues of value capture. 
Debt financing is explored next and this is presented as affording more opportunities for 
innovation. This section examines approaches taken when considering straight debt, and 
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discusses some of the dynamics of bonding issues, and the pros and cons of engineering a bond 
element in the debt package. lliustrations are also given by way of examples of real projects 
with significant bond issues. 
This chapter goes on to discuss other approaches and tools for financial engineering and their 
impact on the project structure. These include the use of mezzanine fmance and interest rate 
swaps. Project leasing is also introduced and the mechanics of its application to project finance 
explored. 
The latter sections of this chapter revisit capital markets, fmancial institutions and commercial 
exploitation, and the integration of these into the engineered package of finance for a project. 
An overview of the use of capital markets (introduced in the preceding chapter as a means of 
broadening the base of investors that a promoter can source funds from) in financial 
engineering is given. Elements of a case study are used to highlight some of the problems that 
may arise if capital market use is not done prudently. The roles that fmancial institutions such 
as the World Bank and Export Credit Agencies can play are also discussed and some of the 
impacts that involvement of these organisations has on a project's finances are considered. The 
concept of using commercial exploitation to finance some, or all, of a project has already been 
introduced in the preceding chapter; in this chapter more examples of commercial exploitation 
in project finance are given. Details of these case studies help to illustrate the benefits to the 
parties concerned, of such exploitation and indicate some of the more innovative methods of 
engineering project finance. 
Finally, an excetpt of the details for a real project is given and is analysed in the context of 
fmancial engineering. Though not an exhaustive illustration of the resources available, the 
project detailed makes use of several financial instruments and credit enhancement, and serves 
to show some of the ways in which an actual project on the ground has engineered its fmancial 
elements to improve its creditability and profitability for all concerned 
4.1 PACKAGING THE FINANCE 
Paramount to the success of a tender for a privately fmanced proj ect, and indeed to the success 
of the project itself is the overall financial package proposed for the venture. With the constant 
evolution of the private finance market, it is essential that a comprehensive analysis of the 
financial features of the project be conducted, to ensure that the most beneficial options for 
financing the project are employed. This can be a complex and time consuming task due to the 
various requirements of such funding sources as those mentioned in the previous chapter. The 
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project examples given in the preceding chapters and those discussed later in this chapter give 
an idea of the level of sophistication that is involved in arranging the fInance for a project. For 
this reason, most Special Purpose Vehicles (SPV'S) undertaking privately fmanced projects 
employ a financial adviser, normally a merchant or investment bank, to assist them in the 
fmancial packaging of their proposaL The role of the adviser is primarily to determine the 
feasibility of the project under the limitations and constraints of the fInanc-ial markets. The 
engineering of a successful financial package for the project obviously depends on in-depth 
knowledge on country and industrial fmancing conditions, and a fInancial adviser appointed at 
the early stages of project development and whose remuneration largely depends on the success 
of the project, would help avoid major pitfalls that might otherwise plague the project. The role 
of the fmancial adviser is covered in depth by Walker and Smith (1995). Part of the objectives 
of this study is to enlighten SPV's who can in tum ensure that the role of the adviser is more 
effective. 
The fmancial package refers to the structure of the fmancial arrangements for funding a project. 
Inclusive in the fmancial package are: the ratios of debt to equity, the sums and terms any 
senior debt, subordinated debt and soft loans. The fmancial structure may also include bonds 
issued against the project, guarantees obtained, fmancial costs and repayment schedules, and 
any other externalities arranged to provide revenue inflow such as the commercial opportunities 
mentioned in the preceding chapter. 
The variations that occur across fmancial packages are due to the engineering of the structure, 
hence the term fInancial engineering. One, if not the most, fundamental aspect of privately 
fmanced projects is the financial engineering that accompanies the proposaL Financial 
engineering in project fmance is the structuring of the fmance terms of the projects in the most 
efficient and profitable way whilst maintaining the robustness of the endeavour. It addresses the 
source of funds, repayment and debt service structures, the payment mechanisms or the revenue 
stream, and of course the profitability of the project. Essentially fmancial engineering could 
make or break a project. 
Indeed studies today show that in the fmancial world, project fInance is not so much the novel 
approach from 'traditional' or 'conventional' financing that it used to be. The current evolution 
in fmancial engineering is at such pace that already non-recourse fInancing is now being 
referred to as 'traditional' or 'conventional' project finance. Innovations and 'new breed' 
financing techniques now arise from the development and grafting of other sophisticated 
mechanisms such as mezzanine fmance, interest or equity swaps and synthetic leasing, onto, or 
in place of, non-recourse fmancing (Watkins 1999). In the US particularly in the power sector, 
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hybrid project fmancing combining leasing, project bonds and straight debt are becoming 
common. 
Another aspect of project fmance that could be considered under fmancial engineering is the 
packaging of several project finance deals together; This helps to pool the risk spread, enhance 
the credit of weaker projects and provide an investment that is sizeable enough to be of interest 
to large investors. Credit Suisse First Boston (CSFB) has surged ahead in this field by 
structuring, in 1999, a $1 billion, four-year revolving facility for Calpine, a US power plant 
corporation, that enables it pursue its medium term strategy of build4J.g 12 to 16 power plants. 
CSFB has also pioneered the Collaterized Loan Obligation (CLO) market and the innovative 
private placement programme which provides funds of $2.7 billion part of which have already 
been used to fmance five transactions worth a total of $1 billion, (Euromoney, 2000). 
The benefits of this approach are that projects can be sponsored quicker and more efficiently 
than through the traditional syndicated loans route as the investors can commit and execute 
faster. Also the expense of seeking financing for each project individually is removed, reducing 
the total project costs. This aspect of project fmancing, although of great importance to the 
fmancial world, is outside the scope of this study and is therefore not examined in any depth 
here. 
Due to the complexity and variety of projects now undertaken, the scope for fmancial 
engineering is very broad. There are however limitations such as the constraints on the 
conditions of financing that are acceptable to the lenders and investors. These constraints are 
often tied in with the risk profile of the project and of each participant [Risk in project finance 
is not the focus of this study but readers may wish to refer to such texts as Merna and Smith 
(1994) and Smith (1999) for coverage of the topic]. The fmancing structure is also dependent 
on the economic climate at the time. The recent Asian financial crisis and Brazil's January 1999 
devaluation served to adversely affect investors' and lenders' inclinations. Such situations 
require the designing of innovative structures that renew interest and enable deals to be closed. 
The following example taken from a report by the futernational Finance CorPoration highlights 
the impacts of some of these economic changes, IFC (1999). 
The KMR Power Corporation (US) had planned to raise fmancing for its $175 million 
independent power project in Colombia (TermoCandelaria) through a 1998 high-yield debt 
issue in New York's 144A bond markets. However due to worsening of the Asia crisis in 
October of that year, a new solution was required. This involved re-engineering the package so 
that an $85 million subordinated loan was raised from an AA rated partner (Zurich 
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Reinsurance), and appointing Bank of America (BoA) as financial adviser who proceeded to 
obtain a full package of political insurance for the project. BoA also arranged the remaining $90 
million in five-year senior debt, providing $40 million itself and the rest from Colombian 
institutions. It is obvious then that in engineering the fmancial package, one has to anticipate 
potential economic changes and build in enough flexibility to tackle any arising problems. 
Essentially, financial engineering involves two processes: 
• 
• 
Credit Enhancement: Structuring of the various project-related agreements entered by the 
participants in such a way as to enhance the creditworthiness of the borrower. This credit 
enhancement reduces the risk to lenders and therefore lowers the cost of borrowing. 
Financial Instruments: Innovations in developing financial instruments that improve the 
viability of the project. This involves making optimal use of the capital markets and 
sources of funding as discussed in Chapter Three. Ultimately this attracts more equity 
investors and potential project lenders. 
It is very difficult to examine the two items separately as the strength of their use lies in their 
co-existence in project structures. The following sections will attempt however to explore these 
core processes of financial engineering. 
4.2 CREDIT ENHANCEMENT 
Whilst project fmance is typically non-recourse, realistically in the event of default, a lender 
may be exposed to equity risks or be unable to recover lent principal. Mere reliance on the 
revenue-producing project contracts to service debt may be insufficient to protect the lender. 
For this reason, credit support or credit enhancement from a creditworthy source may be 
required to reduce the risks to the lenders. 
Credit enhancement may be of the form of direct guarantees by the project sponsors or the 
project participants, guarantees by third parties not directly participating in the project, and in 
some cases contingent guarantees and 'moral obligations of the project participants. Hoffman's 
extensive writing on project finance identifies other mechanisms for enhancing credit 
worthiness as including limited, indirect, implied and deficiency guarantees, comfort 
undertakings, insurance, letters of credit, surety obligations, liquidated damages, take-or-pay, 
through-put and put-or-pay contracts, indemnification obligations, and additional equity 
commitments (Hoffman 1998: p412). Some of these are explored in later sections. 
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Macquarie (1996) however advises on meticulous consideration on the usefulness of the type of 
enhancement used by looking at factors like the term of the device selected, its cost, the 
difficulty in enforcement and the time required to arrange such an enhancement. In order to be 
effective each type of credit enhancement is normally in the form of a separate agreement that 
is incorporated into the whole project's finance structure. It is necessary for this documentation 
to be in place before financial arrangements for the project can be c1~sed. The credit 
enhancement needs to be collaterally assigned to the lender who must have the rights to enforce 
it; if the enhancement is removed without agreement, the project lender could consider this a 
loan default. 
The financial community's perception of risk at any given point in time determines, to a large 
extent, the type of credit enhancement that is necessary to satisfy the lenders or equity 
investors. Guarantees against certain risks on one occasion might not be required several years 
later, as with processes or technology with proven reliability. Conversely a guarantee not 
present initially might suddenly become required, perhaps as a result of changes in political 
scenarios. This may be illustrated by the project to expand the capacity of an existing refmery 
by the National Oil Distribution Company (NODCO) in Qatar. Barc1ays was sole arranger and 
underwriter for the $850 million deal but had to rearrange the deal with sub-underwriters and 
co-arrangers when Russia announced a 90 day debt moratorium. The news from the Russian 
government effectively stopped all lending to emerging markets. By reducing the debt to $510 
million and the tenor from a possible thirteen and a half years to a nine-year maximum, 
amongst other engineered variations, Barclays was able to renegotiate the deal with Qatar 
(Project Finance 1999). The Asia crisis of the 1990's and the Brazilian devaluation in 1999 also 
served to undermine the confidence of investors in these areas and as such slightly different 
fmancing terms than may have otherwise been agreed on had to be used to enable the financing 
of projects. 
Some of the mechanisms mentioned here that are used to enhance the creditability of project are 
examined in the following sections. 
4.2.1 Guarantees 
Guarantees serve to shift some project risks to units that prefer little direct involvement in the 
operation of a project. They are mechanisms that permit entities to invest capital without 
becoming directly involved in the project. Project lenders may request guarantees for certain 
activities, such as completion of construction, in order to protect themselves from risk. A third 
party is able to assume these risks through a guarantee, as opposed to a loan or equity 
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contribution, whilst avoiding [mancial reporting of the liability guaranteed as a direct liability, 
although it may be footnoted. 
Essentially, project sponsors and third parties are the types of guarantors in project financing 
and these are discussed in the following sections. Obviously the value of a guarantee to a lender 
is dependent on the creditworthiness of the guarantor. There is great emphasis on the language 
of the guarantee as the lender may not be sure that creditworthy support is in place unless there 
is a waiver of defences and absolute and unconditional obligation on the guarantor (Alces 
1983). 
4.2.1.1 Sponsor Guarantees 
The project sponsors or members of the Project Company (SPV) normally establish 
subsidiaries, which are awarded contracts such as the construction or operation and 
maintenance contracts, for the realisation of the project. As the subsidiary often lacks the capital 
to totally assume some of the underlying risks, the sponsor may have to offer some form of 
credit enhancement, often in the form of a guarantee of the obligations of the subsidiaries. For 
example a completion guarantee could require the sponsor to complete the construction of the 
project if the subsidiary is unable to do so. Once construction is complete, subject to agreed 
performance levels the completion guarantee terminates. In this instance it would be important 
that measures of completion are established beforehand in the guarantee. 
Demands for guarantees in a project's structure must be done in such a manner that the 
'commerciality' of the project is not inhibited. A balance must be achieved when combining 
enhancement mechanisms with other sponsor risks. This ensures that the project proceeds 
without burdening the sponsor to the point that the non-recourse nature of the project is 
jeopardised. 
Although the sponsors are the most common guarantors in project financing, occasionally they 
may be unwilling, or unable, to supply sufficient guarantees in terms of credit. This may give 
rise to the need for credit enhancement by a third party. 
4.2.1.2 Third Party Guarantees and Monoline Wraps 
Most participants in a privately funded project are potential third party guarantors (see Figure 
2.4). Third parties that may offer guarantees include banks, insurance companies, specialist 
investment companies, bilateral and multilateral agencies, input suppliers, equipment 
manufacturers, contractors and output purchasers. Typically, third party guarantors act as 
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commercial guarantors for a fee and the risks that they cover range from specific commercial 
risks, political risks, casualty risks, and war risks to various force majeure risks. 
Third party credit enhancement is described by Walker and Smith (1995: p77) as 'filling the 
empty chair' and is evident in the following example taken from the same text. Hopewell 
Holdings Shajiao B Power Plant in Peoples Republic of China (PRC) was the first privati sed 
power project in Asia and had Guangdong General Power Company (GGPC) as the off-taker. 
However GGPC was deemed an unknown credit risk as it was an unknown entity to 
international bank lenders and was not licensed to deal in foreign exchange. Furthermore, its 
entire revenues were in Renmenbi (PRC currency), which at that time foreigners were not 
allowed to hold. The risk was unable to be priced or taken by the lenders or sponsors and a 
solution was found in inviting third party involvement. Guangzhou International Trust and 
Investment Company (GITIC) is a trading and investment company with holdings in Hong 
Kong as well as China and was recognised for international borrowing, and it guaranteed 
GGPC's power purchase payments removing the unknown payment risk from the lenders and 
sponsors. 
Project companies often seek out the services of fmancial guaranty insurance companies such as 
Financial Security Assurance (FSA) who, by nature of having the highest available credit 
ratings from the major rating agencies, are able to guarantee the timely service of debt and 
principal repayment. The benefits of this include achieving the highest available credit rating 
for the project debt hence attracting a broader range of lenders. Specific insurers that are 
specialised in financial guarantees are often known as Monoline Insurers. This means that the 
insurer is in one insurance business only, the insurance of investment-grade debt securities, and 
is not exposed to risks from any other lines of business, as are property, casualty and life 
insurers. Moreover, every mono line bond insurer has at least one Triple-A rating from a 
nationally recognized rating agency, and every insured bond, in turn, receives a Triple-A rating 
based on the insurer's own capital and claims-paying resources. It is noteworthy that bonds that 
receive a Triple-A rating with the aid of a monoline are not identical to 'true' AAA rated bonds, 
and institutional investors buy insured bonds at a discount compared to real AAA bonds. The 
reason for this lies in the fact that notwithstanding a rare and irrevocable guarantee provided by 
an insurer, the contractual framework of the guarantee is such that there is the residual risk that 
payment on the part of the guarantor when called upon may be delayed or not fully paid out. 
Understandably the lower the creditworthiness of the bond issuer (without the monoline), the 
greater the probability of resorting to the guarantor and hence the greater the discount available 
to the investors. 
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The necessity of such guarantees varies depending on the capital markets that are accessed. In 
the United States projects that seek revenue bond financing (see section 3.6.1) are required to 
achieve investment grade rating from the rating agencies. This system works because the 
insurance premium paid by the issuer is more than offset by the reduction in the amount of 
interest paid to the investors as a result of the higher credit ratings achieved by using bond 
insurance. Jones et al (1996) report that in the US the expectation on the part of the suppliers of 
capital that ratings be available causes firms wishing to raise capital to acquire a rating. Jones et 
al are of the opinion that ratings may not play such important roles in Europe, as European 
investors do not generally demand this. This of course means that firms do not have to incur the 
costs of obtaining such ratings but for European projects that are hoping to attract extensive US 
capital, ratings may have to be sought. With the continued expansion of Europe's private 
fmance market as predicted by PJI (2000) ratings may however become commonplace for 
projects wishing to fmance from within Europe. 
4.2.2 Other Credit Enhancement Tools 
Other means of credit enhancement include Indirect Guarantees (such as Take-or-Pay Contracts 
and Take-and-Pay Contracts), Implied Guarantees, Put Options, Letters of Credit and 
Insurance. 
Take-or-Pay contracts exist when the sponsor is able to secure a contractual agreement with a 
buyer who makes payments on certain dates in return for available deliveries of goods or 
services at specified prices. This can greatly enhance the fmancial package for the project in the 
eyes of lenders and investors as it provides a guaranteed revenue stream. The payment 
obligation of the buyer is unconditional thus even of no goods or services are delivered the 
payment obligation still exists. Take-and-Pay contracts are similar to the Take-or-Pay contracts 
except that the payment obligation is conditional on the delivery of the goods or services. 
Implied guarantees are not contractual in nature and are just means of providing assurances to 
the lender that the guarantor will provide necessary support to the project, supposedly out of its 
underlying credit. Implied guarantees can be based on the size of the parent companies' equity 
investment or by Comfort Letters that express the parent companies' intention to continue 
supporting the proj ect. 
A Put Option, in the context of project finance, is an agreement between the project sponsors 
and specified third parties whereby the sponsors agree to purchase the third party's equity 
interests or debt obligations should equity returns or debt repayment obligations (or other 
specified contingencies) not be met. 
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Letters of Credit are used to protect against failure of the Spy to satisfy specific conditions by 
substituting the payment obligation and creditworthiness of a more solvent party (usually a 
bank) for the payment obligation and creditworthiness of the less solvent SPY. 
Project risks not otherwise covered by other agreements can be insured at a premium to the 
SPV. The insurance package is of great importance to the lender and often included in the 
policies are requirements that the lender be made aware of any changes, or indeed cancellation, 
to the policy (Hoffman 1998). 
There are many forms of credit enhancement and the main ones have been addressed here. The 
enhancement of creditability for a project is done in hand with other fmancial instruments and it 
is through these that the benefits of enhancement can be seen to manifest as the ability of these 
instruments to attract capital is enhanced. The instruments provide the access to the sources 
while the enhancement improves the quality of the access. 
4.3 FINANCIAL INSTRUMENTS 
Key to the success of most, if not all privately fmanced projects, is the project cash flow. A 
typical philosophy in structuring the levels of debt and equity is to use as much debt as the 
project cash flow allows. This is done to realise an attractive return for the shareholders. 
However generally speaking, the less equity in a project, the greater the risk to the cash flow. 
An unstable cash flow means greater risk of non-repayment to the lenders and no dividends to 
the investors. It is obvious then that to maximise the return to investors whilst at the same time 
protecting the project cash flow requires innovative financing instruments and techniques. 
These instruments and techniques are frequently, if not always, applied together with credit 
enhancement. In determining the most appropriate instruments for each project, borrowers need 
to consider factors such as: 
• Drawdown and repayment profiles 
• Currency mix 
• The level of protection required against interest rate movements 
• Balance sheet structure 
The mix of financing instruments differs from one region to another and this is due to the 
sectoral shifts in the demand for financing that exist. This can be illustrated by the differences 
between financing in East Asia and in Latin America. Following the privatisation of assets, 
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Latin American infrastructure enterprises have turned to bond and equity markets for most of 
their international fmancing. In East Asia there has been a significant rise in international bond 
and equity fmance, but syndicated loans have been the main source of fmance, accounting for 
more than half in 1996 and an even larger share in 1995 (see Figure 4.1). 
This is explained largely by private power projects, which have relied mostly on syndicated 
loans, with debt-to-equity ratios in the range of 75 to 25. Other sectors such as 
telecommunications have relied more on bond and equity issues than the power sector, but 
syndicated loans have also been important (Kohli et a11997: 4-6). 
These regional differences are also due to the fact that in the absence of well-developed 
financial markets it is difficult to utilise sophisticated capital market instruments particularly 
during the construction phase of the project. 
Financing (or privole infrosttucture projects. by~. 1986-96 
(lJSS t6ns) 
o---... ~---1986 1918 1992 
s..c.; •• 'Il0l..,,. ~ IGlld • .,-.; Wortd ................ . 
(source: Euromoney; Loanware; Bondware; World Bank staff estimates) 
Figure 4.1: Financing for infrastructure projects in East Asia (1986 -1996) 
The level of market sophistication accessible to a project determines the fmancial instruments 
that can be used. The following sections discuss some of the instruments used to adapt and 
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modify the more traditional forms of debt and equity into more flexible and profitable 
mechanisms. 
4.3.1 Equity 
To the promoter, equity means expensive capital. As the cost of equity is higher than debt, 
equity needs higher overall return (and therefore revenues) to give the same r~te of return. The 
level of equity in a project's finance structure is influenced greatly by the debt providers' 
requirements and of course by whether or not high equity is specified as an important criterion 
in the Request For Proposals (RFP's). Generally speaking, high equity commitments are 
required when fmancing is considered to be a problem as with the case of Hopewells 
Guangzhou-Shenzhen-Zhuhai Superhighway in China where the equity was 30%. This was due 
to difficulties in raising fmance during political and economic instability resulting from the 
June 4, 1989 massacre and uncertainty about revenues (Wu 1991). The Labuan Water Supply 
Project in Malaysia where the IPCO group proposed 30% equity as a result of the financial 
market's uncertainty, and the high level of equity that Thailand and Hong Kong generally 
require for BOT projects are other examples (Attajarusit 1988; Anderson 1989). 
In contrast to these are the projects such as estuarial crossings, which are monopolistic in nature, 
and where the revenues are certain and cash flows predictable. The equity levels for such 
projects can be low. The most prominent use of low equity is Bank of America's strategy of 
'pinpoint' equity finance and 100% debt financing for three BOT projects in UK: the Dartford 
Bridge, the Second Severn Crossing and the Skye Bridge (Tiong 1995: p286). 
An adaptation to fixed equity involvement is the ability to sell or transfer equity stakes. This 
allows providers to limit their involvement to terms with the highest returns. In this way equity 
providers can pull out their equity stakes and invest them in other projects with higher internal 
rates ofretum (lRR). In 1996 the UK's Private Finance Panel (PFP) published a guide on the 
transferability of equity in which it stressed that in general there are no restrictions on the 
sponsor equity investment for PFI projects (PFP 1996: p6). Consequently, private sponsors 
have the freedom to sell and to invest parts of their equity stake in other PFI projects, and thus, 
there exists the possibility to adjust the project's financial structure to suit the project risk 
structure, for example at the end of the construction period. This transfer of equity allows 
sponsors to build opportunities into the fmancial structure for reaping higher returns on their 
initial equity injections as described below. Hoffman (1998: p82) however describes equity 
investments in infrastructure projects as more illiquid than those in projects in other industries. 
This is particularly true in countries with developing equity markets. Some governments 
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impose equity sale restrictions on project sponsors particularly in the early project years to 
ensure sponsor support. Also when governments want ownership ultimately in local hands the 
sale of equity will be restricted until a sufficient local investment base develops to purchase 
interests in the project. 
The project sponsors equity contribution covers, in most cases, pre-construction, or 
developmental cost, and is only part of the total equity although it can still run into millions of 
dollars. Although the risks are higher at the pre-construction stages, the sponsors expect to reap 
very high returns on this portion of the investment. This is realised by sale of part of the 
sponsors' equity at a substantial premium to new investors, and also by charging a premium for 
fresh equity that is brought in by new investors after construction (Ahluwalia 1997). 
Equity terms can also be varied to suit the return requirements of providers such as contractors. 
For example, a contractor, who injects equity for the opportunity to obtain the construction 
contract for the project, could transfer or sell its equity stakes on construction completion. On 
completion the construction profit would have been received and at that point the IRR for the 
contractors investment is high as a result of those profits. Continued involvement as an equity 
provider would reduce the internal rate of return (IRR) for the contractor's investment as the 
impact of the construction profits on the IRR would diminish. Also, a high level of equity stake 
would undermine the effect of the construction profits and therefore it is in the contractor's 
interest to reduce its equity stakes in a project. A contractor's equity stake is also reflected on 
its balance sheets and therefore affects it's gearing. Hence equity stakes would make it more 
expensive for it to borrow more capital. It is worthy of note at this point to mention that 
increasingly, the projects coming to the markets contract the construction works on a lump sum, 
certain date, fixed price contract, with less requirements for equity participation on behalf of the 
contractor. This may be primarily due to the almost certain possibility that the contractor will 
look to transfer its equity stake on project completion. Walker and Smith (1995: 84-87) 
illustrate the dynamics of equity returns more fully. 
The concept of value capture as introduced in Chapter Three is often viewed as engineered 
equity (Macquarie 1996: p54). Although this study often addresses elements of value capture in 
the context of exploitation of commercial opportunities, it is rightly mentioned here as part of 
the structuring of the equity element of a financing. This is because the sponsors of a project 
may benefit through an increase in land values by developing commercial, housing or retail 
estates. Key sites may have their value created or significantly enhanced by the new project. If 
the project company owns the site, then the entire benefit can be captured using the profit from 
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redeveloping the property to offset some or all of the cost of the infrastructure. Macquarie 
identifies some of the major issues associated with engineering a value capture mechanism as: 
• How the value increase should be calculated; 
• The real beneficiaries of any increased value; 
• How the benefits are allocated or shared among the beneficiaries; 
• The boundaries of the benefits area; and 
• How any value increase should be collected or realised. 
Several projects have successfully captured the benefits of increased value to surrounding areas 
and engineered such capture into the fmancial package of the project. Some examples include 
the previously mentioned Guangzhou-Shenzen Expressway, which used the increased value to 
adjacent lands to cross-subsidise road construction costs, and the Hong Kong Eastern Harbour 
Crossing, which increased the projects IRR from 4% to 12% by obtaining the rights to develop 
property above the main railway station (see section 4.8). 
The terms and structures of equity provision are continually being revised to suit projects within 
the available legal frames. However, this revision is largely influenced and dependent on the 
debt structure of the project and it is within the debt instruments that the most innovation seems 
to have occurred in the project fmance market. 
4.3.2 Debt 
As previously mentioned, debt is still the main source for the larger portions of funding for 
privately fmanced projects. The arrangements that are implemented in the debt structure depend 
largely on the lenders' preferences and confidence in the project. Issues that need to be 
addressed would include the repayment schedule, which needs to be tailored to the cash flows 
of the project. Figure 4.2 illustrates the various cash flow profiles that exist across sectors and 
types of projects and also depicts the typical debt repayment profiles in comparison. (NB. 
Figure 4.2 is used for illustrative purposes and is not drawn to any scale on any axis.) It can be 
seen that the repayment profiles reflect the cash flow characteristics somewhat. For projects 
with early high cash flows the debt repayment is also high such as with oil or gas development 
projects. These have early high cash flows that then decline in the later stages of the project. 
The debt repayment payment can also be seen to reflect the cash flow. For industrial projects 
the debt repayment typically reflects the peaks and troughs of the cash flows. Depending on the 
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nature of the project the interest payments may need to be capitalised (not paid straight away 
but added to the outstanding capital). Repayments can either be graduated to reflect a gradual 
change in the cash flow, structured as equal quarterly or semi-annual payments or incorporate 
principal repayment at maturity. The structure agreed between the lender and the project 
company varies depending on the sector or type of project, and on any peculiar features or 
arrangements that might exist. It is obvious then that any desire to alter these typical profiles 
would involve reconsideration of the borrowing terms or restructuring of the terms of the debt 
element of the financing. 
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Figure 4.2 : Typical project cash flows and debt repayment profiles 
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Although the short-tenn maturities are often a mismatch with the long-tenn nature of the 
project's cash flow profile, there is still a strong market for bank debt. Many financings are 
taking shorter tenn loans, particularly during the construction period, complemented with 
equity provision, and the option to refmance on more favourable tenns after construction when 
the risk profile is different. Engineering the project structure to include refmancing also gives 
the project company the opportunity to access the bond markets and rai~e finance more 
competitively with which to repay outstanding principal and reinvest into the venture. 
In accessing the bond market, the issuer must be aware that a stable macroeconomic 
environment in the home country is necessary for the proper functioning of a long-tenn bond 
market. The investor is extremely concerned with inflation as this erodes the value of the 
investment, as well as the interest rates on the investment earnings. 
An investor may, to limit exposure, limit the tenns of bonds purchased to shorter maturities for 
example. They may also seek bonds with built in floating rates. The issuerlborrower needs to 
however complement such issues with derivatives such as interest rate swaps in order to offer a 
predictable cost profile, especially for highly leveraged infrastructure projects (Ferreira and 
Khatami 1996: p39). Interest rate swaps are explained in section 4.3.5. 
The marriage of credit enhancement and fmancial instruments as discussed in previous sections 
that are now part and parcel of most project finance transactions becomes obvious when 
exploring the details of project bond issues. The samples of project details below illustrate the 
almost inevitable combination of these two elements of fmancial engineering in the project 
fmance market. 
• July 1998 - The £91.2 million deal for Meridian Hospital Co pic was the first UK hospital 
bond to be sold without a mono line wrap, and the first to be index linked. The 30 year 
bond, rated BBB+ by Duff & Phelps, has an initial coupon of 4.1875% and re-offer spread 
of 160bp* over the 2016 index linked Gilt. Both interest and principal will rise in line with 
inflation (EuroWeek 1998a). 
• March 1999 - RBC DS Global Markets launched the first water utility PFI bond in the 
UK for a £79.3 million issue through Stirling Water Seafield Finance pIc, for the Stirling 
Water consortium. East of Scotland Water Authority (ESW A) has awarded the 30-year 
Almond Valley and Seafield concession to the consortium comprising Thames Water, MJ 
Gleeson and Montgomery Watson Ltd. The concession involves the design, building, 
operation and maintenance of five wastewater treatment plants in and around Edinburgh. 
• 
• 
The 27.5-year bonds, wrapped by MBlA Assurance SA through the MBlA-AMBAC 
International joint venture, are rated AaaJ AAA by Moody's and Standard & Poor's, and 
will contribute some 80% to the project's costs (EuroWeek 1999b). 
September 1999 - The Bishop Auckland Hospital Project in the UK was financed with 
index-linked credit-enhanced bonds issued under the PFI Private Finance Initiative (PFI) 
projects. The use of credit enhancement opened up a greater band of investors for the 
project (Whitham 1999: p 18). 
June 2000 - Deutsche bank placed one of the largest PFI bonds so far to fmance 
construction of a new building for the UK's main Electronic spying installation, the 
Government Communications Headquarters, in Cheltenham. The £406.85 million bond 
was issued by Integrated Accommodation Services pIc (lAS), a consortium that has a 
contract to demolish two buildings, build a new one and service it until 2029. The 
consortium comprises Carillion, previously the construction wing of Tarmac, British 
Telecom and security company, Group 4. The group expects to finish construction by 
2003. The transaction was wrapped by triple-A rated mono line insurer Financial Security 
Assurance UK, but is believed to be the first PFI deal to be rated single-A by Standard & 
Poor's before the wrap (Euro Week 2000b: p22); 
(* A basis point is one one-hundredth of a percent. For example, a 150 basis point rise in interest 
rate is the same as a 1.5% rise. A 10 basis point fee is the same as a 0.1 % fee.) 
The reasons for the greater suitability of bonds for privately fmanced projects lie in the 
characteristic structure of the projects: relatively large amounts of capital (typically 
£50million+) are required over long periods of time. For this form of investment bonds are 
ideal. Banks tend to be uncomfortable with such a long term loaning approach and want their 
money back again as soon as possible. This can have a detrimental effect on the Net Present 
Value of a project. Furthermore a wrapped bond will usually prove a cheaper source of finance 
than a bank loan. Although banks now offer lower cover ratios in order to compete with the 
bonds, bonds can be expected to maintain the edge and to see projects benefit from the 
competition generated. 
PjI (2000) reports that the European bond markets are expanding rapidly at the moment and 
project developers can be confident of fmding buyers for correctly priced bonds regardless of 
the special features, which the project company might want to include. The project company 
can put together any complicated structure and then take it to a bond house that will be able to 
fmd investors whose needs match up. Furthermore, as the breadth and liquidity of the European 
bond markets increase over the coming years, conditions will only improve. On the flip side, 
there is a sense in which bonds are less flexible, because it is much more difficult to renegotiate 
with several hundred bondholders than with one bank. However, the up front flexibility of the 
bond market - you can put anything you want into the offering circular - means that you can 
specify in advance how to deal with any event that might involve a meeting of bondholders. 
As mentioned before debt normally provides the greater portion of the finance necessary to 
realise a project. The promoters however now often see senior bank debt as too restricting and 
generally as claiming part of the returns that could be absorbed into the project. For this reason 
other borrowing arrangements that provide more flexibility, reduce and/or complement the 
amount of sponsor equity required, reduce costs, or even provide a means of increased returns 
are being sought. Some other borrowing instruments are outlined below. 
4.3.3 Mezzanine Finance 
The use of mezzanine fmance is one way to enhance the returns to investors and in its broadest 
sense can be considered to be the gap between senior debt and ordinary equity. Mezzanine 
finance is attractive to lenders as it provides higher yields than can normally be obtained from 
loans. The return to lenders for providing mezzanine fmance depends heavily on the perceived 
risks of the project but is generally over 3% greater than would be expected on senior debt. 
Mezzanine arrangements closely resembling equity command higher returns on capital, usually 
in the range of 15-20% whilst those more similar to debt obtain lower returns. 
Walker and Smith (1995) outline the following as factors that the selection of particular 
instruments for use in the mezzanine layer depend on: 
• The project's prospective cash flow 
• The cost of the instrument 
• The legal and tax consequences of utilising the instrument 
• The capital structure of the project company, existing and prospectiye 
• The risk/reward perceptions of the financing institutions involved 
• The size and purpose of the financing 
The maturity period of mezzanine finance is normally longer than that for senior debt and this 
combined with the insecure nature of the fmance makes it more expensive than bank debt 
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(Levine 1998). It is however less expensive than straight equity due to the higher returns 
required by the equity providers. Generally mezzanine fmance improves the balance sheet by 
reducing the leverage. This is because banks view subordinated and unsecured debt as being 
similar to equity or quasi-equity: junior to the banks' capital. The greater flexibility in setting 
interest rates and loan terms that is associated with mezzanine fmance, combined with the 
longer debt maturity also helps to improve the proj ect cash flow. 
There are lenders that specialise in mezzanine fmance and they are able to fill in the debt-equity 
gap with unsecured loans from $500,000 to $20million. These loans are still junior to the 
capital of the secured creditors in the event of bankruptcy and as Levine explains, the lenders, 
in return for their increased risks, seek interest on the loan often with warrants to buy common 
stock. By this the mezzanine lender provides the subordinated debt but also takes a minority 
equity position giving the lender a stake in the upside potential in the project. The mezzanine 
lenders often expect stock warrants or some other mechanism (termed 'equity kicker') that 
requires the borrower to buy back the stock from the lenders. The payback on the loans 
typically starts in the fifth to sixth year, with final payment due in the eight to tenth year. 
There is an acknowledgement by Jessop that there has been a move in the market for tranches of 
mezzanine debt to be provided in place of loan stock or equity (Jessop 1998: p13). Jessop also 
concurs with Levine by defining mezzanine fmance as expensive debt as opposed to cheaper 
equity and though it is an important fmancial instrument for large scale, complex project deals 
its application in smaller deals may be limited 
Mezzanine providers have similar rights to senior debt providers and will be compensated in 
termination events. This may prove to be little incentive to resolve issues to make the project 
work and result in prolific easy bailing out under such circumstances. It must be said however, 
that mezzanine fmance improves the quality of the senior debt and hence the projects 
marketability, and as such appeals to investors looking for a share in the 'up side' risk of the 
project (Ahluwalia 1997: p100). 
4.3.4 Project Leasing 
A result of fmancial engineering that is becoming more common particularly for power projects 
is the use of leasing. This has developed from the corporate world of leases where essentially 
one party takes out a loan to acquire an asset (or construct infrastructure), and then leases the 
property to another party whose lease payments are often equal to the interest payment on the 
loan with a principal sum being made at the end of the lease. An example of this is Synthetic 
Leasing, an off-balance-sheet transaction in which a special-purpose entity is created to obtain a 
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loan, which is used to buy some real estate. The real estate is then leased back to the parent 
company, which makes lease payments that are equal to the interest payments on the loan. At 
the end of the lease a balloon payment becomes due. 
Project Leasing is the engineering of the legal and tax structures of the project such that tax 
efficiencies are gained and costs reduced. It is a combination of the concept of limited recourse 
financing and finance leasing (where the lessor leases the asset to a lessee. The lessor retains 
the legal title to the project whilst the lessee has the right to use the assets.) In a project lease an 
asset employed in a project is leased against the project bank's (lender' s) assessment of the 
project cash flows. The main attraction of the inclusion of a lease is that it is tax based - that is 
the lessor claims tax depreciation. This provides savings over debt as to the extent that tax 
depreciation would not otherwise have been used. 
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Figure 4.3: Project Lease Structure 
Referring to Figure 4.3 it can be seen that by including a lease, a second creditor (the lessor) has 
essentially been introduced into the structure. This can be of concern primarily to the lenders 
over issues of control in instances where the creditor has to enforce its security. This is 
normally overcome by the inclusion of an inter-creditor agreement, which sets out the order in 
which the two parties can realise security, and against which risk exposures (Bull 1993: p41). 
Project leases can be either a Domestic Tax-based Lease or a Cross-border Lease. A domestic 
tax based lease will probably provide the most attractive savings as authorities often grant the 
most favourable tax depreciation to assets located within their own jurisdiction. However to 
operate a domestic tax based lease requires a well developed local leasing market with 
sufficient tax capacity to absorb the large value tax losses arising from major capital 
investment. Local leasing can also be either leveraged as in the USA and Japan, or single 
investor as in the UK. Through a leveraged lease the lessor obtains whole entitlement to the tax 
depreciation while typically funding a small percentage (normally around 20%). This will allow 
the rest of the asset to be fmanced through limited recourse fmancing. This ability to claim the 
tax benefits of the transaction while providing only a small portion of the capital required 
enables the lessor to lease the equipment/asset to the lessee, at a lower cost than the lessee could 
obtain if it sought either a direct lease or some other form of non-recourse fmancing Colucci 
1999: pI8). For a single investor lease however, the requirement is such that the lessor must 
completely finance the whole asset (Bull 1995). 
Cross-border lease allows for the access of tax depreciation from external jurisdictions - that is, 
a country may allow assets abroad (in countries where domestic capacity is not available for 
instance), to claim tax depreciation but usually at a reduced rate from domestic assets. This is to 
encourage a preference for domestic leases. It may also be possible to access depreciation from 
two different jurisdictions although this has not been widely documented. Export credits 
(discussed in section 4.5.2) can also be used in a lease structure; that is fmancing by the lessor 
taking an export credit guarantee for a percentage of the assets costs. This can be used to 
support the credit of projects in lesser-developed countries where the projects would be 
otherwise 'unbankable'. 
Leasing is becoming a greater part of project fmancing and institutions and governments are 
looking at ways of initiating enabling legislature for its implementation. An example is the 
Inter-American Development Bank's (IDB) study into a framework that will allow private 
investors to become involved in irrigation schemes in Brazil by way of leases (Wood 1999: 32-
35). Morash reports that financial institutions, changing as a result of complex challenges posed 
by deregulation and industry wide changes, are constantly exploring the avenues through which 
the leasing option can be exploited in the context of project finance (Morash 2001). 
rhis section's coverage of project leasing is by far not exhaustive as the market is far too vast 
and complex to do so. The main points on its application to project fmancing have, however 
been touched upon highlighting that its use is often in conjunction with the instruments and 
mechanisms discussed in previous and succeeding sections. 
1.3.5 Interest Rate Swaps 
Jne of the main concerns for a project company in obtaining senior bank loans is that of interest 
rate risk. Fluctuating interest rates can cause problems to projects' debt repayment profiles and 
place investors' returns at risk. In projects financed with bank debt the borrower is generally 
committed to pay a floating interest rate to the banks. In many projects however, the payment 
mechanism does not allow the borrower to pass on the variations in interest cost to its 
customer( s). A mechanism that allows a degree of protection against this is that of interest rate 
swaps illustrated in Figure 4.4. 
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Figure 4.4: Interest Swap relationships 
In a typical interest rate swap, the project company pays fixed interest rate to the swap 
counterpart and receives floating interest. The project company then pays floating interest to the 
banks and the net interest payment is therefore fixed. Similarly if the project is fmanced by 
bonds, then the project company is exposed to falls in interest rates that will leave it paying a 
higher rate of interest than necessary on its borrowings (bond coupons). In this case the project 
company can enter into an interest rate swap agreement as previously described except in this 
case the project company receives fixed and pays floating, thereby effectively converting its 
fixed income liability into a floating rate (Clarke and Lousada 1998). Often the swaps are 
provided by the lead arranger which allows the arrangers credit committee some control over 
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the hedging strategy, i.e. making investments in order to reduce the risk of adverse price 
movements in a security, by taking an offsetting position in a related security. 
Effectively one counterpart agrees to exchange a fixed interest rate on a specific notional 
principal in return for a floating rate of interest on the same notional principal. The arrangement 
also stipulates the term to maturity of the agreement. No principal is exchanged in the 
transaction. The interest rate on the floating leg of the swap transaction is typically reset at the 
beginning of each interest-payment period, and the cash interest payment is made at the end of 
the period. The London Interbank Offered Rate, or LmOR (The interest rate at which banks 
lend to each other), is commonly used as the floating rate. Payments between counterparts are 
usually netted, and a single amount is settled on each payment date. 
As a financial engineering tool swaps are very useful for offsetting fluctuations in interest rate 
changes. In their application to project fmance, each swap, as is to be expected, is based around 
an individual project cash flow and Clarke and Lousada report that for extensive maturities 
around and beyond twenty years, the swap has to be built out of a large number of underlying 
swap transactions. 
Swaps are becoming more common on the project finance market as more promoters gain 
knowledge and expertise in the field. One high profile project that has used swaps is the 
London Underground where swaps were used to convert the floating rate funding into fixed 
(NAO 2000). 
The instruments discussed in this section have been those that are conc~rned with structuring of 
the debt portion of a project's financing. These provide ways of increasing the flexibility and 
efficiency of borrowing. Whilst bank debt is cheaper than equity there is a trend for promoters 
to move to bond issuance. Although banks are pressured to provide competitive alternatives 
through loan provisions they are not too hard done by some of the developments in fmancial 
instruments. By offering fee earning services that enable them to bring bond deals to the 
market, banks do not end up with large amounts of risk-tied capital on the their balance sheets, 
although they may have to provide a certain amount of short term bridging fmance 
The use of the fmancial instruments discussed in the preceding sections can give rise to 
numerous permutations of fmancial arrangements that allow for optimising of the funding 
structure. The sources of debt and equity also need to be considered, as the market constraints 
need to be examined when developing the fmancial package. The capacity of the debt and 
equity markets, their willingness to invest, their preferred risk profiles and the levels of return 
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required are some of the issues that need to be considered when exploring the sources of 
fmance. 
1.4 CAPITAL MARKETS 
l'he previous sections have explored some of the elements in engineering _equity and debt 
fmancing. Any capital sourced for a project will fall in one or both of these categories. The only 
possible exception would be direct government grants, which for the purposes of fmancial 
engineering is considered in this chapter under equity. Although sponsors and banks raise 
equity and debt respectively, capital markets can and do provide an expansive source for both 
equity and debt, and their role as a source for raising equity on the domestic and international 
stage is discussed in the previous chapter. 
By accessing capital markets rather than conventional medium term financing, the promoters 
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the tradability of the inst!Uments. ~his increased range reduces costs to the borrower due to 
competition and the different return expectations of the investors. 
Jverall, the increasing sophistication of the innovative instruments within the project fmance 
market, some of which are discussed in this chapter, is placing pressure on banks to maintain 
their position as providers of the greater portion of fmance for proj ects. They are responding by 
developing their ability to place and trade the new instruments. This seems to be, in the near 
future at least, constrained to the developed countries where the capital markets have the ability 
and means to engineer innovative investment and fmancing options as the need arises. 
fhe story is slightly different with developing economies where the domestic markets when 
they exist or are effective at all, offer very limited absorbing capacity while demanding higher 
rates and offering shorter maturities than offshore markets. Guasch (1996: p368) reports that in 
the early 1990's domestic financing of infrastructure investments was infeasible in Latin 
America. ill 1994 maturities longer than three years were almost unheard off except perhaps in 
Argentina, which has one of the most developed capital markets in the region. 
Jccasionally fmancial engineering may backfrre as with the famous Eurotunnel. Due to the 
hugeness of the undertaking, the joint companies were allowed to issue shares first to private 
institutional investors, and then to the public even though the works hadn't begun. The massive 
initial public offering (IPO) helped to create such a wide distribution of shares that effectively 
diffused power within the equity holders, and this left the contractors with greater control over 
the project companies as well as the contracting consortium. The contractors were able to issue 
claims for variation orders with little control by the non-contracting shareholders and although 
the situation was eventually remedied, it was not until cost overruns exceeded 100% of the 
original estimated project cost. 
It is then obvious that where independent investors are involved by way of the capital markets, 
the overall impact on the management of the project needs to be considered carefully. Also, 
managing the needs of these investors is markedly different to situations where the project 
participants provide the equity. The needs of these third party investors must be borne in mind 
when conducting negotiations. These considerations are of great importance especially now that 
initial equity holders look to transferring their equity stakes early on in the project cycle to 
maintain a high IRR for their investments 
4.5 SPECIALISED FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS 
Several f~~ncial institutions exist which can be involved in the financiIlg of ~ project in one 
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~ay or another to ultimately improve tE:l?_ fi~ancial ,<luali!Y..9f the goj.ect. Their involvement 
may be by way of financial consulting and advice, or by loans and equity participation. 
Depending on the situation aid grants may also be made. A feature of these institutions also of 
great importance is the guarantee service that they offer. Guarantees have been discussed in 
great detail in earlier chapters and their impact on creditworthiness of a project described. The 
involvement of these institutions could be very significant in building or improving investor 
confidence in an otherwise seemingly risky project. Some of these institutions such as the 
W orId Bank and other Development agencies may have almost altruisRc origins and drivers, 
but they are aware that private sector participation and commercialisation is crucial to realising 
many of their desired goals. In the context of project fmancing fmancial institutions as 
discussed here include special infrastructure funds such as those set up to promote private 
participation in infrastructure provision. Institutions such as the EIF and EIB as discussed in the 
previous chapter may also be included in this category. 
Qne way of addressi!1.Klh~~~~~i~.~~!~S !~_ a .~o~~~.~~_ ~?~e_s~~~_.~~b~ market is by __ ~~~ating 
specialised institutions to deal with infrastructure financing. Examples are the Pakistan Private 
'--, __ .....-_r __ ·-_··· __ "'_ ..... _ --- __ " __ " .. _ _ __ .. ____ ~.c_ "___ _ __ _ _ ___ -._ 
Sector Energy Development Fund, established in 1998, which provides subordinated loans to 
, 
private sector power projects, and the Jamaica Private Sector Energy Fund established in 1992 
to provide long-term finance. Another example of such an institution is Partnership UK (PUK) 
set up in the UK to succeed the Treasury Taskforce. PUK is itself a PPP with a 49% 
government stake and encourages the financing of projects by providing advisory services to 
the private sector and also by taking equity stakes in projects. 
·.5.1 Options Provided By Financial Institutions 
llese institutions are able to provide private promoters with various options that could improve 
:he structure ofa project's finance package. Ahluwalia (1997: plOl) discusses the role of such 
nstitutions; some of the options they provide are highlighted below. 
• Take-out financing. Occasionally a project requires initial early financing in the form of 
short-term debt (such as credit from suppliers to fmance equipment purchase), which is 
refinanced later by longer-term debt. A specialised fmancial institution may, for a 
commercial fee, be able to guarantee such refinancing at a predetermined fmancing cost. 
Essentially, the project is therefore assured that should the refmancing not be available on 
specified terms when needed, the institution will either provide the funds directly or 
reimburse the difference between the predetermined cost of fmancing and the cost at 
which funds can be raised. 
• Liquidity Support. By creating a market or by providing support in the form of put options 
(see section 4.2.2) the institutions are able to encourage bond issuance. 
• Securitisation. Being involved in a string of successfully operating infrastructure projects 
allows the specialised fmancial institution to pool assets and hence reduce risk by 
diversification. 
• Direct Financing. Specialised financial institutions could be approached for direct 
fmancing (on a limited scale). This would give confidence to potential investors and could 
leverage larger flows of funds from other sources. As with mezzanine financing, 
subordinated loans from specialised financial institutions, for example, could improve 
senior debt and stimulate a larger flow of total resources at reduced costs. 
)epending on the institution involved there are occasional peculiarities or conditions stipulated 
by the institution that may pose some problems. For instance, many Finance- Operate projects 
tn the UK. have benefited from involvement of the EIB and EIF. Some projects may fmd 
llowever, as with some bidders for DBFO projects, that as the EIB does not take construction 
phase risk, bank guarantees need to be in place to support its loan during the construction phase. 
[n practice, the time and internal approval process required by EIB to provide funds could also 
mean that it may be difficult for bidders to blend EIB and commercial bank or bond funding. 
fhe difficulty involved with EIB funding has been considered in some projects to outweigh the 
)otential cost saving (Highways Agency 1998: p19). 
.5.2 Export Credit Agencies 
:xport Credit agencies play an increasingly important role in the project finance market and are 
mportant in the securing fmance for projects as their involvement provides extra confidence for 
enders lending against project cash flows. These agencies effectively offer coverage in the 
orm of providing creditworthiness to investments. This way, companies can ~se export credit 
1gencies in their country to improve the creditability of their investments abroad. 
'he ECGD, (Export Credit Guarantee Department) is the UK's official export credit agency and 
s a governmental agency of the Department of Trade and Industry that offers guarantees for 
nvestment by UK's companies in other countries, particularly developing countries. Examples 
)f guarantees that are offered (a maximum of £ 100 million of loan principal or equity plus 
etained earnings, maximum term of 15 years) include those against currency transfer risks, 
:xpropriation and war, revolution and civil disobedience (ECGD 2001). 
>ther examples of organisations that provide Export Credit facilities include: 
• United States Export-Import Bank ("USExim"): generally for creditworthy U.S exporters, 
U.S. financial institutions, creditworthy foreign importers to the U.S, and foreign fmancial 
institutions. Coverage in form of direct export loans or guarantees. 
• The Export-Import Insurance division of Japan's Ministry of International Trade and 
Industry (MITI). A governmental agency providing coverage mainly for Japanese 
companies and non-Japanese companies registered in Japan. 
• Export Import Bank of Japan. ('Jexim'). Provides limited political risk coverage limited to 
loans from financial institutions (and branches) in Japan for the funding of recently 
privati sed business and related industries in developing countries. Unusually, here the 
coverage is not limited to Japanese export financing. 
• 
• 
Export Development Corporation of Canada (EDC) 
OECD member countries (Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development) 
have also each established export credit agencies that are similar to the ones above. See 
www.oecd.org for the current list of members and further details (OECD 2001). 
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4.6 MUL TILATERAL AND BILATERAL INSTITUTIONS 
Multilateral Institutions, or agencies, function between and across several borders. This is 
different to bilateral agencies which are agencies established in the parent countries that 
promote economic development activities between the parent country and others. It could be 
said that multilateral agencies do not have a parent country but are owned by all the member 
countries. Examples of multilateral institutions include the Inter-American Development Bank 
(IDB) and the World Bank (see Table 3.1 in preceding chapter for other examples). 
The IDB is an international fmancial institution created in 1959 to help accelerate the economic 
and social development of Latin America and the Caribbean. The IDB Group also includes the 
Inter-American Investment Corporation and the Multilateral Investment Fund, which promote 
private sector development in the region. The IDB is owned by its 46 member countries: 26 
borrowing countries in Latin America and the Caribbean and 20 non-borrowing countries (16 
European Countries, U.S.A, Japan, Canada and Israel). The non-borrowing countries use the 
IDB as a tool for strengthening economic relations with more countries in the Latin American 
and Caribbean region than would be possible with just bilateral institutions (IDB 2000). 
Another major multilateral institution is of course the World Bank (officially known as the 
International Bank for Reconstruction and Development - illRD). The bank is part of the World 
Bank Group, which also consists of the International Development Agency (IDA), the 
International Finance Corporation (IFC), the Multilateral Investment Guarantees Agency 
(MIGA), and the International Centre for the Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID). About 
50% of the shares in the World Bank are owned by developing nations whilst the largest 
industrial countries, known as the Group of Seven or G-7 (Canada, France, Germany, Italy, 
Japan, the United Kingdom, and the United States) have about 45 percent with the United 
States having the largest shareholding of about 17% (illRD 2001). 
The World Bank is very much pro-private finance but primarily in the developing world. There 
are two types of World Bank lending. The first type is for developing countries that are able to 
pay near-market interest rates. The money for these loans comes from investors around the 
world when these investors buy bonds issued by the World Bank. The second type of loan goes 
to the poorest countries, which are usually not creditworthy in the international fmancial 
markets and are unable to pay near-market interest rates on the money they borrow. The World 
Bank cannot issue bonds to raise money that would finance lending to these countries. Lending 
to the poorest countries is done by the World Bank affiliate, the International Development 
Association (IDA). IDA lends an average of about $6 billion a year to the world's poorest 
countries and its credits are free of interest, carry a low 0.75 percent annual administrative 
charge, and are very long term-35 or 40 years including 10 years grace (IDA 2001). 
Projects in developing countries approach multilateral agencies as their involvement improves 
the creditability of the project and as such can attract more private investors. By engineering 
such enhancements as MIGA guarantees, a project company can protect itself and the project 
from default risks by the sovereign state. However the involvement of these multilateral 
institutions may raise issues of control and interference as they may demand levels of 
involvement and stricter satisfaction of criteria such as environmental considerations. 
Bilateral institutions/agencies are very similar to multilateral agencies except, as mentioned 
earlier that bilateral agencies attempt to develop and improve economic relations between one 
parent country (where the agency is established) and other countries. Bilateral agencies are set 
up by governments (mostly developed countries) to develop economic ties with other countries 
to offer fmancial support for development and in so doing benefit from supply and procurement 
opportunities. These agencies work closely with bilateral agencies in other countries and with 
the World Bank (DFID 2001). 
Examples of bilateral agencies include the UK's Department for International Development 
(DFID - formerly known as Overseas Development Administration), the United States Agency 
for International Development (USAID) , Australian Agency for International Development 
(AusAid), and the Deutsche Gesellschaft fur Technische Zusammenarbeit (GTZ) GmbH. Other 
examples are listed in Table 4.1. 
A project company may again approach its country's bilateral agency to participate financially 
in a project abroad, particularly if the project structure can be engineered such as to allow for 
participation of the country's private sector firms in the project. 
The in~olvement of a bilateral or multilateral organisation in a project may improve the 
creditability of the project and hence potentially lower the fmancing costs. The contacts and 
relationship that exist between these agencies and sovereign states across the world may also 
help to expedite the implementation of a project. 
'J/ 
Austrian Development Co-operation 
Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA) 
Danish Development Agency (DANIDA) 
Department for International Development Co-operation (Finland) 
Agence fran9aise de deveiopement (AID) 
Irish Aid 
Japan Bank for International Co-operation (JBIC) 
Japan International Co-operation Agency (nCA) 
Kreditanstalt fUr Wiederautbau (KFW) 
Netherlands Development Co-operation 
New Zealand Official Development Assistance (NZODA) 
Norwegian Agency for Development Co-operation 
Swedish International Development Co-operation Agency (SIDA) 
Swiss Agency for Development and Co-operation (SDC) 
(Source: World Bank http://www.worldbank.orglhtmllextdr/institutionslbilaterals.htm) 
Table 4.1: Bilateral Agencies 
4.7 ALLOCATION OF RISK 
There is scope for fmancial engineering by manipulating the risk allocation. Emerson (1983) 
notes that this requires the identification of two broad categories of risk: the lenders' risk and 
investors' risks. It is the author's view that perhaps a third category should be included, that of 
the public sector's risks. Though this may seem to depart from the dogma that private financing 
is all about transferring risk to the private sector, it is suggested in view of the increasing 
partnering that is occurring between the public and private sector manifested in the new wave 
of PPP's. This is also in line with a recent report by the UK's Institute of Public Policy and 
Research (IPPR) which advocates further evaluation of the partnering mechanisms vis-a-vis 
risk transfer and allocation, IPPR (2001). Generally lenders are usually prepared to only accept 
post completion risks, expecting that the promoters and investors take on all the pre-completion 
risks. The engineering of the finance of projects by risk allocation is however outside the scope 
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of this study and will not be considered here. Nevitt P.K (1983) and Emerson (1983) are 
examples of texts that cover this area in more depth. 
4.8 EXPLOITATION OF COMMERCIAL OPPORTUNITIES 
As already mentioned in the preceding chapter there is o~casionally scope in p_rivately financed 
projects for commercial innovation to create an inflow of cash. These innovations can be woven 
into the fabric of the concession agreement to provide different sources of revenue. Although 
funds that can be obtained from commercial opportunities are seldom accessible until the post-
completion stage, or until the venture is effectively online, there are ways of exploiting 
commercial opportunities earlier if innovation is applied in engineering the contract terms and 
the fmancial package. 
A good example is the BOT concession of the Eastern Harbour Crossing in Hong Kong 
awarded to a consortium led by Japanese contractor Kumagai Gumi. The crossing was to 
comprise of road and rail tunnels, which would be tolled. The concession also provided for the 
construction of the new Lam Tin Station at the crossing. In Hong Kong, dwellings near Mass 
Transit Railway (MTR) stations are highly desirable for obvious reasons, and no doubt with this 
in mind, the consortium managed to secure, under a separate agreement, property development 
rights above the station. 
From Figure 4.5 it can be seen what use these rights were put to. Eight large 33-storey 
apartment blocks were constructed by a joint venture between the consortium and a . local 
contractor set up for that purpose. Smith reports that most of these were pre-sold ahead of their 
construction (Smith 1999: p11S). By including this seemingly separate apartment block 
project, the consortium succeeded in strengthening its fmancial position in relation to the 
concession and in creating a source of revenue that was not directly related to the revenue 
stream anticipated from the traffic though the tunnels. Overall the IRR was increased from 4% 
to 12%. 
Another example is the previously mentioned Guangzhou-Shenzen Expressway which used the 
increased value to adjacent lands to cross-subsidise road construction costs. 
Opportunities for commercial innovation may prove to be rare however possible areas include 
tapping into the commercial aspects of airport retail in airport projects and the development of 
land corridors adjacent to road projects and improving the cash flow with revenue from the 
subsequent development of commercial properties on the corridor. 
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(Source: Smith, A.I. 1999: p114) 
Figure 4.5: Property development above Lam Tin Station, Eastern Harbour Crossing, Hong Kong 
Obviously the opportunities for such commercialisation may be few and far between but such 
innovations should always be looked for, as the favourable impact that they may have on the 
project revenue could be considerable. 
4.9 FINANCIAL ENGINEERING EXAMPLE 
The following details of a project finance deal are highlighted here in box 4.1 as illustration of 
some of the instruments and mechanisms that can be engineered into the fmancial package of a 
project. In March of 2000 Citibank led a $730 million loan and synthetic lease to fi nance 
Pacific Gas and Electrical (PG&E) National Energy Group 's 1,048 MW La Paloma gas fi red 
power generating plant. The details of La Paloma below are excerpts from Project Finance 
(2000: p 19). 
lUU 
This particular project fmancing has been chosen for illustrative purposes as it makes use of a 
variety of instruments. From the excerpt it can be seen that the fmancial engineering for this 
project has accessed the debt markets, using both a straight bank loan and a bond issue. The 
package is structured so that the commercial paper has not exceeded 50% of the financing. This 
was in accordance with views that bonds should not be issued for more than 50% of the debt 
required or the project may become unacceptably vulnerable to some of the bond risks 
discussed in the preceding chapter, (Smith 2001). 
BOX 4.1 La Paloma Project Details 
... La Paloma's $730 million financing includes a $25 million debt service reserve facility, $15 
million working capital, $374 million of commercial paper backed by the parent PG&E Corp., 
rated AI A3 and issued through a Citibank managed conduit, $295 million term loan B tranche, 
and $21 million in certificates. Sponsors also have a 55% equity stake. 
The loan is priced as follows: 137bp for the construction phase, 150bp for the end of the 
construction through year five, 225bp for years six through ten, 237.5bp for years 11 through 
maturity. 
" ... the large commercial paper funding, ..... is appealing to sponsors who like the low cost and 
security of payments. In addition, the commercial paper acts like a bridge loan during the 
construction period, except that commercial paper market funding costs maybe lower." 
"The commercial paper is funded in the market and the cost of it is backstopped by the banks. 
So in the event that the conduit falls through, the banks are on the hook, so the company 
always has certainty of funding. " 
A 100% cash sweep option loan after year seven of the loan's tenor is another feature of the 
financing PG&E National Energy Group selected so they would have an opportunity to 
refinance .... 
"The deal is door to door 18-years for the non-recourse loan and B-notes and the cash sweep is 
something that occurs beginning in the 17th year and we see it as a way for banks to recognise 
that we have a very strong incentive to refinance before the seventh year." 
There is also an element of credit enhancement as a rating has been sought for the bonds. The 
debt is structured to have a working capital with a reserve facility and a second tranche (B) has 
also been included. A large sponsor equity stake has also been built in. The bonding facility is 
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described as a cheaper option to a bridging loan for the construction period. The list of 
instruments and mechanisms used in this example is by no means exhaustive. It does however 
serve to show that the engineering of a project's financing is done bearing long-term intentions 
in mind such as that to refmance, and implementing structures that improve the flexibility, 
viability and returns of the project. 
4.10 SUMMARY 
This chapter has been structured to explore the engineering and structuring of financial sources 
in ways that provide the most profitable and robust fmancing arrangement for a privately 
fmanced project. The instruments and novel approaches that may be used in project fmancing 
as introduced in earlier chapters, and the permutations that may be arranged and the benefits of 
such arrangements, are discussed in great detail in this chapter. 
By discussing credit enhancement and the use of fmancial instruments as its main components, 
this chapter has introduced the concept of financial engineering. Credit enhancement has been 
explored with an introduction to guarantees and monoline wrapping of securities and the use of 
fmancial instruments was explained with debt and equity as the main categories under which 
the finance sources falL 
This chapter has investigated the means of engineering the equity component of the project's 
fmancing such as through the varying of equity terms and inclusion of value capture elements. 
There has also been an investigation into the innovative means through which the debt 
component, whether as bank loans, bonds or other forms of debt, can be structured in the 
package for improved profitability and success. 
Other approaches and tools for financial engineering, such as project leasing, mezzanme 
fmancing and interest rate swaps have also been addressed within this chapter. Capital markets, 
the involvement of fmancial institutions and the exploitation of commercial opportunities to 
improve the robustness of a project have been delved into within the structure of this chapter, as 
has the integration of these into a project's financing by financial engineering. 
Throughout, case studies have been used as illustrations and this chapter concludes by outlining 
details of a real project that incorporates several elements of financial engineering as a 
demonstration of its applicability. 
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CHAPTER FIVE 
BID DEVELOPMENT 
5.0 INTRODUCTION 
An appreciation of the processes involved in the engineering of project fmancial structures is 
required, in order that the contexts in which the approaches and methods employed in the 
following chapters exist are fully understood. For this reason this chapter is structured to afford 
an insight, fIrst into the progression of funding structure development, and then into the 
fmancial model; a tool created during such development and fundamental to the selection of an 
appropriate funding structure. The viewpoint of a bidder's financial adviser has been assumed. 
5.1 THE PROCUREMENT PROCESS 
Requests by the government for expressions of interest in any PFI projects are published in the 
Official Journal of the European Community (OJEC) (MoD 2003a). Private sector sponsors 
interested in participating in a project are subject to the procurement procedures put in place by 
the public sector. In the case of the UK these procedures are influenced by government policy 
and by requirements to conform to European procurement guidelines (lIM Treasury 2002). The 
UK's Office of Government Commerce (OGC) has produced a detailed step-by-step guide to 
the procurement process available on its website (OGC 1999). These procedures may differ 
cosmetically, i.e. naming conventions, from project to project and sector to sector but the 
overall approach is similar; with the procurer or public sector controlling the formats of the 
procedures involved. The broad categories below summarise the procurement stages. The 
fmancing strategy for the project will develop as further negotiations are entered into 
throughout the categories identified below and is manifested in the development of a financial 
model. As acknowledged in the report by SMi Group (SMi 2002), the provision of a financial 
model has become a key element of the project development process. The study conducted by 
Tiong (1995b) on the importance of a strong and viable fmancial package to the awarding of the 
contract also concludes that the inclusion of a sound financial package is key in the award of 
most privately financed contracts. 
As such, much of this study is concerned with the development and manipulation of a financial 
model. However at this stage it is necessary to enlarge on some of the considerations and 
processes that come into play during the procurement stages in relation to the financial strategy. 
• 
• 
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Pre-Qualification: Guidance from the OGe requires that interested parties responding 
to the OJEe Notice mentioned above should be evaluated against the minimum 
standards set for technical capacity, fmancial and economic standing and ability (where 
procurement is for services but not works) (OGe 1999). The purpose of the pre-
qualification process is to assess the competenoe of the interested parties and is not 
intended to deal with proposals for the particular project. The outcome of the pre-
qualification stage is a list of bidders suitable for consideration in the next stage of 
procurement, i.e. the invitation to tender 
Invitation To Tender (ITT): Here preliminary information on the project is given to 
the list of successfully pre-qualified bidders. On the basis of this information the bidders 
are required to submit an Outline Proposal for the project (MoD 2003a). Although the 
development of the project financing strategy commences as soon as a client expresses 
an interest in a project, the fmancial aspects with which this study is concerned are not 
really initiated until the ITT stage. The submitted proposal will include elements of the 
fmancing strategy to be adopted (Pwe 2002). The procurer evaluates the submitted 
proposals and a limited number of bidders are short listed for further negotiations. 
• Invitation To Negotiate (ITN): The short listed bidders are invited to submit a more 
detailed tender on which negotiations are based. More detailed financial details are 
required at this stage and features of the fmancial model are often specified in detail as 
part of the tender. Generally the model needs to show how the initial assumptions at 
ITT translate into cash flow and profits over the life of the project (SMi 2002). Some 
negotiations are conducted on the bids submitted by the short-listed bidders. NAO 
(2000; p4) illustrates how the development of the public sector comparator, against 
which tenders are evaluated, accompanies the !TN stage. For further information on the 
public sector comparator see the Treasury Task Force publication How to Construct a 
Public Sector Comparator (Treasury Taskforce Policy Statement No.5) and Public 
Sector Comparators and Value for Money (Treasury Taskforce Technical Note No.2). 
After the negotiations the client may seek a best and final offer (BAFO) on the basis of 
the clarified bids. 
• Best and Final Offer: The BAFO stage mayor may not be included in the procurement 
process and its inclusion should normally be stated in the !TN documentation (OGe 
1999). The MoD states in its guidelines that most MoD PFI projects have not required 
BAFO's but proceed to contract award based on the previous negotiations and the 
resulting bid ranking (MoD 2003a). The BAFO will include detailed information on the 
• 
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technical and fmancial aspects of the bid. The financial model is key at this stage and a 
Preferred Bidder is selected for the project based on the submitted BAFO's. The Office 
of Government Commerce recommends that in order to ensure value for money the 
Preferred Bidder should be required to run funding competitions, as lenders are more 
likely to offer more competitive terms to a Preferred Bidder (PFU 2002). This may be 
strengthened by the fact that by the BAFO stage the lenders should -have carried out 
further due diligence on the project and its participants. 
Contract Award and Financial Close: The end result of a successful BAFO 
submission is a contract binding the parties involved under the terms of the financial 
model and the terms and conditions of the concession contract. The project is said to 
have reached the Financial Close stage and this process of closing the deal is often 
lengthy and plagued with difficult negotiations. One of the final tasks before fmancial 
close is reached is that of establishing the Hedging Strategy. The strategy adopted at 
fmancial close will depend on the type of fmancing used. Usually but not always, 
100% of the debt will be hedged with an interest rate swap (see section 4.3.5). This 
effectively means that the SPY will pay a constant fixed rate on its debt obligations over 
the life of the swap. For instance money initially raised by way of a bond is held in a 
bond deposit account until required and it is usual for the interest rate on the bond 
deposit account to be hedged by means of derivative contracts such as Forward Rate 
Agreements- where rates to apply over a period are agreed in advance, or an Amortising 
Swap where the notional principal of the swap amortises or reduces over time. This 
helps to ascertain the potential returns by way of interest earned on the deposit account 
in the event of fluctuating interest rates. At fmancial close the inputs into the model will 
be fmalised and will form a binding contract. With fluctuating rates of interest and 
hedging pricing this can be tricky and it is usual to identify sections of the model that 
will require updating just before fmancial close so that the fmalising of the model can 
be done quickly and easily. These will normally be limited to reference interest rates. 
The contract is only awarded by successfully reaching fmancial close and the 
concession is normally considered to commence the moment the contracts are signed. 
5.2 CONSIDERATIONS DURING PROCUREMENT 
The ITT documents as issued by the public sector will include the Draft Concession Contract as 
the principal draft contract. This contract must be reviewed to assess its impact on the funding; 
this will primarily involve highlighting issues that may be of concern to the lenders, and the 
impact on the bankability of the project. Examination of the contract terms in reference to 
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responsibility for planning, payment mechanisms, termination provisions, compensation on 
termination, change and variation mechanisms andforce majeure, are important as these areas 
have a direct impact on the funding of the project and as such need to be carefully evaluated to 
ensure that a robust funding structure is designed. 
Furthermore, to ensure an informed strategy is adopted it is often, if not always necessary, to 
conduct a review and analysis of the market sector. Such analysis may include gathering 
information on other similar projects; researching and reviewing existing funding structures and 
funding providers; establishing a preliminary view on risk allocation; undertaking an analysis of 
strengths, weaknesses, opportunities and threats (SWOT analysis) on the competing bidders; 
and reviewing current public sector guidance on funding (Whittal 2002). The market sector 
analysis increases the chances of tender success and would enhance the fmancing strategy 
adopted. 
The fmancial model is key to the financing of the project. It is a complex tool and is used in 
choosing an optimal project funding structure for the project by way of analyses showing the 
key fmancial outputs of different financial structures. The outputs of the model provide 
important information to the project stakeholders. For the procurer (public sector) the model 
needs to demonstrate project viability and value for money. For the lenders a robust financing 
structure that assures repayment needs to be displayed, and for the shareholders the projected 
returns need to be commensurate with the capital at risk (SMi 2002). The model is almost 
always spreadsheet based (although database programmes can be used) and outlines the 
fmancial strategy from project start to fmish. It is normally structured on a semi annual basis 
(semi annual periods) and illustrates the financial robustness of the structure; a key factor in 
convincing lenders to fund the project. Typical outputs would include the Net Present Value 
(NPV) of the project, the gearing, and the projected cover ratios. The model also indicates the 
returns to the sponsors (MoD 2003b). 
The initial building of the fmancial model involves incorporating sponsor constraints on the 
project and model. Some of these may arise as a result of the sponsors' internal accounting 
practices or shareholders requirements. For instance shareholders may demand a specified 
minimum return from the project. Other restrictions may include limits on the amount and 
number of periods of losses and the amount of pure equity that the sponsor may inject into the 
project. Obviously excessive constraints will undoubtedly result in a sub-optimal funding 
structure. 
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At the earlier stages of the model development uncertainties abound: uncertainties such as those 
regarding the costing of the project activities and the terms and rates at which the project will 
be financed. The options of financing considered for the project have been discussed in earlier 
chapters and will include senior debt funding, i.e. bank loans, bond issues, leasing or 
combinations of these; equity financing, i.e. subordinated debt, mezzanine funding, pure equity, 
or combinations of these; and combinations of senior debt and equity fmanciY{g. Note here that 
subordinated debt is highlighted under equity. This is because an assumption is made that, as in 
many cases, the subordinated debt for the project is provided by the project shareholders. In the 
case of subordinated debt being provided by third parties it would be classed as a loan; junior to 
the senior debt (MoD 2003b). 
During the earlier preparatory stages of the model, indicative financing terms such as margins 
on loans and fmancing fees are obtained from potential lenders and these are used within the 
initial model. For this reason it is normal for a few assumptions to be made at this stage 
although these need to be documented in detail. 
In practice the costings of the project i.e. the cost breakdown of the construction and operation 
and maintenance schedules, is unlikely to have been finalised by the sponsors. Estimates are 
therefore required for use in the model. Indeed the finalised figures are often not received until 
hours before the final bid is to be submitted. This obviously limits the amount of time that can 
be dedicated by the fmancial adviser/ modeller to optimisation of the model. 
All projects need appropriate risk allocation and the manner and extent to which the public 
sector wishes to transfer risk to the private sector needs to be determined from the concession 
contract. The structure of the model, which will reflect the lenders view on the risk allocation, 
will also be impacted by the payment mechanism and any likely deductions associated with the 
mechanism. For this reason an extensive review of the risk allocation implicit in the concession 
contract and subsequently implemented through the secondary contracts needs to be conducted 
and considered whilst developing the model. 
Any innovative funding structures conceived need to be taken into account early on to ensure 
that the model is designed to cope with any peculiarities that may arise as a result. In 
establishing potential sources of funding for the project the lending institutions' experience of 
project fmance must be considered, as must their relationships with the sponsors. More 
importantly, consideration should be given to their arranging and underwriting capacity, the 
maximum debt tenor offered and their inclinations vis-a-vis the market rates for spreads and 
margins. The perceived complexity and reliability of the funding process must also be weighed 
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up. Privately financed projects are normally heavily dependent on debt as this often forms the 
majority of the financial package, and as such potential future lender difficulties need to be 
avoided as these could be fatal for the project. At the same time savings that could be made by 
comparing lending rates could be substantial and need to be sought. It is usual that lenders 
identified in this manner are contacted shortly afterwards and Confidentiality and Exclusivity 
Agreements signed with them to secure their possible services in the face of c~mpetition (PWC 
2002). 
Essentially a competition is held among the potential fmance provi~ers for the best financing 
terms. This may be done at the IIT stage to improve the initial bid and/or at BAFO stage as 
mentioned earlier at the request of the client (PFU 2002). It is important to keep the competitive 
tension as the fmancing costs are a major proportion of the project costs and as such the more 
favourable the terms the lower the NPV of the project will be. The potential lenders will base 
their submitted indicative rates based on preliminary information passed on by the consortium 
outlining the total funding requirement, the type of fmance, i.e. bank and or/bond, subordinated 
debt and/or pure equity, and total contributions required from the various debt and equity 
funding sources. Lenders will also require an outline of the sources and uses of funds during the 
construction stage, i.e. the highest risk stage. 
The potential lenders supply their rates and terms by way of a Term Sheet outlining the terms 
and conditions, fees, margins, constraints and the lenders' security over the project. A sample 
term sheet is given in Appendix A. Evaluation of the terms sheets in order to select the lending 
institutions to include in the bid in response to the IIT will include consideration of the 
following factors: total number of lenders to be selected; which terms produce the cheapest 
NPV; the deliverability of the financing terms and level of approval given by the lenders credit 
committee (lenders internal committee that approves lending transactions). It is also important 
to consider whether any banks have proposed equity participation as this reduces the total 
funding requirement from the sponsors. Equity participation by banks however is normally 
adopted at the expense of sponsor control over the project and may also increase the complexity 
of documentation and, as mentioned in section 3.2, may involve further legal complications. 
During the evaluation of PFI tenders the NPV of each bid submitted will be an important 
evaluation criteria. From the procurers point of view the NPV of the income stream is one, if 
not the, key evaluation criteria. Of the funding structures modelled by a bidder, the structure 
with the lowest NPV will be arrived at by optimisation of the model. Financial modellers agree 
that the three variables that dictate the optimal structure are cover ratio limits, equity return and 
gearing, (Douglas 2000; Woodings 2002). In practice the lenders' tenn sheets will specify the 
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minimum cover ratios they are willing to permit (see Appendix A), and as already mentioned, 
the sponsors will have indicated their minimum return requirements (SMi 2002; NHS 2001) 
Theoretically then, the option available to the fmancial modeller is the choice of gearing at 
which the model is optimal. This however is still not strictly true, as the term sheets will also 
have specified a gearing limitation. It can therefore be seen that the 'optimal' nature of an 
optimal model is rather subjective. Senior fmancial analysts agree that the lenders are often 
overcautious in their term sheets (Porter 2002). fu practice it is occasionally possible for 
modellers to renegotiate the gearing with the lenders without increasing the financing costs 
although changes are never too different from the lenders original figures. This is only normally 
done if the benefits are demonstrable and as long as the lenders risk exposure is unaffected or 
perhaps even reduced. The optimisation process of financial modelling is further discussed in 
Chapter Seven. 
Adherence to accounting standards is important in financial modelling if the model is to 
withstand audit. Although Taxation and Capital Allowances are not addressed in this study to 
any great degree they are complex areas subject to fuland Revenue rules and guidance. MoD 
(2003b) defmes capital allowances as allowances that a company can offset against profits 
chargeable to corporation tax if it is investing in capital equipment. Capital allowances 
effectively allow a reduction in the value of the project assets as in depreciation and this is 
implemented in project fmance for tax efficiency. There are strict tax rules governing capital 
allowance that prevent initial excessive write off as in depreciation. With capital allowance you 
reduce the profits that are subject to tax by reducing the value of the assets on the sheets. At the 
ITT stage an estimate as to the capital allowance will normally be sufficient in the 
determination of the funding structures however it is essential that at later stages, an expert 
opinion be sought regarding the correct rates for the calculation of the allowance as application 
of incorrect rates may lead to a material misstatement of the tax computation in the model. 
Many bidders use the capital allowances aggressively to improve the competitiveness of the 
bid, however the implementation must be prudent enough to withstand audit. 
The inputs and assumptions give rise to the Base Case Model and sensitivities are conducted to 
ensure that the model is sufficiently robust to withstand reasonable downside sensitivities. 
These analyses provide the sponsors with an indication of the sensitivity of the project to 
various factors including changes in CAPEX, OPEX and sponsor required returns. They also 
provide the lenders with comfort that in a reasonable downside scenario, they will still be repaid 
in full. The lenders will use the results to ensure that the cover ratios achieved are satisfactory. 
It is important that sufficient documentation of sensitivities must be kept such that each 
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scenario used in the sensitivity analysis can be recreated at any time in the future. One way of 
doing this is by using data or sensitivity tables where all the variables of the analysis are listed 
and from which the model will draw its inputs. 
The client will require that the fmancial model is submitted accompanied by Support Letters 
from the lenders verifying the contents of the Term Sheets (also included with the bid) and 
confirming their willingness to fmance the project (PFU 2002). Where there is a group of 
lenders for the project a common Term Sheet is agreed upon and submitted with the Support 
Letter. Occasionally bidders may decide to propose more than one funding solution for the 
project. fu these cases Support Letters and Term Sheets should be submitted for each financing 
solution (PwC 2002) 
5.3 SUMMARY 
This chapter has given a brief outline of the relevant stages involved when entering into a 
contract for a privately fmanced project. The context of funding structure development has also 
been explained. 
The development of the fmancial model has been identified as becoming significant at the 
fuvitation To Tender stage. At this stage the fmancial structure is designed around the 
specifications provide by the draft concession contract. The structure is also limited by the 
indicative terms and constraints provided by the lenders and shareholders. 
Short-listed bidders from the ITT stage are invited for further negotiations in the ITN stage. Best 
and Final Offers may be required of the bidders based on the renegotiated terms. A high level of 
technical and financial detail is essential at BAFO stage and greater commitment is required 
from the potential lenders to the project. Financial close is achieved after successful 
negotiations and the project commences as soon as the concession contract is signed. 
The details explained in this chapter offer an important background to the development of the 
model and the simulations run as part of this study. For this study the development of a 
fmancial model is achieved as would be for the stages described in this chapter. The processes, 
data and information required for this development are outlined in the following chapter and the 
structure and realisation of the model is detailed in Chapter Seven. 
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CHAPTER SIX 
DATA CAPTURE 
6.0 INTRODUCTION 
This Chapter outlines how data collection and interpretation is achieved. The selection of the 
data sample is explored and the criteria applied highlighted. The processes for data extraction 
from the sample are then discussed alongside the explanation of data interpretation and 
collation. 
The data extracted here is used to derive a generic project. This generic project is a theoretical 
project, details of which are developed from extensive review of several actual projects within 
the health sector. This review of projects is used to identify parameters that can be assumed to 
be typical to projects in the sector. A generic project is then structured around these parameters. 
The cost and financial profiling of this so developed project is explored in this chapter and this 
forms the basis of the fmancial model developed in Chapter Seven. 
6.1 DATA CLASSIFICATION 
The data required to develop the generic project is qualitative and quantitative in nature. The 
qualitative data encompasses the methods, models and processes of structuring fmance whilst 
the quantitative data consists of the financial details of project funding structures. With a view 
to meaningful analysis the qualitative and quantitative data is further classified into the 
following: 
• The processes initiated during proj ect finance structuring; 
• The fmancial tools used in this structuring; 
• Constraints and issues affecting structuring; 
• Financial terms and details of funding structures of existing projects. 
The first two classes fall under the qualitative umbrella whilst the last clearly involves 
quantitative data. The third, constraints and issues affecting structuring, could be either 
qualitative or quantitative as the constraints are often in the form of limitations in the financial 
terms but could also be due to external issues such as the economic outlook, policy or , 
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corporate strategy. These external issues are beyond the scope of this research but some of the 
impacts of these on the structuring are addressed. 
6.2 DATA COLLECTION AND INTERPRETATION 
The project finance market is highly commercially sensitive with most projects shrouded in 
corporate and government secrecy. As a result there is very little project specific information 
and even less project specific data in the public domain. Aside from the commercial concerns of 
cautious sponsors there is also political concern as the provision of public infrastructure and/or 
services by the private sector is often dogged by controversy. Indeed in some instances such as 
the London Underground project in the U.K., the procurement of the projects may be legally 
challenged (BBC 2002). For these reasons it has been extremely difficult to obtain meaningful 
data to support this study. 
Of the classes of data identified as necessary for this study, financial data is the least readily 
available information and almost all the firms and agencies contacted during the course of this 
research declined to release any such data for analysis or referral, citing commercial sensitivity 
and competitive pressures as reasons for refusal. This was not altogether unexpected as this 
issue was foreseen in the initial research proposal in the authors Transfer Report. The following 
sections describe the data selected for this study and the processes involved in the data capture 
and interpretation. 
6.2.1 Data Sample 
The hard data required consists of explicit financial details from a sample of several projects. 
The sample is a pool of Health Projects in the UK mostly procured under the Private Finance 
Initiative. Using projects from within the same sector enables the assumption to be made that 
the project conditions and required standard of the facility and/or service are common to these 
projects or at least very similar. On examination of the sample projects, trends and typical 
ranges of the relevant values were identified. From these trends and ranges, characteristic 
details for the financial structure of a project were then generated. The supposition was that 
from the sample pool of health projects, a 'typical' project with a fmancial structure in line with 
the trends displayed by the sample would be arrived at which could, for the purposes of this 
study, be considered to be generic to the health sector. The details of this generic project could 
then be used for further analysis. This procedure ensures that the data used for further analysis 
is representative of actual project financial structures in the market within this sector, whilst the 
confidentiality of the project details within the sample remains protected. 
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Whilst definitions and criteria (such as project size, financial mechanisms employed and date of 
fmancial close) for selecting the projects to include in the sample were initially drawn up, the 
level of data actually accessible made adherence to most of these impossible. Due to limitations 
on the amount of data available the criteria eventually used in the selection procedure was 
primarily that the sample was to consist of projects procured by means of concession contracts 
and all within the same sector. In particUlar health sector projects were selected, as it was 
considered that elements of the asset and service provision involved are perhaps more similar 
between projects than may be the case in other sectors. Other criteria applied included that the 
projects be of very similar concession lengths and, as the data w<;mld have to be extracted 
largely from the projects' financial models, that the model layouts facilitate such extraction. 
The time scale of this thesis (three years) and the amount of work involved in the processes 
outlined below dictate that a restriction be placed on the size of the sample to retain feasibility 
of the study. However, too small a sample may not provide enough or convincing data, whilst 
too large a sample could become cumbersome. For this reason eight health projects were 
considered for the sample with five deemed suitable for inclusion under the criteria above. 
6.2.2 Data Collection, Measurement and Interpretation 
Figure 6.1 outlines the stages involved in the processes of data collection, measurement and 
interpretation. In an effort to source data for this research several parties were contacted. These 
included project companies (SPV's), members of project consortia (sponsors), financial 
advisers and banks, almost all of who were unwilling to make any data available for this 
research. The author however, was able to secure a stay of ten weeks in a shadowing capacity 
with the Project Finance and Privatisations Group (now Infrastructure and Government 
Utilities) of PricewaterhouseCoopers (PwC), determined as the market leader for project 
fmance by Project Finance International in its project fmance league tables of January 2002. 
Much of the initial quantitative and qualitative data was collected during this period from a 
number of project fmance deals. By sourcing the data from project details available to, and 
structured not just by PwC, but also by various other parties, the potential for bias within the 
project structures was eliminated. 
The data required for the study was extracted from the collated sample by detailed manual 
examination of the projects' financial models, all of which are structurally different. The list of 
data required was driven by the required inputs for the generic project's financial model (see 
Chapter Seven) and as such the schedules of data extracted were designed to match that of the 
model. 
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Data Sourcing 
Sample 
Project 1 Project 2 Project 3 Project 4 Project 5 
Determination of 
Characteristic Cost 
Profile 
Indicators 
Subject to 
External 
Influences 
Generic 
Project 
ProiIle 
(Base Cases) 
Determination of 
Characteristic 
Financing Profile 
Figure 6.1: The data collection, measurement and interpretation processes. 
The extracted data is grouped into two: 
• Cost and Revenue Data. This consists of the development costs up till contract award, 
construction and operational costs, and information on the revenue stream of the 
project. The data on construction costs is scheduled on a monthly basis. This is to 
ensure that the cost trend over the construction period is sufficiently reflected. 
Development costs refer to the project related costs that are incurred by the sponsors or 
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the project company itself prior to fmancial close, i.e. up contract award, (Yescombe 
2002). For modelling purposes these costs are scheduled for repayment in the ftrst 
period of construction and as such the development cost data here was collected 
alongside the construction costs data. Operational costs are those incurred after the 
facility is online and in operation. These include the day-to-day running costs as well as 
the major maintenance costs. There are various forms the revenue str~am for a project 
may take including user pays (tolls), shadow tolls and government service payments. 
The revenue stream for the generic project was determined to be of the form of a ftxed 
annual service payment to the SPV. The operational cost and revenue stream data are 
extracted together as these are scheduled semi annually over the project's life. 
• Financial Data. This is data relevant to the ftnancing aspects of the projects in the 
sample, i.e. the fmancial instruments used and information on the projects' ftnancial 
structure. Much of this information is also present on a project's Term Sheet (see 
section 5.2) 
Outlines of the data sheets populated with the data extracted are located in Appendix B and can 
be referred to for a list of data items required. 
6.2.3 Cost Prof't1ing the Generic Project 
To obtain a construction cost proftle for the generic project the average construction expenditure 
within the sample over the construction phase was calculated from the cost data gathered. This 
expenditure was processed further to determine average unit construction expenditure. As the 
sample is comprised of health sector projects the Hospital Bed was assumed and applied as the 
Unit, computing the average construction cost per unit (or bed) over the construction period. 
These costs were then adjusted for the differing construction phase lengths across the sample. 
Figure 6.2 graphs the average construction cost per unit (i.e. per bed) calculated based on all the 
projects in the sample. The imposed trend line on the graph shows that the unit construction 
cost can be considered to rise gradually during the initial construction months, peaking almost 
halfway through construction before decreasing gradually till the end of construction. 
The actual average unit construction cost proftle plotted in Figure 6.2 has been selected as the 
construction proftle for the generic project. Figure 6.3 illustrates that this average expenditure is 
very similar to the average unit cost proftles exhibited by projects 1,2,3 and 4 and can be said to 
be representative of 80% of the sample projects. Project 5 exhibits much higher costs over a 
much shorter construction phase. The use of the average cost proftle as opposed to the trend 
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line ensures that the often ' peaky ' nature of construction expenditure that occurs in proj ects. the 
sample projects being no exception, is accounted for. 
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Figure 6.2: Average construction cost per bed for data sample 
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Figure 6.3: Individual sample projects ' monthly construction cost profile and the average monthly 
construction cost profile 
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Review of the development cost data available indicates that the development costs within the 
sample are consistently applied as comprising costs incurred up to the award of the contract. 
For the purposes of cost scheduling within the sample these are assumed to occur in the first 
period of construction. As development costs are project specific an approach has been adopted 
for determining the development costs for the generic project which involves viewing the 
sample development costs as a percentage of the total financing amount for each sample 
project. Table 6.1 lists the proportions as determined from the sample projects. 
Sample Project 
Project 1 
Project 2 
Project 3 
Project 4 
Project 5 
Average 
Development Costs as a 
Proportion of Total Financing 
2.38% 
Unknown 
7.17% 
4.57% 
4.44% 
4.64% 
Table 6.1: Development costs of sample as a proportion of total project financing. 
As Table 6.1 indicates the development cost profile for the sample can be said to average 4.64% 
of total fmancing. This average has been applied so that the development cost of the generic 
project is fixed at 4.64% of the total fmancing figure and it is assumed that, as exhibited by the 
sample, this is representative of the project fmance market. 
Profiling of the generic project's operational costs was achieved much the same way as the 
construction costs. Figure 6.4 charts the operational costs per bed for each project in the sample 
and also plots the average operational unit cost. The operational unit costs are scheduled on a 
semi annual basis, as the operational phase of the projects are scheduled semi annually. As can 
be seen from Figure 6.4 the projects have different operational phase lengths. For this reason 
the profiles are charted from the first operational period. The average operational unit cost in 
anyone period is based on figures derived only from projects that are still operational in that 
period. As with the construction costs, this average unit cost profile has also been selected as 
the operational unit cost to be applied to the generic project. 
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Figure 6.4: Semi-annual operational unit cost profile of sample. 
6.2.4 Financial Profiling of the Generic Project 
The financial profiling of the generic project was achieved by an extensive review of the sample 
projects. The financial models were explored and details relating to the financial structure 
extracted. The extraction was done in tandem with the initial stages of the generic model design 
(see Chapter Seven); the inputs required for the generic model again dictating the list of data 
extracted from the sample. The financial data items extracted from the sample are listed in the 
financial details data sheets in Appendix B, and include vital items such as gearing, facility 
amounts, key financial terms and rates, margins and fees , and key dates to determine lengths of 
construction and operational phases. From the data extracted a typical financing structure and 
typical terms were determined for a project in the health sector. 
The cost and financial profiling carried out result in an initial project structure and set financia l 
terms. As mentioned above these have been applied to the generic project thus creating an 
initial base case for the generic project; one against which structures resulting from changes to 
the terms or financing structure are later compared. Appendix C is a record of all initial input 
values used to derive this initial base case model. 
The qualitative data collected comprises processes involved in modelling fi nancial structures, 
the different mechanisms available for financing, and suitable measures for use as Key 
Performance Indicators (KPl' s). The qualitati ve data was gathered fro m di sc uss ions with 
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fmancial consultants and modellers during the shadowing period at PwC, from material 
reviewed during earlier stages of this research, and from examination and scrutiny of possible 
outputs of the financial modelling process. 
Most of the qualitative data is difficult to record formally but is revealed in this study through 
the design and structuring of a fmancial model (see Chapter Seven), the discussions 
accompanying the development of the model, the process of simulating different financing 
structures with the model, and the analysis of the outputs from such simulations as in Chapter 
Eight. 
Key Performance Indicators Performance Element 
Gearing Exposure 
Equity Return Profitability 
Cover Ratios Robustness 
NPV of the Revenue Stream Profitability 
Table 6.2: The key performance indicators. 
The performance indicators were identified as the outputs of the fmancial model that are best 
suited to reflecting the impact of change in financial structure. By design these indicators are 
determined in the Outputs section of fmancial models (see Chapter Seven). Key Performance 
Indicators were derived by initially identifying which of the indicators would help quantify the 
fore mentioned impact and then considering those of greatest concern to the main parties 
involved in the project, i.e. the sponsors, the lenders and the client or public sector. This was 
done by review of the information required of the financial models by the client, as indicated in 
the ITN and requests for BAFOs; the fmancial details considered by the lenders during the due 
diligence procedure; and the shareholders requirements of the developed fmancial model 
(Douglas 2000; NHS 2001; OGC 1999; PwC 2002). Considering stakeholders' concerns in the 
event of an altered financial structure helped to identify these aspects as profitability, exposure 
to risk and robustness. Table 6.2 lists these performance indicators and specifies the area of 
project performance reflected by each. This is consistent with the material reviewed in earlier 
chapters and with the measures used within the project fmance market for project evaluation. 
6.3 SUMMARY 
Due to the commercial sensitivity that exists in this field project data is very difficult to come by 
and financial information on projects is kept very closely guarded. This chapter has outlined the 
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process undertaken to collect, interpret, and manipulate data for this thesis. The data sample 
consisted of projects realised by project financing methods, procured by means of concession 
contracts and all within the same sector. In particular health sector projects were selected, as it 
was considered that elements of the asset and service provision involved are perhaps more 
similar between projects than may be the case in other sectors. The sample was then used as the 
source for direct data extraction. The data collected thus was used to determine typical 
characteristics that might be considered as generic to projects in the health sector. These 
features were then used as parameters around which a generic project to suit the health sector 
was developed. Some of the characteristics derived in this manner include the cost and financial 
profiles for the generic project. By creating a theoretical project in this manner the 
confidentiality of the data sources is maintained, without jeopardising validity of the study. The 
following chapter details the development of a financial model for the generic project arrived at 
in this chapter. 
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CHAPTER SEVEN 
DEVELOPMENT OF THE GENERIC MODEL 
7.0 INTRODUCTION 
A significant part of this study involves the design and development of a fmancial model as a 
tool for realising the research objectives. This section outlines the model structure so designed 
and describes relationships between the different components. Any assumptions that were made 
in the development are highlighted and the reasons behind them summarised. The data used to 
design and populate the model was collected as detailed in the previous chapter. 
The model was built after extensive review of several professionally developed models for 
various privately fmanced projects, run by various consortia. The structure and contents of a 
professional financial modelling training course as provided to PricewaterhouseCoopers for it's 
financial modellers was also studied, and contributed to the initial development stages. 
Throughout the development of the model dialogue was maintained with several fmancial 
modellers around the country and advise sought where and when necessary. 
The latter sections of this chapter introduce the optimisation process as carried out during 
fmancial modelling. This process attempts to manipulate the model parameters and to strike a 
balance between minimising financial cost and maximising profitability subject to the lenders' 
and shareholders' constraints. 
7.1 MODEL STRUCTURE 
The overall structure and logic of the model is illustrated in Figure 7.1. The model developed 
can be very broadly classified into Inputs, Calculations and Processing, and Outputs. For the 
modelling process the project life, which can run to several decades, is divided into semi annual 
periods. This is reflected in the schedules for the inputs, the processing of the data and the 
outputs of the model. The following sections elaborate on the structure of the model as created 
in Microsoft's Excel Spreadsheets package under the categories identified above. Different 
sections of the model are contained and manipulated on separate worksheets within the same 
Excel workbook and these are identified in the text. 
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Figure 7. 1: The structure and logic of the financial model. 
7.2 I NPUTS 
The Inputs section is the primary section of the model and its contents form the basis for the 
development of processes for the other sections. All inputs to the model are made into thi s 
section and are classified into Non-Time Based Inputs (NTBI) and Time Based Inputs (TBI). 
Non-Time Based Inputs refer to the input data, information or assumptions that do not change 
with time i.e. from period to period. Examples would be the margin on a loan or the start and 
stop dates for construction and operational phases. Reference by other model sections to data 
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items in this section is absolute, for example the input value for the margin on the loan would 
be referred to and applied unchanged throughout the project regardless of the project period. 
Time Based Inputs are those input data and assumptions that are expected to change from 
period to period. For instance the indices applied to reflect inflation would need to change every 
period. The project expenditure is also expected to differ from period to period. Reference by 
the model to the data in this section can be said to be relative, as reference to the TBI is only 
made to input data in corresponding project periods. 
Due to the period specific nature of the TBI, for each data item calculations are required to 
determine the appropriate figures for each period of the project. In the case of the inflation 
example mentioned above, a fixed input value for inflation would require the calculation of the 
applicable indices for each project period to represent such inflation. The NTBI however 
contains no calculations. 
7.2.1 Non-Time Based Inputs 
These are inputs and assumptions that do not change in time i.e. for the duration of the project. 
The Non-Time Based Inputs (NTBI) set the boundaries of the project. As mentioned previously 
there are no calculations here and reference to these is made and applied as they are input; 
unchanged throughout the model. Inputs into the NTBI section will fall under some of the 
following areas: 
Key Dates: These are the important dates that defme the project and include dates such as start 
and completion dates for the construction phase, and the operation and maintenance phase of 
the project. Other key dates include commencement of drawdowns on the debt, repayment of 
debt, and initiation of fmancing mechanisms or processes such as the indexation of revenues (to 
match inflation) or capitalisation of interest. 
Accounting Assumptions: Inputs and assumptions relating to the taxation treatment of the 
project, depreciation and capital allowances, and the financial statements are recorded in this 
section. This area of project fmancing is complex and some expertise is required to ensure that 
the appropriate taxation treatment is applied. 
Dividends: Any constraints placed on dividend payments are listed here. In project financing the 
dividend payments are restricted by retained profit or loss as stated in the profit and loss 
accounts with dividend payments not usually made until later stages of the project. This is 
because the huge cumulative accounting losses made during the early stages of the project need 
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to be diminished by profits once operations become profitable. Dividends are usually only paid 
out when the cumulative losses are reduced to zero and an overall cumulative profit is recorded. 
Reserve Accounts: These accounts are for accumulation of funds to offset expenditure or cash 
outflow at a later date. Two such accounts are used in this study: the Debt Service Reserve 
Account (DSRA), which funds the debt service payments, and the Major Maintenance Reserve 
Account (MMRA) , which funds the major maintenance expenses. For this study a strategy 
commonly adopted by financial modellers to finance these accounts is used. In each period, 
50% of the debt service due in the following period is deposited in the DSRA; for the MMRA 
the following percentages of future expenditures are deposited: 100% of the next period's major 
maintenance expenditure, 66% of the period after that (next period + 1), and 33% of the period 
after that (next period + 2). As of the start of the first operational period the reserve accounts 
would not have accumulated funds and for this reason it is assumed that the accounts are pre-
funded in the period before operations to ensure that the required balance of the reserve 
accounts is met. The calculations for the reserve accounts are done through the Cash Dedication 
Mechanism or Cash Cascade Sheet. 
Financing: The financing options and the terms of such options are listed in this section. The 
options included in the model for this study are Senior Bank Loans, Bonds, Subordinated 
Loans, Equity Bridge Loans, and Pure Equity partiCipation. The terms for the financing options 
as input into the NTBI sheet are mostly taken from the facility Term Sheets as introduced in 
Chapter Five and include the maximum facility amount, margins/spread, fees, term of the 
facility and date for drawdowns, repayment and interest capitalisatiOlY. The reference rates for 
the facilities are also specified (LmOR for senior and subordinated loan; Gilts for Bonds), as 
are the interest rates applicable on any cash deposits. Monoline wrapping has been built into the 
model as an option for credit enhancement and the terms for this option are input here with the 
financing terms. The gearing or debt/equity ratio of the funding structure also forms an input in 
this section and the percentage composition of the total funding structure from all the options is 
highlighted. The model has been designed to include switches allowing selection and 
deselecting of the different fmancing options. The switches here permit the selection of 
mono line wrapping, indexation of the bonds, use of an equity bridge loan and the selection of a 
debt repayment option (annuity or sculpted). The repayment options and the equity bridge loan 
are discussed in later sections. 
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7.2.2 Time-Based Inputs 
As already mentioned the Time-Based Inputs are those that change over time i.e. that vary from 
period to period. Calculations are used to manipulate the inputs so that the appropriate figures 
are used for each period through the model. The TBl Sheet uses the key dates from the NTBl to 
set out the dates for the semi annual schedule used throughout the financial model. The 
construction phase of the project is also scheduled into monthly periods within the TBl Sheet 
for a clearer breakdown of initial costs. The following are sections under which Time Based 
Inputs are made on to the worksheet. 
Macroeconomic Assumptions: The inflation rate assumed for the duration of the project is used 
to calculate the appropriate index to apply to construction, operating and development costs; 
and to revenues and index-linked bonds. These indices are calculated for and applied to semi 
annual calculations in the model as required. It has been assumed that under the tendering 
process for project fmance, inflation risk is borne by the procurer up until financial close, and as 
such the procurer is often the source of the assumed inflation rate for fmancial modelling. This 
assumption is made as the bidders have no control over inflation and stipulating an assumed 
inflation rate allows easier bid evaluation and comparison. At fmancial close the inflation 
assumptions are updated to reflect current trends. 
Revenues: This project has been assumed to be a Health PFl Project and the revenue input is 
assumed to be an annual figure payable by the procurer (public sector). In practice the 
calculation of this annual figure will be subject to the terms and conditions of the payment 
mechanism in place. The TBl Sheet schedules the revenue by halving the annual input into a 
semi annual revenue stream, which is then applied throughout the model. The revenue input is a 
'real' value, i.e. does not take any account of inflation. Application of the inflation indices to 
the real values in later calculations results in 'nominal' revenue values. 
Operating and Major Maintenance Costs: The operational and major maintenances cost are 
also recorded as real costs per annum, which are then split into semi annual values. Major 
maintenance schedules for long-term infrastructure projects are often of a 'peaky' profile as 
major maintenance is carried out at intervals. For this study it is assumed that the major 
maintenance proftle is similar to that illustrated in Figure 7.2 and the major maintenance cost 
schedule assumed effects such a profile. The figure shows that there is no major maintenance 
expenditure until around the 6th year of the project. The figure also exhibits the peaky profile 
associated with major maintenance costs as mentioned earlier with relatively low initial 
expenditure rising, and sustained for longer periods, further into the project's lifecycle. Major 
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maintenance costs are highest and most sustained in the latter years of the proj ect although 
there is reduced expenditure just before cessation of the major maintenance cycle. This profile 
reflects and is typical of the lifecycle costs of health projects where the regular maintenance and 
renewal of equipment is involved. During financial modelling the operating and maintenance 
cost figures are supplied by the consortium and are directly input as scheduled by the 
consortium, i.e. hard coded into the model and the modeller has no control over the schedule. 
Major Maintenance Expenditure 
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Figure 7.2: Major maintenance cost profile for the Generic Project. 
Construction and Development Costs: The construction and development costs are also real 
values and are supplied by the consortium; the modeller has no control over the schedule. 
Development costs refer to costs incurred by the consortium in developing the proposal and bid. 
The development costs are normally scheduled to occur in the first period of the project as they 
are occurred in the run up to start of construction. The TBI Sheet breaks down these costs into a 
monthly schedule of outgoings throughout the construction phase. These costs are subj ect to 
inflation when processed further by the model. 
Pre-funding Costs: As mentioned earlier the pre-funding of the reserve accounts is assumed to 
occur in the last period of construction (period before the start of operations) and as such is 
considered a cost during the construction phase. The pre-funding amount is input in the Non-
Time Based Inputs and then scheduled with the TBI monthly cost schedule. 
The source and rationale behind the actual input data used in this model is discussed in Chapter 
Six. It is from these inputs that the model sources its data for process ing. The data entered into 
Paginated 
blank pages 
are scanned 
as found in 
original thesis 
No information 
• • • IS missing 
127 
7.3.3 Interest on Cash 
The Interest on Cash Sheet in the model calculates the interest due on any cash deposits. The 
proceeds from any bond issue are held in the Bond Proceeds Holding account and any interest 
due on this account is also calculated here. Any interest earned is fed back as income into the 
cash flow of the project. 
7.3.4 Accounting and Statements 
The Taxation Sheet applies the appropriate corporation tax to the model, ensuring that all 
qualifying deductions are made from the taxable profits and applying any capital allowances 
and depreciation from the Semi Annual Depreciation and Capital Allowances Sheet. This 
section also includes the compilation of the financial statements within the Statements Sheet of 
the model. Here the Cash flow Account, Profit and Loss Account, and the Balance Sheet are 
developed. As has been stressed in earlier sections it is the cash flow of a project that is crucial 
to its success. This however does not refer to the cash flow statement here, which is just 
produced as an accounting requirement. The actual flow of cash in the project is recorded under 
the Cash Dedication Mechanism; also known as the Cash Cascade. 
7.3.5 Cash Dedication Mechanism 
.. 
The Cash Dedication Mechanism or Cash Cascade traces the actual flow of cash through the 
project. It is so called because it is structured in order of dedication of cash. The flow or 
cascade of cash is arranged in order of priority; in other words there is a strict pecking order 
when it comes to access to the cash flow. The access to cash available (after all project specific 
costs are expended) is prioritised in the following order: senior debt service; debt service 
reserve account; subordinated debt service; and fmally shareholders returns (dividends). The 
required transfers to the reserve accounts are also calculated on the Cash Dedication 
Mechanism Sheet. 
A sculpting mechanism has been developed on the Cash Dedication Mechanism Sheet as a 
method for moulding the debt service payments to the cash available. This is discussed in 
further detail as part of the optimisation process in section 7.5. 
7.4 OUTPUTS 
The Output section of the model houses the products of the modelling and optimisation process. 
At anyone time, the displayed outputs are only valid for the current input values. Hence for 
analytical purposes the outputs are collated and recorded for comparison after each run of 
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inputs. The Outputs section primarily consists of measurements of the key indicators identified 
in section 6.2.4 as well as other relevant features used in later analysis. The outputs from the 
model are presented under the following categories. 
7.4.1 Ratios 
Ratios are an integral part of project finance and are key indicators of project performance. The 
precise definitions of ratios are very important as minor differences can lead to a substantial 
difference in project economics. Throughout the research analysis conducted here, consistency 
in calculating and defining the variables and indicators ensures that meaningful comparisons 
can be made during analysis. Most of the ratios are calculated based on the cash flows from the 
fmancial statements and the appropriate cash flows necessary for each ratio calculation is 
outlined within the Ratios Sheet. The following subsections discuss the ratios of relevance to 
this study. 
Debt Equity Ratio (Gearing): This is a measure of the proportion of debt and equity fmancing 
the project, i.e. the gearing. For the purposes of this study, subordinated debt is assumed to be 
provided by the shareholders and the combination of the pure equity and subordinated debt is 
termed blended equity. The gearing ratio is calculated as follows: 
G . Blended Equity (i.e.Equity + Subordinated Debt) eanng= 
Equity + Subordinated Debt + Senior Debt 
Cover Ratios: There are two types of cover ratios, Historic Cover Ratios and Forward Looking 
Cover Ratios. Historic Cover Ratios will, at the time of calculation, be calculated on known 
figures, i.e. they always look backwards. Historic Cover Ratios include Debt Service Cover 
Ratios and Interest Cover Ratios. Forward Looking (or NPV) Cover Ratios always look forward 
and therefore will always be calculated on the basis of projected data. NPV Cover Ratios 
include Loan Life Cover Ratios and Project Life Cover Ratios. There are several ways of 
calculating these ratios but for consistency, and also in an effort to remain contiguous to 
professional practice, the ratios calculated for this study are the Debt Service Ratio (DSCR) and 
the Loan Life Cover Ratio (LLCR). The DSCR's compare how the cash flows in each period 
compare to the debt service that must be made in that period whilst the LLCR's compare how 
project future cash flows are expected to cover loans outstanding. Both cover ratios are 
calculated from when the debt is fully drawn, i.e. from when debt service commences. The 
formulae used for the cover ratios determined for the analysis are: 
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DSCR = Cash flow Available for Debt Service + Debt Reserve 
Debt Service 
LLCR = NPV of future Cash flow Available 
Debt Balance 
Internal Rates of Return: The Internal Rate of Return (IRR) for a stream of cash flows is the 
discount rate at which the Net Present Value of that stream of cash flows would equal zero 
(Levy & Sarnat 1994). The IRR figures give a measure of the profitability of the project and are 
calculated in real and nominal terms, and for pre- and post- tax cash flows. The nominal rate of 
return is calculated on the basis of nominal pre-finance cash flows (pre- and post- tax), i.e. the 
cash flows, as they appear in the cash flow statement. The real rate of return is calculated on the 
basis of deflated pre-fmance cash flows (pre-and post- tax) by adjusting the nominal cash flow 
values by a suitable deflator factor (calculated in the TBI Sheet). The primary IRR used for 
analysis in this study is the Shareholder IRR (return on blended equity) although the model also 
computes other IRR's such as those for the separate components of blended equity. 
7.4.2 Summary Sheet 
The Summary Sheet has been included in the financial model as an outline of the key features of 
the project and the funding structure that may be of interest to a viewer, prior to in-depth 
examination of the model is conducted. It is meant to serve as a 'at a glance' sheet for the 
model. 
7.4.3 Results 
The Results Sheet has been created to collate the different values and results considered relevant 
to the analysis. The Results Sheet contains an outline of the current funding structure, the 
corresponding returns (IRR's), and the key cover ratios. This sheet serves as an exporting 
template as the information contained is copied and recorded elsewhere after each successful 
simulation of the modelling and optimisation process. These recorded simulation outputs form 
the results of this study, the analysis of which is discussed in Chapter Eight. 
7.5 OPTIMISATION 
The term optimisation is subjective but is defined here in reference to financial modelling, as the 
manipulation of a base case model to lower the cost of financing whilst maintaining 
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profitability and robustness. Financial engineering refers to the selection of instruments and 
mechanisms to finance a project and modelling is the development of the financial model. 
Optimisation can be considered the fmal stage of financial engineering where elements of the 
financial model are adjusted to reduce cost, increase commercial/cash flow efficiency, and 
profitability, as far as the fmancial package selected will allow, and within the constraints 
dictated by the fmancial engineering. The expression optimisation is somewhat misleading, as 
there is no one 'correct' final structure for the financial model. The structure decided upon will 
depend on the requirements of the investors and as in practice optimisation is carried out largely 
within hours of fmancial close; it is often the case that there may be room for further 
improvements to the fmal model. 
An element of the financial structuring that has been already mentioned is the bundling of 
subordinated debt and pure equity together as Blended Equity. This as already stated is due to 
the assumption that the shareholders provide both, and that the subordinated debt repayments as 
well as being junior to the main facility, are so flexible as to be treated as Equity. The returns to 
shareholders are assessed based on the funds provided, i.e. the blended equity. It is also 
common for the blended equity to be provided by means of an equity bridge loan as long as the 
project economics permit this. The equity bridge loan is a loan made by the lenders to the 
project company to cover the blended equity during the construction stages and is retired as 
soon as construction is completed, with a bullet payment, which includes the interest and 
margin accrued on the loan. The reason for the use of the bridge loan is that debt is cheaper than 
shareholder funds and therefore an equity bridge loan may reduce the costs of financing 
although the provision of this is dependant on the lenders securing a guarantee for the bridge 
loan repayment. 
This study has determined three main aspects of the fmancial model that are key to the 
optimisation process. These are Cover Ratios, Shareholder Returns and Gearing. 
• Cover Ratios: The level of debt that can be raised for a project is based primarily on its 
ability to pay interest and repay loan instalments as they fall due, with a comfortable 
margin of safety. To assess this margin of safety lenders calculate cover ratios 
(Yescombe 2000). These ratios measure the level of cash available relative to the 
payments due and are subject to minimum levels stipulated by the lenders. The ratios 
most commonly used are the Debt Service Cover Ratio (DSCR) and the Loan Life 
Cover Ratio (LLCR). The DSCR measures the ability of the project to service the debt 
from the annual cash flow whilst the LLCR considers the same but taken over the life of 
the loan. The DSCR gives a more immediate overview of the cash flow as it helps to 
• 
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indicate whether the next debt service payment can be made. The LLCR can be 
considered to be more refmed and accounts for performance over the longer term 
(Newman 2003). Typical minimum ratios required by lenders are 1.15 for the DSCR 
and 1.2 for the LLCR. Arguably optimisation would involve ensuring that the cover 
ratios are maintained at the minimum requirements throughout the project. However the 
model will need to demonstrate that this will be sustainable in downsid~ scenarios such 
as in the event of increased inflation or maintenance costs. 
Shareholder Returns: The minimum return on equity is set by the shareholder and is 
subject to market trends. This can also be referred to as the cost of equity. With the 
project fmance market being as politically charged as it is in the UK. there is 
disinclination to demand excessive returns. For the projects reviewed for this study the 
current minimum required return on blended equity is in the region of 13%. There is a 
degree of flexibility in setting the required return depending.on the individual project 
specifics but these are usually subject to the minimum demanded by the shareholders. 
One of the options during optimisation is to lower the actual return on the model to the 
target of 13% thereby lowering fmancing costs. 
• Gearing: This is the ratio of debt to blended equity. Obviously as debt is the cheapest 
form of finance it is sensible that projects shoufd seek as high a gearing as possible, i.e. 
maximise debt to reduce costs. However for a project, there is usually a maximum 
gearing beyond which prospective lenders are unwilling to lend, requiring that the rest 
be provided by shareholders. This is a constraint to which financial modellers must 
work. It must be noted that this may be inherently sub optimal as it may be 
demonstrable from the financial model that a higher level of gearing can be supported 
by the project. The limitations set by the lenders are influenced by the economics of the 
model of course, but also by the risk perceptions of the lenders, market conditions and 
by availability of previous experience in the technology involved. For instance even as 
this research is carried out there are preliminary developments in possible new energy 
projects in the UK. such as Wind Farms and Tidal Power Projects as a result of the 
expected decline in world oil reserves. Financial consultants are aware that these would 
be considered as relatively new technology by lenders and hence subject to higher level 
of risk. Indeed whilst current privately financed projects have typical debt levels of 85% 
to 95%, such new projects may have to be financed at levels as low as 65% to 75%, due 
to lenders uncertainties about the unproven markets, (Newman 2000). 
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7.6 THE OPTIMISATION PROCESS 
The optimisation process described here is a combination of the observed approach adopted by 
financial modellers and that developed to suit this study. The revenue stream of the model 
adopted for the generic project is structured as a fixed annual service payment by the 
government linked to inflation. The primary driver during the optimisation _process is, more 
often than not, the reduction of revenue required and therefore, the bid price. Beyond 
construction, the bulk of the costs of a project are related to the debt and equity service. For 
most projects interest rates are generally fixed by hedging (interest rate swaps) and also do not 
change with inflation, hence there is little need to index the bulk of the revenue to inflation. 
Costs such as operating costs and maintenance costs do rise with inflation however and for this 
reason 40% of the revenue stream for this research's base case model is indexed to inflation. In 
cases where the debt service is linked to inflation such as with index-linked bonds, the bulk of 
the revenue stream needs to be indexed and for this research, 100% of the revenue is linked to 
inflation for structures with index-linked bonds. 
The starting point for the optimisation process is the input of a large initial annual service 
payment that satisfies requirements, i.e. lenders' and investors' criteria, and modelling checks. 
This is then gradually reduced until either the cover ratio requirements and/or the required 
returns are no longer met. There are also other checks performed to ensure that the model 
structure is still sound such as checks that there is sufficient cash to repay the debt and that the 
Balance Sheet balances. Once the revenue has been reduced to a level at which the 
requirements are not satisfied, changes are then made to other elements in an attempt to restore 
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the satisfactory status of the model. Alteration of the debt repayment profile is one of the ways 
this can be achieved. 
For an annuity based debt repayment profile, the debt service amounts (principal + interest) in 
each period are always equal but the proportion of principal repaid increases gradually whilst 
the interest paid decreases. For a sculpted profile the repayment amount in each period is 
dependant on the amount of cash flow available as determined by the cash dedication 
mechanism. This sculpting to match the cash flow is normally achieved by calculating the 
amount of debt service that must be made in each period to leave enough free cash to satisfy the 
lender's stipulated minimum DSCR in each period. 
There is also the possibility of manual sculpting where the debt repayment profile is altered to 
suit the cash flow profile. Here the amount of principal repaid in individual periods is changed 
depending on the amount of cash that is available for debt service and also to reflect the level of 
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post debt service cash that is desired in any period. Within the generic model developed this is 
achieved by altering the cover ratios i.e. changing the minimum cover ratios required in 
individual periods. By increasing the cover ratio in a period, less senior debt is repaid in that 
period and more cash is made available for subordinated debt, and then equity service as a 
result of the cash cascade structure. The debt service resulting from sculpted repayments is 
therefore often irregular. Sculpting is also frequently used to ensure that the c~sh flow remains 
positive in each period of the project. 
Revenue sculpting is a different approach to that described above. Here the revenue stream is 
not a fIxed amount but is proftled essentially by working backwards, determining the amount of 
revenue required in each period to achieve a fIxed annual DSCR. There are also means of 
optimising the model for tax effIciency to ensure that any tax benefIts are exploited. This 
requires expert knowledge and is not addressed by this study. 
In brief, assuming the shareholder returns indicated in the model are at the minimum level 
required; an increase in the gearing (should there be flexibility) would decrease the amount of 
equity. All things being equal this decrease of equity would result in an increase to the returns 
as there is less equity making the same earnings. There would therefore be room to reduce the 
revenue (and hence bid price), reducing the amount of free cash distributable to shareholders, 
thereby diminishing the returns (obviously only as far as the minimum required level). This is 
however subject to the cover ratios and debt service requirements being met. Optimisation of 
models is an iterative process requiring a strong understanding of the dynamics of the model. 
This is often further complicated by peculiarities that may be inherent in models authored by 
other modellers. 
7.7 SUMMARY 
The fmancial model developed for the generic project was devised after the extensive review of 
several professionally developed models for various privately fInanced projects. This chapter 
has outlined the different parts to the model and explained the function of each. 
The model is logically structured to accept time based and non- time based inputs through the 
main user interface. Calculations based on these inputs can then be performed, processed and 
manipulated by the model. The outputs of such processing will form results for the simulations 
conducted for this study; these are presented in Chapter Nine and discussed in Chapter Ten. 
The model has been designed to include switch mechanisms that allow the selection of different 
fInancing options that enable various fInancial packages to be simulated. Part of the simulation 
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process involves optimisation of the model. This is the manipulation of the parameters of each 
financial package to maximise profitability whilst minimising financial costs. The process for 
optimising the models generated by the simulations for this study has been discussed in this 
chapter and has been highlighted as subject to the constraints on the financial structure 
demanded by the lenders, shareholders and procurer. 
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CHAPTER EIGHT 
VERIFICATION AND VALIDATION FOR SIMULATIONS 
8.0 INTRODUCTION 
This chapter introduces the process of verification and validation (V & V) highlighting its 
desirability and outlining accepted methods for ensuring a sufficient level of confidence. The 
process of V & V as applied to this thesis is discussed following its application from the 
derivation of the generic proj ect, through to the design and development of the fmancial model 
for the project. The methods adopted are integrated with the development of the model ensuring 
that V & V is continuous from conception to completion. The conceptual model is verified and 
validated, as is the data used for this thesis. The V & V of the generic financial model is then 
examined at the micro and macro level, i.e. V & V of components and V & V of the model as a 
whole. The various stages involved in the creation of the generic project, and the design and 
development of the fmancial model, are also independently verified and validated by experts 
and project fmance professionals. The latter sections of this chapter outline the simulations 
conducted on the verified and validated model. 
8.1 WHAT IS VERIFICATION AND VALIDATION? 
Verification is defined by Davis (1992) as the process of ensuring that the conceptual model 
design has been transformed into a computer model with sufficient accuracy. Carson (1986) 
defines validation as the process of ensuring that the model is sufficiently accurate for the 
purpose at hand. There are various other defmitions such as Shi (2002) who quotes Zeigler 
(1984) as stating that verification is a process to assure the simulation model is properly 
realised, whilst validation is a process to assess the degree to which the simulation model's 
input-output relations map onto those of the system. In simple terms verification is checking 
that the model performs as intended, whilst validation ensures that the model built is an 
accurate representation of the system under study. 
Shi (2002) notes that the complexity involved with modelling and in experimenting with the 
model greatly increases the chances of getting invalid results that do not typify the system being 
modelled. Pidd (1998) characterises one of these errors as a type zero error where the modeller 
asks the wrong questions so that the model does the totally wrong thing or the model does not 
operate in the manner in which it is intended. In order to minimise this V & V must be 
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implemented to ensure, as much as is possible, that the simulation model is free of such errors 
and does actually characterise the real system being simulated. 
Robinson (1997) concludes that whilst V &V should be rigorously applied to models it is not 
possible for the process to arrive at absolute validity. Indeed Robinson asserts that V & V cannot 
prove that a model is correct since this is not possible. Resinovie et al (1997) concur with this: 
the process cannot be assumed to result in the perfect model, as the perfect model would be the 
real system itself. V & V therefore sets out to prove that a model is in fact incorrect but by 
showing that the model is not incorrect under different circumstances there is increased 
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confidence in the model and its results. The more the V & V tests are unable to show that the 
model 'fails' or is incorrect, then the greater the extent to which confidence can be attached to 
the model. 
The processes for V &V are often classified as either a white-box or black-box process (Pidd 
1998). The white-box processes refer to those that involve a look at the inner workings and 
dynamics of the model, verifying or validating internal components. Black-box processes are 
the opposite, 'blacking out' the internal components, and verifying and validating the model as 
a whole. Black-box validation is the only process that requires a completed model. 
Sargent (1996) summarises the entire V & V process as;l step-by-step procedure that deals with 
conceptual model validity, verification, operational validity, and data validity; this summary 
corresponds with the classifications identified by Pidd above. Conceptual model validation 
involves checking that any assumptions made at the conceptual stage of model development are 
correct and are relevant to the study. Validation of the model at conceptual level, i.e. before 
being transformed or developed into a computer model can also be classified under the white-
box processes. Verification establishes that the components of, and the model as a whole, 
function as is intended and sufficiently represent real world elements. Operational validity is a 
black-box process at macro level, determining that the model represents the simulated system. 
As implied, data validation assesses that the accuracy of the data collected for model 
development, validation and simulation is sufficient. 
Sargent's summary indicates that the V&V procedure is tied with the development of the model, 
and Nayani and Mollaghesemi (1998) concede that integration of verification and validation 
with the model development is crucial. The approach adopted for verification and validation 
within this thesis as discussed below is in line with the summary and procedures above. 
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8.2 VERIFICATION AND VALIDATION OF THE MODEL 
The true conceptual model was based on a generic project for which a project fmance structure 
would be designed. A generic financial model for the generic project would then be developed 
which would simulate this project fmance structure. The model was required to allow further 
simulations to be run which would provide an insight into the trends and properties of the 
different elements of the project finance structure. The development of the generic project is 
described in Chapter Six, and the fmancial model, which allows the simulation of the financial 
aspects of this project's life over the entire concession, was subsequently developed as 
described in Chapter Seven. The simulations run on this financial model are outlined in the 
latter sections of this chapter. 
Kleijnen (1995) and Balci (1994) write extensively on current V & V techniques and how they 
are applied to simulation models. The techniques used for the V & V process for this thesis are 
derived from a combination of commonly applied approaches as advocated by the text 
reviewed, techniques advised by experts, and other methods tailored to suit any peculiarities of 
the processes involved in this thesis. Verification of the model can only be achieved beyond the 
conceptual stage when the components developed can be tested. The same can be said for the 
data, as its verification cannot be achieved without use of the model. For this reason the V & V 
approach adopted was split into two stages as described in the following sections. First the 
validity of the conceptual model and the data was established, and then actual development of 
the model was embarked on. As advocated by Sargent (1992) and Nayani and Mollaghasemi 
(1998) the V&V process was integrated with the development of the financial model and this is 
reflected in the second stage of the validation and verification as is discussed further below. 
Mention of the real world/system during the V & V process is in reference to standard or normal 
project finance market practice and values as observed from other projects. 
8.2.1 Conceptual Model Validity 
In developing a conceptual model Robinson (1997) espouses that the modeller or designer needs 
to acquire an in-depth understanding of the real world system to be tackled, and to have a great 
deal of interaction with those who have knowledge of the system. Prior to developing the model 
the author spent three months immersed with project fmance experts in the field achieving such 
acquisition of understanding and obtaining different perceptions of actual practice. Checkland 
(1981) also highlights this as necessary for overcqming the problem of deciding which 
interpretation of reality is relevant to the problem being tackled. 
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The information and skills gathered whilst working with these experts were put to use in 
developing modelling objectives and a conceptual model. Validation of the conceptual model 
was achieved by consultation with the experts. Table 8.1 highlights some of the outcomes of 
this V & V process. A list of experts consulted is included in Appendix D of this thesis. 
Sensitivity Pre- V & V Conceptual Post-V&V 
Tests Model Conceetual Model 
Construction 
Yes Cost No 
Interest Rate Yes No 
Inflation Yes Yes 
Table 8.1a: Changes to sensitivity test during V &V of conceptual model 
Bond 
Amortisation 
Schedule 
Pre- V & V Conceptual 
Model 
10:20:30:40 over last 4 
years 
Post-V&V 
Conceetual Model 
Manually sculpted 
over last ten years 
Table 8.1b: Changes to bond amortisation profile during V&V of conceptual model 
Table 8.1a illustrates an outcome of the conceptual model validation: a reduction on the number 
variables that were chosen for sensitivity tests. Initially the conceptual model was outlined to 
include tests on the model's sensitivity to construction costs, interest rates and inflation. 
Through the validation process with the experts it became obvious that identification of 
sensitivity to construction costs would not offer any information on the fmancial structure of the 
project under test, and would most likely simply indicate variation in the total amount of 
funding required. Likewise, as it had been assumed that most, if not all projects, employ an 
interest rate swap at fmancial close, a test on sensitivity to interest rates would be inconsistent 
with the assumptions and structure of the model. For this reason the sensitivity tests were 
limited \ to variable inflation. Table 8.1 b also shows another example of the results of 
consultation with experts. The amortisation schedule for bond structures was initially outlined 
to repay the bond over the last 4 years in a 10:20:30:40 split. This was changed during the V &V 
process to amortisation over the last ten years as this was felt to offer more flexibility during 
optimisation of the model as repayments could be sculpted over the longer period, allowing a 
more gradual back-ended profile to be developed. 
The V & V of the model with experts ensured that the components of the conceptual model were 
representative of actual project finance practice, and relevant to the objectives set out for the 
model, i.e. exploration the project finance structure, the various components of the financial 
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package and the impact of certain conditions on the structure. This validation approach is 
supported by Robinson (1994) who notes that whilst there are no formal methods for validating 
a conceptual model, by using outlines of the objectives of the project and the modelling 
approach, feedback can be sought from appropriately qualified individuals such as those with 
detailed knowledge of the system, which in this case refers to experts in the fmancial modelling 
domain. The above approach adopted for conceptual model validation was therefore deemed 
appropriate and was revisited with any conceptual variations resulting from changes adopted 
downstream in the model development phase. 
8.2.2 Data Validation 
The development of the spreadsheet model commenced after conceptual validity had been 
addressed. Inaccuracies in the data required for development and population of a model are 
potentially a source of error in the model and effort must be made to ensure that this is 
minimised. 
Procedures were put into place to limit the possibility of inaccuracies arising from the data used 
in the generic model. Most of these are as were implemented and discussed in Chapter Six 
during data capture. The raw data used for the development of the generic project was sourced 
from the financial models of real projects, which were developed by experts. These models in 
the data sample had been subjected to scrutiny at various levels by expert model developers, by 
lenders during due diligence, and by the public sector during evaluation of bid submissions. 
This gives a great deal of confidence in the data collected as it had previously undergone a very 
high level of testing and audit by relevantly qualified authorities. 
By minimising the processing of this data before its direct use, its validity is maintained: in 
deriving the generic model the raw data was simply reviewed to identify ranges for each of the 
data items mentioned in Chapter Six. During the cost and financial profiling, average figures 
per unit were achieved by adopting the hospital bed as a unit. Although this may have 
introduced an element of error, the resulting figures for costs, required fmancing and revenues 
when applied to the SOO-bed generic project, were very similar for similar sized projects in the 
sample. These figures were also checked against other real projects independent of the data 
sample. The values for the generic project were confIrmed to be in line with all comparisons. 
The input data required for the initial base case model was also checked against other projects 
independent of the data sample. All the initial time-based and non-time based inputs for the base 
case were presented to expert project fmanciers who confirmed that the values were in line with 
market values and therefore representative of the real system. For the simulations outlined in the 
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latter sections of this chapter the varied inputs are gearing, percentage composition of blended 
equity, and inflation. These are effectively forms of sensitivity tests; the range used for the 
gearing reflects the highly geared nature of all project fmance structures whilst the ranges for 
blended equity composition and inflation have been chosen to reflect extreme conditions. 
Experts have confIrmed these ranges as realistic and as accurately reflecting real conditions and 
practice. Changes are also made to the fmancial structure during simulations -and use made of 
different fmancial instruments. These have been checked with experts and against other models 
independent of the data sample, and this has shown that the variation of instruments and 
structure are applied in a manner also consistent with market practice ... 
8.2.3 Verification: White-Box Method 
According to Kleijnen (1995), when embarking on the V&V of the actual model it is necessary 
to carry out the verifIcation before validation. This is in agreement with the simple defmitions 
given in the section 8.1 that indicate that the model's components, and the model as a whole 
would have to be shown to be functioning correctly before the model could be tested to show 
that it addressed the purpose for which it was created. Other studies reviewed for this thesis 
have also adopted this approach to V&V (Nayani and Mollaghasemi 1998, Ng and Smith 1998, 
Resinovie et al 1997). 
The white-box method of verifIcation tests the components of the model to ascertain whether or 
not they perform as intended. For this purpose the broad classifIcation used in Chapter Seven 
was adopted verifying the model's components for Inputs, Calculations and Processing, and 
Outputs as discussed below. 
Inputs: The inputs component of the model is primarily intended to provide an interface for the 
input of data and assumptions and to keep these separate from the workings of the model. The 
inputs section also generates a monthly and semi annual schedule used throughout the model. 
The cost and fmancial profiling developed as detailed in Chapter Six are also applied to the 
generic project here. 
A visual check of the NTBI and TBI Sheets of the model established that these serve as an 
interface for data input. Displaying the formula contents of the spreadsheet cells also indicated 
that the NTBI has no calculations whilst the TBI sheet has simple calculations relating only to 
the derivation of the monthly and semi annual schedule for the model, and for applying the cost 
profIling developed from the data sample. 
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The TBI sheet schedules each project year into semi annual periods of June to November and 
, 
December to May, with the first period of the proj ect starting in June 2000 and the last ending 
in November of 2032. This is consistent with the assumption that the 2-year construction phase 
starts in June 2000 , followed by 30 years of operations. The construction schedul e is monthly, 
starting in June 2000 and ending in November 2002. The construction cost schedule applied to 
the model involved scaling up an assumed unit cost with the hospital bed as the unit , in order to 
reflect the characteristic costs identified in Chapter Six. 
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Figure 8.1: Verification of construction costs 
Figure 8.1 verifies that the profile applied suitably reflects the cost profiles exhibited by the 
data sample, as both are very similar. 
Review of the TBI also showed that when a revenue value of £ 18 million was input, this was 
applied through the schedule as revenue of £9 million per semi annual period . Likewi se the 
constant annual value (real) assumed for operating costs was split and scheduled with half 
incurred in each semi annual period of each year. This confirms correct scheduling of revenue 
and cost data . 
Calculations and Processing: This section contains vanous sheets performing van ous 
functions. The Nominal Sheet converts the real cost fi gures into nominal by applying the 
appropriate inflationary indices. Figure 8.2 shows the real and inflated nominal va lues as 
calculated on the Nominal Calculations Sheet when arbitrary inputs were made. The fi gure 
shows that this component of the model effectively reflect s the impac t of infla tion on the costs 
and revenue. The construction cost is shown as nominal figures hard coded from the profilin g. 
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Figure 8.2: verification of the nominal calculations. 
The model is designed to calculate the funding requirement and to match the sources of funding 
to this requirement. Table 8.2 lists the funding provided in each period when the project was 
geared at 94% with 5.85% of subordinated debt and 0.15% equity, and Figure 8.3 displays the 
level of funding required in each period of the construction phase. Table 8.2 illustrates that the 
proportion of funding provided by each source is in line with the gearing required for the 
project and verifies that the funding provided matches the totals required in each period as 
illustrated in Figure 8.3. 
Period 1 Period 2 Period 3 Period 4 Period 5 
Construction 15 .53 21.34 24.26 21.87 15 .78 Cost 
Development 6.19 Cost 
Loan Fees 4.76 2.48 1.74 0.97 0.32 
Pre fund DSRA 1.37 
Prefund MMRA 0.09 
Total Funding 26.48 23.82 Reguired 
26.00 22.84 17.56 
Funding 26.48 23.82 26.00 22.84 17.56 
Provided 
Equity % 0.15 0.15 0.15 0.15 0.15 
Subordinated 5.85 5.85 5.85 5.85 5.85 
Debt % 
Senior Debt % 94 94 94 94 94 
Table 8.2: Verification - funding provided for 94% gearing. 
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Figure 8.3: Verification -funding requirements at 94% gearing. 
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Figure 8.4: Drawdown on Funds. 
Figure 8.4 displays the drawdown profile for the project and the figure verifies that the Loan 
Schedule correctly sets out the draw down in each period to match the funds required as 
indicated in Figure 8.3. Review of the Loan Schedule also correctly showed interest accrued 
declining with decreasing outstanding loans. 
The depreciation calculations and capital allowance schedule showed that these elements were 
applied appropriately : the asset value was depreciated by £2.9 7 milli on, over 50 periods or 25 
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years, consistent with the inputs. The capital allowances also exhibited a profile in line with the 
reducing balance profile assumed. The capital allowances curve, illustrated in Figure 8. 5, 
shows the rapid initial decrease in asset value implied by the reducing balance, levelling out in 
later periods. 
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Figure 8.5: Verification - capital allowances. 
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Figure 8.6: Verification - cash cascade. 
The cash cascade was also verified by changing the debt service cover ratio requirement to 1.0 
under a sculpted debt repayment profile. A 1.0 DSCR has the effect of allowing 100% of cash 
available after costs and expenses to be used towards senior debt service. The resulting 
repayment profile is shown in Figure 8.6. The figure shows no subordinated repayments were 
made until the senior debt was paid off as a result of the cascade of cash . In the same manner 
the shareholders, having the most junior claim to the cash flow , did not receive any cash 
distributions until the subordinated debt was paid off. The above procedure also serves to veri fy 
the sculpting mechanism: Figure 8.6 shows that the sculpting mechanism served to ac hieve a 
repayment profile for the debt in line with the cash flow . 
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Figure 8.7: Verification - MMRA. 
Senior Debt Blended Equity Financing Fees Gearing % (Subordinated Debt & Equity) £m £m £m 
90 112.19 13 .87 10.63 
92 114.51 11.07 10.45 
94 116.82 8.28 10.27 
96 119.13 5.50 10.01 
98 121.45 2.73 9.91 
Table 8.3: Verification - gearing impact. 
The response of the model to inflation is recorded in Table 8.4. Different levels of inflation were 
simulated for different financial structures and the resulting impact on revenue, operating costs, 
and debt repayments was observed. All inputs except for inflation were kept constant for the 
three different financing options simulated, i.e. bank loan, fixed bond and indexed bond. 
Table 8.3 shows that the revenue stream and operating costs rose with inflation irrespective of 
the senior debt option. The different rates of increase for the revenue and OPEX correctly 
reflected the indexation assumed; 40% of the revenue and 100% of OPEX was indexed. In all 
cases the debt repayments did not change with inflation for the senior loan and the fixed bond 
options, however as expected the indexed linked bond option showed a rise in nominal bond 
repayments when the assumed inflation was increased. The results in Table 8.4 furth er veri fy 
the model and the way the structure reflects inflation. 
Inflation % Revenue NPV £m 
Senior Loan Package 
0.0 104.89 
3.0 120.34 
5.0 135.12 
Fixed Bond Package 
0.0 104.89 
3.0 120.34 
5.0 135.12 
Index Linked Bond Package 
0.0 
3.0 
5.0 
104.89 
120.34 
135.12 
Table 8.4: Verification - response to inflation. 
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Total Operating 
Cost£m 
206.80 
356.52 
524.18 
206.80 
356.52 
524.18 
206.80 
356.52 
524.18 
Total Debt 
Repayment £m 
116.82 
116.82 
116.82 
122.56 
122.56 
122.56 
122.56 
236.08 
371.41 
The effect of the revenue stream was also tested: the value for revenue input was increased and 
decreased alternately. An increase in the cash within the model should result in earlier 
repayment of debt when sculpted and/or an increase in returns to the shareholders. The results 
of the test exhibited just that: doubling the revenue stream from £17m to £34m and sculpting 
the debt repayments resulted in a decrease in average life of the senior debt from 14 years to 4 
years. At the same time the shareholders IRR showed an increase from 15% to 48%. This 
confirms the model's capability to sculpt repayments to available cash resulting in earlier 
repayments. This also shows that the model outputs in terms of returns correctly reflect the cash 
state of the model: an increase in revenue leading to earlier and higher distributions. Conversely 
a decrease in revenue from £17.5m to £15m extended the average life of the loan to beyond 33 
years leaving the debt unpaid. The model outputs also displayed a drop in shareholder returns 
from 15% to 14% again demonstrating correct structuring of the model. 
Finally the model was tested to ensure that the inbuilt error trapping system was functional. This 
involved deliberate input of incorrect or inconsistent data thereby forcing errors in the model. 
When the revenue was decreased as above, the outputs displayed 'Error' signs highlighting that 
the debt remained unpaid and that the cash flow was not positive throughout the model. Other 
tests were also run to ensure that the Error signs for non-repayment of subordinated debt, 
insufficient reserve account pre-funding, and the non-balancing of the financial statements were 
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triggered when these errors were forced on the model. The tests proved that the model was able 
to trap errors and flag inconsistencies when they occurred. 
All the tests carried out above on the model have verified that the components of the model 
function as intended and that the model as a whole processes responds to the various inputs in 
the right manner. 
8.2.5 Validation: White-Box Method 
The validation involved adopting best practice methods in structuring the model to minimise 
sources of error. Validation was also achieved by having the model reviewed and evaluated by 
project fmance professionals, a V&V approach supported by Lynch (1996) and Culley (2002). 
During the white-box validation the components of the model were checked against other valid 
models. The approach adopted in structuring the model and its logic was borne out as valid 
from the comparisons, which confirmed that good modelling practice, as adopted in the real 
system was being implemented here. Some of the considerations during the white-box 
validation conducted on the model include the following. 
• Inputs: The inputs of the model were kept on separate worksheets. To minimise 
sources of error all inputs were hard coded, Le. input manually, and no calculations 
were allowed on the Non-Time Based Inputs sheet. Some calculations were applied to 
the inputs on the Time Based Inputs sheet however these were limited to simple 
calculations such as applying the average unit cost profiles to the generic model and the 
computation of indices to effect the impact of inflation. The layout of the input sheets 
. also allows easy visual checking that the data is accurately input. Examples of the input 
sheet layouts can be seen in Appendix C. 
• Calculations and Processing: For the components that are effectively the machinery of 
the model all worksheets are scheduled such that the date/semi-annual period heading 
for each column on each sheet matched the date/semi annual heading of the same 
column on the Time-Based Inputs sheet. This introduced consistency and made visual 
checking of the model easier. During development formulae were entered only into the 
first column of the schedule; this was then copied across the sheet so that all cells in a 
row had the same formula. Checking of the formulae on each sheet then involved 
working down each cell of the first column of the schedules. Other columns were 
checked visually and random checks were performed on the formulae across the 
schedules to limit the potential for propagated errors. A system of structuring the sheets 
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was adopted whereby each row would refer only to rows above it on the sheet where 
possible. This made it easier to follow the flow of logic on each sheet. 
Part of the V & V involved the inclusion of checks built into the model to alert the 
modeller to discrepancies or errors. Visible checks were put in place on each sheet at 
key stages of the logic to return an "ERROR" value if, at run -or design time, 
calculations did not perform as intended or inconsistencies developed between related 
values. These were checked against other models and with professionals for relevance, 
and for confIrmation that the errors trapped were significant to the meaningful 
engineering of the fmance. 
The audit toolbar provided with the Excel software, which can be used to trace and 
follow the logic of the spreadsheet calculations, was used in establishing that the 
relationships between the elements of the model accurately represented those in practice 
or in the real system. 
The white-box validation established the following amongst others: 
• The model does not allow repayment of loan principal during construction; 
• The interest accrued on the loan is rolled up until repayments commence after 
construction; 
• The Taxation Sheet does not charge tax on the cash flow until a profIt is made; 
• Distributions are not made to the shareholders until all losses have been 
diminished by periodic profIts; 
• Bond coupons are made over the construction period 
The experts approached confIrm, as does reference to other valid models in existence, that these 
are all representative of actual practice in the project fmance fIeld thereby validating the engine 
of the model. 
Outputs: Alongside the processes and methods implemented as described above, fmancial 
modelling experts conducted white-box validation on the components of the model repeating 
some of the process above amongst others. The outputs of this model also match those required 
by the lenders for evaluating models during their due diligence process (Douglas 2000, Newman 
2003, SMi 2003); by the client or public body for evaluating the bids; and also by the sponsors 
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for ensuring profitability. During the testing, review of the results showed that movement in the 
KPI's identified in Chapter Six served to underline the relevance of the indicators. 
8.2.6 Black-Box Validation for Operational Validity 
The Black-box validation reviews the overall functionality of the model. Balci (1994), Sargent 
(1996) and Banks et al (1988) advocate comparison to other valid models as a method for black-
box validation. Figure 8.8 adopted from Robinson (1997) illustrates this approach and the 
reasoned relationship that if IR = k then the OR, or the impact to OR, should be equal to OG or 
very similar to the impact on OG. 
I 
Figure 8.8: Black-box validation 
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This approach for validation was attempted on the model, however the level of complexity 
involved with financial models made this very difficult. As each project is unique so are the 
financing tenns. Peculiarities with each model made it unreasonable to assume parity between 
other models in the system and the generic model, and attempts to match the numerous variables 
and terms made the exercise cumbersome and error prone. Instead, for the black-box validation 
a simple approach was adopted which assessed the model's behaviour under extreme situations. 
These extreme condition tests (Law and Kelton 1991; Banks et al 1996; Sargent, 1996; Balci 
1994) verify that the model perfonns as would be expected in the real system. Reference to 
graphical presentations in the model such as the graphs for cash flow, debt outstanding, cover 
ratios amongst others greatly aided the validation process. 
The effect of zero inflation on the model outputs was assessed and as expected, showed a great 
increase in the cash flow. This reflects the fact that although 40% of the revenue stream is 
indexed to inflation, 100% of costs are subject to any escalation. Therefore at zero inflation the 
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impact on reduced costs is greater than on the revenue, leading to a net increase in cash flow. 
This was also correctly reflected by an increase in blended equity returns as a result of increased 
cash available for distributions to shareholders. Projects in the real system would be expected to 
behave in the same manner, as inflation would be expected to have an escalating impact on 
project costs. 
Should the operator of a project introduce efficiencies that ultimately lead to a reduction in 
operational costs, these savings would revert to the operator or shareholders. The model was 
also shown as valid in this respect as when operating costs were reduced the model displayed an 
increase in shareholder IRR. 
In the real system, depending on economic conditions, project sponsors are able to negotiate 
with bank loan lenders to some degree with regards to sculpted repayments. When there is an 
increase in cash flow, the sponsors may wish to repay debt earlier, or conversely when 
unexpected expenditures arise, repayments may be put off for longer. Again the model allows 
for this as it offers a sculpting mechanism that matches the debt repayments to the cash flow. 
The model allows repayments to be stopped in individual periods that may be identified as 
critical. It also allows the sculpting of repayments for repayment as early as possible. This 
mechanism is also used for ensuring that the minimum cover ratios stipulated by the lenders are 
implicit in the repayment schedule. All these are tools and methods that have been identified as 
used in practice today in models reviewed during compilation of this thesis. 
As with the white-box validation, the model was made available to professionals experienced in 
model evaluation that reviewed the model and ran tests not too dissimilar to those mentioned 
above. The outputs of the model when fed certain inputs under known conditions as above, and 
the feedback provided by the experts, serve to validate the model as a sufficiently accurate 
representation of the tools and processes involved in developing fmancial packages for privately 
financed projects. 
The sections above have detailed the V & V of the generic model from the validation of the 
conceptual model and the data selected for this thesis, through to the V & V of the components of 
the model, and the fully functioning model as a whole, using different white-box and black-box 
methods. Whilst it is not possible to prove that a model is absolutely correct (Robinson 1997) 
the verification and validation carried out here has increased confidence in the derived generic 
project and the fmancial model developed to reflect its financial structure. The V & V processes 
carried out above have demonstrated that the generic model developed is sufficiently accurate 
and is suited to the purpose for which it was designed, i.e. that of simulating fmancial packages 
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with various instruments and under different financing terms and condit ions. To achieve this the 
author has, using the verified and validated generic model , simulated different financial 
structures and scenarios to test the performance and behaviour of the generic model. The section 
below outlines the different simulations run, the results of which are reported in Chapter Nine 
and analysed in Chapter Ten. 
8.3 SIMULATIONS 
The data, model components and the model as a whole have been verified and validated as 
described in the preceding sections, allowing confidence to be placed in the soundness of the 
simulations outlined below and the resulting outputs. Data described in earlier chapters form the 
parameters for the initial base case for the model and the inputs required for this model are the 
characteristic cost and financing profiles, the derivations of which are described in sections 
6.2.3 and 6.2.4. 
A series of simulations were run comparing different project financing structures implemented 
to fund the generic project. These different financial packages were achieved by altering the 
financial package within the generic model; thus generating several financial packages. Figure 
8.9 illustrates the initial financial package of the generic project as profiled from the collected 
data. 
Subordinated 
Debt 
5.85% 
Figure 8.9: Financial composition of generic project. 
Pure Equity 
0.15% 
Senior Debt 
94% 
The figure indicates that the generic project is highly geared with a debt equity ratio of 94:6. 
The 6% blended equity comprises 5.85% subordinated loan and 0.15% pure equity. The 
blended equity is so called because it is assumed that the shareholders of the project company 
provide both the pure equity and the subordinated loan. 
The simulations for this research were conducted in 6 stages (A-F) based on the area of 
financing being investigated. The simulations were controlled by the use of a worksheet in the 
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model on which the different combinations of input data required for each simulation are 
outlined. As each simulation case was selected on the worksheet, the combined data for that 
simulation fed into the appropriate sections of the model as the current inputs. The different 
inputs for the simulated models are summarised in Appendix E and the stages are outlined 
below: 
• Stage A: Four simulations (Base Case 1 - 4) were run to compare different 
combinations of debt repayment profiles. An annuity profile and a sculpted profile have 
been assumed as the available options for senior and subordinated loan repayment. The 
following repayment profile combinations were simulated for senior and subordinated 
debt respectively: Sculpted and Annuity; Sculpted and Sculpted; Annuity and Sculpted; 
Annuity and Annuity. From analysis of the model outputs, the most competitive 
repayment profile from this simulation in terms of meeting lenders' requirements, as 
well as providing the most competitive annual service payment and shareholder returns, 
was adopted as the senior/subordinated debt repayment profile combination for all 
subsequent simulations. It has been assumed that the outcome of Stage A simulations is 
valid for senior bank loan and bond issue structures. 
• Stage B: Base Cases 5 and 6 model the replacement of the senior loan with a bond 
issue. Two simulations were considered: a fixed rate bond (Base Case 5) and an index-
linked bond (Base Case 6). The repayment profiles for the senior debt and subordinated 
debt reflected the results of Stage A and the simulations were structured to reflect the 
impact of using fixed and index-linked bonds. 
• Stage C: This stage was structured to examine the effect of adjusting different 
components of the blended equity, i.e. the subordinated debt and the pure equity 
components. The impact of a high proportion of subordinated debt relative to pure 
equity and vice versa was considered using Base Cases 7 and 8, which simulated a 
subordinated debt! pure equity split of5.85%: 0.15% and 0.15%: 5.85% respectively. 
• Stage D: Here four models (Models Dl to D4) simulated different gearings for the 
financial package. Different gearings between 90% (Model Dl) and 98% (Model D4) 
were simulated. Corresponding changes were made to the blended equity to reflect the 
results from Stage C. Table 8.5 lists the gearings that the models were structured to 
simulate and shows that the simulation for 94% gearing will be sourced directly from 
Stage A simulations. 
Case Senior Debt 
Model D1 90% 
Model D2 92% 
Stage A Base Case 94% 
ModelD3 96% 
ModelD4 98% 
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Subordinated Debt 
Stage C result 
Stage C result 
5.85% 
Stage C result 
Stage C result 
Pure Equity 
Stage C result 
Stage C result 
0.15% 
Stage C result 
Stage C result 
Table 8.5: Gearing simulations for Stage D 
• Stage E: Here the generic model's sensitivity to inflation was tested. A sensitivity 
analysis is a modelling technique used to compare the effect of changes in independent 
variables on the overall project. These changes are applied to the variables individually 
whist keeping all other variables constant. In this case the changing variable was 
inflation whilst all others were kept constant. This stage was divided into three sections 
with three simulations run in each section. Section E1 tested the sensitivity of the bank 
loan base case whilst section E2 modelled the impact to a fixed bond package, and 
section E3 that to an indexed bond. The inflation values tested for each section were 
0.0%, 3.2% (default) and 7.5%. These are assumed to represent the best, current and 
worst case inflation scenarios (respectively) for the generic project. 
• Stage F: This was carried out to examine the effect of monoline wrapping. This was 
done through the simulation of fixed (Model F1) and index-linked bond issues (Model 
F2). As all other bond issue models were simulated as unwrapped bonds, Models F1 and 
F2 simulated wrapped fixed and indexed bond finance. 
As mentioned earlier the inputs for all simulations were controlled from a worksheet containing 
predetermined data. The simulations were carried out such that for each simulation the 
appropriate case was selected on the Simulations worksheet and when the model was then run, 
all inputs were sourced from those predetermined for the selected case. For each simulation the 
model optimisation process discussed in Chapter Seven was followed prior to analysis. Each 
simulation was run as a separate model so that reference could be made to each individual 
scenario. Use was not made of Excel's Scenario function as this is not compatible with the 
automatic sculpting mechanism built into the model. It was also considered that the number of 
variables involved would make this cumbersome. 
155 
8.4 SUMMARY 
The role and importance of verification and validation in research has been explained in this 
chapter. The process of V & V as applied in this thesis has also been discussed as occurring in 
two stages: conceptual model and data validation, and verification and validation of the model 
developed. 
Experts validated the conceptual model developed in the early stages and this ensured that the 
components of the conceptual model were representative of actual project fmance practice, and 
relevant to the objectives set out for the model. Procedures were also put in place to limit the 
possibility of inaccuracies arising from the data used in the model. The data was sourced from 
expertly scrutinised and validated models, allowing a high level of confidence to be placed in 
the data collected. 
By describing the verification and validation techniques applied to the components of the model 
and to the model as a whole, this chapter demonstrates that the model performs as is intended. It 
also shows that the model represents actual practice in the project fmance market with sufficient 
accuracy, and is a valid tool for the exploration of financial structures, mechanisms, and 
instruments for privately fmanced projects. The latter sections of this chapter outline the 
simulations that were carried out using the verified and validated model during such 
exploration. 
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CHAPTER NINE 
PRESENTATION OF RESULTS 
9.0 INTRODUCTION 
The results of the simulations are presented in this chapter. Here the outcomes are noted and 
values for the performance indicators are reported as recorded. This results chapter does not 
contain any discussion or analysis of the results; this is conducted in the next chapter. 
Consistency was maintained during simulations by ensuring that where required models 
retained the same gearing, and that any required increments in gearing within a stage were 
relatively constant. This approach ensures that any comparative analysis later applied to the 
results is justifiable. 
9.1 STAGE A - REPAYMENT PROFILES: BANK LOAN PACKAGES 
As outlined in Chapter Eight Stage A simulations explore the repayment of debt when the 
generic project is fmanced by a senior bank loan and a subordinated loan. This exploration is 
expected to indicate which profiles, if any, are better suited for the project's debt repayment. 
Table 9.1 outlines the simulations carried out to explore loan repayment profiles. Each 
simulated package had a gearing of 93.38% (blended equity: 6.48%subordinated debt; 0.14% 
pure equity), the senior debt comprising a senior bank loan. Due to the structure and dynamics 
of the developed model, it was difficult to attain the exact gearings desired for each simulation. 
An effort however was made to achieve as close a match as possible hence the reported 
fractional gearings. 
Case Senior Debt Subordinated Debt 
Base Case 1 Annuity Annuity 
Base Case 2 Annuity Sculpted 
Base Case 3 Sculpted Annuity 
Base Case 4 Sculpted Sculpted 
Table 9.1: Stage A - Simulated repayment profiles 
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Table 9.1 shows that repayment of the senior loan was simulated, first as an annuity and then on 
a sculpted basis, and for each of these repayment of the subordinated was also considered as an 
annuity and sculpted. 
Table 9.2, which outlines some outputs of the simulations, shows that all base cases are able to 
achieve the target minimum DSCR. The minimum LLCR's are somewhat similar but with Base 
Cases 3 and 4 being closer to the required minimum. The average values for the LLCR are 
almost identical for all cases however there is a marked difference in the average DSCR values. 
Base Cases 3 and 4 have much lower average DSCR values of around 1.2 whilst for Base Cases 
1 and 2 the average DSCR is in excess of3.6. 
Base Case 1 Base Case 2 Base Case 3 Base Case 4 
Target Min DSCR 1.15 1.1.5 1.15 1.15 
Min DSCR 1.15 1.15 1.15 1.15 
Average DSCR 3.75 3.65 1.25 1.21 
Target Min LLCR 1.18 1.18 1.18 1.18 
MinLLCR 1.24 1.23 1.18 1.18 
Average LLCR 1.33 1.32 1.31 1.31 
Funding Required £125.1M £125.1M £125.lM £125.1M 
RevenueNPV £122.9M £122.2M £121.6M £121.9M 
Project IRR 7.59% 7.53% 7.34% 7.35% 
Shareholder IRR 15.09% 14.73% 15.06% 15.28% 
Average Life of 16yrs 16yrs 14yrs 14yrs Senior Debt 
Table 9.2: Stage A - Outputs. 
The project returns and shareholder returns are somewhat similar across all four models. Base 
Cases I and 2 both have a project IRR of around 7.5% (Post Tax; Nominal) whilst Base Cases 3 
and 4 both have a lower project IRR of around 7.35%. The trend is rather less obvious for the 
shareholders IRR with values between 14.7% and 15.3%. The blended equity IRR (Post Tax; 
Nominal) for Base Case 2 (14.73%) is closest to the minimum requirement of 13% whilst that 
for Base Case 4 is furthest out. Base Cases 1 and 3 exhibit similar blended equity IRR (15.09% 
and 15.06% respectively). The average life for the senior debt is 16 years for Base Cases 1 and 
2 and 14 years for Base Cases 3 and 4. 
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Table 9.2 also shows that the funding requirement calculated for all four cases is circa £125 
million. The revenue required for each base case does vary however. Base Case 1 requires the 
highest revenue at almost £123 million (NPV). Base Case 2 is over £720,000 cheaper at £122.2 
million. Base Case 4 requires a revenue stream with an NPV of just under £ 122 million. The 
revenue stream for Base Case 3 (£121.63 million) is almost £300,000 less than that for Base 
Case 4 and has the lowest revenue demand of all four models. 
The slightly varied outputs above are mostly as expected and as would be associated with very 
similar financial packages. Surprising though are the cover ratio figures, which are markedly 
different. Base Cases 1 and 2 exhibit average DSCR figures are similar but much higher than 
those for Base Cases 3 and 4. Base Case 3 and 4 also attain the target minimum LLCR whilst 
the figures for Base Case 1 and 2 are higher. These differences are not consistent with the 
differences already indicated for the revenue values and will be one of the focuses of the 
discussion and analysis in Chapter Ten. 
9.2 STAGE B - REPLACEMENT OF LOAN WITH BOND ISSUE 
This stage involved the simulation of two models, each fmanced by a bond issue: a fixed rate 
bond for Base Case 5, and an index-linked bond for Base Case 6. The simulations were 
expected to highlight the performance of the fmandal model, and the impact on finandal 
outputs, when the senior debt for the project was realised by way of a bond issue. The 
simulation of both a fixed bond and an indexed bond model was also expected to reveal any 
differences in the fmandal profile of the project due to these two different types of bond. 
The gearing achieved for both was again 93.38% (blended equity: subordinated debt 6.48%; 
pure equity 0.14%). As a result of Stage A analysis (see Chapter Ten) the senior debt repayment 
is sculpted and the subordinated debt is repaid as an annuity. The bond repayment has however 
been sculpted for repayment over the last ten years, and manual sculpting has been applied to 
achieve the back-ended profile desirable for bond repayment, i.e. starting with smaller initial 
repayments which gradually increase throughout the repayment period. The cover ratios over 
the repayment period have been structured to gradually decline from 10.0 to 0.0 over the ten-
year period as part of the manual sculpting. This assumed amortisation profile is applied to both 
Base Case 5 and 6. The outputs obtained from the simulations are summarised in Table 9.3. 
Base Cases 5 and 6 are both able to sculpt to the minimum DSCR and have high average DSCR 
values of above 11. The LLCR values also satisfy the target minimum although Base Case 6 
exhibits a much larger margin in the LLCR than Base Case 5. This trend is also reflected in the 
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average LLCR figures. Base Case 6 shows a much higher proj ect IRR than Base case 5 and 
also slightly higher shareholder returns. Both cases have an average life of around 28 years. 
Immediately obvious is the much higher values for average DSCR recorded for the bond cases 
than was evident for the bank loan structures in Stage A. The much longer average life for 
senior debt recorded in this stage, relative to those of Stage A are consistent with the long-term 
nature of bond instruments. Also apparent is the difference between revenue levels required for 
the fixed rate structure and for the index linked bond structure. These form part of the issues for 
analysis and discussion in the following chapter. 
Target Min DSCR 
Min DSCR 
Average DSCR 
Target Min LLCR 
MinLLCR 
Average LLCR 
RevenueNPV 
Project IRR 
Shareholder IRR 
Average Life of Senior Debt 
Table 9.3: Stage B Outputs 
Base Case 5 (Fixed Bond) Base Case 6 (Indexed Bond) 
1.15 
1.15 
11.93 
1.18 
1.20 
1.39 
£120.7M 
7.67% 
13.54% 
28. 19yrs 
1.15 
1.15 
11.38 
1.18 
2.19 
2.93 
£150.8M 
12.83% 
14.93% 
28.21yrs 
9.3 STAGE C - BLENDED EQUITY COMPOSITION 
This stage assesses the impact of changing the blended equity composition of the financial 
package. This involved testing high/low and low/high ratios for the subordinated debt/pure 
equity combination of the blended equity. The blended equity split for subordinated debt/pure 
equity was 80120 for Base Case 7, and 20/80 for Base Case 8. Base Case 7 and Base Case 8 
were structured to have a gearing of 94%, however due to modelling dynamics as discussed 
earlier, the actual gearings achieved were 93.38% and 94.32% respectively. This slight 
difference in gearing is considered to have minimal impact on the results relative to the change 
in blended equity composition and therefore acceptable. 
Table 9.4 outlines some of the outputs for Base Cases 7 and 8. The package for Base Case 7 has 
already been discussed as part of Stage A simulations, as the package structure is the same as 
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that for Base Case 3. Reference to Table 9.4 shows that Base Case 8 outputs vary significantly 
from those for Base Case 7: the revenue required is £53 million greater, the IRR's are almost 
double and the average life of the senior debt is less than half that for Base Case 7. The results 
therefore initially indicate that the structure with a higher proportion of pure equity within in the 
blended equity requires far greater revenue to sustain the financing package, and also displays 
higher LLCR's than that with greater proportions of subordinated debt. The~e packages also 
exhibit higher IRR figures. 
Base Case 7 Base Case 8 
Target Min DSCR 1.15 1.15 
Min DSCR 1.15 1.15 
Average DSCR 1.25 1.21 
Target Min LLCR 1.18 1.18 
MinLLCR 1.18 1.20 
Average LLCR 1.31 1.66 
RevenueNPV £121.6M £174.8M 
ProjectIRR 7.34% 13.11% 
Shareholder IRR 15.06% 28% 
Average Life of Senior Debt 13. 96yrs 6.5yrs 
Table 9.4: Stage C outputs. 
Changed polarity in the blended equity composition was further investigated by carrying out 
three further simulations based on Base Case 8: Base Cases 8a, 8b and 8c. Table 9.5 outlines the 
results of these simulations alongside those of Base Case 7 taken from Table 9.4. 
Base Case 8a, which has a higher level of equity than subordinated debt, is modelled and 
optimised disregarding the minimum shareholder IRR restriction of 13%. Base Case 8b 
essentially further optimises Base Case 8a to include shareholder lRR criteria. Base Case 8c 
repeats the modelling process but explores different debt repayment profiles and their impact on 
the outputs. Table 9.5 indicates that the blended equity for Base Case 7 has a high proportion of 
subordinated debt whilst that for Base Case 8 and its variations, has higher levels of pure equity. 
Table 9.5 also shows that Base Case 8a is able to achieve a financial model close to that of Base 
Case 7 and with a similar revenue demand. The results however show key differences in the 
DSCR and IRR indicators: average DSCR is much higher for Base Case 8a (4.96) than Base 
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Case 7 (1.25) and the shareholder IRR for Base Case 8a is 9% whilst that for Base Case 7 is 
15.06%. 
Sub. Debt 
driven Pure Equity driven 
Base Case 7 Base Case 8a Base Case 8b Base Case 8c (Annuity x Annuity) 
Target Min 1.15 DSCR 1.15 1.15 1.15 
Min DSCR 1.15 1.16 1.15 1.48 
Average DSCR 1.25 4.96 1.20 1l.12 
Target Min LLCR 1.18 1.18 1.18 1.18 
MinLLCR 1.18 1.18 1.19 1.52 
Average LLCR 1.31 1.95 1.62 2.38 
RevenueNPV £121.6M £121.9M £174.8M £139.3M 
Project IRR 7.34% 7.09% 13.04% 9.41% 
Shareholder IRR 15.06% 9% 28% 13% 
Average Life of 13.96yrs 14yrs 6.5yrs 16yrs Senior Debt 
Table 9.5: Further Stage C simulations. 
The analysis of these results conducted in the following chapter will discuss the apparent 
inconsistency where the package with an equity driven blended equity component requires 
much higher levels of revenue to meet costs and modelling criteria and yet has enough cash 
flow to make far larger returns to shareholders. 
9.4 STAGED-GEARING 
Simulations here consider different gearings for the generic model. Four versions of the model 
with actual gearings of 89%, 91.19%, 95.59% and 97.8% were simulated. As mentioned earlier 
the fractional gearings are due to the dynamics of the model and difficulty in achieving specific 
gearings. The changes in gearing were accompanied by corresponding changes in subordinated 
debt i.e. 10.86%, 8.67% and 4.27% respectively; the pure equity contribution was constant at 
0.14% for all simulations: The results of Base Case 3 of Stage A at 93.38% gearing are also 
considered here. Table 9.6 outlines some of the outputs extracted from the result for the 
gearings simulated, and shows that the minimum DSCR of 1.15 is attainable at all five gearings. 
Minimum LLCR values are also attained except at 95.59% and above. The model was unable to 
be optimised fully at 95.59% and above, as the loan life cover ratio requirement (minimum 
LLCR = 1.18) could not be met. The defaulting cover ratios are indicated in bold type in Table 
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9.6. Increasing the revenue only served to increase the shareholder return figures whilst the 
minimum LLCR remained breached. Lowering of revenues whilst restricting shareholder 
returns also did not overcome the LLCR breach. This behaviour was even more pronounced at 
higher levels of gearing. 
Initial observations indicate then that the level of gearing does make a difference to the 
profitability and viability of the financial structure. It is also evident that at certain levels of 
gearing the model cannot be brought to satisfy all stakeholders' criteria; primarily that of the 
lender's stipulated minimum cover ratios. In this case these criteria could not be satisfied at 
95.59% and above. Discussion of these issues is raised in the following chapter. 
ModelD1 ModelD2 Base Case 3 ModelD3 ModelD4 
Gearing 89.00% 91.19% 93.38% 95.59% 97.80% 
Target Min DSCR 1.1.5 1.1.5 1.1.5 1.1.5 1.1.5 
Min DSCR 1.15 1.15 1.15 1.15 1.15 
Average DSCR 1.34 1.29 1.25 1.19 1.21 
Target Min LLCR 1.18 1.18 1.18 1.18 1.18 
MinLLCR 1.28 1.22 1.18 1.12 1.09 
Average LLCR 1.46 1.37 1.31 1.41 1.48 
RevenueNPV £123.8M £122.6M £121.6M £137.lM £137.1M 
ProjectIRR 7.75% 7.54% 7.34% 9.15% 10.94% 
Shareholder IRR 14.65% 14.80% 15.06%% 19.62% 22.22% 
Average Life of 13.88yrs 13.94yrs 13.96yrs 9.45yrs 9.40yrs Senior Debt 
Table 9.6: Stage D outputs. 
9.S STAGE E -INFLATION SENSITIVITY 
Stage E simulates changing inflation conditions on the generic model. Stage E is split into three 
sub-stages, El, E2 and E3. Stage El simulates bank loan financing whilst E2 and E3 simulate 
fixed and indexed bond fmancing respectively. Gearing for all stages was maintained at around 
93% (El: 93.38%. E2 & E3: 92.99%) and the same levels of inflation was tested on each 
fmancing structure to enable comparative analysis. 
Earlier simulations have assumed an inflation rate of 3.2% based on current rates at the time of 
this study and this is repeated here. This stage also considered two further rates: 0.0% and 
7.5%. These rates are assumed to represent the extremes of possible upside and downside 
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inflation scenartOS In a relatively stable economy such as the UK 's ; higher rates may be 
expected in more volatile economies. It should be noted here that the structure of the model is 
such that inflation is constant throughout the project, i.e. 7.5% inflation input implies that 
inflation is at 7.5% in every year of the project. As mentioned in Chapter Seven a proportion of 
the revenue input into the model is indexed to inflation (40% for bank loan and fixed bond 
structures; 100% for indexed link bond structures. The following sections present the outcome 
of assuming the above inflation rates. 
9.5.1 Stage E1 - Bank Loan Packages 
Figure 9.1 charts the outputs of the model at the default inflation rate of 3.2%. The model has 
been optimised to satisfy modelling requirements and stakeholder criteria, and the figure has an 
inset outlining some of the key measured indicators. The figure shows that the revenue stream, 
40% of which is indexed to inflation, rises fairly in line with the total operational cost profile 
(operating costs + major maintenance + interest costs). The cash available for senior debt 
service (interest and repayment of principal) is also indicated on the chart and this is shown to 
primarily decline throughout much of the project before rising slightly at the end of the project. 
16 
14 
12 
10 
Ii) 
c: 
0 
8 
.-
E 
I.+J 6 
4 
2 
0 
0 
Model E1a - Outputs at Inflation = 3.2% 
-+-- Revenue 
-+- Repayments 
-+-- Cash Available to Senior Lenders 
Shareholder IRR =15.13%; 
DSCR: min =1 .15; average =1.33; 
LLCR: min = 1.19; average = 1.35; 
Average life of senior debt = 14.38yrs; 
Annual revenue = £17,457 ,190; 
Revenue NPV = £122,229. 
10 20 30 
~ Total Operational Costs (Incllnterest) 
-+- Dividend 
40 50 60 
SemiAnnual Period 
Figure 9.1: Bank loan structure at 3.2% inflation. 
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The repayment of principal exhibits a fluctuating profile with similar trends to the cash 
available. A line showing the dividend distribution to shareholders is also drawn on the graph 
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and this indicates that no dividend payments are made until after period 56 which is also after 
the last principal repayment is made. The inset shows that minimum cover ratio requirements 
are met and that the DSCR and LLCR both display averages of l. 3. The annual revenue derived 
for this scenario is just under £ 17.5 million (£ 122.2 million NPV). Shareholder returns are 15%. 
Figure 9.2 represents the impact of the reduction of inflation to zero inflation. No other 
alterations were made to the model; the debt repayment was left unchanged. The fi gure shows a 
flat revenue profile and decreasing total operational costs. The cash available for debt service 
can be seen to change significantly from the previous profile from period 22, increasing rapidly 
and peaking in period 51 at over £ 15 million. Dividends are paid out a few periods earlier bit 
still towards the end of the project from period 54. At zero inflation the revenue stream is 
shown to have an NPV of £ 1 05 million but the minimum DSCR of 1.15 is breached although 
the LLCR minimum of 1.18 is satisfied. 
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Figure 9.2: Bank Loan Structure at 0.0% inflation. 
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Figure 9.3 charts the impact of an increase of inflation to 7.5%. It shows that the total 
operational costs escalate faster than the revenue stream with the costs almost equalling the 
revenue in some periods . The profiles for cash available for debt service and dividend 
distribution are also affected; the cash available is greatly reduced, falling below zero between 
periods 36 and 60 and there are no distributions to shareholders until period 60 of the project. 
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The inset shows that the net present value of the revenue stream is over £ 162 mil lion and that at 
this repayment profile the cover ratio requirements are not met. 
Model E1c - Initial Outputs at Inflation = 7.5% 
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Figure 9.3: Bank loan structure at 7.5% inflation. 
9.5.2 Stage E2 - Fixed Bond Packages 
50 60 70 
The simulations conducted in this stage replaced the senor bank loan with a fixed bond issue. In 
this section of the results charts representing the bond packages have all data plotted off the 
primary axis (left hand vertical axis) except for the cash available, which is plotted off the 
secondary vertical axis (right hand vertical axis). 
Figure 9.4 highlights the outputs of the project when funded by the fixed bond structure at the 
default inflation rate of 3.2%. The figure shows the debt amortised over the latter end of the 
project (assumed to be paid off over the last ten years of project) . The revenue profile is the 
same as that for the bank loan package, increasing gradually throughout the operational phase. 
The total operational costs, which include the interest costs on the borrowings, rise quickly and 
almost equal the revenue between period 40 and 50 before tailing off towards the end of the 
project. The cash available increases throughout much of the project; it averages around £8 
million during the construction phase, rises steeply during the earlier periods of operations 
before increasing to a lesser extent after period 20 and finally declining after period 56. 
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Model E2a - Outputs at Inflation = 3.2% 
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Figure 9.4: Fixed bond structure at 3.2% inflation 
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The DSCR remains high throughout the proj ect except in the periods before operations where 
the minimum DSCR value is recorded. The chart also shows that no dividend payments are 
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made except in the very last period . The annual revenue stream required for thi s scenario is 
£ 17.3 million (£ 121 million N PY) and the average life of the senior debt is around 28 years. 
Simulation of zero inflation resulted in the profiles displayed in Figure 9.5. The figure shows 
the expected flat profile of the revenue stream and the relatively fl at operational cost profi le, 
which declines after the start of amortisation. Up until the start of amorti sation of the debt the 
cash available displays a similar trend to that when inflation is at 3.2%, peaking at around £80 
million before declining for the rest of the project. 
The debt is fully repaid and the inset shows that the cover ratio requirements are met and with a 
high average DSCR. The net present value for the revenue is £ 1 04 million. The sli ght increase 
in IRR reflects the increased distributions to shareholders although this still only occurs in the 
last period of the project. 
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The high inflation scenano of 7.5% was also simulated and the mode l' s perfo rmance is 
illustrated in Figure 9.6 . The revenue stream is shown to increase much more steeply. The cash 
available also increases much more rapidly in the earlier years of operations but peaks at less 
than £70 million before period 30, before dec lining steadily until the end of the projec t. The 
fi gure also shows that the total operational cost profil e is steeper than that for the revenue but in 
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this case the costs rapidly escalate above the revenue stream between periods 34 and 40 and 
even more so between periods 44 and 51 . 
The figure shows that even though the shareholder IRR satisfies the minimum requirement of 
13%, dividend distribution is minimal or zero. The inset reveals that the increase of inflation to 
7.5% inflation results in cash flows at which the cover ratio requirements are not met and that 
the NPV of the revenue also increases to £ 160 million. 
9.5.3 Stage E3 - Indexed Bond Packages 
The performance of the generic project financed with an index-linked bond issue at the default 
inflation rate of 3.2% is charted in Figure 9.7. The figure shows the total operational costs rising 
as with the base case of the fixed bond, seemingly in line with the revenue stream, but declining 
after the start of amortisation. The revenue stream however can be seem to much steeper as a 
result of 100% indexation of the revenue: £12 million at the start of operations and £29 million 
at the end of the project. The cash availability line indicates that, as with the fixed bond, there is 
a build up of cash right from the early stages of the project. The cash available peaks however at 
£ 160 million before period 30 and then declines gradually till the end of the project. 
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Figure 9.7: Index bond structure at 3.2% inflation. 
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Figure 9.7 indicates that dividend payments are made from period 26 onwards and a return to 
shareholders of almost 25% is achieved. The cover ratio requirements are also met and the 
169 
average life of the senior debt is almost 29 years. The annual revenue required to sustain the 
financial package is £21 million (NPV = £ 177 million). 
Figure 9.8 represents the effect of zero inflation on the model. Again the revenue stream profile 
is flat and the total operational costs are relatively flat during the project , declining after period 
40 or the start of amortisation of the debt. The cash available increases for much of the project 
declining only from period 40 onwards. 
Model E3b - Outputs at Inflation = 0.0% 
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Figure 9.8: Indexed bond structure at 0.0% inflation 
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The cover ratios still satisfy the minimum requirements but the shareholder IRR is reduced. This 
is reflected by the dividend payment profile, which starts off much later in the project (from 
period 40 onwards). The net present value of the revenue payments is £127 million . 
Significantly, the model shows a change in the average life of the senior debt indicating that 
there is higher level of cash available for the senior lenders, which has been put towards retiring 
the debt earlier. 
Simulation of high inflation is presented in Figure 9.9, which indicates the initial performance 
of the indexed bond package at 7.5% inflation before the repayments are sculpted to the cash 
flows. Revenue and total operational costs are shown to rise dramatically. The cash ava ilable 
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profile is skewed to the left at 7.5% inflation as the indexed bond structure exhib its a rapid cash 
build-up in the years preceding repayment. Again, as with Figure 9.7 , the cash availab le peaks 
around period 30 but the levels of cash are much greater; in excess of £ 180 milli on (as opposed 
to £ 160 million). 
The revenue and total operational cost profiles also remain divergent with the revenue stream 
always higher than costs in this case. The cost line does not exhibit a significant decline during 
amortisation as observed with other simulations. Although the shareholder returns are indicated 
as being above 20%, with a large dividend payout at the end of the project, the cover ratio 
requirements are not satisfied. 
The revenue was increased in an attempt to fu lly repay the bond, however at these higher levels 
of revenue the model indicates rising cash flow but the minimum DSCR remains breached. The 
profi les resulting from this adjustment are illustrated in Figure 9.10. 
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Model E3c - Outputs (adjusted revenue) at Inflation = 7.5% 
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Figure 9.10: Indexed bond structure at 7.5% inflation - revenue adjusted. 
9.6 STAGE F - MONO LINE WRAPPING 
Here the fixed bond and indexed bond cases were simulated to include monoline 
insurance/wrapping. Table 9.9 lists some extracted outputs from the simulations and compares 
these with those extracted from models funded with unwrapped bonds. 
With reference to Table 9.9 the indicators that show significant change are those linked to the 
financing costs. The table shows that bond wrapping significantly increases the financing costs; 
wrapping the indexed bond appears to be more expensive. The table also shows that the 
mono line fees paid upfront, i.e. 33% of the NPV of the fee , is £2 .9 million for the fixed bond 
and £4 .6 million for the indexed bond. Over the life of the project further payments are made to 
the mono line insurer up to an NPV of £6.0 million for the fixed bond and £9.4 million for the 
indexed bond. 
The results indicate that there are no other significant changes to the model outputs except for 
an increase in the annual revenue requirements for the financial packages. In the cases 
simulated above, re-optimising the wrapped fixed bond structure resulted in a £3.8 milli on 
increase in revenue NPY, and an increase of £5.3 million in the case of the indexed structure. 
The reasons for this and considerations that arise as a result are di scussed in the following 
chapter. 
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Fixed Bond Index-Linked Bond 
Monoline: Unwrapped Wrapped Unwrapped Wrapped 
Model E2a ModelFl ModelE3a ModelF2 
Gearing 93% 93% 93% 93% 
Financing Fees £0.9M £4.6M £0.9M £7.3M 
Up front Monoline Fee 
£2.9M £4.6M (33% of fee NPV) 
Monoline Fee over 
Project Life £6.0M £9.4M 
(67% of fee NPV) 
Min DSCR 1.15 1.15 1.15 1.15 
Average DSCR 11.56 11.62 14.17 13.77 
MinLLCR 1.20 1.20 2.70 2.65 
Average LLCR 1.39 1.39 3.44 3.40 
Annual Revenue £17.3M £17.8M £20.9M £21.6M 
RevenueNPV £120.8M £124.6M £176.9M £182.2M 
Shareholder IRR 13.54% 13.54% 24.86% 23.82% 
Average Life of Senior 28.32yrs 28.31yrs 28.73yrs 28.73yrs Debt 
Table 9.7: Bond finance structures with and without mono line wrapping. 
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CHAPTER TEN 
DISCUSSION AND ANALYSIS 
10.0 INTRODUCTION 
This chapter discusses the results and conducts analysis on the observations made in Chapter 
Nine. As part of the analysis further review of the model has been conducted where necessary, 
and more detailed or specific information extracted from the various models where required. 
Reference is also made to the results in the previous chapter, and to items in the Appendices. 
The concept of optimal gearing is one of the issues that arise as a result of the examination of 
the results and this is also discussed in depth within this chapter. This chapter concludes with a 
summary of the salient issues arising from the analysis in the following sections. 
10.1 STAGE A - REPAYMENT PROFILES: BANK LOAN PACKAGES 
Stage A simulations focused on the repayment profile of a bank loan funding package. Table 
10.1 lists the cases and repayment profiles that were simulated and the results are presented in 
section 9.1. 
Case Senior Debt Subordinated Debt 
Base Case 1 Annuity Annuity 
Base Case 2 Annuity Sculpted 
Base Case 3 Sculpted Annuity 
Base Case 4 Sculpted Sculpted 
Table 10.1: Stage A - Simulated repayment profiles. 
Figure 10.1 charts the DSCR's taken from the models for the cases above and shows that Base 
Cases 3 and 4 have more desirable cover ratio profiles. The lower values of Base Cases 3 & 4 
are consistently closer to the minimum DSCR value of 1.15, indicating that the cash flow is 
more efficient; all available cash either being used towards costs and debt service or being 
distributed to shareholders as excess cash. This is also clearly reflected in the average DSCR 
figures reported in the results; the higher average DSC:R figures for Base Cases 1 and 2 are an 
indication of greater levels of cash available after meeting costs and debt service, which 
however do not seem to increase the shareholders returns much beyond those for Base Cases 3 
and 4. 
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Figure 10.1: Stage A - Debt service cover ratios. 
This indication is confinned by Figure 10.2, which charts the cash flow for the projects and 
displays very similar profiles to those of Figure 10.1. The figure affinns that there is much 
higher cash build up throughout the project in Base Cases 1 & 2 relative to Base Cases 3 and 4. 
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Figure 10.2: Stage A - Cumulative cash flow. 
Inspection of the cash dedication mechanism and the financial statements for the models makes 
it apparent that this early cash build up is due to the annuity profile of the senior debt repayment 
and the accounting restrictions on dividend payouts: dividends cannot be paid until the losses 
carried forward (retained losses) are diminished. Profits earned are used to reduce the losses 
carried forward and once the retained losses are diminished to zero, any profit over and above 
this is distributed to shareholders. For this reason dividend payments nom1ally occur severa l 
years after the project is operational. For Base Case 1 the seni or and subordinated debt 
repayments are fi xed to the annuity amounts and as the retained losses are not di mini shed until 
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period 56, any cash over and above this debt service is locked in the model and cannot be taken 
out as early dividend payments. For Base Case 2 the senior debt repayment is also on an 
annuity basis and even though the subordinated debt repayment is sculpted, the cover ratio 
restrictions, the modelled requirement that the cash flow remain positive, and the need for cash 
available for funding the reserve accounts, result in the subordinated debt repayment occurring 
towards the very end of the project. This again effects cash build up during th~ early years of 
the project as the available cash is not used to retire the subordinated debt and cannot be 
extracted as dividend payments due to accounting restrictions. From this analysis it is obvious 
that Base Case 3 and 4 have more desirable DSCR and cash flow profiles suggesting that the 
generic project would be better served by the repayment profiles adopted in these cases. 
The project and shareholder IRR's are less indicative and with a range of 0.6% between models 
no clear trend can be determined from the results in Table 9.2. 
Lenders and investors are inclined to structure loans for average lives of 15-20 years and 
consultation with project fmanciers confrrms that the average life of senior debt of 14 to 16 
years achieved for the above Base Cases as acceptable if somewhat front-ended, (Newman 
2003). 
As the CAPEX is expected to be the same for the models any differences in the funding 
requirements would have to stem from fmancing costs. The financing fees for the four models 
are similar indicating that the difference in costs is due to the debt service costs for the different 
repayment profiles with interest due on loans outstanding varying with repayment schedule. 
This difference in fmancing costs gives rise to different revenue demands. Base Case 3 and 4 
have the lowest demand for revenue, and as this is key to the clients evaluation of a bid, would 
be considered the lowest bids. 
From the analysis above it would appear that the debt repayment profiles for Base Cases 3 and 4 
are more desirable for this project; i.e. sculpted senior debt repayment with the subordinated 
debt repayment either sculpted or repaid as an annuity. The significant inference can be made 
from this affirmation that senior debt is better repaid on a sculpted basis than as an annuity 
regardless of the subordinated debt repayment profile. As the NPV of the revenue stream for 
Base Case 3 is almost £300,000 lower than that for Base Case 4, the repayment profile 
combination for Base Case 3 is selected as most favourable for this PFI model i.e. senior debt 
repayment sculpted and the subordinated debt repaid as an annuity. This combination of 
repayment profiles is applied to all the packages simulated in succeeding simulations (Stages B 
- F). 
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10.2 STAGE B - REPLACEMENT OF LOAN WITH BOND IsSUES 
Here funding of the project with a senior debt component that consisted of a bond issue was 
explored. Fixed and indexed linked bonds were simulated and the outcomes of the simulations 
are outlined in section 9.2. The nature of the bond market is such that bondholders do not 
normally wish for irregular repayment schedules preferring instead a bullet retir~ment at the end 
of the project or a smooth back-ended amortisation profile. As already mentioned in the 
previous chapter the profile adopted for the bond models is a back-ended SCUlpt. 
In the case of the fixed bond package (Base Case 5) the revenue stream has a net present value 
of £ 120.7 million, which is less than those for the bank loan financed models of Stage A, which 
are around £ 121 million (See Table 9.2). The same cannot be said of the indexed bond (Base 
Case 6) as the revenue stream has an NPV of £150.8 million. From the modelling process the 
constraints on the bond models were identified as the minimum DSCR and the amortisation 
profile: the models cannot be further optimised without breaching the 1.15 minimum DSCR 
figure, and any further decrease of the revenue stream to the indexed bond structure renders the 
model incapable of repaying the senior debt fully before the end of the project. 
Paul Newman of PricewaterhouseCoopers concurs that the average life of 28 years for both 
cases is both normal and desirable for a bond-fmanced project, as bondholders prefer debt with 
long average lives ranging from 25 to 28 years (Newman 2003). 
The results for Stage B show that although the project IRR differs for both cases, the 
shareholder returns differ slightly with the indexed bond providing greater returns. An analysis 
of the model indicates that this is due to the dividend payments mentioned earlier; the indexed 
bond package allows more and earlier dividend payments. The cash flows charted in Figure 
10.3 also suggest that this may be related to the fact that Base Case 6, i.e. the indexed bond 
model, has a much higher build up of cash; almost double that for Base Case 5 (fixed bond) 
after period 25. 
The DSCR can be considered to be much more critical for a bond issue than for a bank loan 
structure. This is because bondholders are particularly averse to default on the interest payments 
and as such a poor DSCR profile would not be attractive to lenders. The high average debt 
service cover ratios exhibited by the models imply a build of cash in the model, as illustrated by 
Figure 10.3 a & b. Accounting restrictions on dividend payouts also aggravates this lock up of 
cash, as the retained losses are not diminished until the latter stages of the project. Indeed for 
Base Case 5 only one dividend payment is made. This is in the form of a 'Cash Sweep', 
distributing available cash to shareholders at the very end of the project. Base Case 6 does 
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allow for a few dividend payments although these too are towards the end of the project 
(starting four years before the end of the project) . Figure 10.3 also shows that the indexed bond 
structure (Base Case 6) has a much higher cash build-up particularly after period 25 . 
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Figure 1O.3b: Base Case 6 cash flow 
The high DSCR values are partly due to the entire senior debt being raised at the start of the 
project with the bond issue with the post construction balance of the bond proceeds holding 
account transferred to the cash flow once the project is operational. For bond-financed projects 
the actual bond issue also has to be in excess of the CAPEX as the coupons on the bond 
(interest payments) are payable throughout the construction periods and these are drawn down 
from the bond proceeds. High average DSCR can also be attributed to the fact that the bonds 
are not retired until the end of the project. 
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DSCR values are calculated over the debt service period; in the case of a bond issue thi s start s 
as soon as the bond is issued (pre-construction) whilst for a bank: case the DSCR would be 
calculated starting from start of operations. Closer inspection of the bond model s' DSCR 
profiles in Figure 10.4 reveals that the restriction on the ratio for both cases occurs in the period 
before start of operations. Beyond this point the DSCR is well over the minimum. It can also be 
seen that the cover ratios start declining from the start of repayments as a result of the back-
ended sculpt. As was mentioned earlier DSCR values are far more critical with bond finance 
than with bank: loan finance and a failure to meet the obligations would most likely be treated as 
a default on the borrowings. In contrast, for bank: loan structures such a breach of the minimum 
DSCR in one period may be overlooked based on the strong cover ratio profile over the rest of 
the project. 
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It is obvious from the results that both cases provide shareholders returns that are not too 
dissimilar whilst satisfying all criteria. However from the figures highlighted earlier it is also 
clear that the fixed bond structure demands revenue with an NPV that is £30 million less than 
that for the indexed bond. From the modelling process it was apparent that the indexed bond 
package (Base Case 6) could be optimised to provide more favourable outputs than these if the 
repayment profile/ amortisation schedule was changed. However under the imposed conditions 
the fixed bond provides better value for the project. 
10.3 STAGE C - BLENDED EQUITY COMPOSITION 
Stage C simulated changed polarity in the composition of the blended equity. A high/low sp lit 
of the subordinated debt/pure equity and vice versa was explored. The results of the simul ati ons 
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are outlined in section 9.3. Base Case 7 was simulated with a higher proporti on of subord inated 
debt and Base Case 8 with higher pure equity. 
The relatively high revenue recorded for Base Case 8 can be attributed to the LLCR restri ctions. 
As defined in Chapter Seven the LLCR in any period is the NPV of all cash flow available for 
debt service over the life of the loan, i.e. loan life cash flow, divided by debt outstanding as of 
that period. Reduction of Base Case 8 revenue as may appear desirable, effects a reduction in 
the loan life cash flow, reSUlting in lower LLCR' s. However reference to Figure 10.5 which 
charts the LLCR of Base Case 8, shows that during the early years of the proj ect LLCR is not 
much greater than the minimum of 1.18 and as such an attempt to reduce the revenue would 
almost certainly result in a breach of LLCR limits particularly in period 6. 
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Figure 10.5: LLCR profile for Base Case 8 
As subordinated debt is cheaper than equity it is to be expected that the use of more pure equity, 
as in the case of Base Case 8, should increase the costs and therefore decrease the returns to the 
shareholders. In other words sharing in the same returns for a larger investment of equity should 
reduce returns (lRR). The results (see Table 9.4) however seem to suggest otherwise with the 
increased proportion of pure equity in Base Case 8 giving rise to higher shareholder returns; 
increasing from 15% to 28%. This higher return cannot be viewed in isolation but instead can be 
attributed to the much larger revenue input for Base Case 8. 
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As a result of the high revenue required to meet the LLCR restriction as discussed above the 
, 
loan is repaid rapidly (average life = 6.5 years) . This early repayment of the senior debt imp lies 
that cash, after debt service, is made available for distribution to shareholders much earl ier on in 
the project, as subordinated debt service is minimal. This is confirmed by an inspection of the 
financial statements and the cash dedication mechanism, which show that with relatively low 
subordinated debt service required, most cash left over after debt service is available for 
distribution to shareholders. This earlier and larger distribution of cash increases the shareholder 
IRR for Base Case 8. Figure 10.6 charts the cash available for distribution to shareholders and 
clearly shows the increased Base Case 8 distributions after the senior debt is repaid that is 
responsible for the increased shareholder IRR. 
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Figure 10.6: Stage C - Cash available for shareholder distribution 
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Further variants of Base Case 8 were simulated for further analysis : Base Case 8 was 
remodelled and optimised as Base Case 8a disregarding the minimum shareholder return 
requirement; Base Case 8b as a control simulation, re-optimised Base Case 8a with shareholder 
restrictions, and Base Case 8c explored simulating a different repayment option. Base Case 8a 
was able to achieve a financial model close to that of Base Case 7 and with a similar revenue 
demand. However as indicated in the previous chapter the results show key differences in the 
DSCR and IRR indicators: average DSCR is much higher for Base Case 8a (4.96) than Base 
Case 7 (1.25) and the shareholder IRR for Base Case 8a is 9% whilst that for Base Case 7 is 
15.06%. 
Analysis of Base Case 8a ' s financials show that the revenue levels arri ved at result in a 
sustained retained loss, which is not fully diminished by the project profits until peri od 50 of 
the model. As dividend payouts are dependent on a retained profit there are no shareho lder 
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distributions from the available cash for Base Case 8a until after period 50. The relatively high 
average DSCR for the model is as a result of the locked in cash, which cannot be distributed. 
This late and low level of distributions is one of the reasons for the low shareholder IRR. The 
IRR difference could also be explained by the fact that pure equity is more expensive than 
subordinated debt. For this reason it would be expected that increasing the pure equity 
proportion of the blended equity would give rise to a decrease in shareholder lRR. Simply put, 
increasing the amount of equity invested whilst sharing the same profits implies a reduced rate 
of return. 
The relative impact on IRR reduction, of the increased equity versus the cash locked in the 
model has not been measured. This measurement would be further complicated by the fact that a 
decrease in the subordinated debt leads to a decrease in funding requirements as a result of 
reduced interest costs (see results sheets in Appendix F). Some of these savings in interest costs 
may be available for shareholder distribution. 
Base Case 8b is an alteration of Base Case 8a to meet the shareholders requirements of a 
minimum IRR of 13%. During the optimisation process it was noted that once the shareholders 
requirements were met the LLCR requirements became critical, as with Base Case 8 described 
previously. The earlier analysis of Base Case 8 is further substantiated by the very similar 
results for the optimisation of Base Case 8b (see Tables 9.4 and 9.5 of Chapter Nine). Overall, 
the evidence from Base Cases 7, 8, 8a and 8b provide evidence that it is more favourable to 
increase the subordinated debt component of the blended equity rather than the pure equity. 
Base Case 8c was simulated to establish whether altered repayment profiles would improve the 
fmancial package resulting from an increased pure equity component (as in Base Case 8). From 
the simulations a profile that repaid the senior and subordinated debt as annuities proved to be 
most favourable. Table 9.5 shows that the repayment of senior and subordinated debt as 
annuities for Base Case 8c satisfies all the criteria with a revenue demand of just over £139 
million. It is clear though from the cover ratios, that in this case there is also some degree of 
cash lock-up. This implies that the cash flow may not be efficient and that the model is 
somewhat sub-optimal with regards to distributions to shareholders. The revenue requirement 
though lower than Base Case 8 still remains far greater than that for Base Case 7. It should also 
be noted that the results do not indicate which ratio of pure equity to subordinated debt at which 
a change in the repayment profile ought to be consider~d. This has not been pursued here as this 
is considered to be outside the scope of this thesis. 
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10.4 STAGE D - GEARING 
This stage considered financing the project at different levels of gearing. Table 10.2 lists the 
various gearings that were explored during these simulations and the results are outlined in 
section 9.4; the model was unable to be optimised fully at 95.59% and above, as the minimum 
loan life cover ratio requirement of 1.18 could not be met. Increasing the revenue only served to 
increase the shareholder return figures whilst the minimum LLCR remained breached. Lowering 
of revenues whilst restricting shareholder returns also did not overcome the LLCR breach. This 
behaviour was even more pronounced at higher levels of gearing. Base Case 3 was as simulated 
in Stage A. 
Model Dl 
Gearing 89.00% 
Table 10.2: Stage D Gearings. 
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Figure 10.7a: Stage D - Cover ratios. 
Figure 1O.7a plots the cover ratios for the above simulations and shows that the model displays 
a minimum average LLCR within the gearing range of 92% to 94%, i.e. either side of Base Case 
3 gearing. The figure also illustrates that the target minimum LLCR is breached between 93% 
and 94% gearing; beyond this the minimum LLCR requirement of 1.18 cannot be met. This 
breach point also coincides with the gearing range identified around the point of inflection of 
the average LLCR curve. The ranges identified above all fall within the range indicated on the 
figure as the critical gearing range, i.e. the range within which the model displays critica l 
changes. 
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Figure lO.7c: Stage D - Revenue and average life of senior debt. 
A similar trend can be identified on inspection of Figures 10. 7b and c. Figure 10. 7b plots the 
rates of return of the project and shows that the model exhibits somewhat stable project and 
shareholder IRR' s between 89% and 93% gearing. There is an obvious change in this trend 
between 93% and 96% gearing with the IRR values showing a sharp increase. This increase 
continues beyond the 96% gearing. At similar levels of gearing the slightly increas ing trend 
displayed by the average life of senior debt is suddenly reversed. Figure lO .7c, which charts the 
revenue NPV and average life figures for Stage D simulations, shows that this corresponds to a 
sudden increase in revenue input to the model. Previous analysis suggests that this drop in the 
average life from 14 years to just over 9 years is a result of excess cash fro m hi gher revenue 
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being used to payoff debt rapidly. However, as was pointed out earlier this increased revenue 
does not correct the LLCR breach that occurs above gearing levels of 95.6%. The critical 
gearing range again identified for the change in Figure 10.7c is from 93% to 95%. 
Further simulations were run in an attempt to corroborate the observations above and to narrow 
the identified range. The results of these further simulations are listed in Table 10.3 alongside 
those for 93.38% gearing, i.e. Base Case 3. Two further gearings were simulated: 92.28% and 
94.48%. These were selected to highlight the trend just before the 93% mark and just beyond 
94%. At 94.48 % the model was unable to be fully optimised, as the minimum LLCR 
I 
requirement could not be satisfied as indicated by the figures in bold type in Table 10.3. 
ModelDs Base Case 3 ModelD6 
Gearing 92.28% 93.38% 94.48% 
Target Min DSCR 1.15 1.15 1.15 
Min DSCR 1.15 1.15 1.15 
Average DSCR 1.27 1.25 1.21 
Target Min LLCR 1.18 1.18 1.18 
MinLLCR 1.20 1.18 1.15 
Average LLCR 1.38 1.31 1.31 
RevenueNPV £122.3M £121.6M £121.9M 
ProjectIRR 7.46% 7.34% 7.34% 
Shareholder IRR 14.94% 15.06% 15.44% 
Average Life of 13.89yrs 13.96yrs 13.60yrs Senior Debt 
Table 10.3: Outputs for Models D5 and D6 
Comparing the results in Table 10.3 with earlier results confirms that the change in the observed 
trend discussed above must occur between 92.28% and 94.45%. With increasing gearing the 
average life rises to 13.96 years at 93.38% and then falls to 13.6 years at 94.48%, and 
substantially lower beyond a gearing of 95%. Significantly, the average LLCR, which falls 
gradually between 89% and 93.38% gearing in Table 9.6 before rising again beyond 93.38%, 
can be seen to effectively 'plateau' in Table 10.3 at 1.31 between a gearing of 93.38% and 
94.48%. The same trend occurs with the revenue NPV: decreasing from 89% gearing, down to 
a minimum at 93.38% before rising again at 94.48% and above. 
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Figure 10.8 charts the returns for Models D5 and D6 imposed on those derived from earl ier 
results. The diagram shows the position on the chart , of the IRR values for Models D5 and D6; 
dashed lines have been used to represent a more accurate trend between 92% and 96% 
incorporating the results for gearings of 92.28% and 94.48%. The figure confirms that the range 
for the critical gearing identified earlier lies between 92.28% and 94.48% and is probably very 
close to 93.38%. 
The evidence above suggests that an 'optimum ' gearing for the generic project exists, of a value 
within the critical range identified. At this optimum gearing revenue demands are the lowest 
achievable whilst still meeting the cover ratio requirements. Beyond this optimum gearing the 
cover ratio requirements are unable to be satisfied and below it the revenue NPV is higher that 
could otherwise be achieved. The issue of optimal gearing as evidenced above is further 
explored below. 
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Figure 10.8: Stage D - Further analysis of rates of return. 
10.4.1 Optimal Gearing 
The response exhibited by the model above to different gearings at a fixed/stated cost of debt 
(interest rate), minimum cover ratio stipulation, and fixed cost of equity (return to 
shareholders), may be further explained by the following simplified example. This illustration 
considers a project with the following specific details: 
• Project A asset value = £ 1,000. 
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• Cost of debt over loan life = 7% 
• Cost of equity over loan life = 13% 
• Required Minimum Loan Life Cover Ratio (LLCR) = 1.20. 
The £ I ,000 required financing could be separated into the debt and equity- components for 
different levels of gearing (from 0% to 100%) as has been done in Table 10.4. From this the 
actual value of debt cost can be calculated by applying the percentage cost of debt. The same is 
performed for the cost of equity i.e. return on equity. The results for these calculations are also 
shown in Table 10.4. All values are in £ sterling except where indicated. 
Gearing (%) 0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100 
Debt 0 100 200 300 400 Component 500 600 700 800 900 1000 
Equity 1000 900 800 700 600 500 400 300 200 100 0 Component 
Cost of Debt 0 7 14 21 28 35 42 49 56 63 70 
Cost of 130 117 104 91 78 65 52 39 26 13 0 Equity 
Cost of debt 
@LLCR= 0 8 17 25 34 42 50 59 67 76 84 
1.20 
Cost of 130 124 118 112 106 100 94 88 82 76 70 Financing 
Table 10.4: Optimal Gearing - cost of debt and equity. 
The cost of debt resulting from achieving the required loan life cover ratio of 1.20 would be 
higher than if no cover was required and this is reflected by simply multiplying the cost of debt 
by the minimum LLCR. From the values in Table 10.4, the graph in Figure 10.9 can be plotted 
to show the cost of debt and the cost of fmancing, i.e. cost of debt + return on equity, for Project 
A. As debt is cheaper than equity (7% as opposed to 13%) the financing cost declines with 
increasing gearing. The cost of debt increases with increased gearing and is equal to cost of 
fmancing cost, i.e. intersects on the graph, at 100% gearing. 
The finance structure for this project must fall under the area of the graph bounded by cost of 
debt and cost of fmancing. A horizonta1line which when drawn from any point on the vertical 
axis, intersects with the boundary of this area, does so at a point from which a vertical line 
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would indicate on the horizontal axis the maximum gearing sustainable at this financing cost 
i.e. at this cost of debt and return on equity. 
When the cover ratio restriction is applied, the cost of debt changes as calculated in Table 10.4; 
a line representing the cost of debt at the stipulated LLCR is shown on the graph. This line 
effectively shifts the boundary provided by the cost of debt line further into the bounded area , 
reflecting the level of cash flow cover required by the lender. For the project fmance structure 
to satisfy a minimum LLCR of 1.2 the structure must now fall within the area bounded by the 
cost of fmancing and the line for debt cost at LLCR = 1.2. This area of the graph is indicated by 
a dotted pattern. 
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Figure 10.9: Illustration of optimal gearing. 
The debt cost line for LLCR = 1.2 can be seen to intersect with the cost of financing at a gearing 
of approximately 92%. Therefore any gearing below 92% will satisfy the cover ratio and equity 
return requirements. However from the figure it is obvious that the lowest financing cost at 
which the cover ratio requirement is met is at a gearing of 92% and for this reason 92% is 
regarded as the optimum gearing for fmancing Project A. At higher levels of gearing the cover 
ratio requirement will not be met and at lower levels the cost of financing increases. 
From the above illustration it is then obvious that although debt is a cheaper form of financing 
and project companies are advised to maximise debt, as a result of the requirements for debt 
service cover, there is an optimum level of gearing beyond which the financing becomes ill 
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structured. For optimal financing, once this level of gearing has been established the rest of the 
financing should be tailored to suit this level of debt. 
Discussions with Andrew Porter, Director at PricewaterhouseCoopers London, support the 
example of optimal gearing given above. Porter also notes that although a level of gearing may 
be shown as optimal, lenders may still stipulate a lower maximum gearing, (Porter 2002). This 
is a reflection of the lenders' perceptions of risk, market driven or otherwise, that may be 
attributed to the sector in question, and of their overall risk exposure as a result of other lending 
activities. A lower maximum gearing would imply that further equity would have to be 
provided thereby increasing the cost of financing. To minimise this increase project companies 
will usually utilise the cheaper options of subordinated debt or some sort of mezzanine 
financing rather than pure equity. This has been borne out by the simulations performed in 
Stage C, which show that it is preferable to increase the subordinated debt component of the 
blended equity rather than the pure equity, as the financing costs are lower and the cover ratio 
requirements are more likely to be met. 
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Figure 10.10: Detennination of optimal gearing for Generic Model. 
The process described in the illustration above was applied to the generic model for possible 
verification of the evidence from Stage D results. The determination of the optimal gearing of 
the generic model is charted in Figure 10.10. The optimal gearing has been detern1ined using 
both the minimum DSCR and minimum LLCR restrictions. 
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Reference to the figure indicates that the optimal gearing to satisfy the LLCR is 95% whilst that 
to satisfy the DSCR is 93%. In this case 93% would be considered the optimal gearing as higher 
values may cause the DSCR restriction to be breached. These results substantiate the evidence 
already displayed by the analysis of Stage D results, which place the optimal gearing in the 
range of 92.3% to 94.5% (see Figure 10.8). Review of ijase Case 3 and Model D5 also show 
that the fmancial costs highlighted in Figure 10.10 for the optimal gearing (£7 million) are not 
too dissimilar to the financing costs (circa £8 million) of the simulated models. 
Any difference can be attributed to the use of subordinated debt in the generic model's 
financing structure, and the level of inaccuracy that is to be expected in comparing the results 
from actual simulations for this study to the optimal gearing determination theorised above. 
It must be noted here that in reference to optimal gearing, the effects of the use of subordinated 
debt as part of the blended equity have not been accounted for, although logic suggests that as 
subordinated debt is cheaper than equity this would have the effect of lowering the gradient of 
the cost of financing line in Figure 10.10, thereby lowering the gearings at which the cost of 
debt lines intersect. The exact impact of the blended equity structure has not been quantified 
here. A more accurate level of optimal gearing to account for the use of subordinated debt could 
be achieved by considering a weighted average cost of debt but this has not been pursued here 
as this is considered outside the scope of this thesis. 
10.5 STAGE EI-INFLATION SENSITIVITY OF BANK LOAN PACKAGES 
Sensitivity of the model to inflation was tested and Stage E1 simulated the impact of inflation 
changes on the model when structured for bank loan fmancing. The results of the simulations 
shown in section 9.5.1 are further discussed here. For the bank loan structure 40% of the 
revenue stream is indexed to inflation whilst 100% of operational costs, excluding interest 
costs, are subj ect to inflation. 
At 3.2% inflation the results show a restricted shareholder distribution profile resulting from the 
sculpted repayments, which maximise debt repayment. -In this case dividend payments are 
unable to be made until the debt is fully repaid. 
Figure 10.11 illustrates the DSCR profile of the project; the irregular DSCR is a result of the 
sculpting process, which ensures that higher cover ratios are imposed where necessary to make 
sufficient cash available for reserve accounts whilst sculpting the debt repayment to meet the 
meet the minimum DSCR criterion. The revenue and total operational costs also exhibit a 
gradually increasing profile that changes once the inflation is altered. 
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Figure 10.11: Stage El- Cover ratios for bank loan structure at 3.2% inflation. 
The results show that should inflation drop to zero, there would be some significant impacts on 
the model. The revenue profile flattens as a result of no escalation and total operational costs 
decrease. This decrease occurs as the interest cost element of the total operational costs is 
reduced due to lessening loan outstanding with each successive principal repayments. The cash 
available for debt service also changes significantly from the previous profile, increasing 
rapidly in this case after period 22, and peaking in period 51 at over £I 5 million. Review of the 
model ' s cost schedule indicates that this peak coincides with the sudden reduction of major 
maintenance expenditure and suggests that the increased cash flow is a result of the release of 
cash tied up at 3.2% inflation for the inflated major maintenance costs. Although there is a build 
up of cash available in the model it is obvious that shareholder distributions are still not made 
early in the project. This has been attributed to accounting restrictions, which require the 
diminishing of retained losses. 
The reduction of the inflation level to zero from 3.2% gives rise to a mismatch between the 
sculpted repayments and the cash flow available. For this reason further sculpting of the 
repayments becomes necessary. The outputs at the re-sculpted repayment profile are graphed in 
Figure 1O.l2, and this shows that the project can exploit the increased cash flow for earlier debt 
repayment. 
Figure 10.12 illustrates that the debt can be paid off earlier in the event of reduced inflation: by 
period 52 as opposed to period 55 as with earlier results for 3.2% inflation. Thi s is reflected in 
the average life of senior debt , which reduces to 13.5 years from 14.4 years. An increase in 
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shareholder returns is also confinued: 15 40 0 / f 15 13°/ Th 
. / 0; up rom . / 0. is slight increase is due to 
the earlier retirement of the senior debt allowing earlier distribution of cash to shareholders. 
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Figure 10.12: Bank loan structure at 0.0% inflation; debt repayments sculpted. 
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Review of other model outputs reveal that reduced inflation results in a reduction on the pre-
funding required for the MMRA as the major maintenance costs are reduced. The excess cash 
from the initial pre-fund input therefore feeds into, and improves early cash flow . It is also 
possible to push back/delay the debt repayments keeping the average life at 14.4 years whilst 
sculpting individual periods to ensure that DSCR requirements are met. This way the excess 
cash can be taken out straight after the retained losses are diminished thereby further increasing 
IRR. 
The effect of high levels of inflation was explored by changing inflation to 7.5% and re-running 
the model. At this level of inflation the total operational costs escalate faster than the revenue 
stream with the costs almost equal in value to the revenue in some periods. Funding the greatly 
escalated costs bring about a severe reduction in the cash available to the senior lenders. Thi s 
falls below zero between periods 36 and 60. This lack of cash in the project also results in no 
distributions being made to shareholders until the end of the project around period 60. The 
increased inflation obviously impacts on the net present value of the annual revenue payments 
which have not been changed increasing thi s to over £ 162 million. The results show that at thi s 
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level of inflation the financial structure fails with the costs and lenders' and shareholders' 
requirements unable to be satisfied. 
Review of the model establishes that the minimum DSCR is breached in period 22 and falls to 
less than 1.0 in period 23 and beyond. Due to the greatly inflated costs in this case, the MMRA 
requires more pre-funding than is provided and the benefits of the MMRA -are eroded. As 
before, repayment was re-sculpted to suit the cash flow at this level of inflation; however the 
greatly reduced cash flow remained insufficient to retire the debt fully. Further simulation 
showed that full retirement of the senior loan is achievable with an increase of £0.65 million in 
annual revenue payments, although this still results in periodic negative cash flows from period 
23 onwards, primarily during major maintenance. The bank loan structure is therefore unable to 
sustain this high level of inflation without increased revenues and some remodelling, l.e. 
changing the inputs and re-optimising to suit the bank loan structure. 
10.6 STAGE E2 - FIXED BOND PACKAGES 
Stage E2 tested the sensitivity to inflation when the project was financed using a fixed rate 
bond. The results as presented in section 9.5.2 are further discussed here. As with the bank loan 
case 40% of the revenue stream is indexed to inflation. 
At the default inflation rate of3.2% the bond is fully amortised with an average life of28 years. 
From the charts in the results one of the effects of using a back-ended amortising bond is 
immediately obvious; there is a build up of cash over the initial years of the project. This is due 
to the fact that all the debt finance is raised at the beginning with the bond issue with principal 
repayments not being made until the latter periods of the project. The coupon payments 
however are made right from the first period (after bond issue) till the bond is fully retired. 
Although the costs rise with inflation they are met throughout the simulated project, as the 
repayment of debt does not start until much later in period 45. The start of amortisation also 
occurs towards the end of the major maintenance schedule, and as such coincides with a fall in 
the total operational costs due to reduced major maintenance and coupon payments, which 
decrease with retirement of debt. This reduction in coupon payable and in major maintenance 
costs causes an increase in the cash available to the senior lender allowing higher levels of 
principal repayment to be made in the latter periods. 
The model displays a late and low shareholder distribution profile as a result of retained losses 
in the model; shareholder IRR is 13.54%. By fmancing with a bond issue the fmance is raised 
on day one and drawn down during construction for costs and coupon payments. As there is no 
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revenue during construction the bond proceeds diminish and the DSCR is normally lowest in 
the last period before operations. The bond issue amount therefore must be calculated to ensure 
that the minimum required DSCR is not breached before operations and must be sufficient to 
ensure that cash flow, once operational, is able to meet coupon payments in the first years of 
operations. 
At zero inflation the fixed bond model displays a flat revenue stream profile as expected due to 
the lack of escalation. The operational cost profile also flattens fluctuating only as a result of 
the major maintenance schedule, before declining after the start of amortisation due to reduced 
coupon payments and a gradual cessation of maj or maintenance costs. 
Whilst the cash available at 3.2% inflation peaks at £110 million in period 58 before declining 
rapidly, at zero inflation the cash profile is similar but only up until the start of amortisation, 
peaking at £80 million before declining for the rest of the project. Although the zero inflation 
does not increase the revenue, the reduced costs allows the timely repayment of debt and also 
allows more shareholder distributions; this is reflected in the results by the increased 
shareholder IRR 
The performance of the fixed bond structure under high levels of inflation was explored by 
changing inflation to 7.5%. The results show that at t~s level of inflation the total operational 
cost profile is steeper than that for the revenue but in this case the costs rapidly escalate above 
the revenue stream between periods 34 and 40 and even more so between periods 44 and 51. 
The amount of pre-funding required for the MMRA also increases from £93,000 to £115,000. 
At 7.5% inflation the cash profile is also significantly changed, with the increased inflation 
improving revenues and creating an earlier build up of cash more than sufficient to meet the 
c-osts. The cash available peaks however in period 26 at £60 million and rapidly declines 
afterwards. This can be attributed to the effect of escalation on the major maintenance and other 
operational costs matched with a reduced escalation of the revenue (40%). 
Review of the model indicates that whilst the cover ratio requirements are not met, the model is 
robust enough to withstand this level of inflation until very late in the project. The LLCR is not 
actually breached until period 44 and the DSCR breaches the 1.15 minimum in period 59, and is 
only unable to meet the principal repayments, i.e. DSCR <1.0, after period 60 as is indicated in 
Figure 10.13. This implies that the bond would not be fully retired at an inflation level of7.5% 
although default would not occur until the last few years of the project. The ability of the 
project to avoid default for this long is a result of the back-ended nature of bond repayment, in 
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this case amortising over the last ten years . An even more back-ended profile may we ll satisfy 
the cover ratio requirements. 
Should this potential default become apparent during the course of the project, rearrangement of 
the financial package, by re-sculpting debt repayment as undertaken for the bank loan case for 
example, would prove very difficult, due to the inflexible nature of bond financin a and the 
o 
complications involved in negotiating with several or numerous bondholders. 
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Figure 10.13: Cover ratios for fixed bond structure at 7.5% inflation. 
Further modelling also showed that the repayment profile was unable to be re-sculpted around 
the initial inputs, to match the cash flows at 7.5% inflation. For the model to sustain this level 
of inflation would require an increase in the proportion of indexed revenue or an increase in the 
annual revenue payments. However in practice these can only be implemented before financial 
close of the deal, as all parties are contractually bond to the terms after close. In this case 
further simulation indicated that a slight increase of the annual revenue stream from £ 17.3 
million to £17.5 million would be sufficient for the fixed bond structure to withstand inflation at 
7.5%. 
10.7 STAGE E3 - INDEXED BOND PACKAGES 
The results for the sensitivity tests conducted on the model financed with an index-linked bond 
are outlined in section 9.5.3. Those results are discussed in detail below and should be referred 
to when considering the analysis below. 
At the default inflation rate of 3.2% the shareholder IRR is higher than with other financing 
structures but the annual revenue payment in this case is also larger than for other cases. Thi s is 
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in line with the analysis in section 10.2, which suggests that an indexed bond package would 
require higher revenue levels for similar returns as a fIxed bond or bank loan package. 
The results show that at 3.2% inflation dividend payments are made from period 26, i.e. before 
the start of debt repayment, and a distribution to shareholders is sustained throughout the bond 
amortisation. The debt repayment profIle is the same as in previous bond structures but the 
profile of cash available is much steeper due to 100% revenue indexation, peaking at a much 
higher value (circa £160 million) and falling from period 30 rather than rising, as with the ftxed 
bond package. The values of debt repayment in each period (and therefore total debt repaid) are 
also higher in the case of indexed bond as any outstanding principal is also subject to inflation. 
The average life of the indexed bond of 28 years is similar to that of the ftxed bond and is a 
reflection of the back-ended nature of the amortisation profIle. 
Compared to the model at 3.2% inflation the cash availability profile at zero inflation shows an 
obvious skew to the right. This is due to the slower build-up of cash from the reduced revenues. 
At zero inflation the revenue available to the project is reduced and the cash available also 
rapidly drops from the start of the amortisation schedule. This impacts on the shareholder 
distribution, as the project is unable to make dividend payments until much later from period 40; 
this is reflected in the drop of shareholder IRR from 25% to 18%. 
Notwithstanding the reduced revenue to the project, the debt repayments are met at zero 
inflation, and this model retires the bond slightly earlier with average life down from 28 to 26 
years. This is possible as the zero inflation implies that the outstanding value of debt does not 
escalate and hence the periodic repayments are much lower than at higher levels of inflation. 
The results show that at 7.5% inflation, revenue and total operational costs rise dramatically. 
The initial results at 7.5% do not satisfy the requirements and Figure 10.14a shows the resulting 
profiles before the impact of inflation on the repayment profile is taken into account. The fIgure 
shows that at 7.5% inflation the cash available profile is initially skewed to the left as the 
indexed bond structure exhibits a rapid cash build-up in the years preceding repayment. Again, 
as at 3.2% inflation, the cash available peaks around period 30 but the levels of cash are much 
greater; in excess of £180 million (as opposed to £160 million). It is apparent that indexing 
100% of the revenues ensures that the revenue and total cost proftles remain divergent even at 
high levels of inflation; with the revenue stream always higher than costs in this case. The cost 
line in this case does not tail off during amortisation and this is a result of the cumulative effect 
of continued inflation on any outstanding debt, which in tum results in increasing coupon 
outgoings. 
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Figure 10.14a: Indexed bond structure at 7.5% - initial results. 
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Figure 1O.14b charts the profiles after the repayments are made to reflect the high level of 
inflation. The annual revenue payment was increased in an attempt to provide for the full 
repayment of the bond. The figure shows however that although the minimum and average 
LLCR's, and the average DSC R are greatly increased, the minimum DSCR is still breac hed at 
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higher levels of revenue. Closer inspection of the model's cover ratios show that this breach 
occurs in the pre-operations period i.e. period 5, identified earlier as critical for a bond package 
(see Figure 10.4). 
This is due to the increased drawdowns for debt service/coupons during construction, which 
depletes the bond issue proceeds quicker than at lower inflation levels. No revenue is earned 
during this time to offset this increase in coupon payments. At these increased levels of 
inflation the amount of pre-funding required for the MMRA is also increased to £115000 , 
whilst the model has provided for £93,000. This would increase the strain on the cash flow in 
period 5, which is when the pre-funding is injected. 
The repayment profile indicated in Figure 10.14a is unchanged from the profile at 3.2% 
inflation and due to the rising value of debt outstanding there is a repayment shortfall with 
£87.7m of principal (nominal) outstanding at maturity. Adjusting the revenue and sculpting the 
repayments to match the cash flows at this level of inflation as in Figure 10.14b, result in an 
increase in earlier shareholder distributions and debt repayment but still leaves £82.7m 
outstanding. It was found that by stopping the shareholder distributions from period 39 to 64 the 
cash flow is sufficient to repay the bond fully as illustrated in Figure 10.15. This restriction of 
dividends was found to still leave the shareholder IRR at a comfortable 28.64%. This implies 
that for the indexed bond structure with 100% indexed revenues; in the event of high inflation 
the revenue is such that restriction of shareholder distributions can ensure full debt repayment 
whilst high levels of return can still be achieved. 
Figure 10.15 shows the result of restricting distributions on the indexed bond financial package: 
the cash available can be seen to flatten out when accounting restrictions allow for shareholder 
distribution. The figure also shows that no distributions are made between periods 39 and 64 
and that excess cash, after full repayment of the bond, is distributed to the shareholders as a 
'cash sweep' at the very end of the project. 
The profiles for debt outstanding for all simulations are outlined in Appendix G and show that 
the re-sculpting and limitation of dividend payments for the indexed bond structure as above, 
which allows for satisfaction of all stakeholders requirements in the event of very high 
inflation, also results in a profile for debt outstanding very similar to that for inflation levels of 
3.2%. From this the inference can also be made that this profile, illustrated in Figure 10.16, is 
the desired profile for debt outstanding when fmancing a project with an index-linked bond 
issue. Attaining a similar profile can be assumed to indicate a more viable fmancing structure. 
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The results for the simulation of mono line wrappmg as applied to the bond financing are 
outlined in section 9.6. As explained with the development of the model , the wrapping fee is 
calculated per period based on the value of bond out standing at the end of the peri od. The 
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monoline insurer demands upfront payment, made in period 1, of 33% of the NPV of the 
monoline fee calculated for the model. The balance of 67% is paid over the life of the project. 
The fee calculations for the models indicate that the up front fees for wrapping the bond issues 
are £2.9 million for the fixed bond and £4.6 million for the indexed bond. This upfront fee, like 
the coupon has to be paid from the proceeds of the bond issue. Review of the results sheets for 
the models in Appendix F shows that the bond issue amount is increased to cope with the 
increase in fees. The total financing fees, approximately £0.9 million for both the unwrapped 
fixed and indexed bond structures, also increase substantially as a result of the wrapping: up to 
£4.6 million for the fixed bond and £7.3 million for the indexed bond. Over the life of the bond 
the fixed bond pays the balance for monoline fees of £6 million and the indexed bond issue £9.4 
million. 
It is clear then that the indexed bond option is much more expensive to wrap; this can be 
attributed to the cumulative effect of inflation on the amount of principal outstanding in any 
period, which is the basis of the monoline fee calculation. For this reason the impact on the 
mono line fee on an indexed bond structure can be expected to be even greater in an 
environment of high inflation; with zero inflation resulting in wrapping fees of the same 
magnitude as for an equivalent fixed bond structure. 
Whilst the wrapping of a bond increases the attraction of the bond to investors, the cost versus 
benefits must be considered before adoption. The simulations have shown that higher levels of 
revenue are required to meet the costs of mono line wrapping. The results also indicate that the 
models require higher revenue levels than the unwrapped bond options as a result of these 
increased fmancing costs. For the assumed monoline fee of 0.35% or 35 basis points per 
annum, an increase of approximately 3% in the annual revenue payments is required to meet the 
increase in financing fees for both the flXed and indexed bond issues. It must be noted however 
that the results show that this increase in the index linked bond issue resulted in a lower 
shareholder IRR that was exhibited by the unwrapped issue and hence the assumption can be 
made that the increase in revenue required for the indexed issue to attain the same IRR may be 
somewhat higher than 3%. 
10.9 SUMMARY 
This chapter has reviewed and analysed the results and observations of the simulations reported 
in Chapter Nine. The analysis has been aided by the use of charts and references to the results 
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in the appendices to this thesis. Where necessary further tests have been conducted and the 
models scrutinised even closer. 
The results of the simulations were readily interpreted and exhibited logical patterns allowing 
for easier analysis. The analysis conducted and reported within this chapter helps to explain the 
dynamic relationships that exist between model components and the model's response to 
various inputs. The outcome of the simulations demonstrate the existence of a level of gearing 
which can be deemed optimal in terms of satisfying the lenders cover ratio demands, whilst 
achieving the low revenue requirements critical for competitive tendering. The results also 
expose the possibility of using increased pre-funding of reserve accounts in bond-fmanced 
structures to counter early strain on cash flow. The analysis conducted in this chapter suggests 
that repayment of senior debt is better sculpted to match the cash flow than repayment on an 
annuity basis and shows that monoline wrapping of bond issues has no discernible impact on 
the model aside from a direct increase in fmancing costs and therefore revenue requirements. 
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CHAPTER ELEVEN 
CONCLUSION 
11.0 INTRODUCTION 
This final chapter brings together the salient points and fmdings made during the research. This 
thesis melds practice in the real world with information in academia. This is made possible by 
the adopted approach, which couples incisive review of literature with practical aspects of the 
study integrated closely with working alongside project finance professionals. This method 
helped to focus the thesis such that the areas studied are not only significant to research but also 
of commercial interest to industry in terms of application and implementation. This study has 
focused on one, if not the most, fundamental aspect of privately financed projects: that of 
fmancial engineering. 
The sections below show that the contents of this thesis realise each objectives set out in 
Chapter One and ergo achieve the aim of this research, i.e. improving the understanding of 
financial instruments used in project fmancing and the process of fmancial engineering, and 
providing decision aiding notes and observations on the optimal engineering of financial 
structures in project finance. 
Due to the growth of the European Union and the accompanying development of infrastructure, 
events and practice in Europe of relevance to the project fmance market have been a great 
source of information for this thesis. However much of the PFIIPPP practices as outlined in this 
thesis relate to the UK market. Whilst this does not negate inferences that may be made towards 
practice in other countries, the possible existence of peculiarities must be borne in mind. 
Possible differences may arise in areas concerned with legislation, vehicles and initiatives to 
facilitate private financing, payment mechanisms and the readily available sources of finance. 
Projects privately financed using different mechanisms and in various sectors have been touched 
upon throughout this thesis. For the simulations run however, the sample used to generate the 
generic project was limited to concession projects in the UK health sector. As such the 
simulations were run on a fmancial model with features attributed specifically to the health 
sector. Care must be taken in applying any of the information in this thesis to other sectors, as 
differences may exist between the sectors, which have significant impact on interpretation of 
outputs. The financial model used for the simulations was also structured to reflect the payment 
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mechanism that typically exists in health sector projects where the revenue stream is based on 
an availability fee, payable by the client/pUblic sector to the project, for proven predetermined 
levels of service availability. Outputs may differ for projects where the revenue is dependent on 
other payment mechanisms such as those based on market related or 'user pays' principles. 
Interpretation of the information in this thesis and of the conclusions outlined below, within the 
limitations described above and in Chapter One, offers insightful knowledge on the process of 
fmancial engineering for project finance, and on the various instruments and mechanisms that 
can be employed for project profitability and fmancial robustness. 
11.1 CONCLUSIONS 
Here the key conclusions of this study are outlined. These are structured below as the significant 
fmdings made during realisation of the objectives, which were set for this thesis in Chapter 
One. These objectives are also listed below. 
1. To review the project fmance market, tracing its ongms and development, and 
determining its current form 
2. To explore the instruments used m fmancing projects and their development and 
application in today's market 
3. To collect, analyse and interpret data from the project finance market and explore 
permutations of financial structures, using fmancial tools that may be applied directly to 
this data. 
4. To verify and validate the results and outputs of the thesis. 
5. To provide discernible notes and observations on processes necessary for the 
formulation of an optimal financial structure for a privately fmanced project. 
11.1.1 Objective 1 
Review the project finance market, tracing its origins and development, and determining its 
current form. 
The fmancing of projects in the private sector is one of the options for the provision of 
infrastructure and public services. This thesis has identified early private sector involvement in 
such provision as occurring as far back as in the seventeenth century in Europe, driven by the 
sudden growth and demand for long distance travel and commerce. Evolution of private sector 
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provision has also been identified in the fonn of concession contracts awarded to private 
entrepreneurs such as the Perrier brothers who provided water to the city of Paris by financing 
the construction of an aqua-duct, subsequently recouping costs plus profits by charging for the 
water supplied. 
As the demand for infrastructure and public services outstripped the supply by the private sector 
particularly due to the industrial revolution, responsibility for provision fell to the public sector; 
this remained the nonn up until a few decades ago. The author has traced the evolution of such 
provision highlighting that with further increasing demand for public services and greater levels 
of required renewal and repair of infrastructure, the demands on public sector resources has 
now grown to unsustainable levels. This has been the driver in the last few decades for the 
resurgence of private sector involvement, but to a much larger degree than ever before. 
Currently numerous projects continue to be delivered by the private sector, in most cases under 
a concession contract where the private sector raises the fmance, designs and constructs the 
facility, and then operates and maintains the asset, providing a service for which revenue is 
received over a predetennined period. This study goes on to identify the current form and 
current practice in the proj ect finance market. 
In the UK the Private Finance Initiative (PFI) and the Public Private Partnerships (PPP) are 
examples of supporting structures put in place to encourage private provision. There are various 
similar mechanisms used for implementation in other countries. Despite the variety of 
mechanisms, the purpose for these remains the same: to attract private sector capital for the 
provision of infrastructure and public services, and to foster and facilitate private sector 
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involvement in such provision. 
The current fonn of the project fmance market is heavily orientated towards a partnering 
approach between the public and private sectors particularly for socially desirable but 
economically uncertain projects. The current appetite of sovereign states for off-balance sheet 
financing, and the growing demand for improved infrastructure and services in the developed 
and developing world, set against a background of oversubscribed resources, imply that the 
current partnering between the public and private sector for the realisation of required projects 
will remain undiminished. Indeed further experience and opportunity will only make for faster 
evolution within the project finance market. 
Currently project finance is also implemented in many areas different from the traditional 
sphere of infrastructure provision. Financial engineering in project fmance is now being used to 
procure services as well as assets, and within the corporate world for securitisations, mergers 
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and acquisitions. The use of bond issues for financing projects is also on the increase as project 
sponsors realise that there are further returns to be made from active involvement in innovative 
financial engineering. 
11.1.2 Objective 2 
Explore the instruments used in financing projects and their development a;'d application in 
today's market. 
The key to the success of a privately financed project is the finance package that is put in place 
for its realisation. There are several sources of funds for projects, some of which have been 
identified in this thesis as agencies or authorities within the public sector, commercial banks, 
development banks, Islamic banks, pension funds and project participants or stakeholders. The 
fmance is provided using equity and debt instruments, and in some cases as direct grants. 
Equity is effectively risk capital that is provided by investors in return for payments or 
dividends in proportion to the amount of equity provided. Equity is raised through domestic and 
international equity or stock markets. Developing countries are often limited to the international 
equity markets due to unsophisticated domestic markets. 
Debt is often the largest component of a project's financial package and is broadly classified 
into senior and subordinated debt. Senior debt is ranked first by its security over all project 
assets and agreements and most borrowings from commercial lenders for project financing will 
be in the form of senior debt. Subordinated debt can also be secured but by a lesser ranking 
over all assets and agreements and is often more akin to equity than debt, as it can rank after 
unsecured creditors in the event of liquidation. Subordinated debt can be provided by 
stakeholders in the project or by third party investors such as pension funds whose involvement 
in the proj ect is limited to the provision of fmance. 
For projects requiring very large sums of debt in the form of loans, syndication is often used, 
with one bank often serving as the lead bank for the syndicate. Providers of the senior debt 
often have a large degree of control over the project and have set conditions precedent to the 
loan provision. Debt can also be provided by way of a bond issue; the consortium awarded the 
concession essentially issues pieces of paper that state that the issuer (the borrower) promises to 
pay whoever owns the bond (the lender or bondholder) certain interest payments at specified 
dates in the future. Repayments of the principal may be by way of amortisation of the bond on 
an agreed instalment basis or by a bullet repayment at the end of the bond tenn. Bond rating 
firms such as Moody and Standard and Poor provide services where bond issues are rated as a 
205 
means for investors to evaluate and compare bonds. Most bonds in project fmance have to 
achieve an investment grade rating at the least, to attract investors. This thesis highlights that 
the use of bonds in project fmance is growing as promoters seek higher returns or greater 
control over the project. 
The author has revealed that the development of instruments and mechanisms is driven by the 
risk perceptions of the fmance providers. The study has also found that such development is 
also affected by the existing rule of thumb that the higher the perceived risk surrounding a 
project, the larger the proportion of equity or risk capital required. Conversely, projects deemed 
to be safe or low risk are able to raise a larger proportion of the fmance in the cheaper form of 
debt, i.e. are highly geared. Most projects are fmanced at gearing levels from 70% to 90%. With 
growing experience on all sides in project financing, today's market is able to offer increasingly 
competitive terms of fmance. For this reason, fmancial engineering today demonstrates greater 
reliance on innovative fmancing structures and mechanisms. Mezzanine fmancing is one such 
mechanism where third party funds or loans are used as a cheaper option to sponsor provided 
equity. The innovative structuring of mezzanine finance makes it more akin to equity than debt 
and therefore more often referred to as quasi equity. 
The author's research has found that to create a source of funds to the project, the project 
sponsors often incorporate commercial opportunities into the contractual structure. The study 
has however identified that more often than not, commercial opportunities that bring a source of 
funds during the course of the project stem from value added by the project's subsistence, and 
often such value is difficult to capture. This thesis provides illustrations of projects employing a 
degree of commercial innovation and exploitation. 
The creditworthiness of the parties seeking financing has been highlighted as key to 
successfully achieving robust financing. The author shows however that instruments such as 
monoline insurance and guarantees can be used to enhance the credit of the project thereby 
improving funding opportunities. Other instruments used in fmancial engineering include 
interest rate swaps and leasing. Financing instruments are so developed and sophisticated today 
that finns develop and market expertise in selling elements of fmancial engineering which 
become marketable on their own. An example is the sale or purchase of interest rate swaps 
independently of a project. 
11.1.3 Objective 3 
Collect, analyse and interpret data from the project finance market and explore permutations 
of financial structures, using financial tools that may be applied directly to this data. 
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During data collection for the thesis the assumption was made that within the health sector 
privately fmanced projects require similar assets and equipment, and are expected to deliver 
similar levels of service. Whilst some of the fmancing mechanisms are also similar across health 
projects, the relative commonality in the underlying project asset enables focus to be shifted to 
comparison of the financial structures. From the data collected it was therefore possible to 
derive ranges that could be considered typical of health sector projects and ~s such create a 
generic project. The cost and financial profile for this project was achievable using typical 
ranges from the data gathered. 
A complex financial model was developed by the author for this generic project to investigate 
the behaviour of the financial structure under different circumstances. The discussion and 
review within this thesis, of the development of the generic fmancial model and of issues arising 
during the development, provide a clearer insight into the workings and assembly of a financial 
model and a better understanding of the different components. 
The author was able to simulate various financial permutations using the generic model thereby 
exploring bank loan and bond financing and the subsequent debt repayment. The fmancial 
model developed allowed the implementation of various tools such as mono line wrapping, 
reserve accounts and examination of different debt repayment options. The author showed, 
through the simulations, that the model performed differently at different levels of gearing and 
its sensitivity to levels of inflation was dependant on the debt option in place and the profile for 
debt repayment. 
This thesis explains approaches to the arrangement of financing structures for the best levels of 
economic robustness. The role and importance of optimisation of the fmancial package during 
modelling are also demonstrated affording the reader a better understanding of the dynamics of 
a fmancial model and its components. This ultimately improves awareness of fmancial 
engineering, and enhances skills for navigation of fmancial models to identify significant 
indicators, and interpret behaviour or performance of the model. 
11.1.4 Objective 4 
Verification and validation of the thesis outputs. 
Verification and validation of the thesis was carried out at different stages. This was required as 
the conceptual structure for the financial model designed by the author had to be subjected to 
initial V & V, and then the model actually developed from the design had to be verified and 
validated prior to research use. The verification and validation was conducted at a macro and 
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micro level at the conceptual stage, and also during and after development. Much of the V & V 
was done by assessment by experts and comparisons with other real models. 
Initial outputs from the model were presented to experts for comment and as detailed within this 
thesis, this contributed to the verification and validation of the model, allowing sufficient 
confidence to be placed in the model structure, such that its outputs can be considered accurate 
representations of the project finance field under study. This confidence can be extended to the 
outputs of the simulations, which were run using the verified and validated model, and hence to 
the outcomes of the analysis conducted on the results. 
11.1.5 Objective 5 
Provide discern able notes and observations on processes necessary for the formulation of an 
optimal financial structure for a privately financed project. 
This thesis has for the first time married theory with practice in researching the process of 
financial engineering and the nature and, crucially, the dynamics between the different 
components of project finance structures. The extensive discussion and information provided on 
the engineering of fmancial packages in the preceding chapters form part of the outputs of this 
thesis. Issues and considerations when using the various options of debt and equity have also 
been outlined with results from the simulations providing evidence for the conclusions and 
observations. 
This thesis has identified that the integration of the development of the financial model with the 
procurement process is fundamental to the success of the bidding strategy and to the project 
overall. The author developed a complex and commercially applicable financial model with 
similar capacity to those in practice, to show the characteristics of different components of 
financial structures and to determine the nature of the dynamic that exists within such structures. 
The role and requirements of the key components of the fmancial model have been identified 
and explained, as have tests that should be run when considering and structuring the fmancial 
structure for a project. From subsequent discussion and analysis of the simulation results a real 
insight is provided into some of the implications of different fmancial instruments, and the 
performance of the instruments, and the model as a whole, under different conditions and 
financial structures. 
Significantly, the author has also provided evidence for the first time that, for each financial 
package of known debt and equity cost, and minimum cover ratio stipulation, there exists an 
'optimal' or best level of gearing at which revenue demands for the model are the lowest 
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achievable whilst still meeting the cover ratio requirements. The results have shown that beyond 
this optimal gearing the cover ratio requirements are unable to be satisfied, and below it the 
revenue NPV is higher that could otherwise be achieved. From the lenders' perspective this 
optimal gearing can be referred to as the maximum gearing at which the project could be 
funded. For sponsors the ability to determine the optimal gearing allows maximisation of project 
returns and minimisation of financing costs. This will also allow the spon;ors to only seek 
sustainable levels of debt. Comparison of the optimal gearing level for a project with the 
tendered finance package will go some way to allowing the procurer ascertain the robustness of 
a bidder's financial package. 
This thesis uniquely details the process of optimisation during fmancial modelling, elaborating 
by illustration on the dynamic relationships between key components of the process. Cover 
ratios, shareholder returns and gearing have been identified as fundamental to optimisation and 
their roles have been discussed with illustrations given by detailing the adopted optimisation 
method during simulations. The author has within the chapters of this report, outlined the steps 
taken during optimisation such as with the sculpting of debt repayment, explaining the effects 
on the outputs, as a result of the model's structure and dynamics. 
The author has also highlighted the discovery during the research, of the possibility of using 
increased pre-funding of the major maintenance reserve account in bond financed structures, as 
a means of introducing cash into the model in the pre-operations period; this was found to 
improve strained cash flow in the initial periods of operations due to coupon payments being 
made throughout the construction phase, during which no revenue is received. The results have 
shown that the pre-operations period is often the period of greatest cash flow stress for bond-
financed structures particularly for indexed bond structures in the event of increased levels of 
inflation. 
Notably, the results also indicate that for index linked bond packages, the fmance structure is 
likely to fail in the event of high inflation, even with 100% indexation of revenues, if 
limitations are not put in place to restrict increased dividend distributions to shareholders. 
Failure to do so will most likely result in inability to fully retire the bond during the repayment 
or amortisation periods. Monoline wrapping of bonds has also been shown to have no 
significant impact on the financial model aside from a direct increase in the cost of financing. 
Overall, wrapping of fixed or indexed bonds has been shown to require an increase to the 
annual revenue payments by a factor roughly equivalent to the monoline fee multiplied by 10. 
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Importantly this thesis has also demonstrated that regardless of the repayment schedule for the 
subordinated debt, the repayment of senior debt is better scheduled on a sculpted basis rather 
than as an annuity. In the simulations run for this thesis the favoured repayment profile 
combination for debt was the sculpted repayment of senior debt with repayment of the 
subordinated debt as an annuity. 
11.2 Further Research 
During the course of this research areas were uncovered which, though deemed to be outside the 
scope of this study, were identified as areas that would benefit from further investigation. These 
included the identified possibility that it may become beneficial to consider a change in the debt 
repayment profile for a project, at a certain proportion of pure equity within the blended equity 
component. In other words should the very small pure equity component of the blended equity 
be increased gradually, there may exist a point at which the existing repayment profile becomes 
ill adapted or unsuitable for the project. 
Research into financial engineering would also benefit from further exploration of optimal 
gearing. Whilst the existence of an optimal level of gearing has been brought to light by this 
study, no study has been performed on the impact of the sponsor provided debt on any 
ascertained level of optimal gearing. Further research could be conducted considering 
mechanisms for optimal gearing determination that include a weighted cost of debt. Such a 
mechanism would have to reflect the source of subordinated debt, i.e. whether provided by the 
sponsors, who consider this as part of the equity cost, or by third party lenders with no equity 
holdings in the project. 
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APPENDIX A: SAMPLE INDICATIVE TERM SHEET 
The Lead Arrangers have not sought or obtained the internal credit approvals, which are required before 
any formal undertaking of an extension of credit can be made. These indicative terms and conditions 
should not be construed as a commitment by the Lead Arrangers to enter into any specific transaction nor, 
other than as contemplated by this term sheet, are the terms and conditions set out below intended to be 
exhaustive. Participation by the Lead Arrangers is subject to completion of their usual- credit, technical, 
legal, financial and other due diligence plus execution of acceptable project, credit, security and other 
agreed documentation and satisfaction of all conditions precedent. 
Capitalised terms used in this term sheet are defined in the attached Annexure. 
Borrower: 
Lead Arrangers: 
Description of Facilities: 
Facility Agent: 
Security Trustee: 
Facility Amount: 
Facility Purpose: 
\ 
Availability: 
Repayment: 
Base Interest Rate: 
Margin: 
A special purpose company incorporated m VictorialNew 
South Wales. 
ANZ Investment Bank, Dresdner Bank AG, National Australia Bank, The 
Toronto-Dominion Bank and Westdeutsche Landesbank 
Girozentrale, (severally and in equal proportions). 
An Australian dollar loan note facility option to be syndicated 
domestically and internationally ('Facility'). A bill 
reliquification option will be included. 
An Australian dollar working capital facility (including 
performance bonds) is to be provided by a single lender and 
documented separately. Conditions precedent, representations 
and warranties, undertakings, defaults and other terms are to be 
consistent with the loan note facility terms. Funding costs for 
the working capital facility will be the BBSY bid rate plus an 
agreed margin. 
[To be determinedJ 
The security trustee will be nominated by the Facility Agent and should 
be a related entity of the Facility Agent. 
[To be determined. This may be subject to adjustment on or before the 
date of Financial Close to ref/ect the Banking Base Case 
Model as updated to ref/ect the actual interest rates to apply 
from the date of Financial Close.] 
To [mance the acquisition of the assets in conjunction with sponsor's 
equity and to fund associated costs. 
The Facility will be available for drawdown until 1 March 
2000. Drawdown will occur on satisfaction or waiver of all 
outstanding Conditions Precedent. Any amount not drawndown 
on the first drawdown (apart from under the working capital 
facility) will be cancelled. 
5 years from Financial Close. 
BBSY bid rate for the relevant interest period as displayed by the Reuters 
Monitoring System. 
The margin will adjust based on the ratings matrix below: 
Fees: 
Optional prepayment: 
Drawings: 
Security: 
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Ratine Years 1-3 Year 4 YearS 
A- 0.75% 0.85% 0.95% 
BBB+ 0.80% 0.95% 1.05% 
BBB 0.90% 1.05% 1.15% 
BBB-/unrated 1.10% 1.25% 1.35% 
An underwriting fee of the aggregate of: 
(a) the greater of 1.3% of: 
(i) the amount drawn under the Facility on the 
firstdravvdown; and 
(ii) 80% of the Facility Amount; and 
(b) 0.5% of the amount (if any) vvhich is the difference 
betvveen the Facility Amount and the amount drawn 
under the Facility on first dravvdown. 
The underwriting fee will be payable to the Lead Arrangers on 
settlement of the acquisition of assets (vvhether or not the 
Facility is drawn down). The Borrovver agrees to use the 
Facility if it is the successful bidder. The above fee structure is 
based on the assumption that conditions precedent to first 
dravvdown vvill be limited to those of a mechanical nature. 
The Borrovver vvill pay the agreed fees of the Lead Arrangers' 
legal counsel and all agreed fees for consultant's engaged by 
the Lead Arrangers that are producing reports to satisfy 
conditions precedent. 
The Borrovver may prepay, vvithout penalty (other than break 
costs for payments other than on a rollover date), all or part of 
the Facility on providing 5 business days' notice. Prepayments 
must be at least A$ I 0,000,000 and a multiple of A$5,000,000. 
Dravvings may be for 1, 2, 3 or 6 month terms. If necessary, 
the Borrovver will agree to make dravvings of 1 month duration 
for the first 6 months after first dravvdown in order to facilitate 
syndication. 
A security trust deed structure vvi11 be established with the nominated 
security trustee holding the securities on behalf of all lenders 
under the Facility, the vvorking capital bank, svvap providers in 
relation to the Facility (vvhether or not also lenders under the 
Facility) and, (subject to agreement) vvhere intercreditor and 
subordination arrangements acceptable to the Lead Arrangers 
have been agreed, mezzanine debt lenders. S vvap providers, in 
respect of their exposure under the svvap, vvill only have a vote 
for their net svvap exposure in the case of default. Mezzanine 
and subordinated debt providers will not have voting rights 
unless othervvise agreed by each of the Lead Arrangers. 
Where any part of the Facility, svvap or mezzanine debt is 
refinanced and the Security is not discharged, the refinancing 
lenders and svvap providers are to become beneficiaries under 
the security trust and have the benefit of the Security on a pro 
rata basis vvith the lenders under the Facility, subject to 
intercreditor and subordination arrangements being agreed in 
Conditions Precedent: 
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relation to mezzanine debt (consistent with the initial financing 
arrangements) . 
The sec~ty trust ~tructure is designed to minimise stamp duty 
and achieve efficIency in the transfer and sharing of the 
Securities. 
The security trust deed will contain a guarantee and indemnity 
from each Project Group entity (other thaIi the Borrower) in 
respect of the debts of the Borrower. 
The security will be: 
(a) a first ranking registerep charge over each Project 
Group entity's assets and undertakings (except to the 
extent that any right under the Distribution Network 
Lease or any other asset (including contracts), 
cannot be charged); 
(b) a registered mortgage of all leasehold and freehold 
land owned by any Project Group Entity; and 
(c) an effective third party charge from each Sponsor 
over the shares it holds in the holding company 
within the Project Group (with limited recourse to 
only the shares held by the Sponsors). 
The Security will be released if a Project Group entity obtains a 
credit rating of at least BBB+ (or equivalent) and the Borrower 
refinances (on an unsecured basis) at least 50% of the debt 
outstanding under. the Facility. There will be no lender 
approval criteria for a refinancing if at least 50% of the debt 
outstanding is refinanced and a credit rating of at least BBB+ is 
maintained in respect of the debt after refinance. Refinancing 
in other circumstances will be subject to the approval of the 
Majority Lenders or on meeting certain agreed objective 
criteria. Thereafter a negative pledge will be provided by all 
Project Group entities to the Facility Agent on behalf of all 
lenders under the Facility. At that time all indebtedness of 
each entity of the Project Group will be unsecured other than 
debts mandatorily preferred by law. 
Any debt used to refinance the Facility will rank equally with 
the debt under the Facility. 
The conditions precedent to be satisfied before a drawing may 
be requested are: 
(i) 
(ii) 
execution of the Finance Agreements (including ISDA 
documents but, subject to paragraph (ii), excluding 
Hedges) and the Equity Agreements in form and 
substance satisfactory to the Facility Agent (acting on 
the instructions of each of the Lead Arrangers); 
execution of the Hedges that the Lead Arrangers and 
the Borrower have agreed must be entered into by 
Financial Close; 
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Note: The hedging requirements by Financial Close 
are to be discussed. 
(iii) evidence, in form and substance satisfactory to the 
Facility Agent (acting on the instructions of each of 
the Lead Arrangers), of the payment of the equity 
sUbscriptions and shareholder loans as contemplated 
by the Equity Agreements to achieve a gearing ratio 
immediately after the first drawdown of [*]. The 
gearing ratio will be measured at Financial Close; 
(iv) provision of a pre-funding certificate, in form and 
substance satisfactory to the Facility Agent (acting 
on the instructions of the Lead Arrangers), for each 
Project Group entity and each Sponsor attaching 
copies of: 
(v) 
(vi) 
(a) its constitution or a certificate confirming 
that there is no constitution; 
(b) its certificate of registration; and 
(c) extracts of minutes of meetings of its 
board of directors and, if required by the 
Lead Arrangers, of its shareholders 
approving the relevant Project Group 
entity or Sponsor to enter into the 
transaction), which evidences the 
resolutions authorising the signing and 
delivery of the Transaction Documents to 
which the Project Group entity or Sponsor 
is a party and observance of obligations 
under those documents; 
(d) any Authorisations necessary for the 
execution or performance of the 
Transaction Documents; 
each original power of attorney under which a person 
signs a Transaction Document for a Project Group 
entity or a Sponsor showing evidence of stamping and 
registration (where required by law prior to 
execution); 
certified copies of each of the following documents 
on the terms approved by each of the Lead 
Arrangers: 
(a) the Sale Agreement and any associated 
documents; 
(b) each of the Material Contracts; 
(c) the Licences; and 
(d) the Vesting Contracts. 
(vii) confirmation from each of the Lead Arrangers that 
they have: 
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(a) 
(b) 
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completed all due diligence enquiries to 
their satisfaction and have received copies 
of due diligence reports provided to the 
Project Group entities and reliance letters 
from appropriate advisers to the Borrower 
and Sponsors in respect of the due 
diligence reports, in form and substance 
satisfactory to each of them; and 
received a certificate in form and 
substance acceptable to each of the Lead 
Arrangers from their insurance consultant 
confirming that insurance policies 
required to be maintained by the 
Borrower under the Finance Agreements 
have been effected, are current (or will at 
Financial Close be current), and the 
security trustee's interest is noted on the 
relevant policies; 
The Finance Agreements will be drafted to 
incorporate the requirements of the Distribution 
Network Lease and the recommendations of the 
consultant. Consequently the certificate need only 
confirm the policies reflect the 'required insurance' 
under the Finance Agreements. 
(c) received reports in form and substance 
acceptable to each of the Lead Arrangers 
from their consultants in relation to the 
regulatory and technical issues associated 
with the business; 
(d) received a satisfactory opinion from their 
accountants in relation to the accounting 
and taxation consequences for the Lead 
Arrangers of the transactions 
contemplated by the Transaction 
Documents; and 
(viii) the Lead Arrangers have received satisfactory legal 
opinions from: 
(1) their legal advisers; and 
(2) the legal advisers to the Project Group 
and Sponsors; 
(3) legal advisers to any Project Group entity 
or Sponsor that is incorporated in a 
jurisdiction other than Australia; 
(ix) evidence that all Licences are current and enforceable; 
(x) proVISIon of a certified copy of the Banking Base Case Model, in form and substance 
satisfactory to the Facility Agent (acting on the instructions of each of the Lead Arrangers), and 
associated audit report from auditors acceptable to the Lead Arrangers 
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APPENDIX B: DATA SHEET OUTLINE 
DATA COLLECTION SHEET 
SAMPLE PROJECT 
I Sector~ Health [Health IHealth IHealth - IHealth 
Range 
PI 5~/;t~;~ />/;;~:jr/;i'/?~f* / J!~ i;!Q ,eta! S/ /h . /"' 
Project Length (Years) 
~onstruction Start Date 
~onstruction Start Period 
!construction End/Operations Start Date 
Length of Construction (months) 
pperations End Date 
Operations End Period 
NUMBER OF BEDS 
Istart Dates for Escalation for. 
Construction Costs 
Period 
Development Costs 
Period 
Operating Costs 
Period 
Bond Indexation 
Period 
MacroEeonoJl1l~ M$l.ImptiQI')$ 
jAnnuallnfiation (RPI) 
UBOR 
Al / lQ ;-;~ . 
,c::eQI,mtin ; A~l.!mptions 
Type of Depreciation (Straight Line/Reducing Balance 
Length of Depreciation (years) 
Depreciate to 
Start of Capital Allowances Date 
Start of Capital Allowances Period 
Type 
Percentage of Capital allowable 
Yo to apply to Allowable % 
!corporation Tax 
!working Capital 
Receivables 
Payables 
No. of Days in Year 
1N0. of Days in SemiAnnual Period 
Financing 
Interest on Cash Balances (over Reference Rate) 
Interest on Overdraft (Over Reference Rate) 
Senior Debt 
Project 1 Project 2 Pro ject 3 Project 4 Proiect 5 Typical 
Range 
~--------------~------------~I I ~/o of Debt to Equity 
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~ank Debt or Bond Debt? 
Bank Loan 1 I 
Maximum Loan Amount *1000 
Reference Rate 
Yo of Anancing 
Margin over Reference Rate During Construction 
~argin over Reference Rate Post Construction 
IT erm of Loan 
Repayment type (Annuity or ~culpted) 
~wap Rate for Loan (% per annum) 
~wap Credit Charge 
MLA (%) 
!commitment Fees (% per annum on undrawn amounts) 
UpFront I Arrangement Fee (% of Facility) 
First Drawdown Date 
First Drawdown Period 
ILast Drawdown Date 
Last Drawdown Period 
~tart of Repayment Date 
Istart of Repayment (Period) 
ILast Repayment Date 
iLast Repayment (Period) 
Interest Rolled up from date 
nterest Rolled up from period 
Interest Rolled Up Until Date 
Interest Rolled up till (Period) 
!Agency & Technical Fees 
Drawdown TiminQ 
~ank Loan 2 I 
~aximum Loan Amount *1000 
Reference Rate 
~ of Financing 
~argin over Reference Rate During Construction 
~argin over Reference Rate Post Construction 
!Term of Loan 
Repayment type (Annuity or ~culpted) 
~wap Rate for Loan (% per annum) 
~wap Credit Charge 
~LA(%) 
~ommitment Fees (% per annum on undrawn amounts) 
UpFront I Arrangement Fee (% of Facility) 
First Drawdown Date 
First Drawdown Period 
ast Drawdown Date 
Last Drawdown Period 
Start of Repayment Date 
~tart of Repayment (Period) 
~st Repayment Date 
LastRepa~ent(Period) 
Interest Rolled up from date 
Interest Rolled up from period 
Project 1 Project 2 Project 3 Project 4 Proiect 5 Typical 
~ __________________________________________ r-__________________________________ ~Range 
Iinterest Rolled Up Until Date I I 
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Interest Rolled up till (Period) 
fb,gency & Technical Fees 
Drawdown Timing 
aond 
Fixed or Index Unked (Fixed = 0, Indexed = 1) 
Monoline Wrapped? (NO = 0, YES = 1) 
Max Facility Amount *1000 
Yo of Financing 
Reference Gilt Rate (% pa) 
Spread over Reference Rate (% per annum) 
UpFront / Arrangement Fee (% of Facility) 
Interest on Bond Holding Account 
iTenor (years after Contract Execution) 
~onth of first coupon payment (1-6) 
Repayment type (Annuity or ~culpted) 
Issue Date/First Drawdown Date 
Period 
~ast Drawdown Date 
Period 
First Repayment Date 
Period 
~st Repayment Date 
Period 
Drawdown Timiing for Interest 
!wrapping Fee Upfront (% of amount) 
Yo Monoline paid over bond life 
lEIond Maturity Date 
Period 
Reserve Accounts 
Debt Reserve 
Maintenance Reserve 
Blended Equity 
[TARGET IRR (Nominal) 
[Equity Bridge Loan 
~ridge Loan In Use? 
Facility Amount *1000 
Yo of Financing 
~argin over Reference Rate (% per annum) 
UpFront / Arrangement Fee (% of Facility) 
p,mmitment Fees (% per annum on undrawn amounts) 
~ullet Repayment Date 
Bullet Repayment Period 
First Drawdown Date 
Period 
~ast Drawdown Date 
Period 
Interest Rolled Up Until 
Period 
Interest Capitalised until 
Period 
Drawdown Timing Factor 
Subordinated Debt 
Project 1 Project 2 Project 3 Project 4 Project 5 Typical 
Range 
~----------------~~--------------II I ~A, of Total financing 
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!Facility Amount *1000 
Margin I Coupon 
UpFront I Arrangement Fee (% of Facility) 
~mmitment Fees (% per annum on undrawn amounts) 
Repayment type (Annuity or ~culpted) 
Interest paid during the construction phase? 
Rrst Drawdown Date 
Rrst Drawdown Period 
ast Drawdown Date 
iLast Drawdown Period 
~umber of Repayments 
Repayment Start date 
Repayment Start Period 
~st Repayment date 
ast reoavment Period 
Interest Rolled up - Start Date 
NTerest Rolled Up Start Period 
Interest Rolled up Until date 
Int Rolled up until Period 
!Tenor (years) 
Eaulty 1 
1% of Total financing 
iBlended Retum 
! 
Facility Amount *1000 
Injected Date 
Injected Period 
Repayment/Redemption Date 
Repavment/Redemption Period 
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APPENDIX C: INITIAL BASE CASE INPUTS 
Non-Time Based Inputs 
oncession Length (in months; including Construction) 
ILJ~'''''''''("'T start 
onstruction End 
perations start 
perations end 
dates for Escalation 
Depreciation 
- start 
- time 
Depreciation to zero (Yes = 1, No = 0) 
Taxation 
Capital allowances 
Capital allowances start 
Owners costs set against tax when they occur 
All interest & fees set against tax when they occur 
Corporation tax 
Assumed that tax year is calendar year 
Straight Line 
Years 
Start/Mid/End 
Mid 
Mid 
Mid 
Mid 
Mid 
01-uc,"'-VLI 
30-
01-Jun-OO 
25 
% of Capital @ 
reducing balance 30% 25% 
$tr~i£}htlihe " , .' : :' 20% ,.,. . 4 ' 
01-Jun-00 
30% 
Tax Payment: 50% of last periods tax bill paid + 50% of this periods bill 50% 
Loss carried forward is unlimited 
Deferred taxation assumed to be nil 
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Non-Time Based Inputs 
Financing 
Initial (lowest in sensitivities sheet) Annual LlBOR 3.63% 
from 28/03/03 (Bank of England 
Initial (lowest in sensitivities) Annual Inflation 3.20% 
inflation sourced from http://www.moneyworld.co.uklglossary/gI00278.htm 
Interest on cash on deposit (annual) Reference Rate + -1.00% 
Interest on overdrafts 
GEARING 
Senior Loan 
SemiAnnual -0.50% 
Reference Rate + 
SemiAnnual 
1.50% 
0.75% 
Senior Debt 94% 
Blended Equity 6% 
sub debt 5.85% 
pure equity 0.15% 
Loan 1 
Diff b/w Max and Min (Ot05000+ve) 369 
Maximum amount [, 116,821,485 % of Total Financing 94% % of Senior Debt 100% 
minimum required 116821115.81 
Fees on loan 
- Front End Fee (Arrangement) 1.30% 
- Commitment fee 0.50% 
Term of Loan (Years) 25 
Margin on loan 1.13% 
First drawdown 01-Jun-00 
Last drawdown 30-Nov-02 
Repayment Start 01-Dec-02 
Last Repayment 31-Jan-28 
Interest rolled up until 30-Nov-02 
Interest & fees capitalised until 01-Dec-02 
Drawdown timing factor 50% 
0% 
Non-Time Based Inputs 
Loan 2 
0 
0 
0% 
0% 
0 
2.00% 
0.50% 
1.20% 
01-Jun-00 
30-Nov-02 
01-Dec-02 
31-Jan-28 
30-Nov-02 
01-Dec-02 
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Maximum Amount (Issue) 
% of Financing 
Diff must be +ve (Ot05000) 
r 
Fees 
minimum requiredl ......... ____ o:."J1 
- Upfront Fee (% of Bond Amount) 
- Agency Fees 
Monoline Wrapped? 
- % per annum 
- Paid Upfront 
Initial (lowest in sensit ivities) Annual Fi xed Gilt 
Initial (lowest in sensitivities) Annual Indexed Gilt 
Spread over reference rate 
Tenor (Years after contract execution) 
Fi r$tCoupOl1 Payrnerit(Jvtorithsaft~rc()n$tructi()n ) . ....... . 
Interest on Proceeds Holding Account 
Drawdown timing factor for Interest 
Issue Date/1 st Drawdown Date 
Last Drawdown Date 
First Repayment Date 
Last ent Date 
Blended Equity 
Facility Amount 
% of Financing 
I 8104416.4llnput -. 
Equity Bridge loan In Use? 
Fees on Bridge Loan 
- Front End Fee (Arrangement) 
- Commitment Fee 
Margin on Loan 
First Drawdown 
Last drawdown 
Bridge Repayment date 
Interest Rolled Up Until 
Interest Capitalised Until 
Drawdown Timing Factor 
Bullet Repayment Date 
122558804 
122,558,804 
0% 
0.63% 
Monoline 
0.35% 
33.00% 
5.50% 
6.30% 
0.17% 
30 
<> 6 
5.68% 
100.00% 
01-Jun-00 
31-0ec-02 
01-0ec-02 
30-Nov-32 
8,105,380 
6% 
No 
0.90% 
0.30% 
0.40% 
01-Jun-00 
30-0ec-02 
30-Nov-02 
31-0ec-02 
30-Jun-03 
50.00% 
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Subordinated Debt 
Facility Amount 
As % of Blended Equity 
Fees on Loan 
- Front End Fee (Arrangement) 
- Commitment Fee 
Coupon 
First Drawdown 
Last Drawdown 
Repayment start 
Last Repayment 
Interest Roll Up Start 
Interest Capitalised Until 
Drawdown Timings 
Equity (Share Capital) 
Facility Amount 
As % of Equity & Bridge 
Date Injected 
Date Redeemed 
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N on-Time Based Inputs 
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7,902,773 
97.50% 
2.00% 
0.00% 
13.00% 
01-Jun-00 
30-Nov-02 
01-Dec-02 
31-Jan-30 
01-Jun-00 
31-Dec-02 
50.00% 
202,635 
2.50% 
01-Jun-00 
31-Dec-32 
Semi Annual Period Count 
Annual Period Indicator 
Annual Period Count 
Macroeconomic _umptio,.. 
Amuallnterest Rate (UBOR) 
Semi Annual Interest Rate (LIBOR) 
Annuallnfl. on rate 
Semi Annual Inflation Rate 
Inflation Indl_ 
Construction Costs 
Start 
Mid 
End 
Development coste 
Start 
Mid 
End 
Revenues 
Operating <csts 
Bond Ind.""tion 
Start 
Mid 
End 
Start 
Mid 
End 
Start 
Mid 
End 
End 
Mid 
Start 
Deflation factor to real terms 
x = Period Number and the resultina y value is Per Bed 
EAdltlgn MId B2 y.llJO Ig 
y. 1.1.801,.0 .... • p""", 
R' = 0.8834 
R ........ (Roal) 
o ations Period FI 
3.20% 
Scenario 1 
Scenario 2 
SconarJo 3 
Sconwio ;,use 
Scenario 1 
FIXEDADSCR 
usiJg formula 
Discount Rate 
e.oO% 
Operating costa (Roaq 
usin formula from csJcd from sam 10 
Conatn Start 
Period Start 01-JurHlO 
Period End 3O-Nov-00 
Period 2000.1 
1.1 
1.80% 
1.59% 
1.00 
1.01 
1.00 
1.01 
1.00 
1.01 
1.00 
1.01 
1.00 
1.01 
1.01 
1.00 
1.00 
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Time-Based Inputs 
01-Dec-oo 
31-May-01 
2000.2 
2 
1.2 
1.80% 
1.59% 
1.01 
1.02 
1.02 
1.01 
1.02 
1.02 
1.01 
1.02 
1.02 
1.01 
1.02 
1.02 
1.01 
1.02 
1.02 
1.02 
1.02 
1.01 
1.02 
01-Jun-01 01-Dec:-01 
3O-Nov-01 31-May-02 
2001.1 2001.2 
3 
2.1 
2 
1.80% 
1.59% 
1.02 
1.03 
1.04 
1.02 
1.03 
1.04 
1.02 
1.03 
1.04 
1.02 
1.03 
1.04 
1.02 
1.03 
1.04 
1.04 
1.03 
1.02 
1.03 
4 
2.2 
2 
1.80% 
1.59% 
1.04 
1.05 
1.06 
1.04 
1.05 
1.06 
1.04 
1.05 
1.06 
1.04 
1.05 
1.06 
1.04 
1.05 
1.06 
1.06 
1.05 
1.04 
1.05 
Op Start 
01-Jun-02 01-0ec-02 
3G-No1l-02 31-May-03 
2002. 1 2002.2 
5 
3.1 
1.80% 
1.59% 
1.06 
1.07 
1.07 
1.06 
1.07 
1.07 
1.06 
1.07 
1.07 
1.06 
1.07 
1.07 
1.06 
1.07 
1.07 
1.07 
1.07 
1.06 
1.07 
8 
3.2 
3 
1.80% 
1.59% 
1.07 
1.08 
1.09 
1.07 
1.08 
1.09 
1.07 
1.08 
1.09 
1.07 
1.08 
1.09 
1.07 
1.08 
1.09 
1.09 
1.08 
1.07 
1.08 
Mean Unit O .... tina Costa Over Opora\/ng POI'iod """,I~.I 
Eguatioo md 82 Valyo :ua 
y = 5.8057x°.l7e Power 
R' = 0.899 
01-Jun-03 
3O-Nov-03 
2003.1 
4.1 
1.80% 
1.59% 
1.09 
1.10 
1.11 
1.09 
1.10 
1.11 
1.09 
1.10 
1.11 
1.09 
1.10 
1.11 
1.09 
1.10 
1.11 
1.11 
1.10 
1.09 
1.10 
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01-Dec:-03 
31-May-04 
2003.2 
8 
4.2 
4 
1.80% 
1.59% 
1.11 
1.12 
1.13 
1.11 
1.12 
1.13 
1.11 
1.12 
1.13 
1.11 
1.12 
1.13 
1.11 
1.12 
1.13 
1.13 
1.12 
1.11 
1.12 
01-JurHl4 
3I)-N0v-04 
2004.1 
5.1 
5 
1.80% 
1.59% 
1.13 
1.13 
1.14 
1.13 
1.13 
1.14 
1.13 
1.13 
1.14 
1.13 
1.13 
1.14 
1.13 
1.13 
1.14 
1.14 
1.13 
1.13 
1.13 
17,370,890 Service Payment Per Annum (input in Control!) 
o 0 0 0 
o 0 0 
3000000 
o 
o 
o 
o 
o 
o 
o 
o 
o 
o 
8885445 8885445 8885445 8885445 
7387715.384 8857559.205 6609068.004 6501009.079 
12709.71728 13170.85256 13583.42322 13958.23739 
8885445 8885445 8885445 8885445 
3000000 3000000 300000O 300000O 
o 57111.989361) ~137.5fl53()7 645:H174f/4 6745.848285 
IMojor Malnblna""" Cools /Real) straight from ¥!"Pie o o 
IMonthly Coot S<:hodule 
Monthly Period Co<.ll 
Construction Period FI!\! 
Period Starting 
Period Ending 
Period No. 
Conatn Start 
01-JurHlO 
3G-JurHlO 
2000.1 
01-Jul-OO 
31-JuJ-OO 
2000.1 
01-Aug-OO 
31-Aug-OO 
2000.1 
3 
01-Sef>-OO 
~
2000.1 
01-0<1-00 
31-Oct-OO 
2000.1 
5 
01-Nov-OO 
3O-Nov-OO 
2000.1 
8 
01-Oec-OO 
31-Dec-oo 
2000.2 
7 
01-Jan-Ol 
31-Jan-01 
2000.2 
01-F~1 
28-F~1 
2000.2 
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Time-Based Inputs 
COfWtruction Costs 
l _______ -.-J~_. __ ,. __ . ____ .. ~ ______ .... J .. ________ l~ ______ . _ _._J, _____ . - ~- - - -- _____ --_. ____ .~ __ . _____ . _____ -1 _____ _ 
Below i. the Irend Une for the A __ Monthly 
Conslru<:tlon Coats for 8 Health Sector PFI project 
x = Period Number and the , ...... ti value I. Per Bed (£OOO's) 
Monthl ConslrUoD ts 
y = -0.0131,( + 0.4097. + 4.328 
l::~U;;~~~'SAV«~CoaIPrdru~ __ ~:~-::-=~E:=~'=::I~ii~~~Eii~j~;i~L~~@iih:;8~~E~~;~~~~;~~F·~:1.~.~1E-~2s5~E~~99~ 
Sceruwlo 2 (Using Sample'. Cost T,end Line) 2382300 2547500 2719600 2878600 3024500 3157300' 3mooo 3383800 3477100 
SoetB'D in US" 
s.:.narlo 1 (Ualng Samplo'o Avo,.. Coat Profllo) 3193380.482 2813618.528 2367777.67 2978978.4 2109256.2 22_1._ 2828150.341 29112852.82 3709822._ 
Developmont Coots 
From the Data collected and analysed the foIlow;ng formula has been arrived at for the Development Costs for a HeaUh Sector PFI project 
• 0eveI ant Coat ied ani in the first Project Period 
Development Coals (Arat Period) 
= 4.64% of Total Ananc:1 
Aroi Period Flag 0 
IBank Switch 
Bond Switch !I 
Development Coals - lJplront 
Prefuncl DSRA 
PNfuncl MMAA (3.IM"'" before -tst MM outgolng) 
6172897.444 
a 
o 
a 
o 
1383000 
79068 
o 
o 
o 
o 
o o 
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APPENDIX D: EXPERTS CONSULTED DURING 
VERIFICATION AND VALIDATION OF THIS THESIS 
Alan Douglas, Head of Project Finance, Bank of America, London. UK. 
Andrew Porter, Director, PricewaterhouseCoopers, London. UK. 
Chris Tanner, Assistant Director, PricewaterhouseCoopers, London. UK 
Nigel Smith, University of Leeds. UK. 
Neil W oodings, Director PricewaterhouseCoopers, London. UK. 
Paul Newman, Manager PricewaterhouseCoopers, London. UK 
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APPENDIX E: INITIAL SIMULATION INPUTS 
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APPENDIX F: SIMULATION RESULTS SHEETS 
IRESUL TS SHEET 
Inputs 
F j nan ci~ 
Senior Loan 1 
Senior Loan 2 
Bond (Indexed ) 
Blended Equity 
Subord inated Loan 
Prefund DSRA (max required ) 
Prefund MMRA (m in required) 
MacroEconomics 
Switches 
Annua l Interest Rate 
Annual Inflation 
Equity bridge in Use ? 
Bond Manoline Wrapped ? 
Senior Loan Repayment Option 
Bond Repayment Option 
Subord inated Debt Repayment Option 
Outputs 
Fundll'!a Uses 
CAPEX 
Capitalised Interest 
Prefund DSRA 
Prefun d MMRA 
Financing Fees 
Bid/Development Costs 
Funding Sources 
Senior Loan 1 
Senior Loan 2 
Senior Bond Issue 
Subordinated Debt 
Equity 
Cash Balances 
Maximum Cash Balance 
Minimum Cash Balance 
NPV's 
Revenue Stream NPV 
Checks 
Balanced Sheet Balanced ? 
Cashflow positi ve ? 
Senior debt repa id 
Sub debt repa id 
DSRA fullyf unded 
Tota l 
98,783 ,087 
1,265 ,647 
0 
123,000 
7,324,343 
6 ,944,116 
£114,440,194 
Total 
0 
0 
106,384,073 
7,886,358 
169,762 
£114 ,440,194 
di scounted at 
6% 
-.iMax amounts) 
No 
Yes 
133 ,548,078 
8,054,785 
7,853 ,_ 
o 
93 ,289 
3,63% 
3,20% 
nl . 
Sculpted 
Annuity 
YES 
YES 
% 
86.32% 
1.11% 
0.00% 
0. 11 % 
6 .40% 
6 .07% 
100.00% 
% 
0.00°,'0 
0 .00% 
92.96% 
6.89% 
0.15% 
100.00% 
Total 
148,354 ,377 
o 
£182,197,022.42 
o YES 
YES 
YES 
Scenario/Simu lation : 
Run on: 
Percentages 
Required /Desired Gearing 
Actual Gearing 
Com pOSition of senior debt 
Composition of Blended Eq uity 
§E!eads/Ma!.9lns 
Loan 1 
Loan 2 
Bond (over reference rate ) 
Subordinated Loan 
Project IRR 's 
Project IRR (Pre Tax) 
Project IRR (Post Tax) 
Project IRR (Pre Ta x) 
Project IRR (Post Tax) 
Subordinated Debt IRR 
Blended Equity IRR (Post Tax) 
Blended Equity IRR (Post Tax) 
Equity (Dividends) IRR 
EquitylCash IRR (Post Tax) 
Equity (Dividends ) IRR 
Equityl Cash IRR (Post Tax) 
Cover Rat ios 
OSCR - minimum (Excl Reserves) 
OSCR - Average (Excl Reserves) 
Mini mum DSCR Year (Exc Reserves) 
Senior Loan 1 
Se nior Loan 2 
Bond 
Pure Equity 
Subord inated Loan 
LLCR - Minimum (Inc Reserve + Cash b/f) 
llCR - Average (Inc Reserve + Cash b/f) 
Minimum llCR Year (I nc Reserves + Cash b/f ) 
!Average life Senior Debt (yrs) 
Nomina l 
Nominal 
Real 
Real 
Nomina l 
Nom inal 
Rea l 
Real 
Nomina l 
Nomina l 
Real 
Real 
Target Minimum OSCR 
Target Minimum LLCR 
94 : 6 
92 .96 : 704 
1 13° 0 
1 200 b 
017% 
13 00°/0 
1626% 
1626°'0 
1266% 
1266% 
1386% 
2382% 
1033% 
1998% 
4673% 
6627% 
42 18% 
6112% 
1 15 
1 15 
1377 
01-Jun-02 
1 18 
265 
3 40 
Ot -Jun-OO 
28 73 1 
!RESUL TS SHEET 
Inputs 
Financjn~ 
Senior Loan 1 
Senior Loan 2 
Bond (Fixed ) 
Blended Equity 
Subord inated Loan 
Prefund OSRA (max requIred ) 
Prefund MMRA (min required ) 
MacroEconomics 
Switches 
Annual Interest Rate 
Annual Inflation 
Equity bridge in Use ? 
Bond Manol ine Wrapped? 
Senior Loan Repayment Option 
Bond Repayment Option 
Subordinated Debt Repayment Option 
Outputs 
FundinQ Uses 
CAPEX 
Capita lised Interest 
Prefund DSRA 
Prefund MMRA 
Financing Fees 
Bid/Development Costs 
Fundina Sources 
Senior Loan 1 
Senior Loan 2 
Senior Bond Issue 
Subordinated Debt 
Equ"y 
Cash Balances 
Maximum Cash Balance 
Minimum Cash Balance 
NPV's 
Revenue Stream NPV 
Checks 
Balanced Sheet Balanced ? 
Cashflow positive? 
Senior debt repaid 
Sub debt repaid 
OSRA fully funded 
Total 
98,783 ,087 
1,220,316 
0 
93,289 
4,666,881 
6,780,994 
£111,544 ,567 
Total 
0 
0 
103,704,796 
7,674 ,285 
165,486 
£111 ,544,567 
discounted at 
6% 
_ (Max amount;) 
No 
Yes 
130,790,388 
7,675,864 
7,483,971 
° 93,289 
3,63% 
3,20% 
n/. 
Sculpted 
Annuitv 
YES 
YES 
% 
88.56% 
1.09% 
0.00% 
0.08% 
4 .18% 
6 .08% 
100.00% 
% 
0.00% 
0.00% 
92.97% 
6 .88% 
0.15% 
100.00% 
Total 
69 ,551 ,207 
(0) 
£124 ,573,48164 
o YES 
YES 
YES 
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Scenario/Simulation 
Run on: 
Percentaoes 
Required /Desired Geanng 
Actual Geanng 
Com position of senior debt 
Com pOSlllon of Blend ed Equity 
Spread sIMa ra ins 
Loan 1 
Loan 2 
Bond (over reference rate) 
Subordinated Loan 
Project IRR's 
Project IRR (Pre Ta x) 
Project IRR (Po st Tax) 
ProjeC1IRR (Pre Tax) 
Project IRR (Post Tax) 
Subordinated Debt IRR 
Blended Equ ity IRR (Post Tax) 
Blended EqU ity IRR (Post Tax) 
Equity (Dividends ) IRR 
Equity/Cash IRR (Post Tax) 
EqUity (Dividends ) IRR 
Equity/Cash IRR (Post Tax) 
Cover Ratios 
OSCR - minimum (Excl Reserves) 
DSCR • Average (Excl Rese rves) 
Minimum DSCR Year (Exc Reserves ) 
Se nio r loa n 1 
Senior Loan 2 
Bond 
Pure Equi ty 
Subordinated Loan 
LLCR · Minimum (I nc Reserve + Cash b/f ) 
LLCR • Average (Inc Reserve + Cash b/f) 
Minimum LLCR Year (I nc Reserves + Cash b/f) 
IAverage Life Senior Debt (yrs ) 
Nomina l 
Nominal 
Rea l 
Rea l 
Nominal 
Nom inal 
Rea l 
Real 
Nommal 
Nommal 
Real 
Real 
APPENDIX F 
T arge! Minimum DSCR 
Target Minimum LLCR 
94 , 6 
92 97 ' 7 03 
2 50°0 
9" 50°0 
1 \3° 0 
1 200.0 
017°0 
1300°0 
90400 
8 38~, 
56600 
5 02°'0 
13 86°10 
13 54° 1. 
10 330,1. 
1002% 
5 10°0 
5 05% 
185% 
180% 
1 15 
1 15 
11 62 
Ql·Jun·02 
1 18 
1 20 
1 39 
0 1,Ooc-25 
IRESUL TS SHEET 
Inputs 
FinancinQ 
Senior Loan 1 
Senior Loan 2 
Bond (Indexed ) 
Blended Equity 
Subord inated Loa n 
Prefund DSRA (ma x required ) 
Prefund MMRA (min requ ired) 
MacroEconomics 
Switches 
Annua l Interest Rate 
Annual Inflation 
Equity bridge in Use? 
Bond Manolins Wrapped ? 
Senior Loan Repayment Option 
Bond Repayment Opt ion 
Subordinated Debt ReDavment Option 
Outputs 
Fundina Uses 
CAPEX 
Capitalised Interest 
Prefund DSRA 
Prefund MMRA 
Financing Fees 
Bid l Development Costs 
Funding Sources 
Senior Loan 1 
Senior Loan 2 
Senior Bond Issue 
Subordinated Debt 
Equity 
Cash Balances 
Maximum Cash Balance 
Minimum Cash Balance 
NPV's 
Revenue Stream NPV 
Checks 
Ba lanced Sheet Balanced ? 
Cashflow positive? 
Senior debt repa id 
Sub debt repa id 
DSRA fullv funded 
Total 
98.783,087 
1,153,695 
0 
115,602 
951 ,1 5 1 
6 ,669,318 
£107 ,672,853 
Total 
0 
0 
100,128,008 
7,385,066 
159,779 
£107,672,853 
discounted at 
6% 
(Max amount;\" 
No 
No 
128,648 ,078 
7,543 ,585 
7,355 ,046 
o 
115,602 
3, 63% 
7,50% 
nfa 
Sculpted 
Annu ity 
YES 
NO 
% 
91.74% 
1,07% 
0.00% 
0. 11 % 
0.88% 
6. 19% 
100.00% 
% 
0 .00% 
0 .00% 
92 .99% 
686% 
0 .15% 
10000% 
Total 
303 ,598 ,813 
(755,481 ) 
£297 ,269,613.31 
o YES 
YES 
YES 
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Scenario/Simulation 
Run on: 
Percenlaoes 
Requ ired /DesIred Gea nng 
Actua l Gear ing 
CompOSit io n of senior debt 
Com pOSItion of Blended Equity 
$preads/Marains 
Loan 1 
Loan 2 
Bond (over reference rale ) 
Subordinated Loan 
Project IRR's 
ProJectlRR (Pre Tax) 
Project IRR (Post Tax) 
Project IRR (Pre Tax) 
Project IRR (Post Tax) 
Subo rdinated Debt IRR 
Blended Equ ity tRR (Post Tax) 
Blended Equ ity IRR (Post Tax) 
Equity (Oividends ) IRR 
Equityl Cash IRR (Post Tax) 
Equity (Dividends ) IRR 
Equityl Cash IRR (Post Ta x) 
Cover Ratios 
DSCR - minimum (Excl Reserves ) 
OSC R - Average (Excl Reserves ) 
Minimum OSCR Year (Exc Reserves ) 
Se nior l oan' 
Senior Loan 2 
Bond 
Pure Eq uity 
Subordinated Loan 
LLCR - Minimum (Inc Reserve + Cash b/f ) 
LLCR - Average (Inc Reserve + Cash biD 
Minimum LLCR Year (tnc Reserves + Cash b/f ) 
IAverage life Senior Debt (yrs) 
Nom inal 
Nom ina l 
Rea l 
Real 
Nominal 
Nom inal 
Rea l 
Rea l 
Nominal 
Nom ina l 
Real 
Rea l 
APPENDIX F 
Target Minimum DSC R 
Target Minimum LLCR 
94 6 
92 .99 7.01 
250", 
9 ; SOQ. a 
1 13°0 
1 20"'0 
a Ir~o 
13000 0 
2 1 0 1% 
2 1 0 1°'° 
125 7°'0 
1257%1 
1386% 
2864% 
592' , 
19 67% 
6204% 
-019% 
5073% 
5922% 
1 15 
0 95 
10 6 1 
01-Jun-02 
1 18 
4 9 1 
835 
01-Jun-OO 
29091 
!RESUL TS SHEET 
Inputs 
Financina 
Senior Loan 1 
Sen io r Loan 2 
Bond (Indexed ) 
Blended Equity 
Subord inated Loan 
P refund OSRA (m ax required) 
Prefund MMR A (m in req UIred) 
MacroEconomics 
Switches 
Annuallnlerest Rate 
Annual Inflation 
Equity bridge in Use? 
Bond Manoline Wrapped ? 
Senio r loan Repayment Option 
Bond Repayment Opt ion 
Subordinated Debl Repayment Option 
Outputs 
Fundinq Uses 
CAPEX 
Capitalised Interest 
Prefund DSRA 
Prefund MMRA 
Financing Fees 
Bid/Development Costs 
FundinQ Sources 
Senio r Loan 1 
Senior Loan 2 
Senior Bond Issue 
Subord inated Oebt 
Equity 
Cash Balances 
Maximum Cash Balance 
Minimum Cash Balance 
NPV's 
Re venue Stream NPV 
Checks 
Balanced Sheet Ba lanced ? 
Cashflow posit ive? 
Senior debt repaid 
Su b debt repaid 
DSRA fu ll y funded 
Max amounts} 
No 
No 
128 ,648 ,078 
7 ,543,585 
7 ,355,046 
o 
115,602 
3,63% 
7,50% 
nfa 
Sculpted 
Annu it y 
Total 
98,783 ,087 
1,153,653 
0 
93 ,289 
951,151 
6 ,669 ,318 
£107 ,650,498 
Tota l 
0 
0 
100,107 ,034 
7 ,383,718 
159,745 
£107 ,650,498 
discounted at 
6% 
YES 
NO 
87703971.84 NO 
YES 
YES 
% 
91 .76% 
1.07% 
000% 
0.09% 
0.88% 
6.20% 
100.00% 
% 
0.00% 
000% 
9299% 
6.86% 
0.15% 
100.00%) 
Total 
162 ,074,888 
(805,323 ,358) 
£297 ,269,613.31 
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Scenario/Simulation . 
Run on: 
Percentages 
Required /Des ired Gea nng 
Actual Geanng 
Composition of senior debt 
Com posi tion of Blended Equity 
~ead siMargins 
Loan 1 
Loan 2 
Bond (over reference rate) 
Subordina ted loan 
PrO'8cllRR's 
PrO)6CIIRR (Pre Tax) 
ProjecllRR (Post Ta x) 
Project IRR (Pre Ta x) 
Project IRR (Post Tax) 
Subordina ted Debt IRR 
Blended Equity IRR (Post Tax) 
Blended Equity IRR (Post Ta x) 
Equity (Dividends) IRR 
EQuity/Cash IRR (Post Tax) 
Equity (Dividends ) IRR 
Equity/Cash IRR (Post Tax) 
Cover Rat ios 
DSCR - minimum (Excl Reserves) 
DSCR - Average (Excl Rese rves) 
Minim um DSCR Year (Exc Reserves ) 
Senior Loan 1 
Se nior Loan 2 
Bond 
Pure Equity 
Subordinated Loan 
LLC R - Minimum (I nc Reserve + Cash b/f) 
LLC R - Average (I nc Rese rve + Cash b/f) 
Minimum LLCR Year (Inc Reserves + Cash b/f ) 
IAverage Life Senior Debt (yrs ) 
Nom ina l 
Nom ina l 
Rea l 
Real 
Nom ma l 
Nomina l 
Real 
Real 
Nomina l 
Nominal 
Real 
Real 
APPENDIX F 
Targe t Minimum DSCR 
Target Minimum LLCR 
~ 6 
92 99 7.01 
1 13°0 
I 20°0 
a 17G o 
1300°0 
21 01°0 
21 0 1°0 
1257°0 
1257', 
1386°b 
308 1", 
5 92' , 
2168% 
6288% 
170% 
51 52~, 
5921% 
1 15 
094 
997 
01.Jun-02 
1 18 
173 
397 
01 -Jun-32 
!RESUL TS SHEET 
Inputs 
FinancinQ 
Senior Loan 1 
Senior Loan 2 
Bond (I ndexed) 
Blended Equity 
Subordinated loan 
Prefund OSRA (max reqUIred) 
Prefund MMRA (m in required) 
MacroEconomics 
Switches 
Annual Interest Ra te 
Annual Inflation 
Equity bridge in Use? 
Bond Manolins W rapped ? 
Senior Loan Repa yment Option 
Bond Repayment O pt ion 
Subordinated Debt Repayment Option 
Outputs 
Fundi nq Uses 
CAPEX 
Capitalised Interest 
Prefund DSRA 
Prefund MMRA 
Financing Fees 
Bid /Developm ent Costs 
Fundina Sources 
Senior Loan 1 
Senior Loan 2 
Senior Bond Issue 
Subordinated Debt 
Equity 
Cash Ba lances 
Maximum Cash Ba lance 
Minimum Cash Balance 
NPV'. 
Revenue Stream NPV 
Checks 
Balanced Sheet Ba lanced ? 
Cashflow posit ive? 
Senio r debt repaid 
Sub debt repaid 
DSRA fullv funded 
Total 
98,783,087 
1,153,653 
0 
93 ,289 
951 ,151 
6,669,3 18 
(107 ,650 ,498 
Tota l 
0 
0 
100,107,034 
7,383,718 
159,745 
(107 ,650,498 
discounted at 
6% 
Max amounts) 
No 
No 
128,648 ,078 
7,543 ,585 
7,355 ,046 
79.068 
3,63% 
0,00% 
n/a 
Sculpted 
Annu it v 
YES 
YES 
% 
91 .76% 
1.07% 
0.00% 
0.09% 
0.88% 
6 .20% 
100.00% 
% 
0.00% 
000% 
9299% 
6.86% 
0.15% 
100.00% 
Total 
132 ,456 ,035 
o 
( 126,5 12,443.22 
o YES 
YES 
YES 
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Sc.enario/Sim ulation : 
Run on: 
PercenlaQes 
Required/Des ired Gea nng 
Act ual Gea nng 
CompoSition of senior debt 
Composition of Blended Equit y 
Spreads/Marains 
Loan 1 
Loan 2 
Bond (over reference rate ) 
Subordinated Loan 
Pro "ect IRR's 
Project IRR (Pre Tax) 
Project IRR (Post Tax) 
ProjecllRR (Pre Tax) 
Project IRR (Post Tax) 
Subordinated Debt IRR 
Blended Equity IRR (Post Tax) 
Blended EqU ity IRR (Post Tax) 
Equity (Dividends ) IRR 
Equity/Cash IRR (Post Tax) 
Equily (Dividends ) IRR 
Equity/Cash tRR (Post Tax) 
Cover Ra tios 
DSCR - m inimum (Excl Reserves) 
DSCR - Average (Exc t Reserves ) 
Minimum DSCR Yea r (Exc Reserves) 
Se nior loa n 1 
Senior Loan 2 
Bond 
Pure Equity 
Subord inated Loan 
LLCR - Minimum (Inc Reserve" Cash b/f) 
LLCR - Average (Inc Reserve" Cash b/f) 
Minimum LLCR Year (Inc Reserves" Cash bJf) 
IAverage Life Senior Debt (yrs) 
Nom inal 
Nominal 
Rea l 
Rea l 
Nomina l 
Nom ina l 
Rea l 
Real 
Nomina l 
No minal 
Rea l 
Rea l 
APPENDIX F 
Target Minimum OSCR 
Target Minimum LLCR 
94 6 
9299 70 1 
0' , 
C', 
1 13"0 
1 20°0 
o 1 7~o 
13000 e 
11 850 0 
10340 0 
1185% 
10 34°~ 
1386% 
17 94o~ 
13 86°~ 
1794% 
3009% 
·258% 
3009% 
·258% 
1 15 
1 32 
1920 
01 -Jun-02 
1 18 
1 64 
1 99 
0 1-Jun-OO 
jRESUL TS SHEET 
Inputs 
Financina 
Senior Loan 1 
Senior Loan 2 
Bond (I ndexed ) 
Blend ed Eq uity 
Subordinated Loan 
Prefund DSRA (ma x req uired ) 
Prefund MMRA (m in req ui red) 
MacroEconomics 
Switches 
Annua llnl erest Rate 
Annual Inflation 
Equity bridge in Use? 
Bond Manol ine W rapped ? 
Senio r Loan Repayment Option 
Bond Repayment Option 
Subord inated Debt Repayment Option 
Outputs 
Funding Uses 
CAPEX 
Capitalised Interest 
Prefund DSRA 
Prefund MMRA 
Financin9 Fees 
Bidl Development Costs 
Funding Sources 
Senior Loan 1 
Senior Loan 2 
Senio r Bond Issue 
Subordinated Debt 
Equity 
Cash Balances 
Maximum Cash Balance 
Minimum Cash Balance 
NPV's 
Revenue Strea m NPV 
Checks 
Ba lanced Sheet Balanced? 
Cashf low posit ive ? 
Senior debt repaid 
Sub debt repa id 
DSRA fullv funded 
Total 
98,783 ,087 
1,153,653 
0 
93,289 
95 1,15 1 
6,669 ,318 
£107 ,650,498 
Total 
0 
0 
100,107,034 
7,383,718 
159,745 
£107 ,650,498 
discounted at 
6% 
(Max amounts) 
No 
No 
128 .648 .07 8 
7,54 3,585 
7,355,046 
o 
93 ,289 
3.63% 
3.20% 
n!a 
Sculpted 
Annu ity 
YES 
YES 
% 
91 .76% 
1.07%, 
0.00% 
0.09% 
0.88% 
6 .20% 
100.00% 
% 
0 .00% 
0.00% 
9299% 
6 .86% 
0. 15% 
100.00% 
Total 
144,334,412 
o 
£176 ,967.658.31 
o YES 
YES 
YES 
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Scenario/Simu lation : 
Run on: 
Percentaaes 
Require d/DeSired Gea nng 
Actua l Geari ng 
Com position of senior debt 
Co mposition of Blended Eq uity 
Spreads/Marqins 
Loan 1 
loa n 2 
Bond (o ver refe rence rate) 
Subordinated Loan 
Project IRR's 
Project IRR (Pre Ta x) 
Project IRR (Post Ta x) 
Project lRR (Pre Tax) 
ProjectlRR (Post Ta x) 
Subordinated Debt IRR 
Blended Equity IRR (post Tax) 
Blended Equity IRR (Post Tax) 
Equity (D ividend s) IRR 
Equity/Cash IRR (Post Tax) 
Equ ity (Dividends) IRR 
Equ ity/Cash IRR (Post Tax) 
Cover Ratios 
DSCR - m inimum (Excl Reserves ) 
DSCR - Average (Excl Rese rves) 
Minimum DSCR Yea r (Exc Reserves ) 
Senior Loan 1 
Se ni or loa n 2 
Bo nd 
Pure Equity 
Subord inated Loan 
LLCR - Minim um (Inc Reserve + Cash b/f ) 
LLCR - Average (In c Reserve + Cash b/f ) 
Minimum LLCR Yea r (I nc Reserves + Cash blf) 
IAverage Life Senior Debt (yrs) 
Nominal 
No minal 
Rea l 
Real 
No minal 
Nom inal 
Rea l 
Real 
No minal 
Nom ina l 
Real 
Real 
APPEND IX F 
Target Minimum DSC R 
Target Minimum LLCR 
S4 6 
92.99 701 
1 13\)<o 
1 20°0 
017 0 0 
1300°/0 
15 75°~ 
15 75°'0 
12 16°'0 
12 16°'0 
1386% 
24 86% 
1033% 
2099% 
4955% 
6827% 
44 92% 
6305% 
1 15 
1 15 
14 17 
01·Jun· 02 
1 18 
270 
3 44 
01 ·Jun·OO 
2873 j 
IRESUL TS SHEET 
Inputs 
Financin~ 
Senior Loan 1 
$enlor Loan 2 
Bond (F"ed) 
Blended Equity 
Subord inated Loan 
Prefund DSRA (max required ) 
Prefund MM RA (min requi red ) 
MacroEconomics 
Switches 
Annual Interest Rate 
Annual Inflation 
Equity bridge in Use? 
Bond Manoline Wrapped ? 
Senior Loan Repayment Option 
Bond Repayment Option 
Subordinated Debt Repayment QDtion 
Outputs 
FundinQ Uses 
CAPEX 
Capital ised Interest 
Prefund DSRA 
Prefund MMRA 
Financing Fees 
Bid/Development Costs 
FundinQ Sources 
Senior Loan 1 
Senior Loan 2 
Senior Bond Issue 
Subordinated Debt 
Equity 
Cash Balances 
Maximum Cash Balance 
Minimum Cash Balance 
NPV's 
Revenue Stream NPV 
Checks 
Ba lanced Sheet Ba lanced ? 
Cashflow positive ? 
Sen ior debt repa id 
Sub debt repaid 
DSRA fuliV funded 
Tota l 
98,783 ,087 
1,148,228 
0 
93,289 
91 6,502 
6 ,421,508 
£107 ,362,615 
Total 
0 
0 
99,84 1,523 
7,361 ,770 
159 ,322 
£107,362,615 
discounted at 
6% 
(Max amount;\ 
No 
No 
123 ,670, 388 
7,362 ,017 
7,178 ,121 
o 
115,602 
3,63% 
7,50% 
nfa 
Sculpted 
Annuitv 
YES 
YES 
% 
9201% 
1 07% 
000% 
0.09% 
0.85% 
5.98% 
100.00% 
% 
0 .00% 
0,00% 
92.99% 
6.86% 
0 15% 
100.00% 
Total 
58,539 ,543 
(0) 
£162 ,927,229 .92 
o YES 
YES 
YES 
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Scena rio/Simulation ' 
Run on: 
Percentaqes 
Req uired /Des ired Gea rtng 
Act ual Gea ring 
Composition of senior debt 
Composition of Blended Equity 
SpreadslMarains 
Loa n 1 
Loan 2 
Bond (over reference rate ) 
Subord inated Loan 
Projoc t IRR's 
Project IRR (Pre Ta x) 
Project IRR (Post Tax) 
Project IRR (Pre Tax) 
Project IRR (Post Tax) 
Subo rdinated Debt IRR 
Blended Eq Uity IRR (Post Tax) 
Blended EqU ity IRR (Post Ta x) 
Equity (Divid ends) IRR 
Equity/Cash IRR (Post Tax) 
Equity (DIVIdends ) IRR 
Equity/Cash IRR (Pos t Tax) 
Cover Ratios 
DSCR - m inim um (Exci Reserves) 
DSCR - Average (Excl Reserves ) 
Minimum OSCR Year (Exc Reserves) 
Se nior Loan 1 
Senio r loan 2 
Bond 
Pure Equity 
Subord inated loan 
LLCR - Minimum (Inc Reserve + Cash b/f) 
LLCR - Average (Inc Reserve + Cash b/f) 
Minimum LLCR Yea r (Inc Reserves + Cash b/f) 
!Average Life Senior Debt (yrs ) 
Nom ina l 
Nom ma l 
Rea l 
Rea l 
Nom ina l 
Nomina l 
Rea l 
Rea l 
Nomina l 
Nomina l 
Rea l 
Rea l 
.!-\PPENDIX F 
Target Minim um OSCR 
Target Minimum LLCR 
94 6 
9299 7 01 
1 13~c 
1200.0 
0170<0 
1300ll-o 
8790." 
778', 
1 200~ 
0 26' , 
1366°0 
1363°0 
592"1 
5 71% 
992', 
4 83"1 
2250,,0 
-2 46010 
1 15 
1 15 
1091 
01 -Jun-02 
1 18 
1 18 
1 42 
01-Jun-26 
29321 
!RESUL TS SHEET 
Inputs 
Financing 
Sen ior Loan 1 
Sen ior Loan 2 
Bond (F Ixed ) 
Blended Equity 
Subord inated Loan 
Prefund OSRA (ma x requ ited ) 
Prefund MMRA (m in requ ired ) 
MacroEconomics 
Switches 
Annua l Interest Rate 
Annual Inflation 
Equity bridge in Use ? 
Bond Manoline Wrapped? 
Senior Loan Repayment Opt ion 
Bond Repayment Option 
Subordinated Debt Repayment O ption 
Outputs 
Funding Uses 
CAPEX 
Capital ised Interest 
Prefund DSRA 
Prefund MMRA 
Financing Fees 
Bid/Development Costs 
Funding Sources 
Senior Loan 1 
Senior Loan 2 
Senior Bond Issue 
Subordinated Debt 
Equity 
Cash Balances 
Maximum Cash Balance 
Minimum Cash Balance 
NPV's 
Revenue Stream NPV 
Chec ks 
Balanced Sheet Balanced ? 
Cashflow positive? 
Senior debt repaid 
Sub debt repaid 
DSRA fully funded 
Tota l 
98.783 ,087 
1,148 ,228 
0 
93 ,289 
916 ,502 
6.421,508 
£107 ,362 ,6 15 
Tota l 
0 
0 
99,841 ,523 
7 ,361 ,770 
159 ,322 
£107 ,36 2 ,615 
discounted at 
6% 
Max amounts) 
No 
No 
123 ,670. 388 
7.362 ,0 17 
7, 178 ,121 
o 
115 ,602 
3.63% 
7,50% 
nla 
Sculpted 
Annuity 
YES 
NO 
% 
9201 % 
1.07% 
0.00% 
0.09% 
0.85% 
5.98% 
100.00% 
% 
0.00% 
0.00% 
92.99% 
6.86% 
0. 15% 
100.00% 
Total 
55 ,666 ,651 
(12 ,752.496 ) 
£ 160,41 6 ,650.24 
o YES 
YES 
YES 
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Scena no/Simula tion ' 
Run on: 
Percentages 
Req ulred fDeslred Gea rin g 
Actua l Gea nng 
Composltton of senior debt 
CompOSition of Blended Equity 
S reads/Mar ins 
Loan 1 
Loan 2 
Bond (over reference rate ) 
Subordinated Loan 
Project IRR 's 
Project IRR (Pre Tax) 
Project IRR (Post Tax) 
Project IRR (Pre Tax) 
Project IRR (Post Tax) 
Subordinated Debt l RR 
Blended Equity IRR (Post Tax) 
Blended EqUIty IRR (Post Tax) 
Equity (Dividends ) JRR 
Equity/Cash IRR (Post Tax) 
EqUity (Dividends ) IRR 
Equity/Cash IRR (Post Tax) 
Cover Rat ios 
DSCR - minimum (Excl Reserves) 
OSCR - Average (Excl Reserves ) 
Mintmum DSCR Year (Exc Reserves) 
Senior l oa n 1 
Senior Loa n 2 
Bond 
Pure Equity 
Subordin ated Loan 
LLCR - Minimum (Inc Reserve + Cash bID 
LLCR - Average (Inc Reserve + Cash bJt) 
Minimum LLCR Year (I nc Reserves + Cash b/f ) 
!Average Life Senior Debt (yrs) 
.'\ PPENDIX F 
Model E2b 
M. -30-2003 07:09 PM 
Nom inal 
Nominal 
Rea l 
Rea l 
Nom inal 
Nom inal 
Real 
Rea l 
Nominal 
Nominal 
Real 
Rea l 
Target Min imum DSCR 
Targel Minimum LLCR 
94 6 
9 2 99 70 1 
1 13~o 
1 20°0 
o '70 , 
1300°0 
8 35"" 
7 41°-0 
079°0 
-0 08", 
1386% 
1304% 
5 92". 
5 15% 
iJOI V/O' 
588% 
ItDIV/O' 
· 1 50% 
1 15 
- 1 79 
924 
01.Jun- 32 
1 18 
-0 42 
1 21 
01-Dec-3! 
2832 1 
!RESUL TS SHEET 
Inputs 
Financing 
Senior Loan 1 
Senior Loan 2 
Bond (Fixed ) 
Blended Equity 
Subordinated Loan 
Prefund DSRA (max required) 
Prefund MMRA (min requ ired) 
MacroEconomics 
Switches 
Annual Interest Rate 
Annual Inflation 
Equity bridge in Use? 
Bond Manoline W rapped ? 
Senior Loan Repayment Option 
Bond Repayment Option 
Subordinated Debt Repayment O ption 
Outputs 
Funding Uses 
CAPEX 
Capita lised Interest 
Prefund DSRA 
Prefund MMRA 
Financing Fees 
Bid/Development Costs 
Funding.Sources 
Senior Loan 1 
Senior Loan 2 
Senior Bond Issue 
Subordinated Debt 
Equ ity 
Cash Balances 
Max.imum Cash Balance 
Minimum Cash Balance 
NPV's 
Revenue Stream NPV 
Checks 
Balanced Sheet Balanced ? 
Cashflow positive? 
Senior debt repa id 
Sub debt repaid 
DSRA fully funded 
Total 
98,783 .087 
1,148 ,228 
0 
93 ,289 
916,502 
6.421 ,508 
£107.362 .615 
Total 
0 
0 
99,841 ,523 
7.361,770 
'59 ,322 
£'07 ,362 ,615 
discounted at 
6% 
Max amounts) 
No 
No 
123 ,670 ,388 
7 ,362 ,017 
7 ,178,121 
o 
115,602 
3.63% 
7.50% 
n/. 
Sculpted 
Annuity 
YES 
NO 
% 
92 .01% 
1.07% 
0.00% 
0.09% 
0.85% 
5.98% 
100 .00% 
% 
0 .00% 
0 .00% 
92.99% 
6 .86% 
0 .15% 
100.00% 
Total 
55 ,666 ,651 
(' 2,752.496) 
£160,416,650.24 
o YES 
YES 
YES 
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Scenario/Simulation · 
Run on: 
Percentaqes 
Required /Desired Gearing 
Actual Gearing 
Composition of senior debt 
Composition of Blended Eq uity 
S read sIMa r in s 
Loan' 
Loan 2 
Bond (over reference rate ) 
Subordinated Loan 
Pro"ect IRR's 
Project IRR (Pre Tax) 
Project IRR (Post Tax) 
Project IRR (Pre Ta x) 
Project IRR (Post Tax) 
Subordinated Debt IRR 
Blended Equity IRR (Post Tax) 
Blended Equity IRR (Post Tax) 
Equity (Div idends ) IRR 
Equity/Cash IRR (Post Tax) 
Eq uity (Dividends ) IRR 
Eq uity/Cash IRR (Post Tax) 
Cover Rat ios 
DSCR - minimum (Excl Reserves) 
DSCR • Average (Excl Reserves) 
Minimum DSCR Year (£.xc Reserves ) 
Senior loa n 1 
Senior Loa n 2 
Bond 
Pure EqulIy 
Subord inated Loan 
LLCR - Minimum (I nc Reserve + Cash b/f) 
LLCR • Average (Inc Reserve + Cash b/f) 
Minim um LLCR Year (Inc Reserves + Cash b/f ) 
IAverage Ufe Senior Oebt (yrs ) 
APPE DIX F 
Model E2b 
M. -3G-200J 07:09 PM 
No minal 
Nominal 
Real 
Rea l 
Nominal 
Nominal 
Real 
Real 
Nom inal 
Nominal 
Rea l 
Real 
Target Min imum OSCR 
Target Minimum LLCR 
94 6 
92.99 70, 
2 SO.., 
9i 5OQ.~ 
, ,3.., 
, 200..0 
o ,7.., 
13 000.\1 
8 35° 0 
7410,.0 
07900 
-0080,0:1 
1386°'0 
1) Q.4°0 
592', 
5 '5% 
#DI V/O' 
588% 
#DI V/O' 
., 50°'0 
, ' 5 
-, 79 
924 
0 1-Jun-32 
, '8 
-0 42 
, 2' 
01 -Dec·)1 
!RESUL TS SHEET 
Inputs 
Financinq 
Senior Loan 1 
Senior Loan 2 
Bond (Fixed ) 
Blended Equity 
Subordinated Loan 
Pre fund DSRA (max requ ired ) 
Prefund MMRA (min required) 
MacroEconomics 
Switches 
Annual Interest Rate 
Annual Inflation 
Equity bridge in Use ? 
Bond Monoline Wrapped? 
Senior Loan Repayment Option 
Bond Repayment Option 
Subordinated Debt Repayment Option 
Outputs 
Funding Uses 
CAPEX 
Capita lised Interest 
Prefund OSRA 
Prefund MMRA 
Financing Fees 
Bid/Deve lopment Costs 
Fundina Sources 
Senior Loan 1 
Senior Loan 2 
Senior Bond Issue 
Subordinated Debt 
Equity 
Cash Balances 
Maximum Ca sh Balance 
Minimum Cash Balance 
NPV'. 
Revenue Stream NPV 
Checks 
Ba lanced Sheet Balanced? 
Cashflow posit ive? 
Senior debt repa id 
Sub debt repa id 
DSRA full funded 
Tota l 
98.783 ,087 
1.148,228 
0 
93 ,289 
916,502 
6.421,508 
£107 ,362 ,6 15 
Tota l 
0 
0 
99,841 ,523 
7,36 1.770 
159,322 
£1 07 ,362 ,615 
discounted at 
6% 
Max amounts-) 
No 
No 
123,670,388 
7,362,01 7 
7,178,12 1 
o 
79,068 
3.63% 
0.00% 
n!a 
Sculpted 
Annu ity 
YES 
YES 
% 
92.01% 
107% 
000% 
009% 
0.85% 
5.98% 
100.00% 
% 
0.00% 
0.00% 
92 .99% 
6.86% 
0.15% 
100.00% 
Total 
76.462.250 
(0) 
£104 ,174,062 .21 
o YES 
YES 
YES 
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St.enario/Simulation . 
Run on: 
Percentaqes 
Req Uired /Desired Gea nng 
Act ual Gearing 
CompOSition of senior debt 
CompoSition of Blended Eq uity 
Soreads/Marqins 
Loa n' 
Loan 2 
Bond (over reference rate) 
Subordinated Loan 
Pro·ect IRR's 
Project IRR (Pre Tax) 
Project IRR (Post Tax) 
ProjecllRR (Pre Ta x) 
Project IRR (Post Tax) 
Subo rdinated Debt lRR 
Blended Equity IRR (Pos t Tax) 
Blended Equity IRR (Post Ta x) 
Equity (Dividends) IRR 
Equity/Cash IRR (Post Tax) 
Eq uity (Dividends) IRR 
Eq uity/Cash IRR (Post Tax) 
Cover Ratios 
OSCR • minimum (Excl Reserves) 
OSCR - Average (Excl Reserves ) 
Minimum OSCR Year (Exc Reserves ) 
Senior loa n 1 
Sentor Loan 2 
Bond 
Pure EqUity 
Subordinated Loan 
LLCR - Minimum (Inc Reserve + Cash b/f) 
LLCR - Average (Inc Reserve + Cash b/f) 
Minimum LLCR Year (I nc Rese rves + Cash b/f ) 
IAveraqe Ufe Senior Debt (yrs ) 
Nominal 
Nomina l 
Rea l 
Rea l 
Nomina l 
Nominal 
Real 
Real 
Nominal 
Nominal 
Real 
Rea l 
AP PH -m IX F 
94 : 6 
9299 
Target Minimum OSCR 
Target Minimum LLCR 
701 
:oc 
:°0 
<;.!Qo 
' . 
97 ' . 
1 13"0 
t 20°0 
o 17°0 
1300°0 
8500-10 
778°0 
8500,0 
77800 
13860'0 
1381°0 
13 86~. 
1381 0 b 
13310'0 
4 72% 
1331% 
4 72% 
1 15 
1 15 
1222 
01-Jun·02 
1 18 
1 25 
1 61 
01 -Dec-25 
27741 
!RESUL TS SHEET 
Inputs 
Financina 
$enlor Loan' 
Sen ior Loan 2 
Bond (Fixed ) 
Blended Equit y 
Subordinated Loan 
Prefund DSRA (m ax requ ired ) 
Prefund MMRA (m in req uired ) 
MacroEconomics 
Switches 
Annual Interest Rate 
Annual Inflation 
Equity bndge in Use ? 
Bond tv1onoline Wrapped? 
Senior Loan Repayment Option 
Bond Repayment Opt ion 
Subordinated Debt Repayment Option 
Outputs 
Funding Uses 
CAPEX 
Capital ised Interest 
Prefund OSRA 
Prefund MMRA 
Financing Fees 
Bid /Developm ent Costs 
Fundlna Sources 
Senior Loan 1 
Senior Loan 2 
Senior Bond Issue 
Subordinated Debt 
Equrty 
Cash Ba la nces 
Maxim um Cash Balance 
Minimum Cash Balance 
NPV's 
Revenue Strea m NPV 
Checks 
Balanced Sheet Balanced ? 
Cashflow positive ? 
Senior debt repa id 
Sub debt repaid 
DSRA fu lly funded 
Total 
98.783 ,087 
1,148 ,228 
0 
93,289 
916 ,502 
6,421 ,508 
£107,362 ,6 15 
Total 
0 
0 
99,84 1,523 
7,361 ,770 
159,322 
£107,362 ,615 
discounted at 
6% 
Max amounts) 
No 
No 
123,670,388 
7,362,017 
7,178, 121 
o 
79,068 
3,63% 
0,00% 
n! a 
Sculpted 
Annultv 
YES 
YES 
% 
92.01 % 
1.07% 
0.00% 
0.09% 
085% 
5.98% 
100.00% 
% 
0.00% 
0.00% 
92.99% 
686% 
0.15% 
100.00% 
Total 
76 ,462 ,250 
(0) 
£ 104,174,062,21 
o YES 
YES 
YES 
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Scenario/Simulation · 
Run on: 
Percentaaes 
Req uired /Desired G eanng 
Actual G ea nng 
Com posItion of senior debt 
Composition of Blended Equity 
SpreadsJMarains 
Loan 1 
Loa n 2 
Bond (over refe rence rate) 
Subo rd inated Loan 
Pro'eet IRR's 
Project I RR (Pre Tax) 
Project IRR (Post Ta,; ) 
ProJect IRR (Pre Tax) 
ProjecllRR (Post Tax) 
Subordinated Debt IRR 
Blended Equity IRR (Post Tax) 
Blended Equity IRR (Post Tax) 
Equity (Div idends) IRR 
Equity/Cash IRR (Post Ta x) 
Equity (Dividends ) IRR 
EqUity/Cash IRR (Post Ta x) 
Cover Ra t ios 
DSCR · minimum (Excl Reserves) 
DSCR • Average (Excl Reserves) 
Minimum DSCR Year (Exc Reserves ) 
Sentor Loan 1 
Senior loa n 2 
Bond 
Pu re Equit y 
Subord inated Loan 
LLCR - Minimum (I nc Reserve + Cash b/f) 
LLCR • Average (Inc Reserve -+ Cash b/f) 
Minimum LLCR Year (Inc Reserves + Cash b/f) 
IAverage Life Senior Debt (yrs) 
Nom ina l 
Nom ina l 
Rea l 
Rea l 
No mina l 
No m ina l 
Rea l 
Rea t 
Nom inal 
Nom lnat 
Rea l 
Rea l 
APP E0:DIX F 
94 6 
92 99 
Targe\ Minimum DSCR 
Target Minimum LLCR 
7 01 
0', 
C·~ 
<;.!~o 
" 
9" 
" 
1 13C.1I 
120". 
o 170.0 
13000,.. 
850"0 
7 7 9~o 
8 SO", 
7 7 9~o 
13860.'0 
13 75"0 
13 86 °~ 
1 J 7 5Clf~ 
1237Q.o 
4 73% 
12 J7°~ 
4 73% 
1 15 
1 15 
1238 
Ot .Jun-02 
1 18 
1 26 
1 47 
01-Dec-25 
IRESUL T S SHEET 
Inputs 
FinancinQ 
Senior Loan 1 
SenIor Loan 2 
Bond (F!xed) 
Blended EquIty 
SubordInated Loan 
Prefund DSRA (ma)!; required) 
Prefund MMRA (man required ) 
MacroEconomics 
Switches 
Annual Interest Rate 
Annual Infla tion 
Equity bridge in Use? 
Bond N\onoline Wrapped? 
Senior Loan Repa ym ent Option 
Bond Repayment Opt ion 
Subordinated Debt Repa yment Option 
Outputs 
Funding Uses 
CAPEX 
Capitalised Interest 
Prefund DSRA 
Prefund MMRA 
Financing Fees 
BidlOevelopment Costs 
FundlnQ Sources 
Senior Loa n 1 
Senior Loan 2 
Senior Bond Issue 
Subord inated Debt 
Equity 
Cash Balances 
Maxim um Cash Ba lance 
Minimum Cash Balance 
NPV's 
Revenue Stream NPV 
Checks 
Balanced Sheet Balanced ? 
Cashflow positive ? 
Senior debt repaid 
Sub debt re paid 
DSRA fully funded 
Tota l 
98,783 ,087 
1,148,228 
0 
93 ,289 
916 ,502 
6,421 ,508 
£107,362 ,615 
Total 
0 
0 
99,841 ,523 
7,361 ,770 
159,322 
£107 ,362 ,6 15 
discounted at 
6% 
Max am ounts) 
No 
No 
123,670,388 
7,362 ,017 
7,178,121 
o 
93,289 
3.63% 
3.20% 
n! . 
Sculpted 
Annuity 
YES 
YES 
% 
92.01 % 
107% 
000% 
0 ,09% 
0.85% 
5.98% 
100.00% 
% 
000% 
000% 
92.99% 
6 .86% 
015% 
100.00% 
Total 
65.446 ,278 
(0) 
£ 120,792,584 73 
o YES 
YES 
YES 
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Sc.enarto/Slmula tion . 
Run on: 
Percentaqes 
ReqUired /Desired Gea nng 
Actua l Gearing 
CompoSition of sen ior debt 
CompoSition of Blended EqUit y 
SpreadS/Mar ins 
Loan' 
loan 2 
Bond (over reference rate) 
Subordinated Loan 
Proj ect IRR 's 
ProJecIIRR (Pre Tax) 
Project tRR (Post Tax) 
Project IRR (Pre Tax) 
ProjecllRR (Post Tax) 
Subordinated Debt IRR 
Blended Equity IRR (Post Tax) 
Blended EqUity IRR (Post Tax) 
EqUity (DIVIdends) IRR 
Equity/Cash IRR (Post Tax) 
EqUity (DIVidends) IRR 
EqUity/Cash IRR (Post Tax) 
Cover Rat ios 
OSCR • minimum (Excl Reserves ) 
DSCR • Average (Excl Reserves) 
Minimum DSCR Year (Exc Reserves) 
Senior Loan 1 
Sen ,or Loan 2 
Bond 
Pure EqUity 
Subordinated oan 
LLCR • Minimum (Inc Reserve + Cash bit) 
LLCR • Average (Inc Reserve + Cash b/f) 
M inimum LLCR Year (Inc Reserves ... Cash b/r) 
IAverage L ife Senior Debt (yrs) 
Nom ina l 
Nom ina l 
Rea l 
Rea l 
Nom ina l 
Nomina l 
Rea l 
Real 
Nom ina l 
omlna l 
Real 
Real 
APPE~DL\ F 
Target Minimum DSCR 
Target Minimum LLCR 
9 4 6 
92.99 701 
113°c 
120°c 
o 17°0 
1300"0 
8 J6'; 
7 68 11 11 
5 100 0 
435°0 
1386°0 
13 5-4°0 
1033°0 
10020:0 
4 1300 
5 07% 
090010 
1 810 0 
1 15 
1 15 
1156 
01.Jun-02 
1 18 
1 20 
1 39 
0 1-0ec-25 
28321 
IRESUL TS SHEET 
Inputs 
FinancinQ 
$enior Loan 1 
Sen ior Loan 2 
Bond (Bond ) 
Blended Equity 
Subord inated Loan 
Prefund DSRA (ma x reqUired ) 
Prefund MMRA (m in requ ired ) 
MacroEconomics 
Switches 
Annual Interest Rate 
Annual Inflation 
Equity br idge in Use? 
Bond Monoline W rapped? 
Senior Loan Repayment Option 
Bond Repayment Opt ion 
Subordinated Debt RSOBvment Ootion 
Outputs 
Fundl na Uses 
CAPEX 
Capita lised Inlerest 
Prefund OSRA 
Prefund MMRA 
Financing Fees 
Bid/Develo pment Costs 
Fundina Sources 
Senior Loan 1 
Senior Loan 2 
Senior Bond Issue 
Subord inated De bt 
Equity 
Cash Ba lances 
Maxim um Cash Bala nce 
Minimum Cash Balance 
NP\I's 
Revenue Strea m NPV 
Chec ks 
Balanced Sheet Balanced? 
Cashflow positive? 
Senior debt repaid 
Sub debt repa id 
DSRA full y funded 
Total 
98,783 ,087 
8,432 ,645 
1,363 ,000 
115,602 
10,270 ,516 
6,172 ,697 
£125 ,137 ,547 
Total 
116,855,866 
0 
° 8,106,623 
175,057 
£125,137,547 
discounted at 
6% 
(Max amounts) 
No 
116,821,485 
° 
8,105 ,380 
7,902,773 
1,370,077 
115 ,602 
3,63% 
7.50% 
nl . 
Sculpted 
nla 
Annui tv 
YES 
NO 
YES 
YES 
YES 
% 
78.94% 
674% 
1.09% 
0.09% 
8.21% 
493% 
100.00% 
% 
93.38% 
0.00% 
0.00% 
6.48% 
0.14% 
100.00% 
Total 
4,250,670 
(545. 111 ) 
£168.359,380.48 
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Scenario/Sim ula tion ' 
Run on: 
Percentages 
Req uired /Desired Geanng 
Actual G ea ring 
Composition of senior debt 
Com pOSItion of Blended EqUit y 
Spreads/MarQins 
loan 1 
Loan 2 
Bond (over reference rate ) 
Subordinated Loan 
Proj ect IRR's 
Project IRR (Pre Tax) 
Project IRR (Post Tax) 
Project IRR (Pre Tax) 
Project IRR (Post Tax) 
Subordinated DebllRR 
Blended Equity IRR (Post Ta x) 
Blended EqUity IRR (Post Tax) 
Equity (Dividends) IRR 
EquitylCash IRR (Post Tax) 
Equity (Dividends) IRR 
Equity/Cash IRR (Post Tax) 
Cover Rat ios 
OSCR • m inimum (Excl Reserves ) 
DSCR - Average (Exc l Reserves ) 
Minimum DSCR Year (Exc Reserves ) 
Sen ior Loan 1 
Senior Loa n 2 
Bond 
Pure EqUit y 
Subordinated Loan 
LLCR - Minimum (I nc Reserve .. Cash bIt) 
LLCR - Average (I nc Reserve" Cash b/f) 
Minimum LLCR Year (I nc Reserves .. Cash bIt) 
IAverage Life Senio r Debt (yrs ) 
APPE l DIX F 
Model El cRevenue 
M. -30-2003 07:08 PM 
Nom inal 
Nom inal 
Real 
Rea l 
Nominal 
Nominal 
Real 
Real 
Nominal 
Nominal 
Real 
Rea l 
Ta rget Minimum DSC R 
Target Minimum LLCR 
9 4 6 
93.38 661 
" 
0', 
C', 
" 
9" 50", 
1 13"0 
1 20°11 
o 170,.'0 
1300"0 
960°'0 
807"0 
196°'0 
05301'0 
1386'0'0 
1593'0'0 
592% 
7 84'D~ 
2361'0'0 
384 72"', 
1499% 
35090% 
1 15 
1 15 
1 33 
Ol·Oec·02 
1 18 
124 
1 46 
01·Dec-02 
IRESUL TS SHEET 
Inputs 
Financinq 
Senior Loan 1 
Senior Loan 2 
Bond (Bond ) 
Blended Equity 
Subord inated Loan 
Prefund DSRA (max requ ired ) 
Prefund MMRA (m in requ ired ) 
MacroEconomics 
Switches 
Annual Inlerest Rate 
Annual Inflati on 
Equity bridge In Use ? 
Bond tvlonoline Wrapped? 
Senior Loan Repayment Option 
Bond Repayment Option 
Subordinated Oebt Repayment Opt ion 
Outputs 
Fundinq Uses 
CAPEX 
Capitalised Interest 
Prefund DSRA 
Prefund MMRA 
Financing Fees 
Bid/Development Costs 
FundinQ Sou rces 
Senior Loan 1 
Senior Loan 2 
Senior Bond Issue 
Subordinated Debt 
Equity 
Cash a a lances 
Maxim um Cash Balance 
Minim um Cash Balance 
NPY's 
Revenue Stream NPV 
Checks 
Balanced Sheet Balanced ? 
Cashflow posi tive ? 
Sen ior debt repaid 
Sub debt repaid 
DSRA full v funded 
Tota l 
98.783,087 
8.432 ,353 
1,363,000 
93 ,289 
10,270,516 
6,172 ,697 
(125, 114,942 
Tota l 
116,834 ,643 
0 
0 
8,1 05 ,275 
175,024 
(125, 114,942 
discounted at 
6% 
(Max amounts) 
No 
116,821 ,485 
o 
o 
8, 105 ,380 
7,902 ,77 3 
1,372,850 
115,602 
3,63% 
7.50% 
nl . 
Sculpted 
nJa 
An nuity 
YES 
NO 
NO 
YES 
YES 
% 
78 ,95% 
6.74% 
1.09% 
0.07% 
8.21% 
4.93% 
100.00% 
% 
93.38% 
0.00% 
0,00% 
6.48% 
0. 14% 
100.00% 
Total 
31,649,506 
(15,825,504) 
( 162,324 ,690.80 
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Scenarto/Slmulation . 
Run on: 
PercentaQ8S 
Req uired /Desired Gea ri ng 
Actual Gearing 
CompOSition of senior debt 
CompOSItion of Blended EqUity 
SoreadsiMarains 
Loan 1 
Loan 2 
Bond (over reference rate ) 
Subo rdinated Loan 
Proj.ct IRR's 
Project IRR (Pre Tax) 
Project IRR (Post Tax) 
Project IRR (Pre Tax) 
ProjecllRR (Post Tax) 
Subordinated Debt IRR 
Blended Equity IRR (Post Ta x) 
Blended Equity IRR (Post Tax) 
Equity (Dividends) IRR 
Equityl Cash IRR (Post Ta x) 
Equity (Dividends ) IRR 
EquitylCash IRR (Post Tax) 
Cov er Ratios 
OSCR - minimum (Excl Reserves) 
DSCR - Average (Excl Reserves ) 
Minimum DSCR Year (Exc Reserves ) 
SenIor Loan 1 
Sen ior Loan 2 
Bond 
Pure EqUity 
Subord inated Loan 
LLCR - Minimum (I nc Reserve + Cash b/f) 
LLCR • Average (I nc Reserve + Cash bit) 
Minimum LLCR Year (I nc Reserves + Cash b/f) 
IAverage Ufe Senior Debl (yrs) 
No m ina l 
No m ina l 
Rea l 
Rea l 
Nomina l 
Nom ina l 
Real 
Rea l 
Nominal 
Nomina l 
Real 
Real 
APP ENDIX F 
Target Minimum OSC R 
Target Minimum LLCR 
94 6 
9338 662 
1 13°0 
1 20\)'0 
0 170,.0 
1300"> 
859°'0 
729' , 
102°0 
.020010 
13 86% 
1527°0 
592% 
7 23% 
2126% 
378 26% 
12 80% 
344 90% 
1 15 
·039 
751 
0 1-0 ec-23 
1 18 
1 18 
1 13 
0 1..J un-32 
2095 1 
IRESUL TS SHEET 
Inputs 
Financinq 
Sen ior Loan 1 
Sen ior Loan 2 
Bond (Bond ) 
Blended Equ ity 
Subordinated Loan 
Prefund DSRA (ma x required ) 
Prefund MMRA (m in req uired ) 
MacroEconomics 
Switches 
Annual lnlerest Rate 
Annual Inflation 
Equity bridge in Use? 
Bond N'tonol ine Wrapped? 
Senior Loan Repayment Option 
Bond Repayment Option 
Subord inated Debt Repayment Option 
Outputs 
Funding Uses 
CAPEX 
Capita lised Interest 
Prefund OSRA 
Prefund MMRA 
Financing Fees 
Bid/Development Costs 
Funding Sou rces 
Senior Loan 1 
Senior Loan 2 
Senior Bo nd Issue 
Subordinated Debt 
Equity 
Cash Balances 
Maximum Cash Ba lance 
Minimum Cash Ba lance 
NPV's 
Revenue Stream NPV 
Checks 
Balanced Sheet Balanced ? 
Cashflow posi t ive? 
Senior debt repaid 
Sub debt repaid 
DSRA fully funded 
Total 
98,783,087 
8.432,353 
1,363 ,000 
93 ,289 
10,270,516 
6 ,172,697 
£125 ,114,942 
Total 
116,834 ,643 
0 
0 
8,105,275 
175,024 
£125,114,942 
discounted at 
6% 
Max amounts) 
No 
116,82 1.485 
o 
o 
8,1 05,380 
7,902,773 
1,373,344 
115,602 
3.63% 
7.50% 
nfa 
Sculpted 
nJa 
Annu itv 
YES 
NO 
YES 
YES 
YES 
% 
78.95% 
6 .74% 
1.09% 
0.07% 
8.21% 
4 .93% 
100 .00% 
% 
93.38% 
0 .00% 
0.00% 
6.48% 
0 .14% 
100.00% 
Total 
656 ,502 
(30 ,885, 298) 
£ 162,324,690.80 
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Scenario/Simulation 
Run on: 
Percentages 
Requi red /DeSIred Gea ri ng 
AClua l Gea ring 
CompOSition of senior debt 
Composition of Blended EqUity 
Spread sIMa ra ins 
Loan 1 
Loan 2 
Bo nd (o 'Jer reference rale) 
Subord inated Loa n 
Pro "eet IRR's 
Project IRR (Pre Ta x) 
Project IRR (Post T8 '-;) 
Project IRR (Pre Tax) 
Project IRR (Post Tax) 
Subo rdinated Debl lRR 
Blended Equity IRR (post Ta x) 
Blended Equity IRR (Post Tax) 
EqUity (Dividends) IRR 
Equity/Cash IRR (Post Tax) 
Equity (Dividends) lRR 
Equity/Cash IRR (Post Tax) 
Cover Ra tios 
DSCR· m inimu m (Excl Reserves ) 
DSCR • Average (Excl Reserves) 
Minimum DSCR Year (Exc Reserves) 
Senior Loa n 1 
Senio r Loan 2 
Sond 
Pure EqUity 
Subordina ted l oa n 
LLCR · Minimum (I nc Reserve + Cash b/f) 
LLCR - Average (Inc Reserve + Cash b/f) 
Minimum LLCR Yea r (Inc Reserves ... Cash b/f) 
!Average life Senior Debt (yrs ) 
Nominal 
Nom ina l 
Rea l 
Real 
Nom ina l 
Nominal 
Rea l 
Real 
No mina l 
Nomina l 
Rea l 
Rea l 
APPE ND IX F 
Target Minimum DSCR 
Target Minimum LLCR 
94 6 
9338 662 
2 50'", 
97 500-~ 
1 13 0. '0 
120o"c 
01 7-. 
13 000. 0 
859-. 
726'> 
1 02-. 
-022-' 
13 86'> 
14 70o.~ 
5920.0 
6 70OJ~ 
19320.0 
383 980111 
11 00% 
35021 11'11 
1 15 
·730 
·082 
0 1·Dec·25 
1 18 
·307 
077 
01·Dec·26 
14 381 
!RESUL TS SHEET 
Inputs 
FinancinQ 
Senior l oa n' 
Semor Loan 2 
Bond (Bo nd ) 
Blended Equ ity 
Subordinated Loan 
Prefund DSRA (max required ) 
Prefund MMRA (min required) 
MacroEconomics 
Switches 
Annual Interest Rate 
Annual Inflation 
Equity bridge in Use? 
Bond Monoline Wrapped? 
Senior Loan Repaym ent Option 
Bond Repayment Option 
Subordinated Debt Repayment Opt ion 
Outputs 
Funding Uses 
CAPEX 
Capital ised Interest 
Prefund DSRA 
Prefund MMRA 
Financing Fees 
Bid/Development Costs 
Fundi ng Sources 
Senior Loa n 1 
Senior Loa n 2 
Senior Bond Issue 
Subordina ted Debt 
Equity 
Cash Balances 
Maximum Cash Balance 
Minim um Cash Balance 
NPV's 
Revenue Stream NPV 
Checks 
Balanced Sheet Balanced ? 
Cashflow posit ive? 
Senior debt repaid 
Sub debt repaid 
DSRA fully funded 
Total 
98 ,783.087 
8.432 .353 
1,363 .000 
93 .289 
10,270,516 
6,172 ,697 
£125 ,114 ,942 
Total 
116 ,834.643 
0 
0 
8 ,105 ,275 
175 ,024 
£125,114 ,942 
discounted at 
6% 
(Max amounts ) 
No 
116 .821485 
o 
8. 105 ,380 
7.902 ,773 
1.373 ,692 
79,068 
3.63% 
0.00% 
nfa 
Sculpted 
n/a 
Annuity 
YES 
YES 
YES 
YES 
YES 
% 
78.95% 
674% 
109% 
007% 
8.21% 
4.93% 
100.00% 
% 
93.38% 
000% 
0.00% 
648% 
014% 
10000% 
Total 
2 ,040,249 
(0 ) 
£105.413 ,137.68 
250 
Scena rio/Simula tion . 
Run on: 
Pe rcen~ges 
Requ ired /Oeslred Gearing 
Actual Ge anng 
Composition of se nior debt 
Co mposition of Blended Equity 
§preadslMargins 
Loan 1 
Loan 2 
Bond (over reference ra le) 
Subord inated Loan 
Pro·ec t IRR's 
Project IRR (Pre Tax) 
Project IRR (Post Tax) 
ProjecllRR (Pre Tax) 
Projecl lRR (Post Tax) 
Subordinated Debt IRR 
Blended EqUity IRR (Post Tax) 
Blended EqUity IRR (Post Tax) 
Equity (Dividends) IRR 
Equity/Cash IRR (Post Tax) 
Equity (Dividends) IRR 
Equity/Cash IRR (Post Tax) 
Cover Ratios 
OSCR - m inim um (Excl Reserves) 
DSCR - Average (Excl Reserves ) 
Minimum DSCR Yea r (Exc Reserves) 
Senior Loan 1 
Senior Loa n 2 
Bond 
Pure Eq uity 
Subord inated Loan 
LLCR - Minimum (I nc Reserve + Cash b/f) 
LLCR - Average (Inc Reserve + Cash b/f) 
Minimum LLCR Yea r (I nc Reserves + Cash b/f) 
IAverage Life Senior Debt (yrs ) 
Nom inal 
Nom inal 
Real 
Real 
Nom ina l 
Nom inal 
Real 
Real 
Nomina l 
Nom inal 
Real 
Rea l 
/\PPE;\DfX F 
Target Minimum OSC R 
Target Minimum LLCR 
94 6 
93 38 6 62 
2 50~co 
9- 500.0 
, 13~o 
1 20°0 
o 17'; 
13 OO~o 
860., 
7 49°e 
860°0 
7 49°e 
1386ee 
1540°0 
1386°0 
1540°0 
22 29°b 
372 72°~ 
2229·. 
372 72010 
1 15 
1 15 
262 
01 -0ec-02 
1 18 
1 19 
470 
01 -Oec-02 
IRESUL TS SHEET 
In puts 
FinancinQ 
Senior loan 1 
Senior Loan 2 
Bond (Bond) 
Blended Equity 
Subord inated Loan 
Prefund OSRA (max required ) 
Prefund MMRA (m in required) 
MacroEconomics 
Switches 
Annua l Interest Rate 
Annual Inflation 
Equity bridge in Use? 
Bond Monoline Wrapped? 
Senior Loan Repayment Option 
Bond Repayment Option 
Subordinated Debt Repayment Option 
Outputs 
Funding Uses 
CAPEX 
Ca pita lised In teres t 
Prefund DSRA 
Prefund MMRA 
Financing Fees 
Bid/Develo pment Costs 
Fundlna So urces 
Senior Loa n 1 
Senior Loan 2 
Senior Bond Issue 
Subordinated Debt 
Equity 
Cash Ba la nces 
Maximum Cash Balance 
Minimum Cash Balance 
NPV's 
Revenue Stream NPV 
Checks 
Balanced Sheet Balanced ? 
Cashflow positive? 
Senior debt repaid 
Sub debt repaid 
DSRA fu lly funded 
Total 
98,783 ,087 
8,432,353 
1,363,000 
93,289 
10,270,51 6 
6,172,697 
£125,114,942 
Tota l 
11 6 ,834 ,643 
0 
0 
8,105,275 
175,024 
£125,114,942 
discounted at 
6% 
Max amounts) 
No 
116,821,485 
o 
8,105,380 
7,902 ,773 
1,373,344 
79,068 
3,63% 
0,00% 
n/a 
Sculpted 
nfa 
Annu it v 
YES 
NO 
YES 
YES 
YES 
% 
78 .95% 
6.74% 
1.09% 
0 .07% 
8.21% 
4.93% 
100.00% 
% 
93.38% 
0.00% 
0.00% 
6.48% 
0.14% 
100.00% 
Total 
11,76 1,809 
(204 ,801 ) 
£105,413,137.68 
251 
Scenario/Simulation : 
Run on: 
Percenlaqes 
Requ ired /Desired Gea nng 
Actual Gea nng 
CompOSit ion of senior debt 
CompOSItion of Blended EqUity 
S reads/Mar ins 
loan 1 
Loan 2 
Bond (over reference rate ) 
Subordinated Loan 
Proj ect IRR's 
Project IRR (Pre Tax) 
Project lRR (Post Tax ) 
Project lRR (Pre Tax) 
ProjectlRR (Post Tax) 
Subordinated Debt IRR 
Blended Equity l RR (Post Tax) 
Blended Equity IRR (Post Ta x) 
Equity (Dividends) IRR 
Equity/Cash IRR (Post Tax) 
Equity (Dividends) IRR 
Equity/Cash IRR (Post Ta x) 
Cover Ratios 
DSCR - minimum (Excl Reserves) 
DSCR - Average (Excl Reserves) 
Minimum DSCR Year (Exc Reserves) 
Senior Loa n 1 
Senior Loa n 2 
Bond 
Pure Eq Uity 
Subord inated Loan 
LLCR - Minimum (Inc Reserve + Cash bID 
LLCR - Average (Inc Reserve + Cash b/f) 
Minimum LLCR Year (I nc Reserves + Cash b/f) 
IAverage Life Senior Debt (yrs) 
Nommal 
Nom inal 
Rea l 
Rea l 
Nom inal 
Nominal 
Real 
Real 
Nomina l 
Nommal 
Rea l 
Rea l 
APPENDIX F 
Target Minimum DSC R 
Target Minimum LLCR 
94 6 
93. 3.9 662 
· oc~, 
0', 
0', 
250', 
9- SC', 
1 13--0 
1 20°, 
017', 
1300G" 
860°" 
7 51 '> 
8 6 0~, 
751% 
1386% 
1533% 
13860/0 
1533°0 
2202% 
368 30% 
2202% 
368 30% 
1 15 
1 08 
2 61 
0 1-Jun-08 
1 18 
1 22 
1 53 
01-Dec-02 
14381 
IRESUL TS SHEET 
Inputs 
FinancinQ 
Senior Loan 1 
Senior Loan 2 
Bond (Bond ) 
Blended Equity 
Subord inated Loan 
Prefund DSRA (ma .-.; required ) 
Prefund MMRA (min required) 
MacroEconomics 
Switches 
Annual Interest Rate 
Annual Inflation 
Equity bridge in Use? 
Bond Mano line Wrapped ? 
Senior Loan Repayment Option 
Bond Repayment Option 
Subordinated Debt Repavment Ootion 
Outputs 
Funding Uses 
CAPEX 
Capilalised Interest 
Prefund DSRA 
Prefund MMRA 
Financing Fees 
Bid/Development Costs 
Funding Sources 
Senior Loan 1 
Senior Loan 2 
Senior Bond Issue 
Subordinated Debt 
Equity 
Cash Balances 
Maximum Cash Ba lance 
Minimum Cash Balance 
NPV's 
Revenue Stream NPV 
Checks 
Ba lanced Sheet Ba lanced ? 
Cashflow positive? 
Senior debt repaid 
Sub debt repaid 
DSRA fullv funded 
Total 
98 ,783,087 
8,432,353 
1,363,000 
93,289 
10,270 ,516 
6,172, 697 
£125 ,114,942 
Total 
116,834,643 
0 
0 
8,105,275 
175,024 
£125 ,114,942 
discounted at 
6% 
(Max amounts) 
No 
116 ,821,485 
o 
8,105,380 
7,902,773 
1,373,344 
93 ,289 
3,63% 
3.20% 
n/. 
Sculpted 
nfa 
Annu ity 
YES 
YES 
YES 
YES 
YES 
% 
78.95% 
6.74% 
1.09% 
0.07% 
8.21% 
4.93% 
100.00% 
% 
93 .38% 
0.00% 
0.00% 
6.48% 
0.14% 
100.00% 
Total 
1,668 ,836 
(0) 
£122 ,229,325 ,56 
252 
Scenario/Simulation . 
Run on: 
PercenlaQes 
ReqU ired /Desired Gea nng 
Actual Gea nng 
Com pOSiti on of senior debt 
Co mposi tion of Blend ed EqUity 
Spreads/MarQins 
loan 1 
Loan 2 
Bond (over reference rale ) 
Subordinated Loan 
Project IRR's 
Project IRR (Pre Tax) 
Project IRR (Post Ta x) 
Project IRR (Pre Ta)!;) 
Project IRR (Post Ta x) 
Subordinated Debt IRR 
Blended Equity IRR (Post Tax) 
Blended Equity IRR (Post Tax) 
Equity (Div idends) IRR 
Equity/Cash IRR (Post Tax) 
Equity (Dividends ) IRR 
Equity/Cash IRR (Post Tax) 
Cover Ratios 
DSCR - minimum (Excl Reserves ) 
DSCR - Average (Excl Reserves) 
Minimum DSCR Year (Exc Reserves) 
Se nior Loa n' 
Se nior loa n 2 
Bond 
Pu re Eq Uity 
Subordinated Loan 
LLCR - Minimum (Inc Reserve + Cash b/() 
LLCR - Average (Inc Reserve + Cash b/f) 
Minimum LLCR Year (I nc Reserves + Cash b/() 
IAverage Life Senior Debt (yrs ) 
Nominal 
Nominal 
Rea l 
Rea l 
Nominal 
Nominal 
Rea l 
Rea l 
Nom ina l 
Nom inal 
Rea l 
Rea l 
APPEJ<DIX F 
Ta rget Min imum OSCR 
Target Minimum LLCR 
94 6 
93 38 6 62 
1 13°0 
1 20Qo 
o 171)-~ 
'3 00~ 
860°(, 
7 ..!3Oo 
523° 0 
4 100 0 
1386"0 
15 13O~ 
103300 
11 56°0 
21 20010 
374 8900 
17 450 '0 
360 16°'0 
1 15 
1 15 
1 33 
0 1-0 e(..-02 
1 16 
1 19 
1 35 
01 -0 ec-02 
14381 
!RESUL TS SHEET 
From Non-Time Based Assumptions Sheet 
Financina 
Senior Loan' 
Senior Loan 2 
Bond (Bond) 
Blended Eq uily 
Subord inated Loan 
Prefund OSRA (ma x required ) 
Prefund MMRA (m in required ) 
MacroEconomics 
Switches 
Annua l Interest Rate 
Annual Infla tion 
Equity bridge in Use? 
Bond Manoline Wrapped ? 
Senior Loan Repayment Option 
Bond Repayment Option 
Subordinated Debt Repayment Option 
From Summary Sheet 
Funding Uses 
CAPEX 
Capital ised Interest 
Prefund OSRA 
Prefund MMRA 
Financing Fees 
Bid/Development Costs 
Funding Sources 
Senior Loan 1 
Senior Loan 2 
Senior Bond Issue 
Subordinated Debt 
Equity 
Cash Balances 
Maxi mum Cash Ba lance 
Mini mum Cash Ba la nce 
NPV's 
Revenue Stream NPV 
Checks 
Balanced Sheet Ba la nced ? 
Cashflow posit ive? 
Senior debt repaid 
Sub debt repa id 
DSRA fullv funded 
Total 
98,783,087 
8,289,246 
1,394 ,730 
79 ,068 
10 ,360,571 
6 ,104,510 
£125 ,011,212 
Total 
118,114,545 
° 
° 6,721 ,584 
175,083 
£125 ,011 ,212 
discountec at 
6% 
(Max amounts) 
118,115,117 
° 
No 
6,723,793 
6,522,083 
1,394 ,730 
79,068 
3, 63% 
3,20% 
nf. 
Sculpted 
nJa 
Annuil 
% 
79 .02% 
6.63% 
1.12% 
0.06% 
8.29% 
4.88% 
100.00% 
% 
9448% 
000% 
0.00% 
538% 
0.14% 
100.00% 
Total 
1,807,111 
(0) 
£121 ,946,458,46 
YES 
YES 
YES 
YES 
YES 
253 
Scenano/Simulation 
Run on: 
Percentaqes 
ReqU ired /Desired Gea ring 
Actual Gea ring 
Com position of senior debt 
Composition of Blended EqUity 
Loan 1 
Loan 2 
Bond (over reference rate ) 
Subord inated Loan 
Pro· act IRR's 
Projecl lRR (Pre Tax) 
Projec1IRR (Post Tax) 
Project IRR (Pre Ta x) 
Project IRR (Post Tax) 
Subordinated Debt IRR 
Blended Equity IRR (Post Ta)( ) 
Subord inated Debt IRR 
Blended EqU ity IRR (Post Ta)(} 
EqUity (DIvidends ) IRR 
EquitylCash IRR (Post Tax) 
Equity (Dividends ) IRR 
Equity/Cash IRR (Post Ta)( ) 
Cover Ratios 
DSCR - minimum (E)(cI Reserves) 
DSCR - Average (E)(ci Reserves) 
Minimum DSCR Year (Exc Reserves) 
Se nior Loan 1 
Senior Loan 2 
Bond 
Pure EqUity 
Subordinated Loan 
LLCR - Minimum (Inc Reserve + Cash b/f ) 
LLCR - Average (I nc Reserve + Cash b/f) 
Minim um LLCR Year (I nc Reserves + Cash b/f) 
IAverage Life Senior Debt (yrs ) 
Nom inal 
Nomina l 
Rea l 
Rea l 
Nominal 
Nominal 
Rea l 
Rea l 
Nominal 
Nom inal 
Rea l 
Rea l 
.-\PPE:.IOIX F 
Target Minimum OSCR 
Target Minimum LLCR 
1 13~0 
1200-0 
o 1 7~0 
13 00 .. 
856', 
734 .. 
5190.0 
<1 01""D 
1386G.<0 
15 44Do 
1033 ... 
1186' 
21 63 ... 
38302% 
17 86~0 
36804', 
1 15 
1 15 
1 21 
01 -0 ec-02 
1 18 
1 15 
1 31 
01 -Dec.-02 
IR£S~t. TS SF.lEEr 
From Non-Time Based Assumptions Sheet 
Financina 
Senior Loa n 1 
Senior Loan 2 
Bond (Bond ) 
Blended Equ ity 
Subord inated Loa n 
Prefund OSRA (max required) 
Pre fund MMRA (min required) 
MacroEconomics 
Switches 
Annual Interest Rate 
Annual Infiation 
Equ ity bridge in Use? 
Bond Manoline Wra pped ? 
Senior Loan Repayment Option 
Bond Repayment Option 
Subord inated Debt Repayment Opt ion 
From Summary Sheet 
Funding Uses 
CAPEX 
Ca pitalised Interest 
Prefund DSRA 
Prefund MMRA 
Financing Fees 
Bidl Development Costs 
Funding Sources 
Senior Loan 1 
Senior Loan 2 
Senior Bond Issue 
Subordinated Debt 
Equity 
Cash Balances 
Maximum Cash Balance 
Minimum Cash Balance 
NPV's 
Revenue Stream NPV 
Checks 
Balanced Sheet Balanced ? 
Cashflow positive? 
Senior debt repaid 
Sub debt repaid 
DSRA full funded 
Total 
98,783 ,087 
8 ,577 ,299 
1,394 ,730 
79 ,068 
10,191.493 
6,244 ,859 
£125,270 ,535 
Total 
115,603,539 
0 
0 
9,491 ,956 
175 ,040 
£125,270,535 
discounted at 
6% 
Max amounts) 
No 
115,603,541 
o 
9,491 ,968 
9 ,288 ,573 
1,394,730 
79,068 
3,63% 
3,20% 
n!a 
Sculpted 
nla 
Annuitv 
YES 
YES 
YES 
YES 
YES 
% 
78 .86% 
6 ,85% 
1.1 1% 
0.06% 
8.14% 
4.99% 
100.00% 
% 
92.28% 
0.00% 
0.00% 
7.58% 
0.14% 
100.00% 
Total 
1,888,144 
(0) 
£122 ,296 ,541 .50 
254 
Scenario/Simulation · 
Run on: 
Percentages 
Requ ired /Desired Gea nng 
Actual Gea nng 
CompOSItion of senior debt 
CompOSItion of Blended EqUity 
~eads/Margins 
Loan 1 
Loan 2 
Bond (over reference rate) 
Subord inated Loan 
Pro ·ect IRR's 
ProjectlRR (Pre Tax) 
Project IRR (Post Ta x) 
Project IRR (Pre Tax) 
Project IRR (Post Tax) 
Subord inated Debt IRR 
Blended Equity IRR (Post Tax) 
Subordinated Debt IRR 
Blended Equity IRR (Post Tax) 
Equity (Dividends) IRR 
Equity/Cash IRR (Post Tax) 
Equity (Dividends ) IRR 
EquitylCash IRR (Post Tax) 
Cover Ratios 
DSCR - minimum (Excl Reserves) 
DSCR - Average (Excl Reserves) 
Mini mum DSCR Year (Exc Reserves) 
Senior Loan 1 
Senior loan 2 
Bond 
Pure EqUity 
Subord inated Loan 
LLCR - Minimum (Inc Reserve + Cash b/f) 
LLC R - Average (I nc Reserve + Cash b/f) 
Minimum LLCR Year (I nc Reserves + Cash b/f ) 
IAverage Life Senior Debt (yrs) 
Nomlnai 
NomJnal 
Rea l 
Rea l 
Nominal 
Nominal 
Rea l 
Rea l 
Nomina l 
Nom inal 
Real 
Real 
APPENDIX F 
Target Minimum OSCR 
Target Minimum LLCR 
93 7 
192.28 7 72 
9786." 
1 130 0 
1 200'0 
017'; 
13000 b 
860° 0 
7 46 1:11a 
524° 0 
4 13D<a 
13 86°/a 
\494°b 
1033% 
\ 1 38% 
21 02". 
409 91 010 
17 27% 
394 1 0o~ 
1 15 
1 15 
1 27 
0 1-Oec-23 
1 18 
1 20 
1 38 
0 1-Dec-02 
(RESULTS SHEET 
From Non-Time Based Assumptions Sheet 
Financinq 
Senior Loan 1 
Senior loan 2 
Bond (Bond ) 
Blended Equ ity 
Subordinated Loan 
Prefund OSRA (max required) 
Prefund MMRA (min required ) 
MacroEconomics 
Switches 
Annual Interest Rate 
Annual Infiation 
Equity bridge In Use ? 
Bond Manoline Wrapped ? 
Senior Loan Repayment Option 
Bond Repayment Opt ion 
Subordinated Debt Repayment Opt ion 
From Summary Sheet 
Funding Uses 
CAPEX 
Capitalised Interest 
Prefund OSRA 
Prefund MMRA 
Financing Fees 
Bid/Development Costs 
Funding Sources 
Senior Loa n 1 
Senior Loan 2 
Senior Bond Issue 
Subordinated Debt 
Equity 
Cash Balances 
Maximum Cash Ba lance 
Minimum Cash Ba lance 
NPV's 
Revenue Stream NPV 
Checks 
Balanced Sheet Balanced ? 
Cashflow positive? 
Senior debt repaid 
Sub debt repaid 
DSRA fullv fun ded 
Total 
98,783 ,087 
7,857 ,567 
1,394,730 
79 ,068 
10,614 ,711 
5,893,365 
( 124 ,622 ,528 
Total 
121 ,882 ,907 
0 
0 
2,564.473 
175 ,147 
( 124 ,622,528 
discounted at 
6% 
Max amounts) 
No 
121 ,883 ,052 
o 
2,564 ,530 
2,372,247 
1,394 ,730 
79,068 
3,63% 
3.20% 
nla 
Sculpted 
n1a 
Annu ity 
YES 
YES 
YES 
YES 
YES 
% 
79 .27% 
6.31% 
1.12% 
0.06% 
8.52% 
4.73% 
100.00% 
% 
9780% 
000% 
0.00% 
2.06% 
0.14% 
100.00% 
Total 
9 ,136,750 
(0) 
(137,140,062.72 
255 
Scenano/Simulauon 
Run on: 
Percentaqes 
Required /Desired Gearing 
Act ual Gea nng 
Com pOsHlon of senior debt 
CompOSItion of Blended Equity 
S reads/tvtar ins 
Loan 1 
Loan 2 
Bond (over reference rate) 
Subo rd inated Loa n 
Project IRR's 
Project IRR (Pre Ta x) 
Project lRR (Post Ta x) 
Project IRR (Pre Tax) 
Project IRR (Post Tax) 
Subordinated Debt IRR 
Blended Equity IRR (Post Ta x) 
Subordinated Debt IRR 
Blended Equity IRR (Post Tax) 
Equity (Dividends) IRR 
Equity/Cash IRR (Post Ta x) 
Equity (Dividend s) IRR 
Equity/Cash IRR (Post Tax) 
Cover Rat ios 
DSCR - m inimum (Excl Reserves ) 
DSCR - Average (Excl Reserves ) 
Minimum DSCR Year (Exc Reserves ) 
Senior Loan' 
Senior Loan 2 
Bond 
Pu re Equity 
Subord inated Loan 
LLCR - Minimum (Inc Reserve + Cash bIt) 
LLCR - Average (I nc Reserve + Cash b/f) 
Minimum LLCR Year (Inc Reserves + Cash b/f) 
IAverage life Senior Debt (yrs) 
APPE,\DIX F 
Model D4 
M. -3().2003 De:59 PM 
Nom inal 
Nom inal 
Real 
Rea l 
Nom ina l 
Nom inal 
Rea l 
Rea l 
Nominal 
Nominal 
Rea l 
Real 
Targ8t MInimum DSCR 
Target Minimum LLCR 
98 1 
197 8 I I 
~ 5C:'-:. 
92 50·, 
1 ' 3., 
1 2Oo.~ 
o , ~o~ 
13 00'" 
109-do,.oo 
9090." 
750., 
570'0 
1386'" 
22220.., 
10 33'b 
1843"0 
3225"" 
4 16 gg"a 
28 15'" 
400 96°-' 
1 15 
1 15 
1 21 
01-Dec-02 
1 18 
1 09 
1 47 
01-Dec-02 
!RESUL TS SHEET 
From Non-Time Based Assumptions Sheet 
Financina 
Senior Loan 1 
Senior Loa n 2 
Bond (Bond ) 
Blended Equ ity 
Subordinated Loan 
Prefund OSRA (max requ ired) 
Prefund MMRA (m in required) 
MacroEconomics 
Switches 
Annual Interest Rate 
Annual Inftation 
Equ ity bndge In Use? 
Bond tv\onol ine Wrapped ? 
Senior Loan Repayment Opt ion 
Bond Repayment Option 
Subordinated Debt Repayment Option 
From Summary Sheet 
Funding Uses 
CAPEX 
Capitalised Interest 
Prefund OSRA 
Prefund MMRA 
Financing Fees 
Bid/Development Costs 
Fundina Sources 
Senior Loa n 1 
Senior Loan 2 
Senior Bond Issue 
Subordinated Debt 
Equity 
Cash Balances 
Maximum Cash Balance 
Minimum Cash Balance 
NPV's 
Revenue Strea m NPV 
Checks 
Ba lanced Sheet Balanced ? 
Cashflow pos it ive ? 
Senior debt repaid 
Sub debt repa id 
DSRA full funded 
Total 
98,783 ,087 
8 ,145,300 
1,394 ,730 
79 ,068 
10,445 ,390 
6,034 ,125 
£ 124,881,700 
Total 
119,370,505 
0 
0 
5,336 ,090 
175 ,105 
£124,881 ,700 
discounted at 
6% 
(Max amounts 
No 
119,372 ,352 
5,336 ,672 
5,136 ,647 
1,394,730 
79,068 
3,63% 
3,20% 
nl . 
Sculpted 
nJa 
Annu ity 
YES 
YES 
YES 
YES 
YES 
% 
79 ,10% 
652% 
112% 
0.06% 
8.36% 
4.83% 
100.00% 
% 
95.59% 
000% 
0 .00% 
4 .27% 
0. 14% 
100.00% 
Total 
9,986 ,503 
£137,140,06272 
256 
Scenario/Simulation ' 
Run on: 
Percen tages 
Req Uired /Desired Ge anng 
Actua l Geanng 
Composilion of senior debt 
Composit ion of Blended EqUity 
Spread S/Mar ins 
Loan 1 
Loan 2 
Bond (oller refe rence rate ) 
Subordinated Loan 
Pro'ect IRR's 
Project IRR (Pre Tax) 
Project IRR (Post Tax) 
Project IRR (Pre Tax) 
Project IRR (Post Tax) 
Subordinated Debt I RR 
Blended Equity IRR (Post Tax) 
Subordinated DebtlRR 
Blended Equity IR R (Pos t Ta x) 
EqUity (Dividends ) IRR 
Equity/Cash IRR {Post Tax} 
EqUity (Dividends) IRR 
EqUity/Cash IRR (Post Tax) 
Cover Ratios 
OSCR - m inrmum (Excl Reserves ) 
DSCR - Average (Excl Reserves) 
Minimum DSCR Year (Exc Reserves ) 
Se nIOr loan 1 
Senior loa n 2 
Bond 
Pure EqUity 
Subord inated loan 
LLCR - M inimum {Inc Reserve + Cash b/f} 
LLCR - Average {I nc Reserve + Cash b/f} 
Minimum LLCR Year (I nc Reserves + Cash bJf) 
IAverage Ufe Semor Debt (yrs ) 
Nom inal 
Nominal 
Real 
Real 
Nom inal 
Nomina l 
Rea l 
Rea l 
Nominal 
Nom inal 
Rea l 
Real 
APPE~DIX F 
Ta rget Minimum DSC R 
Target Minimum LLCR 
96 4 
195 59 4 4 1 
1092 .. 
915 .. 
74.80.." 
576°0 
1386°0 
19620,.0 
1033°0 
1591% 
31 53°" 
40t 39°" 
27 46 0." 
385 84°0 
1 15 
1 15 
1 19 
01 ·Do<·02 
1 18 
1 12 
1 4 1 
Ot -Oev02 
!RESUlJ;S SI:IEET 
From Non-Time Based Assumptions Sheet 
Financina 
Senior Loan 1 
Senior Loan 2 
Bond (Bond) 
Blended Equity 
Subordinated Loan 
Prefund OSRA (max requ ired ) 
Prefund MMRA (min required) 
MacroEconomics 
Switches 
Annua l Interest Rate 
Annual Inflation 
Equity bridge in Use? 
Bond Monoline Wrapped ? 
Sen ior Loan Repayment Option 
Bond Repayment Option 
Subordinated Debt Repayment Option 
From Summary Sheet 
Fundina Uses 
CA PEX 
Capitalised Interest 
Prefund OSRA 
Prefund MMRA 
Financing Fees 
Bid /Development Costs 
FundinQ Sources 
Senior Loa n 1 
Senior Loa n 2 
Senior Bond Issue 
Subordinated Debt 
Equrty 
Cash Balances 
Maximum Cash Balance 
Minimum Cash Balance 
NPV's 
Revenue Stream NPV 
Checks 
Ba lanced Sheet Balanced ? 
Cashflow posit ive? 
Senior debt repaid 
Sub debt repaid 
DSRA fu ll funded 
(Max amounts ) 
Total 
98.783,087 
8.719 ,685 
1,342 ,281 
79,068 
10,098 ,806 
6,312 ,028 
£125,334 ,955 
Tota l 
114,288 ,527 
0 
0 
10,87 1,505 
174,923 
£125,334 ,955 
discounted at 
6% 
114,291,237 
o 
10,87 1,886 
10,668 ,107 
1,342,281 
79 ,068 
3,63% 
3,20% 
No 
nfa 
Sculpted 
nfa 
Annuity 
% 
78.82% 
6.96% 
1.07% 
006% 
8.06% 
5.04% 
100.00% 
% 
9119% 
000% 
0.00% 
8.67% 
0.14% 
100.00% 
Total 
2,128,407 
(O) 
£ 122,646,624.55 
YES 
YES 
YES 
YES 
YES 
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Scenario/Simulation 
Run on: 
Percentaaes 
Requ ired /Desired Gea ring 
Actual Geanng 
Com pOSition of senior debt 
CompOSItIOn of Blended EqUity 
S reads/Mar ins 
Loan 1 
Loan 2 
Bond (over reference ra te) 
Subord inated Loan 
Project tRR's 
Project IRR (Pre Ta x) 
Project IRR (Post Tax ) 
Project IRR (Pre Tax) 
Project lRR (Post Tax) 
Subordinated Debt IRR 
Blended Equity IRR (Post Tax) 
Subordinated Debt IRR 
Blended Equity IRR (Post Tax) 
EqUIty (Dividends) IRR 
Equity/Cash IRR (Post Tax) 
Equity (Dividends) IRR 
Equity/Cash IRR (Post Tax) 
Cover Ratios 
DSCR . m inimum (Excl Reserves) 
DSCR • Average (Excl Reserves) 
Minimum DSCR Year (Exc Reserves) 
Semor loa n' 
Senior Loan 2 
Bond 
Pure EqUity 
Subord inated Loan 
LLCR • Minimum (Inc Reserve + Cash bit) 
LLCR • Average (Inc Reserve + Cash bit) 
Minimum LLCR Year (Inc Reserves + Cash b/f ) 
IAverage Life Senior Debt <yrs ) 
.-\P PE~1) I\: F 
Model 02 
M. -30-2003 06:59 PM 
Nominal 
Nom ina l 
Rea l 
Rea l 
Nomina l 
Nomina l 
Real 
Real 
Nominal 
Nom inal 
Real 
Rea l 
92 3 
19 1 9 88 1 
Target Minimum OSCR 
Target Minimum LLCR 
1 13Q,0 
120°-c 
o t 7'" 
1300 ... 
866'" 
7 540<0 
529'. 
4 21~ 
1386"> 
148001111 
to 33"> 
t 124% 
2087', 
38231 Ofo 
17 12'" 
36736% 
1 t5 
1 15 
1 29 
0 1-Jun-22 
1 18 
122 
1 37 
01-Dec·02 
IRESUL TS SHEET 
From Non-Time Based Assumptions Sheet 
Financina 
Senior Loan 1 
Senior Loan 2 
Bond (Bond ) 
Blended Equity 
Subordinated l oa n 
Pre fund DSRA (ma x requ ired) 
Prefund MMRA (mi n required ) 
MacroEconomics 
Swrtches 
Annual Interest Rate 
Annual Inflation 
Equity bridge in Use ? 
Bond Monol ioe W rapped? 
Sen ior Loan Repayment Option 
Bond Repayment Option 
Subordinated De bt Repayment Opt ion 
From Summary Sheet 
Funding Uses 
CAPEX 
Capitali sed Interest 
Prefund OSRA 
Prefund MMRA 
Financ ing Fees 
Bid/Development Costs 
Funding Sources 
Senior Loan 1 
Senior Loan 2 
Senior Bond Issue 
Subordinated Debt 
Equ ity 
Cash Balances 
Maximum Cash Balance 
Minim um Cash Balance 
NPV's 
Revenue Stream NPV 
Checks 
Balanced Sheel Balanced ? 
Cashflow posit ive ? 
Senior debt repaid 
Sub debt repaid 
DSRA full funded 
Tota l 
98 ,783 ,087 
9 ,007 ,038 
1,311 ,540 
79,068 
9 ,925 ,601 
6.450 ,603 
£125 ,556 ,937 
Tota l 
111 ,746 ,672 
° 0 
13,635 ,440 
174,825 
£125,556 ,937 
discounted at 
6% 
(Max amounts) 
No 
111.7 49 ,542 
o 
13 ,6 36 ,037 
13.431 ,501 
1,311 ,540 
79,068 
3,63% 
3,20% 
nla 
Sculpted 
n/a 
Ann uity 
YES 
YES 
YES 
YES 
YES 
% 
7868%, 
7 .17% 
1.04% 
0.06% 
791% 
5.14% 
100.00% 
% 
8900% 
0 .00% 
000% 
10.86% 
0.14% 
lOa 00% 
Total 
2 ,61 3,173 
(0) 
£ 1 23 ,792 ,096 .28 
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Scenar io/Simulat ion 
Run on: 
Percentaqes 
RequlredlOeslred Gea nng 
AClua l Gea ring 
Composit ion of senior debt 
CompoSition of Blended Eq Uity 
SpreadslMarains 
Loan 1 
Loan 2 
Bond (over reference rate ) 
Subordinated Loan 
P r~ect IRR's 
Project IRR (Pre Tax) 
PrOject IRR (Post Ta x) 
Project IRR (Pre Tax) 
Project IRR (Post Ta x) 
Subordinated DebllRR 
Blended EqUIty IRR (Post Tax) 
Subordinated Debt IRR 
Blended Equity IRR (Post Ta x) 
Equity (DiVidends) IRR 
Equity/Cash IRR (Post Tax) 
Eq Uity (Divide nds) IRR 
EqUity/Cash IRR (Post Tax) 
Cover Ra tios 
DSCR - minimum (Excl Reserves) 
DSCR - Average (Excl Reserves ) 
Minimum DSCR Year (Exc Rese rves ) 
Senior Loan 1 
Senior Loan 2 
Bond 
Pure EqUity 
Subord inated Loan 
LLCR - Minim um (Inc Reserve + Cash b/f) 
LLCR - Average (Inc Reserve + Cash bl f) 
Minim um LLCR Year (Inc Reserves + Cash b/f) 
!Averaqe Life Senior Debt (yrs ) 
NomIna l 
NomIna l 
Real 
Real 
Nom Ina l 
Nom Ina l 
Rea l 
Rea l 
Nomina l 
Nom inal 
Real 
Real 
APPE:,\OIX F 
Target Minimum DSCR 
Target Minimum LLCR 
90 10 
189 11 
, 130-0 
120"; 
017"; 
1300"; 
883', 
775 ... 
5 ..16°"0 
4 4 1°0 
1386°., 
14 65°0 
103300 
11 10% 
20 91~ 0 
362 11 010 
17 16010 
347 7 8°~ 
1 15 
1 15 
134 
01-Jun-1 1 
1 18 
1 28 
146 
01-0ec-02 
13881 
!RESUL TS SHEET 
From Non-Time Based Assumptions Sheet 
Financina 
SenIor loa n 1 
Senior Loan 2 
Bond (Bond ) 
Blended Equity 
Subord inated Loan 
Prefund DSRA (ma x required) 
Prefund MMRA (m in required) 
MacroEconomics 
Switches 
Annual Interest Rate 
Annual Inflation 
Equity bridge in Use? 
Bond Monoline Wrapped ? 
Senior Loan Repayment Option 
Bond Repayment Option 
Subordina ted Oebt Reoayment Ootion 
From Summary Sheet 
Fundina Uses 
CA PEX 
Capital ised Interest 
Prefund DSRA 
Prefund MMRA 
Financing Fees 
BidlOeveJopmenl Costs 
Fundina Sources 
Senior Loan 1 
Senior Loan 2 
Senior Bond Issue 
Subordinated Oebt 
Equity 
Cash Balances 
Maximum Cash Balance 
Minimum Cash Ba lance 
NPV's 
Revenue Stream NPV 
Checks 
Ba lanced Sheet Balanced ? 
Cashflow positive? 
Senior debt repa id 
Sub debt repaid 
DSRA fullv funded 
Tota l 
98,783 ,087 
7,084 ,241 
1,363.000 
79.068 
10,087,248 
5,392,975 
£122.789 ,618 
Total 
115,814 ,966 
0 
0 
205 ,888 
6.768,765 
£122.789.618 
discounted at 
6% 
Max amounts) 
No 
115,81 4,985 
o 
206 ,433 
5,21 1 
1,363,000 
79,068 
3,63% 
3.20% 
nl. 
Annuity 
nJa 
Annuity 
YES 
YES 
YES 
YES 
YES 
% 
8045% 
5.77% 
111% 
006% 
8.22% 
4.39% 
100.00% 
% 
94 .32% 
0.00°,'0 
000% 
01 7% 
5.51% 
100.00% 
Total 
66 ,320,906 
(0) 
£139,339 ,284.43 
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Scenario/Simulat ion . 
Run on: 
Percent~s 
Req uired /Desired Gea ri ng 
Actual Gea nng 
Com posltton of senior debt 
Com position of Blended Equity 
~eads/Marg i ns 
Loan 1 
Loan 2 
Bond (o ver reference rate ) 
Subord inated Loan 
Pro'ect IRR's 
Project IRR (Pre Tax) 
Project IRR (Post Tax) 
ProjectlRR (Pre Ta x) 
Project IRR (Post Tax) 
Subordinated Debt IRR 
Blended EqUity IRR (Post Tax) 
Subordinated Debt IRR 
Blended EqUIty IRR (Post Ta x) 
Equity (Div idends) IRR 
Equity/Cash IRR (Post Tax) 
Equity (DIVidends) IRR 
Equityl Cash IRR (Post Tax) 
Cover Ra tios 
DSCR - minimum (Excl Reserves) 
DSCR - Average (Excl Reserves) 
Minimum DSCR Year (Exc Reserves ) 
Senior loa n 1 
Senior loa n 2 
gond 
Pure Equity 
Subord inated Loan 
LLCR - Minimum (Inc Reserve + Cash b/f) 
LLCR - Average (I nc Reserve + Cash b/f) 
Minimum LLCR Year (Inc Reserves + Cash b/f) 
IAverage Life Senior Debt (yrs ) 
Nominal 
Nom inal 
Real 
Rea l 
Nomina l 
Nominal 
Real 
Real 
Nomina l 
Nom inal 
Real 
Real 
APPEl\1)!X F 
Target MInim um DSCR 
Target Minimum LLCR 
94 6 
194 32 5 68 
9 ~ o~ 
2 SO .. 
, 13', 
120., 
o 17°c 
13000.0 
11 33"', 
9410.0 
787°, 
6 01"0 
13 86°~ 
13 17°, 
1033°'0 
9 66~, 
13 16°-0 
5860% 
965', 
53 68~, 
1 15 
1 48 
'1 12 
01 ·Dec·02 
1 18 
1 52 
238 
01 -0ec-02 
(RESl'J[TS SHEET 
From Non-Time Based Assumptions Sheet 
Financina 
Senior Loan 1 
Senior Loan 2 
Bond (Bond) 
Blended Eq uity 
Subord inated Loan 
Pre fund DSRA (max requ ired ) 
Prefund MMRA (m in required ) 
MacroEconomics 
Switches 
Ann ua l lnteresl Rate 
Annual Inflation 
Equ ity bridge in Use? 
Bond Manol ine W rapped ? 
Senior Loan Repaymen t Opt ion 
Bond Repayment O ption 
Subordinated Debt Repayment Option 
From Summary Sheet 
FundlnQ U S 8S 
CAPEX 
Capital ised Interest 
Prefund DSRA 
Prefund MMRA 
Financing Fees 
Bid/Development Costs 
FundinQ Sou rces 
Senior Loan 1 
Senior Loan 2 
Senior Bo nd Issue 
Subord inated Debt 
Eq uity 
Cash Salances 
Maximum Cash Ba la nce 
Minimum Cash Balance 
NPV's 
Revenue Strea m NPV 
Checks 
Balanced Sheet Batanced ? 
Cashflow positive ? 
Senior debl repaid 
Sub debt repa id 
DSRA full funded 
Tota l 
98,783 ,087 
7. 156 ,553 
1,363,000 
79,068 
10,108,658 
6,058 ,208 
£123,548 ,574 
Total 
116,532 ,386 
0 
0 
207 ,255 
6 ,808 ,933 
£123,548 ,574 
discounted at 
6% 
{Max am ounts 
No 
116 ,532,395 
7,01 6 ,217 
175 ,406 
1.363 ,000 
79,068 
3.63% 
3.20% 
nf. 
Scu lpted 
nfa 
Ann uity 
YES 
YES 
YES 
YES 
YES 
% 
79.95% 
5.79% 
1.10% 
0.06% 
8.18% 
4.90% 
100 .00% 
% 
94.32% 
0.00% 
0.00% 
0.17% 
5.51% 
100.00% 
Total 
21,625,272 
(0 ) 
£174,837,705.45 
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Scenario/Simulation . 
Run on: 
Percentages 
Required/Desired Gearing 
Actual Gea ring 
Com pOSition of se nior debt 
CompOSllion of Blended Equity 
Spreads/Ma rQ ins 
Loan 1 
Loan 2 
Bond (over refe rence ra te) 
Subord inated Loan 
Pr~ect IRR 's 
Project IRR (Pre Tax) 
Project IRR (Post Tax) 
Project IRR (Pre Tax) 
Project IRR (Post Tax) 
Subordinated Debt IRR 
Blended Equity IRR (Post Tax) 
Subordina ted Debt IRR 
Blended Equity IRR (Post Ta x) 
Eq uity (Dividends) IRR 
EquitylCash IRR (Post Tax) 
Equity (Dividends) IRR 
Equity/Cash IRR (Post Ta x) 
Cover Rat ios 
OSC R - minimum (Excl Reserves ) 
OSCR - Average (Exd Reserves) 
Minimum DSCR Yea r (Exc Reserves) 
Senior Loan 1 
Sen ior Loan 2 
Bond 
Pure Equity 
Subordina ted loa n 
LLCR - Minimum (I nc Reserve + Cash bIt) 
LLCR - Average (I nc Reserve + Cash bIt) 
Minimum LLCR Year (I nc Reserves + Cash b/f) 
IAverage Life Senior Debt (yrs ) 
Nomina l 
Nominal 
Rea l 
Rea l 
Nom inal 
Nominal 
Real 
Rea l 
Nominal 
Nom inal 
Real 
Real 
APP H 'H) ]X F 
Target Minimum DSCR 
Target Minimum LLCR 
94 ' 6 
194 ) 2 5 sa 
C', 
1 13 0 0 
1200 0 
o 17 0 0 
13 000.0 
15900 0 
1304010 
1231 0 0 
9530 0 
1386% 
27 62°~ 
10330 0 
23 66 °~ 
27820 0 
3333% 
2) 86% 
2920% 
1 15 
1 15 
1 20 
01.Jun-03 
1 18 
1 19 
1 62 
01-0 ec-02 
IRESUL TS SHEET 
From Non-Time Based Assumptions Sheet 
Financina 
Sen ior Loan 1 
Senior Loan 2 
Bond (Bond) 
Blended Equity 
Subord inated Loan 
Pre fund DSRA (max requ ired ) 
Prefund MMRA (min requi red ) 
MacroEconomics 
Switches 
Annua l Interest Rate 
Annual Inflation 
Eq uity bridge in Use ? 
Bond Monol ine Wrapped? 
Senior Loan Repayment Option 
Bond Repayment Option 
Subordinated Debt Repayment OPtion 
From Summary Sheet 
Funding Uses 
CAPEX 
Capitalised Interest 
Prefund DSRA 
Prefund MMRA 
Financing Fees 
Bid/Development Costs 
Fundin~ Sources 
Senior Loa n 1 
Senior Loan 2 
Senior Bond Issue 
Subordinated Debt 
Equity 
Cash Balances 
Maximum Cash Balance 
Minimum Cash Balance 
NPV's 
Revenue Stream NPV 
Checks 
Balanced Sheet Balanced ? 
Cashflow positive? 
Senior debt repaid 
Sub debt repa id 
DSRA fu llv funded 
Total 
98,783 ,087 
7,084 ,241 
1,363 ,000 
79 ,068 
10,067 ,246 
5,392 ,975 
£122,769 ,618 
Total 
115,814,966 
0 
° 205 ,668 
6,768,765 
£122,789 ,618 
discounted at 
6% 
Max amounts) 
115,614 ,965 
o 
No 
o 
206 ,433 
5,21 1 
1,363,000 
79,068 
3,63% 
3.20% 
nf. 
Sculpted 
nla 
Annuity 
% 
80.45% 
5.77% 
111% 
0.06% 
8.22% 
4.39% 
100.00% 
% 
9432% 
0.00% 
0.00% 
017%, 
5.51% 
100.00% 
Total 
24 ,899 ,914 
(O) 
£ 121 ,905,148.66 
YES 
YES 
YES 
YES 
YES 
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Scenario/Simulation . 
Run on: 
Percenl8QeS 
Required /Desired Gearing 
Actual Gea nng 
Com position of senio r debt 
Com pOSlllon of Blended Equity 
S read s/Mar ins 
Loan 1 
Loan 2 
Bond (over reference rate ) 
Subordinated Loan 
Projoct IRR 's 
Project lRR (Pre Tax) 
Project IRR (Post Tax) 
Project l RR (Pre Tax) 
Project IRR (Post Tax) 
Subord inated DebtlRR 
Blended Equity tRR (Post Tax) 
Subo rdinated Debt IRR 
Blended Equity IRR (Post Tax) 
Equity (DiVidends) IRR 
Equity/Cash IRR (Po st Ta x) 
Equity (DIvidends) IRR 
Equity/Cash IRR (Post Tax) 
Cover Rat ios 
DSCR - minimum (Excl Reserves) 
DSCR - Average (Excl Reserves) 
Minimum DSCR Yea r (Exc Reserves ) 
Se nior l oa n 1 
Semor loa n 2 
Bond 
Pure EqUIty 
Subordinated Loan 
LLCR - Minimum (Inc Reserve" Cash b/f) 
LLCR - Average (Inc Reserve .. Cash b/f) 
Minimum LLCR Year (Inc Reserves" Cash b/f ) 
IAverage life Senior Debt (yrs ) 
No minal 
Nominal 
Rea l 
Rea l 
Nominal 
Nom ina l 
Re al 
Rea l 
Nom inal 
Nominal 
Rea l 
Rea l 
.-\PPEf'-1) IX F 
94 6 
194 32 5 68 
Ta rget Minimum DSCR 
Target Minimum LLCR 
0'. 
0', 
9- SO', 
2 SO', 
, l JO-, 
I 200-D 
o 1 7 r..o 
13000.1) 
86300 
7090..0 
526'"'0 
377"0 
13 86 0" 
867° 'rl 
1033% 
530% 
8 6 100 
17 800~ 
5 25% 
14 15% 
1 15 
1 16 
496 
01 -Dec-02 
1 16 
1 16 
1 95 
01-0ec-02 
!RESUL TS SF/EET 
From Non-Time Based Assumptions Sheet 
Financi!l9. 
Senior l oan 1 
Sen ior loan 2 
Bond (Bond) 
Blended Equity 
Subordinated Loan 
Prefund DSRA (ma x required ) 
Prefund MMRA (min requ ired ) 
MacroEconomics 
Switches 
Annual I nterest Rate 
Annual Inflation 
Equ ity bridge in Use? 
Bond Manoli ne Wrapped? 
Senior Loan Repayment Option 
Bond Repayment Opt ion 
Subordinated Debt Repayment Opt ion 
From Summary Sheet 
Funding Uses 
CAPEX 
Ca pitalised Interest 
Prefund DSRA 
Prefund MMRA 
Financing Fees 
Bid/Development Costs 
Funding Sources 
Senior Loan 1 
Senior Loan 2 
Senior Bond Issue 
Subord inated Debt 
Equity 
Cash Ba lances 
Maximum Cash Balance 
Minimum Cash Balance 
NPV's 
Revenue Stream NPV 
Cheeks 
Balanced Sheet Balanced? 
Cashflow positive? 
Senior debt repaid 
Sub debt repa id 
DSRA fully funded 
Total 
98,783,087 
7,084 ,241 
1,363 ,000 
79 ,068 
10,087,248 
5,392,975 
£122,789,6 18 
Total 
115,814,966 
0 
0 
205,888 
6 ,768,765 
£122 ,789 ,618 
discounted at 
6% 
Max amounts) 
No 
115,814 ,985 
o 
o 
206,433 
5,211 
1,363,000 
79,068 
3.63% 
3.20% 
n' a 
Sculpted 
nla 
Annu ity 
YES 
YES 
YES 
YES 
YES 
% 
80.45% 
5.77% 
1.11% 
0.06% 
8.22% 
4.39% 
100.00% 
% 
94.32% 
0.00% 
0.00% 
0.17% 
5.51% 
100.00% 
Tota l 
21 ,583,907 
(0) 
£1 74,837,705,45 
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Scenario/Simula tion : 
Run on: 
Percentaqes 
Req uired /Desired Gea ring 
Act ua l Gea nng 
Com position of senior debt 
Com poSition of Blended Equi ty 
~oads/Margins 
Loan 1 
Loan 2 
Bond (over reference rate ) 
Subordinated loan 
Pro·ect IRR 's 
Project IRR (Pre Tax) 
Project IRR (Post Tax) 
Project IRR (Pre Tax) 
Project IRR (Post Tax) 
Subordinated Debt IRR 
Blended Eq uity IRR (Pos t Tax) 
Subord inated Oebt lRR 
Blended Equity IRR (post Tax) 
Equity (Dividends) IRR 
Equity/Cash IRR (Post Ta x) 
Equity (Dividend s) IRR 
Equity/Cash IRR (Post Tax) 
Cover Ratios 
DSCR . minimum (Exc l Reserves) 
DSCR • Average (Exci Reserves ) 
Minimum DSCR Year (Exc Reserves ) 
Senior loa n 1 
Senior loa n 2 
Bond 
Pure Equity 
Subordinated Loan 
LLCR - Minimum (Inc Reserve + Cash b/f) 
LLCR - Average (Inc Reserve + Cash b/f) 
Minimum LLCR Year (Inc Reserves + Cash b/f ) 
IAverage Life Senior Debt (yrs) 
APPE NDI X F 
Base Case 8 
M. -36-2003 05:56 PM 
Nom inal 
Nom inal 
Rea l 
Rea l 
Nominal 
Nom ina l 
Real 
Rea l 
Nom inal 
Nommal 
Rea l 
Rea l 
Target Minimum DSCR 
Target Minimum LLCR 
94 6 
194 32 5 68 
1 130.0 
1 20°0 
o 17";, 
13 000 e 
t 6 0100 
13 11°0 
12 4 1°0 
9 61 ";, 
13 86°0 
27 96 ~0 
1033°0 
2399% 
28 1 7 °~ 
33 72°~ 
24 20% 
2957% 
1 15 
1 15 
1 21 
0 1-J un·03 
1 18 
120 
1 66 
01 ·Doc-02 
IRESUL TS SHEET 
From Non-Time Based Assumptions Sheet 
Financil'lQ 
Senior Loa n 1 
Senior Loan 2 
Bond (Bond) 
Blended Equ ity 
Subordinated Loan 
Prefund DSRA (ma x requ ired ) 
Prefund MMRA (mi n required ) 
MacroEconomics 
Switches 
Annua l Interest Rate 
Annual Infiation 
Equity bridge In Use ? 
Bond Mono line W rapped? 
Senior Loan Repayment Option 
Bond Repayment Option 
Subordinated Debt Repayment Option 
From Summary Sheet 
Fundi nQ Uses 
CAPEX 
Capitalised Interest 
Prefund OSRA 
Prefund MMRA 
Financing Fees 
Bid/Development Costs 
FundinQ Sources 
Senior Loan 1 
Senior Loan 2 
Senior Bond Issue 
Subordinated Debt 
Equity 
Cas h Bala nces 
Maximum Cash Balance 
Minimum Cash Ba lance 
NPV's 
Revenue Stream NPV 
Checks 
Balanced Sheet Balanced ? 
Cashflow posit ive ? 
Senior debt repa id 
Sub debt repaid 
DSRA fully fund ed 
Tota l 
98.783 ,087 
8.432 .167 
1,363 ,000 
79 ,068 
10,270 ,516 
6 ,172,697 
£125.100,535 
Total 
116,821 .116 
0 
0 
8,104.416 
175.003 
£125,100 ,535 
discounted at 
6% 
Max amounts) 
116,821 ,485 
o 
No 
8,105,380 
7,902 ,77 3 
1,363 ,000 
79,068 
3,63% 
3.20% 
n/. 
Sculpted 
nJa 
Annuity 
% 
78.96% 
6.74% 
1.09% 
0 .06% 
8.21 % 
4.93% 
100.00% 
% 
93 .38% 
0.00% 
0.00% 
6.48% 
0. 14% 
100.00% 
Total 
1.644,025 
(0) 
£ 121 .625,082.22 
YES 
YES 
YES 
YES 
YES 
263 
Scenario/Simulation 
Run on: 
Percen tages 
Requ ired /Desired Gearing 
Act ua l Gearing 
Com position of semor debt 
Composition of Blended EqUity 
Spreads/MarQins 
Loan' 
Loan 2 
Bond (over reference rate) 
Subordinated Loan 
Pro 'ect IRR's 
Project IRR (Pre Tax) 
Project IRR (Post Tax) 
PrOject IRR (Pre Tax) 
Project IRR (Post Tax) 
Subordinated Debt I RR 
Blended Equity IRR (Post Ta x) 
Subo rd inated Debt IRR 
Blended Equity IRR (Post Ta x) 
Equity (Dividends) IRR 
Equity/Cash IRR (Post Tax) 
Equity (Divide nds) IRR 
Equity/Cash IRR (Post Tax) 
Cover Rat ios 
DSCR - minimum (Excl Reserves) 
DSCR - Average (Excl Reserves) 
Minimum DSCR Yea r (Exc Reserves ) 
Senior Loa n 1 
Sen ior Loan 2 
Bond 
Pure EqUity 
Subord inated loa n 
LLCR - Minim um (Inc Reserve'" Cash b/f) 
LLCR - Average (Inc Reserve '" Cash b/f) 
Minimum LLCR Year (Inc Reserves '" Cash b/f) 
IAverage Life Senio r Debt (yrs) 
APPENDI X F 
Base Case 7 
M. -30-2003 05:55 PM 
9 ' 6 
9338 
No mmal 
Nom inal 
Rea l 
Real 
Nominal 
Nominal 
Rea l 
Rea l 
Nominal 
Nominal 
Real 
Real 
Target Minimum DSCR 
Target Minimum LLCR 
6 62 
~. 
0"0 
0'. 
'. 
97 .,
1 13 ~o 
1 2O~. 
017 0.'0 
1300"0 
850% 
7 34% 
51 4% 
401% 
13 B601a 
1506% 
1033% 
1149% 
2093% 
37055% 
1718% 
35596% 
1 15 
1 15 
1 25 
0 1.J un- 17 
1 18 
1 18 
1 31 
01-Dec-02 
!RESUL TS SHEET 
Inputs 
Financing 
Senior Loan 1 
Senior Loan 2 
Bond (I ndexed ) 
Blended Equity 
Subordinated Loan 
Prefund DSRA (max required ) 
Prefund MMRA (m in requ ired ) 
MacroEconomics 
Switches 
Annua l Interest Rate 
Annual Inflalion 
Equity bridge in Use? 
Bond Monoline Wrapped ? 
Senior Loan Repayment Option 
Bond Repayment Option 
Subord inated Debt Repayment O Ption 
Outputs 
Fundi n g Uses 
CAPEX 
Capitalised Interest 
Prefund OSRA 
Prefund MMRA 
Fina ncing Fees 
Bid/Development Costs 
Fundi ng Sourc es 
Senior Loan 1 
Senior Loan 2 
Senior Bond Issue 
Subord inated Debt 
Equ ity 
Cash Balances 
Maximum Cash Balance 
Minimum Cash Balance 
NPV's 
Re venue Stream NPV 
Chec ks 
Balanced Sheet Balanced ? 
Cashflow positive? 
Senior debt repaid 
Sub debt repaid 
DSRA lull v lundeo 
Total 
98.783 ,087 
1,153,624 
0 
79 ,068 
951 .131 
6 .669.224 
£107 ,636 ,134 
Total 
0 
0 
100,093 ,559 
7,382 .850 
159.724 
£107 ,636 ,134 
discounted at 
6% 
(Max amount;) 
No 
No 
t28.648 .078 
7,542,585 
7,354,046 
o 
79.068 
3.63% 
3.20% 
nfa 
Sculpted 
Annu ity 
YES 
YES 
% 
91 .78% 
1.07% 
000% 
0.07% 
088% 
6.20% 
10000% 
% 
0.00% 
0.00% 
92.99% 
6.86% 
0.15% 
100.00% 
Total 
144,731 ,534 
o 
£ 150,812,813 .50 
o YES 
YES 
YES 
264 
PercentaQes 
Scenano Simu lation 
Run on : 
Required /Desi red Gea nng 
Actual Gea ring 
Com position of senior debt 
Composition of Blended EqUi ty 
$pread siMaroins 
Loan' 
loan 2 
Bond (over refe rence rate ) 
Subordinated Loan 
Prolect IRR's 
Project IRR (Pre Tax) 
Pro ject IRR (Post Tax) 
Project IRR (Pre Tax) 
Project IRR (Post Tax) 
Subord inated Debt IRR 
Blended Equity IRR (Post Ta x) 
Blended Equity IRR (Post Tax) 
Equity (D ividends) IRR 
Equity/Cash IRR (Post Tax) 
Eq uity (D ividends) IRR 
Equity/Cash IRR (Post Tax) 
Cover Ratios 
OSCR - m inimum (Excl Reserves ) 
OSCR - Average (Excl Reserves ) 
Minimum DSCR Year (Exc Reserves ) 
Sen ior Loa n 1 
Senior Loan 2 
Bo nd 
Pure Equity 
Subord ina ted loan 
LLCR - Minimum (Inc Reserve + Cash b/f) 
LLCR - Average (Inc Reserve + Cash b/f) 
Minimum LLC R Year (Inc Reserves + Cash b/f) 
IAverage Life Senior Debt (yrs ) 
APP E;\DIX F 
Base Case 6 
May-3D- Z003 (05.55 PM ) 
No m ina! 
Nom ina l 
Rea! 
Rea l 
Nomina ! 
Nom ina! 
Rea ! 
Rea l 
Nomina! 
Nom ina ! 
Rea l 
Rea l 
Targe t Minim um DSCR 
Target Minimum LLCR 
94 6 
9299 70 1 
<;.l' , 
1 130-(> 
1 20~o 
01700<0 
13000<(> 
1283°0 
1283" 
9 33~, 
933', 
1386°lt 
1493°0 
1033°'0 
11 37% 
20 60G.lo 
298% 
1686°b 
-02 1°b 
1 15 
1 15 
11 38 
0 1-Jun-02 
1 18 
2 19 
293 
01-J un-OO 
2821 1 
!RESUL TS SHEET 
Inputs 
Financina 
Sen io r Loan 1 
Senior Loan 2 
Bond (Fixed) 
Blended Equity 
Subord inated Loa n 
Prefu nd OSRA (ma x required) 
Prefund MMRA (min req uired) 
MacroEconomics 
Switches 
Annua l lnlerest Rate 
Annual Inflation 
Equity bridge in Use ? 
Bond Ma noline W rapped ? 
Senior Loan Repaymen t O ptio n 
Bond Repayment Opt ion 
Subordinated Debt Repa ym ent O ption 
Outputs 
Fund ing Uses 
CAPEX 
Capitalised Interest 
Prefund DSRA 
Prefund MMRA 
Financing Fees 
Bid /Development Costs 
Fundina Sources 
Sen ior Loan 1 
Senior Loan 2 
Senior Bond Issue 
Subordinated Oebt 
Equity 
Cash Balances 
Maximum Cash Ba lance 
Minimum Cash Balance 
NPV's 
Revenue Stream NPV 
Checks 
Ba lanced Sheet Balanced ? 
Cashflow positive ? 
Senior debt repa id 
Sub debt repa id 
DSRA full funded 
Total 
98,783 ,087 
1,148 ,201 
0 
79 ,068 
9 16 ,502 
6 ,421 ,508 
£107,348 ,367 
Total 
0 
0 
99 ,828,155 
7, 360,91 1 
159 ,300 
£107, 348 ,367 
discounted at 
6% 
Max amounts) 
No 
No 
123,670 ,388 
7,362,017 
7,178,121 
o 
79,068 
3,63% 
3,20% 
nJa 
Sculpted 
A nnuity 
% 
92 .02% 
1.07% 
0.00% 
0.07% 
0.85% 
5.98% 
100.00% 
% 
0.00% 
0 .00% 
92.99% 
6 86% 
0. 15% 
100.00% 
Tota l 
72 ,158 ,834 
(a ) 
£ 120,720,467 62 
YES 
YES 
o YES 
YES 
YES 
265 
Percenlaqes 
Sce na rio/Simu lat ion 
Run on: 
RequlredlDeslred Gearing 
Actua l Gea nng 
Composltton of senior debt 
Composition of Blended Equity 
Spread sIMa r ins 
Loan 1 
Loan 2 
Bond (over reference rate ) 
Subordinated Loan 
Pro' act IRR 's 
Project IRR (Pre Ta)!; ) 
Pro ject lR R (Post Ta)!;) 
Project IRR (pre Ta )!;) 
Project IRR (Post Ta)!;) 
Subordinated Debt IRR 
Blended EqUity IRR (Post Ta)!;) 
Blended Equity IRR (Post Ta x) 
Equity (Dividends ) IRR 
Equity/Cash IRR (Post Tax) 
Equi ty (Dividends) IRR 
EqUity/Cash IRR (Post Tax) 
Covar Ratios 
DSCR - minimum (Excl Reserves) 
DSCR - Average (Excl Reserves) 
Minimum DSCR Year (Exc Reserves ) 
Senior Loa n 1 
Senio r Loan 2 
Bond 
Pure Eq Uity 
Subordinated Loan 
LLCR - Minimum (I nc Reserve + Cash b/f) 
LLCR - Average (Inc Reserve + Cash b/f) 
Minimum LLCR Yea r (Inc Reserves + Cash b/f) 
IAverage Life Senior Debt (yrs) 
APPE NDIX F 
Base Case 5 
Ma y-30- 2003 (0555 PM ) 
Nomina l 
Nominal 
Rea l 
Real 
Nom ina l 
Nominal 
Rea l 
Rea l 
Nominal 
Nominal 
Rea l 
Rea l 
94 . 6 
92 99 701 
Target Minim um DSCR 
Target Minimum LLCR 
1 1 3~ 
1200.. 
0 17'> 
13 00'> 
845% 
7 67% 
5090,-0 
• 34'"0 
1386% 
1354'> 
10 33% 
1002% 
4 l ZOIO 
510% 
089% 
184% 
1 15 
I 15 
11 93 
0 1.Jun-02 
1 18 
1 20 
1 39 
0 1-Dec-25 
!RESUl TS SHEET 
Inputs 
F i nancin~ 
Senior Loan 1 
Senior Loan 2 
Bond (Fixed ) 
Blended Equ ity 
Subordinated Loan 
Prefund OSRA (m ax required ) 
Prefund MMRA (min required) 
MacroEconomics 
Switches 
Annual ln lerest Rate 
Annual Inflation 
Equity bridge in Use? 
Bond Monoline Wrapped? 
Senior Loan Repaym ent Option 
Bond Repayment Option 
Subord inated Oebt Repayment Option 
Outputs 
Funding Uses 
CA PEX 
Capitalised Interest 
Prefund DSRA 
Prefund MMRA 
Financing Fees 
Bid/Development Costs 
Funding Sources 
Sen ior Loan 1 
Senior Loan 2 
Senior Bond Issue 
Subord inated Oebt 
Equity 
Cash Bala nces 
Maxim um Cash Ba lance 
Minimum Cash Balance 
NPV's 
Revenue Strea m NPV 
Checks 
Balanced Sheet Ba lanced ? 
Cashflow positive ? 
Senior debt repaid 
Sub debt repaid 
DSRA fully funded 
(Max amounts) 
Total 
98,783 ,087 
1,148 ,201 
0 
79 ,068 
916 ,502 
6.421 ,508 
£107 ,348 ,367 
Total 
0 
0 
99 ,828,155 
7 ,360 ,911 
159,300 
£107 ,348 ,367 
discounted at 
6% 
No 
No 
123,670 ,388 
7 ,362,0 17 
7 ,1 78 ,12 1 
o 
79 ,068 
3,63% 
3,20% 
n/. 
Sculpted 
Annu ity 
% 
92 .02% 
1.07% 
000% 
0.07% 
0 .85% 
5.98% 
100.00% 
% 
0 .00% 
0.00% 
9299% 
6.86% 
015% 
100.00% 
Tota l 
72 ,158,834 
(0) 
£120,720,467,62 
YES 
YES 
o YES 
YES 
YES 
266 
Percentaoes 
Scena rio/Simulation 
Run on: 
Req Uired /Desired Gearing 
Actual Gearing 
CompoSItIOn of senIOr debt 
CompOSItion of Blended EqUity 
$oreads/Marains 
Loan 1 
Loan 2 
Bond (over reference ra te) 
Subordinated Loa n 
Project IRR's 
Project IRR (Pre Tax) 
Project IRR (Post Tax) 
ProJectl RR (Pre Tax) 
ProjectlRR (Post Tax) 
Subordinated Debt lRR 
B lended EqUity IRR (Post Tax) 
Blended Equi ty IRR (Post Tax) 
Equity (D iVidends) IRR 
Equity/Cash IR R (Post Tax) 
Equity (Dividends) IRR 
Equity/Cash IRR (Post Tax) 
Cover Ratios 
DSCR - minimum (Excl Reserves) 
DSC R - Average (Exc l Reserves) 
Minim um DSCR Year (Exc Reserves ) 
Sen ior loa n 1 
Sen ior Loan 2 
Bond 
Pure EqUity 
Subord inated Loan 
LLCR - Minimum (I nc Reserve + Cash b/f) 
LLCR - Average (Inc Reserve + Cash b/f) 
Minimum LLC R Year {I nc Reserves + Cash b/f} 
IAverage Life Senior Debt (yrs) 
APPENDIX F 
Base Case 5 
May-)()- 2003 (0555 PM ) 
94 6 
92 99 701 
Nomina l 
Nominal 
Real 
Real 
Nominal 
Nomina l 
Rea l 
Real 
Nomina l 
Nomina l 
Real 
Real 
Target MinImum OSCR 
Target Minimum LLCR 
13°, 
1 200.0 
a 170 , 
13ooo,D 
8450(10 
767" 
5 09', 
4 341010 
1386% 
t3 SAoo 
1033', 
1002", 
4 12100 
510% 
089% 
184% 
1 15 
1 15 
11 93 
01.Jun-02 
1 18 
120 
1 39 
01-Dec-25 
28 19\ 
IRESUl TS SHEET 
Inputs 
FinancinQ 
Senior Loan 1 
Senior Loan 2 
Bond (Bond) 
Blended Equity 
Subordinated Loan 
Pre(und DSRA (max required) 
Prefund MMRA (min required) 
Mac roEconomics 
Switches 
Annual Interest Rate 
Annual Inflation 
Equity bridge in Use? 
Bond Monoline Wrapped ? 
Senior Loan Repayment Option 
Bond Repayment Option 
Subordinated Debt Repavment Option 
Outputs 
Funding Uses 
CAPEX 
Capitalised Interest 
Prefund DSRA 
Prefund MMRA 
Financing Fees 
Bid/Developm ent Costs 
Funding Sources 
Senior Loan 1 
Senior Loan 2 
Senior Bond Issue 
Subordinated Debt 
Equity 
Cash Balances 
Maximum Cash Balance 
Minimum Cash Balance 
NPV's 
Revenue Stream NPV 
Checks 
Balanced Sheet Balanced ? 
Cashfiow positive? 
Senior debt repaid 
Sub debt repaid 
DSRA fullv funded 
Total 
98 .783.087 
8.432.167 
1.363.000 
79 .068 
10.270.516 
6.172 .697 
£125.100.535 
Total 
11 6.821 .116 
0 
0 
8.104.41 6 
175.003 
£125.100 ,535 
di scounted at 
6% 
(Max amounts I 
NO 
116.821.485 
o 
o 
8.105.380 
7.902.773 
1.363. 000 
79. 068 
3.63% 
3.20% 
n/a 
Sculpted 
n/a 
Sculpted 
YES 
YES 
YES 
YES 
YES 
% 
78.96% 
6.74% 
1.09% 
0.06% 
8.21% 
4.93% 
100.00% 
% 
93.38% 
0.00% 
0.00% 
6.48% 
0.14% 
100.00% 
Total 
1.304,762 
(0) 
£121 ,905.148.66 
267 
Percentaqes 
Scenario/Simul ation 
Run on : 
Required/Desired Geanng 
Actual Geanng 
Composition of senior debt 
Com po si tion o( Blended EqUity 
Spreads/Marqins 
Loan 1 
Loan 2 
Bond (over reference rate) 
Subordinated Loan 
Project IRR's 
Project IRR (Pre Tax) 
Project IRR (Post Tax) 
Project IRR (Pre Tax ) 
Project IRR (Post Tax ) 
Subordinated Debt IRR 
Blended Equity IRR (Post Tax) 
Subordinated Debt IRR 
Blended Equity IRR (Post Tax) 
Equity (Dividends ) IRR 
Equity/Cash IRR (Post Tax ) 
Equity (Dividends ) IRR 
Equity/Cash IRR (Post Tax ) 
Cover Ratios 
Senio r Loan 1 
Senior Loan 2 
Bond 
Pure EqUity 
Subord inated Loan 
AP PENDIX F 
Base Case 4 
Ma y· 30-2003 (05:54 PM ) 
94 : 6 
93 .38 : 6.62 
Nominal 
Nominal 
Real 
Real 
Nominal 
Nominal 
Real 
Real 
Nominal 
Nominal 
Real 
Real 
250% 
9750% 
113% 
120% 
01 7% 
1300% 
8 55% 
7 35% 
5 18% 
4 02% 
1388% 
1528% 
1035% 
1170% 
21 56% 
372 56% 
17 79% 
357 90% 
Target MInimum DSCR 1 15 
1 15 
1 21 
DSCR - minimum (Excl Reserves ) 
DSCR - Average (Exci Reserves ) 
Minim um DSCR Year (Exc Reserves ) 
LLCR - Minimum (Inc Reserve + Cash b/I) 
LLCR - Average (Inc Reserve + Cash b/I) 
Minimum LLCR Year ( Inc Reserves + Cash b/f) 
IAverage Life Senior Debt (yrs) 
Targel Minimum LLCR 
01-Dec-02 
11 8 
1 18 
1 31 
01-Dec-02 
IRESUL TS SHEET 
Inputs 
Financinq 
Senior Loan 1 
Senior Loan 2 
Bond (Bond) 
Blended Equity 
Subordinated Loan 
Prefund DSRA (m ax required) 
Prefund MMRA (min required) 
MacroEconom ics 
Switches 
Annual Interest Rate 
Annual I nflati on 
Equity bridge in Use? 
Bond Monoline Wrapped ? 
Senior Loan Repayment Option 
Bond Repaym ent Option 
Subordinated Debt Repayment Option 
Outputs 
Funding Uses 
CAPEX 
Capitalised Interest 
Prefund DSRA 
Prefund MMRA 
FinanCing Fees 
Bid/Development Costs 
Funding Sources 
Senior Loan 1 
Senior Loan 2 
Senior Bond Issue 
Subordinated Debt 
Equity 
Cash Balances 
Maximum Cash Balance 
Minim um Cash Balance 
NPV's 
Revenue Stream NPV 
Checks 
Balanced Sheet Balanced ? 
CashOow positive? 
Senior debt repaid 
Sub debt repaid 
DSRA fully funded 
Total 
98 .783.087 
8.432 .167 
1.363.000 
79.068 
10.270.516 
6.172.697 
£125 .100.535 
Total 
116.821 .11 6 
0 
0 
8.104.416 
175.003 
£125.100.535 
di scounted at 
6% 
(Max amountS) 
NO 
116.821 .485 
o 
o 
8.105.380 
7.902.773 
1.363.000 
79. 068 
3.63% 
3.20% 
n/a 
Scu lpted 
nfa 
Annuitv 
YES 
YES 
YES 
YES 
YES 
% 
78.96% 
6.74% 
1.09% 
0.06% 
8.21% 
4.93% 
100.00% 
% 
93.38% 
0.00% 
0.00% 
6.48% 
0.14% 
100.00% 
Total 
1.644 .025 
(0) 
£121 .625.082.22 
268 
Percentaqes 
Scenario/Simulation 
Run on : 
Required/Desired Geanng 
Actual Gearing 
CompoSi tion of senior debt 
Com posi tion of Blended Equity 
Spreads/Margins 
Loan 1 
Loan 2 
Bond (over reference rate) 
Subordinated Loan 
Project IRR's 
Proj ect IRR (Pre Tax) 
Project IRR (Post Tax) 
Project IRR (Pre Tax) 
Project IRR (Post Tax) 
Subordinated Debt IRR 
Blended Equity IRR (Post Tax) 
Blended Equity IRR (Post Tax) 
Equity (Divi dends) IRR 
Equity/Cash IRR (Post Tax ) 
Equity (Dividends ) IRR 
Equity/Cash IRR (Post Tax) 
Cover Ratios 
Senior Loan 1 
Senior Loan 2 
Bond 
Pure EqUity 
Subordinated Loan 
APP ENDIX F 
Base Ca~ 3 
May-30-2003 (05:54 PM ) 
94 : 6 
93.38 : 6.62 
Nominal 
Nominal 
Real 
Real 
Nominal 
Nom inal 
Real 
Real 
Nominal 
Nominal 
Real 
Real 
1()()% 
0% 
0% 
250% 
9750% 
11 3% 
120% 
0 17% 
1300% 
850% 
734% 
5 14% 
4 01% 
1386% 
1506% 
1033% 
1149% 
2093% 
37055% 
1718% 
35596% 
Target Minimum DSCR 1 15 
1 15 
1 25 
DSCR - minimum (Excl Reserves ) 
DSCR - Average (Exci Reserves) 
Minimum DSCR Year (Exc Reserves ) 
LLCR - Minimum (Inc Reserve + Cash b/t) 
LLCR - Average (Inc Reserve + Cash b/t) 
Minim um LLCR Year (Inc Reserves + Cash blf) 
IAverage Ufe Senior Debt (yrs ) 
Target Minimum LLCR 
01-Jun- 17 
1 18 
1 18 
1 31 
01-Dec-02 
13961 
IRESUL TS SHEET 
Inputs 
Financinq 
Senior Loan 1 
Senior Loan 2 
Bond (Bend) 
Blended Equity 
Subordinaled Loan 
Prefund DSRA (max required) 
Prefund MMRA (min required) 
MacroEconomics 
Switches 
Annual Interest Rate 
Annual Inflation 
Equity bridge in Use? 
Bend Monoline Wrapped ? 
Senior Loan Repayment Option 
Bond Repaym ent Option 
Subordinated Debt Repayment Option 
Outputs 
Funding Uses 
CAPEX 
Capitalised Interest 
Prefund DSRA 
Prefund MMRA 
Financing Fees 
Bid/Development Costs 
Funding Sources 
Senior Loan 1 
Senior Loan 2 
Senior Bond Issue 
Subordinated Debt 
Equity 
Cash Batances 
Maxim um Cash Balance 
Minimum Cash Balance 
NPV's 
Revenue Stream NPV 
Checks 
Balanced Sheet Balanced ? 
Cashfiow positive? 
Senior debt repaid 
Sub debt repaid 
DSRA ful ly funded 
Total 
98 .783.087 
8.432.571 
1.375.513 
79.068 
10.272,615 
6,173 ,370 
£125.116.224 
Total 
116.835 ,828 
0 
0 
8,105,371 
175.025 
£125 ,116,224 
discounted at 
6% 
(Max am ountS) 
No 
116.835.985 
o 
o 
8.105.380 
7.902.773 
1.375.51 3 
79 .068 
3.63% 
3.20% 
n/a 
Annuity 
nfa 
SculPted 
YES 
YES 
YES 
YES 
YES 
% 
78.95% 
6.74% 
1.10% 
0.06% 
8.21 % 
4.93% 
100.00% 
% 
93.38% 
0.00% 
0.00% 
6.48% 
0.14% 
100.00% 
Total 
19,823 ,154 
(0) 
£122 .181,714.26 
269 
Percentaqes 
Scenario/Simulation 
Run on: 
RequiredlDesi red Gearing 
AC lual Gearing 
CompoSition of senior debl 
Composition of Blended Equity 
Spreads/Margins 
Loan 1 
Loan 2 
Bend (over reference rate) 
Subordinated Loan 
Project IRR 's 
Project IRR (Pre Tax) 
Project IRR (Post Tax) 
Project IRR (Pre Tax) 
Project IRR (Post Tax ) 
Subordinated Debl IRR 
Blended Equity IRR (Posl Tax) 
Subordinated Debt IRR 
Blended Equity IRR (Post Tax) 
Equity (Dividends) IRR 
Equity/Cash IRR (Post Tax ) 
Equity (Dividends) IRR 
Equity/Cash IRR (Post Tax) 
Cover Ratios 
Sen ior Loan 1 
Sen ior Loan 2 
Bond 
Pure EqUity 
Subordinaled Loan 
APPE DIX F 
Base Case 2 
May- lO-2003 105:54 PM ) 
94 : 6 
93.38 : 6.62 
Nominal 
Nominal 
Real 
Real 
Nom inal 
Nominal 
Real 
Real 
Nom inal 
Nominal 
Real 
Real 
00% 
0% 
0% 
2 50% 
9750% 
11 3% 
120% 
0 17% 
13 00% 
859% 
753% 
5.23% 
4 19% 
1383% 
14.73% 
1030% 
11 17% 
1986% 
446.66% 
16.15% 
42971% 
Target Minimum ADSCR 1.15 
1 15 
365 
DSCR - minimum (Excl Reserves ) 
DSCR - Average (Excl Reserves ) 
Minimum DSCR Year (Exc Reserves ) 
LLCR - Minimum (Inc Reserve + Cash bi t) 
LLCR - Average (Inc Reserve + Cash bi t) 
Minimum LLCR Year ( Inc Reserves + Cash b/f) 
IAverage Life Senior Debt (yrs) 
Target Minimum LLCR 
01 -Dec-26 
1 18 
1.23 
1 32 
01-Dec-02 
16201 
IRESUL TS SHEET 
Inputs 
Financinq 
Senior Loan 1 
Senior Loan 2 
Bond (Bond) 
Blended Equity 
Subo rd inated Loan 
Prelund DSRA (max required) 
Prefund MMRA (min required) 
MacroEconomics 
Switches 
Annual Interest Rate 
Annual Inflat ion 
Equity bridge in Use ? 
Bond Monol ine Wrapped ? 
Senior Loan Repaym ent Option 
Bond Repaym ent Option 
Subordinated Debt Reoavment Option 
Outputs 
Fundin!! Uses 
CAPEX 
Capitalised Interest 
Prefund DSRA 
Prefund MMRA 
Financing Fees 
Bid/Development Costs 
FundinQ Sources 
Senior Loan 1 
Senior Loan 2 
Senior Bond Issue 
Subordinated Debt 
Equity 
Cash Balances 
Maximum Cash Balance 
Minimum Cash Balance 
NPV's 
Revenue Stream NPV 
Checks 
Balanced Sheet Balanced ? 
CashOow positi ve ? 
Senior debt repaid 
Sub debt repaid 
DSRA fully funded 
Total 
98,783 ,087 
8.432 ,571 
1,375,513 
79,068 
10,272.615 
6,173 ,370 
£125,116,224 
Total 
116,835 ,828 
0 
0 
8,105,371 
175,025 
£125 ,116,224 
discounted at 
6% 
(Max am ounts) 
11 6,835 ,985 
o 
No 
o 
8,105,380 
7,902 ,773 
1,375,513 
79,068 
3,63% 
3,20% 
n/a 
Annuity 
nla 
Annuity 
YES 
YES 
YES 
YES 
YES 
% 
78,95% 
6,74% 
1.10% 
0.06% 
8.21% 
4.93% 
100.00% 
% 
93.38% 
0.00% 
0.00% 
6.48% 
0.14% 
100.00% 
Total 
20 ,204 ,911 
(0) 
£122 ,901 ,835 ,09 
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Scenario/Simul at ion 
Run on : 
Percentaqes 
Requi redlDesired Geanng 
Actual Gearing 
Compos ition of senior debl 
CompoSition of Blended Equi ty 
§!lreads/Marqins 
Loan 1 
Loan 2 
Bond (over reference rate) 
Subordinated Loan 
Project tRR's 
Project IRR (Pre Tax) 
Project IRR (Post Tax) 
Project IRR (Pre Tax) 
Project IRR (Post Tax) 
Subord inated Debt IRR 
Blended Equity IRR (Post Tax ) 
Subordinated Debt IRR 
Blended Equity IRR (Post Tax) 
Equity (Dividends) IRR 
Equity/Cash IRR (Post Tax) 
Equity (Dividends) IRR 
Equity/Cash IRR (Post Tax ) 
Cover Ratios 
Sentor Loan 1 
Semor Loan 2 
Bond 
Pure Equity 
SubordInated Loan 
APP ENDIX F 
Base Case 1 
May-30-2003 (05 :s.! PM) 
Nominal 
Nominal 
Real 
Real 
Nominal 
Nominal 
Real 
Real 
Nominal 
Nominal 
Real 
Real 
94 : 6 
93 ,38 : 6,62 
HlO% 
0% 
0% 
250% 
9750% 
11 3% 
120% 
0 17% 
1300% 
8 71% 
759% 
5 34% 
4 25% 
1386% 
1509% 
1033% 
11 52% 
21 03% 
44979% 
17 27% 
4327 4% 
Target Minimum ADSCR 1 15 
1 15 
3 75 
DSCR - minimum (Excl Debt Res erve ) 
DSCR - Average (Excl Debt Reserve) 
Minimum DSCR Year ( Inc Debt Reserve) 
Target Minimum LLCR 
LLCR - Minimum (exc Debt Reserve + Cash b/I) 
LLCR - Average (exc Debt Reserve + Cash b/I) 
Minimum LLCR Year (exc Debt Reserve + Cash b/I) 
IAverage Life Senior Debt (yrs) 
01-Jun-27 
1 18 
1 24 
1 33 
01-Dec-02 
16201 
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Base Case 5: Outstanding Debt Profile 
140,000 ,000 .00 
120 ,000,00000 
100,000,000 .00 
• Fixed Bond 
80,000,00000 
DSub Debt 
<H 60,000,000 .00 
40,000,00000 
20,000 ,000 .00 
o .00 -t-""r::;='-'-~--'----r-----'-"--""""'''''''''---r"----'''''-'''''';;;;;;;:: 
N 
"" 
<D d) 0 N 
"" (20,000 ,000 .00) '7 (') '7 (') "f "f fu U u U u u u 
Ql Ql Q) Q) Q) Q) Q) 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Year 
Base Case 6: Outstanding Debt Profile 
300,000,00000 
250,000 ,000 .00 
200,000,00000 lfl l ndex Linked Bond 
150,000,000 00 D Sub Debt 
<H 
100,000 ,000.00 
50,000,00000 
000 
0 N 
" 
<D co 0 N <t <D <0 0 N ... <D co 0 N <t <D co 0 N ~ <;> <;> <;> <;> <;> N N N N N (') (') (') (') (') "f "f 
(50,000,00000) :t u u u u u U U U U U U U U U U U U U U U u u U <1> <1> <1> <1> Q) Q) <1> Q) Q) Q) Q) <1> <1> Q) <1> <1> Q) <1> <1> <1> Q) <1> <1> 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Year 
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140,000,000.00 
120,000,000.00 
1 00,000,000 .00 
80,000,000 .00 
<H 60,000,000 .00 
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0.00 
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0 
140,000,00000 
120,000,000 ,00 
100,000,000,00 
80,000,00000 
<H 60,000,00000 
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20,000,000 00 
0.00 
(20,000 ,000,00) <1> 
o 
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Base Case 7: Outstand ing Debt Profile 
D Sub Debt 
I!I Loan 1 
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Year 
Base Case 8: Outstanding Debt Profile 
D Sub Debt 
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